The United States appears to be caught in the horns of a
dilemma, trying to balance a desire to maintain relations with Niger whose
government cannot legally receive US aid, and the consequences that would
accrue if US-Niger relations were severed. The clock is ticking on the fate of
US-Niger relations, and there seems to be little any US official can do to
change the outcome.
Lately, Acting Deputy Secretary of State for the United
States Victoria Nuland made her third visit to Niger in the past two years. She
was in the African country to respond to the July 26 military coup, which saw
the ouster of the constitutionally-elected President Mohamed Bazoum by a group
of military officers, operating under the umbrella of the newly-formed National
Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, led by the commander of the
presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, who subsequently declared
himself to be the new head of state.
Niger
and Nigeria are two separate countries in the African continent. Since they are
neighboring countries with similar names, most people get confused about the
difference between Niger and Nigeria. Niger is located in Western Africa. It is
a landlocked country surrounded by Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Algeria. Niger is the biggest country in the West Africa
with a land area of almost 1,270,000 square kilometers. However, about 80% of
its land area lies in the Sahara desert. It has remained a French colony. The
religion of the majority of the population in Niger is Islam. Niger ranks
bottom in the United Nation’s Human Development Index. This country faces many
challenges such as desert terrain, inefficient agriculture, overpopulation,
poor educational level, poverty of people, poor health care, and environmental degradation.
The main agricultural exports of Niger are peanuts and cotton. It is a big
exporter of Uranium.
Nuland
had sought a meeting with the ousted president, Bazoum, as well as the leader
of the new military government, General Tchiani. She was denied both, and
instead held a very strained dialogue with Tchiani’s military chief, General
Moussa Salaou Barmou, who headed a delegation of lesser officers.
The reasoning behind the American game of semantics is that,
by law, if the US recognizes the coup as a coup, then it must cease all
military-to-military interactions between a force of some 1,100 US military
personnel currently stationed in Niger, and its military counterparts, as well
as all other forms of US-funded aid.
The law
known as Section 7008 (of Public Law 117-328, Division K), specifically states
that no funds appropriated by Congress in support of State, Foreign Operations
and Related Programs (SFOPS) “shall be obligated or expended to finance
directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree.”
During her 2-hour discussions with the Tchiani government
delegation, Nuland made it clear that while US relations were currently
suspended, they were not permanently halted. In a post-meeting video press
conference, Nuland emphasized the consequences of the failure to return
President Bazoum to power with General Barmou, a Nigerien special forces
officer who had been trained at US military schools and had extensive
interaction with US military trainers in Niger.
Barmou’s
personal experience with the US military is in many ways the personification of
a relationship that today serves as the foundation of America’s military
presence and mission in West Africa.
The US,
France, and other European partners have been engaged in a years-long campaign,
together with their West African partners, to combat Islamic extremism in the
Sahel region of Africa. Niger, which hosts two major US bases, one outside the
capital of Niamey known as Base 101, and a second, Air Base 201, in Agadez – a
city located on the southern edge of the Sahara. Both bases support US
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations conducted by
MQ-9 Reaper drones and fixed-wing aircraft flown by a Joint Special Operations
Aviation Detachment, as well as other US military operations, including
military airlift and special forces training detachments (France also maintains
a significant military presence in Niger, numbering over 1,000, and there are
several hundred other military personnel from a variety of European Union (EU) nations.
With the collapse of the US, French, EU, and United Nations
military presence in neighboring Mali, and in the aftermath of a military coup
in Chad, Niger has emerged as the last remaining bastion of the US-led
anti-terrorism effort in the Sahel. If the US were to cut relations with Niger
because of the coup, there would be no Western-oriented anti-terrorism efforts
remaining to counter the threat of Al Qaeda and Islamic State terrorism in the
region.
From
Washington’s perspective, the greatest threat that would emerge from any break
in the military-to-military assistance between the US and Niger is not the
potential spread of Islamic fundamentalist-inspired terrorism, but rather
Russian influence, especially in the form of military security support allegedly
provided by Wagner Group, a private military company whose African operations
appear to operate in sync with Russian foreign policy objectives.
Prior to last month’s Russian-African Summit, Prigozhin had
met with Wagner forces who had relocated to Belarus in the aftermath of the
abortive June 23-24 insurrection – which resulted in halting Wagner operations
in Donbass – during which he emphasized the importance Africa would play in
future Wagner activities. Wagner's presence has been reported in several
African countries, including the Central African Republic, Libya, and
Mali. Members of the senior leadership of the coup have reportedly met with
Wagner officials in Mali, to discuss security cooperation between Wagner and
Niger. During her meeting with the coup government, Victoria Nuland singled out
the potential deployment of Wagner into Niger as a worrisome development and
indicated that she pressed upon her Nigerien counterparts her assessment
regarding the detrimental role played by Wagner regarding African security. The
reported meeting between Wagner and Niger representatives indicates that
Nuland’s message did not resonate with hosts.
There is an option that neither Nuland nor her boss,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have yet given voice to. In early 2003, the
US Congress amended Section 7008 to provide for the Secretary of State to seek
a waiver on the grounds of the national security interests of the United
States.
There are two major obstacles for the US when it comes to
any such waiver. First is the amount of political capital that the US has
expended in trying to return President Bazoum to power – to reverse now would
be the kind of nod to Realpolitik that the Biden administration is loath to do.
Second is the fact that Niger, having evaluated its options going forward, may
no longer be interested in maintaining the close relations it previously
enjoyed with the US.
Niger, like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea before it, has
thrown off the mantle of its post-colonial relationship with France, a relationship
that was closely linked with US national security policy in West Africa and the
Sahel.