Heavy rains in Brazil disrupts iron ore production

According to a Reuters report, heavy rainfall in southeastern Brazil has prompted miners including Vale SA to suspend some operations after downpours caused deadly floods in the northeast. 

Rainfall is expected to remain heavy this week in most of top mining state Minas Gerais, after runoff closed roads and railways.

The rains may also have contributed to the dramatic collapse of a canyon rock face in the state on Saturday, killing 10 people visiting a waterfall on boats.

In the northeastern state of Bahia, flooding displaced about 50,000 families and killed some two dozen over the holidays.

Vale said on Monday it has partially suspended operations at its Southeastern and Southern iron ore systems due to the bad weather, but reaffirmed its 2022 production target as the Northern system was not affected.

Samarco, a joint venture between Vale and BHP also cut back operations in its Germano complex, producing at an estimated 50% of capacity until weather allows it to ramp up.

Brazilian steelmakers Usiminas and Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) also halted operations of their mining units.

Anglo American said its Minas-Rio system continued to operate as planned during the rainy season.

Over the weekend, France's Vallourec suspended production from its Pau Branco mine after heavy rainfall caused a dike to overflow.

"We see the news as potentially negative for the entire mining sector, as it could result in new regulations to suspend existing operations or delay new projects," analysts at XP Investimentos said in a research note.

BTG Pactual analysts said economic impacts could be muted if normal operations are restored quickly, but noted it all depends on how long the heavy rainfall will last.

"We estimate there could be more than 100 million tons of annualized iron ore supply at risk at this stage in Brazil, which is a relevant number ‑ roughly 7% of seaborne supply and about 30% of Brazilian supply ‑learly the stakes are high and we could see impacts on short-term iron ore movements," they said.

INTERRUPTED RAILWAYS, CLOSED HIGHWAYS

Vale said in a securities filing that train circulation at its Vitoria-Minas railway was partially interrupted by the rains, halting output at the Brucutu mine and the Mariana complex due to a lack of transportation.

Both mines are part of Vale's Southeastern system, along with the Itabira complex, where production was not affected.

In the Southern system, Vale said all of its complexes had to halt production because key highways BR-040 and MG-030 were closed.

Vale said its Northern System is still operating as planned, and maintained its 2022 iron ore production forecast at 320-335 million tons. It noted its production plan takes into account the seasonal rainfall impact.

The miner also said the rains had not changed the alert level for any of its tailing dams which are under constant, "real-time" monitoring.

"While Vale did not change its production guidance for 2022, we believe that the market could start to project volumes closer to the low end of the range," Itau BBA analysts said, noting that iron ore prices could be supported at their current high levels.

Vale's two halted operations accounted for about 31% of its output in the first nine months of 2021, the Itau BBA analysts said. A two-week halt in these operations could represent an impact of about 3 million tons for the company, according to their preliminary calculations.

Steelmaker Usiminas announced a stoppage at its mining subsidiary Mineracao Usiminas (MUSA) due to weather, but said it had enough inventory of raw material to avoid disruption.

The company also said its Barragem Central tailings dam, which has been inactive since 2014, reached alert level 1 - an initial warning that does not mean a safety breach was noted.

CSN and its steel mining subsidiary CSN Mineracao SA announced a halt to operations of the Casa de Pedra mine, but said they are expected to resume in coming days.

They said port operations at the Itaguai coal terminal, located in the neighboring state of Rio de Janeiro, were also suspended due to excessive rains.

Brazil's regulatory National Mining Agency (ANM) suspended operations at French steel pipe maker Vallourec's Pau Branco iron ore mine in the state after a dike overflowed, cutting off a federal highway. There were no reported injuries.

"After the dam incidents of the past, we welcome the zero tolerance approach that miners are taking in the country to minimize operational risks, which we consider the prudent approach," BTG Pactual said.

Can emerging markets cope with the shift in US Fed policy?

For most of last year, investors priced in a temporary rise in inflation in the United States given the unsteady economic recovery and a slow unraveling of supply bottlenecks. Now sentiment has shifted. Prices are rising at the fastest pace in almost four decades and the tight labor market has started to feed into wage increases.

According to a report by International Monetary Fund (IMF), the new Omicron variant has raised additional concerns of supply-side pressures on inflation. The US Fed referred to inflation developments as a key factor in its decision last month to accelerate the tapering of asset purchases.

Inflation is likely to moderate later in year 2022 as supply disruptions ease and fiscal contraction weighs on demand. The Fed’s policy guidance that it would raise borrowing costs more quickly did not cause a substantial market reassessment of the economic outlook.

The history shows that the effects on emerging markets benign if tightening is gradual, well telegraphed, and in response to a strengthening recovery. Emerging-market currencies may still depreciate, but foreign demand would offset the impact from rising financing costs.

Spillovers to emerging markets could also be less benign. Broad-based US wage inflation or sustained supply bottlenecks could boost prices more than anticipated and fuel expectations for more rapid inflation. Faster Fed rate increases in response could rattle financial markets and tighten financial conditions globally.

These developments could come with a slowing of US demand and trade, which may lead to capital outflows and currency depreciation in emerging markets.

The impact of Fed tightening in a scenario like that could be more severe for vulnerable countries. In recent months, emerging markets with high public and private debt, foreign exchange exposures, and lower current-account balances saw already larger movements of their currencies relative to the USD.

The combination of slower growth and elevated vulnerabilities could create adverse feedback loops for such economies, as the IMF highlighted in its October 2021 releases of the World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report.

Some emerging markets have already started to adjust monetary policy and are preparing to scale back fiscal support to address rising debt and inflation. In response to tighter funding conditions, emerging markets should tailor their response based on their circumstances and vulnerabilities.

Those with policy credibility on containing inflation can tighten monetary policy more gradually, while others with stronger inflation pressures or weaker institutions must act swiftly and comprehensively.

In either case, responses should include letting currencies depreciate and raising benchmark interest rates. If faced with disorderly conditions in foreign exchange markets, central banks with sufficient reserves can intervene provided this intervention does not substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment.

Nevertheless, such actions can pose difficult choices for emerging markets as they trade off supporting a weak domestic economy with safeguarding price and external stability. Similarly, extending support to businesses beyond existing measures may increase credit risks and weaken the longer-term health of financial institutions by delaying the recognition of losses. And rolling back those measures could further tighten financial conditions, weakening the recovery.

To manage these tradeoffs, emerging markets can take steps to strengthen policy frameworks and reduce vulnerabilities. For central banks tightening to contain inflation pressures, clear and consistent communication of policy plans can enhance the public’s understanding of the need to pursue price stability.

Countries with high levels of debt denominated in foreign currencies should look to reduce those mismatches and hedge their exposures where feasible. And to reduce rollover risks, the maturity of obligations should be extended even if it increases costs. Heavily indebted countries may also need to start fiscal adjustment sooner and faster.

Continued financial policy support for businesses should be reviewed, and plans to normalize such support should be calibrated carefully to the outlook and to preserve financial stability. For countries where corporate debt and bad loans were high even before the pandemic, some weaker banks and nonbank lenders may face solvency concerns if financing becomes difficult. Resolution regimes should be readied.

Beyond these immediate measures, fiscal policy can help build resilience to shocks. Setting a credible commitment to a medium-term fiscal strategy would help boost investor confidence and regain room for fiscal support in a downturn. Such a strategy could include announcing a comprehensive plan to gradually increase tax revenues, improve spending efficiency, or implement structural fiscal reforms such as pension and subsidy overhauls (as described in the IMF’s October Fiscal Monitor.

Finally, despite the expected economic recovery, some countries may need to rely on the global financial safety net. That may include using swap lines, regional financing arrangements, and multilateral resources. The IMF has contributed with last year’s US$650 billion allocation of Special Drawing Rights, the most ever.

While such resources boost buffers against potential economic downturns, past episodes have shown that some countries may need additional financial breathing room. That’s why the IMF has adapted its financial lending toolkit for member nations.

Countries with strong policies can tap precautionary credit lines to help prevent crises. Others can access lending tailored to their income level, though programs must be anchored by sustainable policies that restore economic stability and foster sustainable growth.

While the global recovery is projected to continue this year and next, risks to growth remain elevated by the stubbornly resurgent pandemic. Given the risk that this could coincide with faster Fed tightening, emerging economies should prepare for potential bouts of economic turbulence.

Ukraine and Belarus potential sources for a United States-Russia confrontation

Geopolitical Futures claims that one of its top priorities is to know what is coming and ensure its subscribers are informed on important issues before they hit the mainstream. 

Till lately, major news outlets were reporting that Russia was amassing troops at its border with Ukraine; an important buffer country, in an effort to reclaim former Soviet Union territory.

 Lately, Geopolitical Futures has shared an excerpt of that original forecast with the readers. The highlights are:

Ukraine and Belarus are the two places with the potential for a US-Russia confrontation. Ukraine is at risk of falling apart. Russian influence in Belarus will threaten Poland.

Ukraine is caught in the crossfire of the United States, the European Union and Russia. Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are expected to be completed in 2019. These pipelines, which connect Russia’s supply of natural gas to the European Union and Turkey, circumvent traditional and lucrative natural gas transit routes through Ukraine, giving Moscow further leverage over the government in Kiev.

The conflict in eastern Ukraine is frozen but still volatile, and it is unclear whether Ukraine can govern what is left of its territory. Russia is better prepared for intervention there than the West is, but Moscow is betting that Ukraine’s internal dysfunctions will eventually bring much of the country, if not the government itself, back into its orbit.

At the same time, Ukraine is preparing for a presidential election, scheduled for March. Polls show no clear frontrunner, there’s a real chance the political conflict that follows will entangle outside powers, just as it did after the 2014 elections.

Belarus is also concerning. For years, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has juggled relations with the West and Russia, leaning further east or west as necessity dictates. Right now, he is engaging more with the West, much to the chagrin of Russia, which is concerned about increased US military presence in Poland and Romania. Lukashenko has intimated that if a permanent US military base is installed in Poland, Minsk and Moscow may have to respond together. He has insisted that Russian troops will not be stationed in Belarus.

In Belarus, as in Ukraine, Geopolitical Futures does not expect the situation to come apart at the seams – but the competitive forces on both sides are creating tremendous pressure, which, in the shorter term, makes precise developments unpredictable.

Growing port congestion in China and United States

The health of the global supply chains in the next few weeks may partly hinge on the vitality of the trucking sector in a key port near Shanghai. A suspension of trucking services in several parts of China’s Zhejiang province has slowed the transportation of manufactured goods and commodities through one of the world’s most important ports.

There are strict controls on lorries moving goods to or from the Beilun district in Ningbo after the discovery of several cases of Covid-19 in the area, shipping line Maersk said in a recent customer advisory.

This suspension, along with restrictions on truckers in some areas in and around Zhejiang, has halted operations at some yards and warehouses at Ningbo port.

Ports around the world have been struggling to ease congestion as the pandemic heads into a third year. Ningbo is one of the world’s top container gateways and a crucial part of supply chains that connect factories in East China to consumers of automobiles, machines, electronics and toys in the United States, Europe and elsewhere. 

A week’s delay of trade at Ningbo’s port could cost US$4 billion including exports of circuit boards and clothes, according to consultant Russell Group. Some polyester factories in Ningbo have stopped work because they can’t receive raw materials via truck or ship out goods, according to analysts at Wood Mackenzie. Road deliveries of liquefied natural gas, an important fuel for industries unconnected to pipelines has also slowed.

The port was partly shut for weeks last August after a Covid-19 outbreak, causing a slowdown in exports, disruptions and congestion across supply lines.

United States

The Port of New York and New Jersey has largely handled the pandemic-driven jump in imported goods without significant shipping bottlenecks forming. But recently a queue of container vessels waiting to offload has started to form off the coast of Long Island. 

The culprit, the Omicron variant, is keeping hundreds of longshoremen out of work each day because of either illness or the need to quarantine after coming in close contact with an infected person. “We have seen a spike in the number of labour going out into quarantine,” Port of New York and New Jersey Authority Director Sam Ruda, told Bloomberg in an interview.

According to the port authority’s website average waiting time for containerships at the port had increased to 4.75 days in the last week of 2021 as compared 1.6 days as an average for the year. The number of longshoremen unavailable for work was reported to be running at about 350 per day. As of January 07, 2022 the port authority said 11 containerships were currently at anchor waiting to call its terminals. Two of the vessels had been waiting since January 01, 2022.

The port has a seen a significant growth in volumes over the pre-pandemic year of 2019 with in handling 8.12 million teu by the end of November 2021, as compared to 7.47 million teu for the whole of 2019. As compared to US west coast gateway ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the east coast port was largely unaffected by delays and congestion last year. In addition to Covid related worker quarantines last week the port also saw disruption to operations from heavy snow storms.

 

Bangladesh pays huge amount to the US lobby firms

According to a report, Bangladesh’s Awami League government has paid a total of over US$2.3 million to a US firm to lobby the United States government and elected representatives in the last eight years.

The reports show that every year since 2015, the Bangladesh government paid the lobbying firm BGR Government Affairs — previously known as Barbour Griffith & Rogers — about US$320,000. However, in 2021, the government hired two more lobbying firms on short term contracts for a total of US$75,000 — increasing the total lobbying spend to US$395,000.

Earlier, following the US government’s imposition of financial sanctions on the Rapid Action Battalion and on those army and police officers who have led it in recent years, Awami League parliamentarians have called on the government to hire a lobbying firm in the United States — apparently unaware that the Bangladesh government already hired three such firms last year.

This lobbying information is known as US law requires organizations or individuals, which lobby the US government on behalf of foreign entities, to provide financial and other disclosures on a quarterly basis.

The exact amount of money the Bangladesh government has paid is not known, since under the law the lobbying firm is only required to approximate the amount that it has spent on lobbying on behalf of a foreign client to the nearest US$10,000.

BGR’s lobbying started on July 01, 2014 — six months after the national election that was boycotted by opposition parties. In that year the government spent only US$160,000.

During the eight year period, filed reports show that BGR Government Affairs lobbied the Senate, the House of Representatives, the US Trade Representative and the National Security Council on behalf of the Bangladesh government. BGR’s website says that it is a bipartisan firm that “specializes in providing strategic advice, advocacy, and communications strategies for a wide range of clients, including governments…”

Little is known on exactly the issues on which the firm has lobbied, with the firm only stating that it concerned “Bilateral US-Bangladesh relations.” However, disclosures show that part of their role was to respond to articles critical of the government as well as to distribute press releases and messages promoting positive news about Bangladesh.

The reports show that three particular staff members of the lobbying firm have lobbied on behalf of the Bangladesh government: Walker Roberts and Maya Seiden, both co-head of the firm’s International Practice division, and Mark Tavlarides, a member of the team.

The reports say that, on behalf of the Bangladesh government, Roberts has met the Deputy Chief of Staff of the House International Relations Committee and the Special Assistant to the President.

Seiden is said to have lobbied the Special Assistant to the Cabinet Secretary at the White House; the Advisor to the Chief of Staff at the Energy Department; the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Energy; the Senior Advisor at the office of the Deputy Secretary of State; and, the Chief of Staff of the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

The most recent disclosure by the lobbying firm was on October 20, 2021. However, the disclosed documents show that the business relationship between the Bangladesh government and BGR will continue until at least March 2022. 

A new contract was signed on August 09, 2021 by Shahidul Islam, the Bangladeshi Ambassador to the United States, committing the government to continue paying the lobby firm £25,000 a month. “BGR will provide strategic public relations and government affairs counsel for the Government of Bangladesh,” the contract reads.

Netra news reported that in 2021 Bangladesh Government hired two other lobbying firms on short term contracts.

One was the Friedlander Consulting Group who was hired between September 05 2021 and October 05 2021 to “arrange meetings and exchanges between the top leaders of United States and Bangladesh”. The company was paid US$40,000.

Another was Conewago Consulting LLC who was hired for one month from July 26, 2021 by the Bangladesh government. The submitted documents state that the “foreign principal” was the government of Bangladesh but that it was agreed through the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI). The contract, involving a payment of $35,000, was signed by Salman Rahman, Chairman of BEI, who is also a member of parliament and the Prime Minister’s private sector adviser.

Salman Rahman told Netra News that “BEI requested Conewago Consulting to promote enhancement of trade and investment between the United States and Bangladesh to members of Congress.”

Revival of Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul goods train

Resuming operations after 10 years, the first Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul (ITI) train carrying goods from Pakistan to Turkey via Iran arrived in into Ankara on Wednesday, January 05, 2022.

The ITI cargo train started its journey from Islamabad on December 21, 2021, and arrived in Ankara in around 13 days. Turkey’s Transport and Infrastructure Minister Adil Karaismailoğlu, Pakistani parliamentarian Makhdoom Zain Hussain Qureshi and Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Mohammad Farazmand attended a ceremony held to mark the arrival of the train.

Departing from the Margalla station in Islamabad, the train embarked on its 5,981-kilometer (3,666-mile) route, arriving in 12 days and 21 hours. The cargo train aims at boosting trade between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The train comprised of eight loaded wagons, 20 feet (6 meters) in length, each with a capacity of 22 tons.

Karaismailoğlu in his speech said the new railway will offer another option to industrialists and business people on the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey route.

“It will save time and cost as compared to sea transportation between Pakistan and Turkey, which takes 35 days, and will lead to the development of trade between the two countries,” he said.  

“Thus, with the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul train, a new railway corridor will be provided to our exporters in the south of Asia – which has the highest population density globally – reaching Pakistan, neighboring India, China, Afghanistan and Iran. In this way, our country will be one step closer to its goals of becoming a bridge and logistics base between Asia and Europe,” Karaismailoğlu added.

Speaking at the ceremony, Qureshi highlighted that the ITI train would play an important role in enhancing regional connectivity and promoting economic and commercial activities in the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) region. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey established the Regional Cooperation for Development organization in 1964, renaming it the ECO in 1985.

Qureshi added that the train would offer Pakistan an opportunity to further increase its exports and strengthen its connectivity with international markets, including in Europe.

“The current government in Pakistan believes in regional connectivity and we feel that to play a role at the national stage we need to be economically reliable. In order to do that, we need to not only have peace in our region but also increase the trade within our neighborhood and this ITI project will become a friendship project.

“We get access to the European markets and Turkey gets access to the central Asian states so it is a mutually beneficial arrangement and I hope it will be sustainable and we can grow from it further,” Qureshi told Anadolu Agency (AA) in an interview.

Ambassador Farazmand in his speech explained that the ITI railway project was first launched in 2009 under the ECO but remained suspended due to technical issues, restarting a decade later.

He emphasized that the three countries also plan to launch a passenger train along the same route in the near future.

The first train from Islamabad to Istanbul was inaugurated on August 14, 2009. Since then, eight trains have been dispatched from Pakistan to Turkey and Turkey dispatched six trains to Pakistan, but the train service was discontinued due to floods in the South Asian nation in 2009.

Chinese sale of fighter jet to Pakistan attracts other markets with ambitious plans but thin wallets

In December 2021, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) announced that it would soon acquire 25 Chinese-made J-10C combat aircraft. This purchase was a long time coming. Speculation that the PAF would acquire the J-10 goes back at least a decade.

Earlier plans to buy up several dozen J-10s were scuttled by a lack of funding, but India’s decision to purchase 36 highly advanced, French-made Rafale fighter jets apparently pushed Pakistan to move forward with their own buy of modern fighters.

Beijing has not had much luck lately exporting its fighter jets. It has tried to flog some of its less capable combat aircraft on the global market but with little success.

During the 1990s and 2000s, China offered export versions of two domestically-built fighter jets, the JH-7 (designated the FBC-1 Flying Leopard) and the F-8IIM (a heavily upgraded MiG-21, a plane that first flew in the 1950s). Neither of these planes secured an overseas sale.

Until now, China’s best result has been a handful of sales of its JF-17 to Burma (Myanmar) and Nigeria. The JF-17 is a rather basic lightweight fighter jet built explicitly for export. Pakistan has been its biggest buyer, with intentions of acquiring up to 200 planes. At the same time, these JF-17s will be manufactured in Pakistan and equipped with Western radar and Russian engines. There is very little Chinese about this aircraft.

Not surprisingly, the Chinese have pinned a lot of hope on the J-10 when it comes to overseas sales. The J-10 was China’s first “fourth-generation-plus” combat aircraft. It is an agile, single-engine fighter jet roughly in the same class as the US F-16C. It features fly-by-wire flight controls and a “glass cockpit,” meaning that it utilizes several multi-function flat-panel displays, as opposed to traditional analog instruments.

The J-10 has had its share of teething problems. Although its development was initiated in the mid-1980s, it didn’t fly until 1998, and it was nearly 20 years before it entered operational service with China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Even now, it is equipped with a Russian turbofan engine—underscoring China’s ongoing difficulties with developing a usable jet engine.

The latest variant, the J-10C—the version being exported to Pakistan—is considered to be a relatively advanced fighter. The J-10C features highly advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and is capable of firing long-range missiles, meaning that it could engage enemy aircraft as far away as 124 miles.

One report claims that the J-10C is comparable to the most advanced versions of the F-16 (the so-called “Block 60/70” version).

China, despite being consistently among the top 10 arms exporting nations, is still essentially a niche supplier of weapons systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Chinese arms exports in 2020 consisted mainly of tactical missile systems (such as anti-tank weapons or anti-ship cruise missiles) and armed drones. After that come artillery systems, mortars, and lightly armored vehicles.

Sales of big-ticket items, such as warships, submarines, main battle tanks, and fighter jets, were few and far between—the major exceptions being the sale of Yuan-class submarines to Pakistan and Thailand, and offshore patrol vessels to Malaysia.

In fact, in 2020 China slipped to number eight on SIPRI’s list of leading arms exporters, behind France, German, and even Spain. Its arms sales for the period 2016–2020 were less than one-sixth those of the United States, the world’s leading arms exporter.

Armed drones, in fact, are China’s main exception to the rule of exporting rather prosaic weapons systems. As noted in an earlier article, Beijing has had great success selling armed drones.

According to SIPRI, China has exported armed drones to at least 16 countries on three continents, including Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These deals have earned Beijing more than US$700 million in export sales.

China has quickly become the developing world’s go-to source for armed drones, and Chinese drones are being used regularly in combat. While perhaps not as advanced as their competitors, Chinese drones are filling a critical—and lucrative—market niche.

Countries may not be lining up to buy most Chinese weapons, but armed drones are a segment where Beijing has several advantages over its competitors: a “good-enough” product—at a relatively low price—to just about anyone who has the cash, and with few or no questions asked.

Will Beijing be able to duplicate its success with exporting the J-10 that is has had with armed drones? It is probably too soon to say. Certainly, China faces a lot of competition in the global fighter business and, therefore, prospects for overseas sales of the J-10 remain dim.

Nevertheless, a successful sale of the J-10 to Pakistan raises the prospects that China could flood the global arms market with a relatively cheap and yet quite capable fighter jet. In particular, the J-10 could appeal to African, Asian, and Latin American air forces with ambitious plans and thin wallets.