Will US President Trump make the world safer or more dangerous in his remaining days in power?

It is no secret that Donald Trump, President United States had asked for military options for attacking Iran and that Israel has been preparing for such an eventuality. It is the collective responsibility of all to examine the possibility of the US or joint US-Israel attack on Iran and its consequences.

There is absolutely no justification for such an attack, but that is no guarantee that it won’t happen. It needs to be emphasized that none of this would be happening if the Trump administration had not taken the reckless and destructive step of reneging on the JCPOA and launching an economic war on Iran. Whatever adversities the world may face only the Donald Trump would be held responsible for that.

When Trump ordered the assassination of Soleimani in January 2020, administration officials eventually lined up behind the excuse that it was intended to “restore deterrence” against rocket attacks from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Even though these attacks have continued, throughout the year, the US administration is back to issuing of threats of military action in response to attacks that would not be happening if it were not for the president’s own reckless actions. As the anniversary of the Soleimani assassination approaches, the administration is once again drifting towards an avoidable and unnecessary conflict.

Were it not for the president’s “maximum pressure” campaign, the US forces in Iraq would have faced far fewer risks than they do today, and conflict between the two governments would have been less intense. Had it not been for the president’s decision to order the illegal and provocative attack that killed Soleimani and an Iraqi militia leader, tensions between the US and Iran would not be as great as they are now. Trump’s approach to Iran for the last two and a half years has been to pick a fight and then blame the other side for responding to his provocations. Far from deterring attacks from Iranian-backed militias and the Iranian military itself, the Trump administration has been provoking and inviting them. It is mostly a matter of luck that this has not yet triggered a larger conflict.

For its part, the Israeli government is also raising the temperature by sending one of its submarines through the Suez Canal to signal its readiness to respond to retaliation for its murder of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. An Israeli submarine has embarked for the Persian Gulf in possible preparation for any Iranian retaliation over the November assassination of a senior Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Israeli media reported.

The above-water, fully visible Israeli deployment into the Suez Canal and then the Red Sea was a rare move that was reportedly carried out with the acquiescence of Egyptian authorities and was seen as a clear warning to Iran that Israel was preparing for battle as hostilities continue to rise.

The deployment of the Israeli submarine is described as a “message of deterrence,” but it is in fact the result of an ill-advised and illegal attack inside Iran. Had the Israelis not carried out a terrorist attack on Iranian soil, they would not now be worried about possible retaliation. This gets at a basic problem with the hawkish framing of our news coverage related to Iran and the constant misuse of the concept of deterrence by both the US and Israeli governments.

When hawks in the US and Israeli governments talk about “restoring deterrence,” what they really mean is that they want to commit acts of aggression but present them as defensive actions. Blowing up Soleimani had nothing to do with deterring future attacks, and one can see that it has failed to deter them. Murdering Fakhrizadeh definitely had nothing to do with deterring anything. It was just a gratuitous killing that the Israel government did because they could. Now both the US and Israel find that they have to make additional shows of force and issue new threats to ward off possible responses to these earlier aggressive acts. Instead of making them more secure, these aggressive acts have exposed Americans and Israelis to greater risks than they faced earlier on.

Iran non oil trade reported at US$52 billion in 9 months

The value of Iran’s non-oil trade during the first nine months of the current Iranian calendar year (March-December 2020) was reported at US$52 billion by the Head of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA).

The total volume of the country’s non-oil trade was 110 million tons during the period under review, out of that 85.2 million tons were exported commodities and about 25 million tons were imported goods, Informed Mehdi Mir Ashrafi.

The official put the total value of the imports into the country during the said time at US$26.8 billion, while the value of exports was reported to be US$25.1 billion.

According to Mir-Ashrafi, 17.5 million tons of the imported commodities into the country in the period under review were basic goods, accounting for the lion's share of the imports in terms of weight.

Iran's top five non-oil export destinations during this period were China with US$6.4 billion worth of exports, Iraq with US$5.9 billion, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with over US$3.3 billion, Turkey with US$1.8 billion, and Afghanistan with US$1.7 billion.

The country’s top five sources of imports during this period were China with US$7 billion, the UAE with US$6.3 billion, Turkey with US$3 billion, India with US$1.6 billion and Germany with US$1.6 billion worth of imports.

Some 5.2 million tons of commodities were also transited to other countries through Iran, 10.9 percent less than the figure for the same period in the previous year, Mir-Ashrafi said.

Like all other countries around the world, Iran’s trade with its foreign partners has been affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, the situation is getting back to normal and the country’s trade is reaching its pre-pandemic levels.

Tehran and Karachi hold joint webinar on trade expansion

Recently, Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture (TCCIMA), and Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) held an Iran-Pakistan business forum via webinar.

During the online event, the two sides discussed expansion of economic ties and expressed readiness for the implementation of a free trade agreement between the two countries.

In this regard, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Tehran, Rahim Hayat Qureshi talked about his country’s efforts to finalize the free trade agreement. TCCIMA Head, Masoud Khansari called the agreement an important step towards the US$3 billion goal in trade relations between the two countries.

The webinar presented an opportunity to the two countries’ business owners active in various areas including energy, tourism, transportation, food, agriculture, pharmaceutical, health, clothing, textile, and leather to share ideas and explore collaborative capacities.

Speaking in the event, Khansari pointed to the barter trade as a good solution for the current problems in the way of expanding the trade relations between the two sides and noted that the two sides are working on the matter.

He announced the formation of a joint working group between the private sectors of the two countries to identify obstacles and challenges in the way of trade between the two countries and to eliminate them.

“By establishing dialogue and sharing solutions by the private sectors of the two countries, achieving the US$3 billion trade will be possible,” Khansari stressed.

Strengthening the transport infrastructure between the two countries, using the two countries’ national currencies for trade, forming joint ventures for establishing industrial parks in border areas, and finally establishing joint banks were among the solutions offered by the head of TCCIMA for boosting trade between the two sides.

Referring to the opening of the new border between Iran and Pakistan last week, the Pakistani ambassador for his part noted that the governments of the two countries are working to establish more common borders and border markets in the future.

Pakistan has a relatively large consumer market with a population of over 200 million. According to the World Trade Organization, imports constitute over 66 percent of Pakistan’s trade.

Expansion of trade with Pakistan, and boosting exports to this neighboring country is one of Iran's priorities.

Is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean?

Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since

Today it is legally indisputable that the high seas belong to all. This means China`s navy has as much right to ply the Indian Ocean as any other nation, even though it might make countries like India feel a creeping sense of dread. Likewise, it is a well-established fact the People`s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been sailing in the Indian Ocean far more frequently in recent years, compounded by fears that Beijing is seeking to establish new naval bases on the periphery of this ocean. 

Yet, is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean? Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since.

Chinese warships remain despite pirate attacks disappearing almost entirely in the area. However, such assets have also been used for non-combatant evacuation operations in Yemen and Libya, plus ships are available for humanitarian assistance operations. China is understandably concerned about protecting its sea lanes, the conduits that bring in raw materials (9.3 million barrels of oil per day, with 44% of Chinese oil imports coming from the Middle East in 2018) and which simultaneously deliver finished products to Africa and Europe (20% of China`s GDP comes from exports). 

Strategists call these sea lines of communication (SLOC), and Beijing wants to protect them from threats in peacetime and against hostile powers in times of tension or war. China`s economic investments continue to grow, as does the diasporas of its citizens. The Middle East and Africa comprise an essential part of Chairman Xi Jinping`s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, and its importance is seen in the fact that Xi has visited the region 18 times since he gained power in 2012.

Furthermore, there are particular chokepoints along these SLOCs, locations where shipping is funneled and becomes particularly vulnerable. The most obvious of these is the Strait of Malacca between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Other chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandab (the Horn of Africa) and Suez Canal. China`s interest in the Indian Ocean region is a product of growing commercial interests, with the PLAN being handed the task of safeguarding them. 

This is not a new concern, for Beijing`s 2015 Defense White Paper stated that "with the growth of China`s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil...and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue".

In fact, three critical factors affect how China can project power, protect its SLOCs and keep chokepoints open. The PLA is acutely aware of all three, and much effort is devoted to negating current disadvantages.

First is the PLAN`s rather modest presence in the Indian Ocean, especially compared to powers like India or the USA. 

Second is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. Third is China`s rather limited logistics/sustainment infrastructure along the Indian Ocean`s periphery. If China is to dominate the Indian Ocean, if that is its aim, it must address each of the above weaknesses. Interestingly, the US Naval War College recently published a report addressing the PLAN`s utilization of the Indian Ocean. 

Authored by Jeffrey Becker, the report entitled Securing China`s Lifelines across the Indian Ocean provides insights into Chinese ambitions. It summarized China`s predicament as follows: "To address these challenges, Beijing has already undertaken a series of initiatives, including expanding the capabilities of China`s base in Djibouti and leveraging the nation`s extensive commercial shipping fleet to provide logistics support. Evidence suggests that China may also be pursuing other policy options as well, such as increasing the number of advanced PLAN assets deployed to the region and establishing additional overseas military facilities."Becker admitted, "However, while the PLAN`s ability to operate in the Indian Ocean has improved considerably, its ability to project power into the region, and defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints in times of crisis, remains limited."

Addressing each of the three factors in turn, the first was China`s modest naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with just two warships and a support vessel on permanent rotation to the Gulf of Aden. Other warships may occasionally make passage or conduct exercises, plus it is estimated that Chinese submarines perform just two forays into the Indian Ocean annually on average.

Nonetheless, Chinese naval exercises west of the Malacca Strait (but still in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean) are becoming more common. These have two advantages, familiarizing crews with the area, and normalizing the appearance of PLAN ships.

It is certainly possible for the PLAN to deploy more ships there, for it is the largest navy in the world in terms of hull numbers. Becker quoted one source suggesting "that China is already capable of maintaining about 18 ships on station fulltime in the Indian Ocean, given the PLAN`s current force posture".

Senior Captain Liang Fang at China`s National Defense University has written papers advocating that the PLAN deploy aircraft carriers there to protect SLOCs. A Chinese carrier group operating around the Horn of Africa would certainly make a bold statement about Chinese power projection capabilities, and could provide leverage over nearby countries.

However, it is rare for Chinese experts to directly discuss any concept of a dedicated PLAN Indian Ocean squadron. The second aforementioned factor is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. 

Close to home, Chinese warships enjoy support from land-based missiles and aircraft, plus a heavy concentration of submarines, but these are luxuries not afforded in distant seas. Such support would be absent in the Indian Ocean, plus Chinese assets would be within land-based strike range of potential adversaries like India. 

The latter, especially in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, is boosting its ability to detect and track foreign submarines and surface ships. The defensive capacity of Chinese warships is improving, though, The Type 052D destroyer, for example, has 64 vertical-launch missile cells that can fire missiles against multiple enemy aircraft. 

However, within their first five years of service since 2014, none had deployed to the Gulf of Aden. Significantly, their first foray with a Gulf of Aden task force occurred in May 2019. Moving on, the third factor is China`s limited logistics support infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region. China formally opened a shore-based base in Djibouti on 1^st August 2017. 

China is not the only country with a military presence in Djibouti, for France, Italy, Japan and the USA all have military facilities there, with the Saudis to build one too. China has been expanding the pier at its Djibouti military base in recent weeks, sufficient to host at least a four-ship flotilla, including the large Type 901 auxiliary ship. 

The future deployment of more advanced weaponry to Djibouti - such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-submarine aircraft - would indicate more urgent Chinese intent. Already, one of six berths at Djibouti`s commercial Doraleh Multipurpose Port is reserved for use by the PLA.

Becker commented on auxiliary ships: "While these ships could be used to support other vessels in the fleet, given their limited numbers, and the fact that they were designed to support the PLAN`s future carrier strike groups, expanding facilities in Djibouti to support Type 901s may indicate that the base could also host a PLAN carrier strike group in the future. Indeed, the size and nature of the facilities being built at Djibouti suggest that the PLAN is establishing the capability to support a carrier strike group from its first overseas base should it so chose.

"China is well aware of the advantages that new regional logistics bases would bring, and Pakistan is usually touted as the most likely location. Becker noted, though, "...At least in the near term, the likelihood of the PLAN obtaining access to a military facility which it could use during a conflict remains remote, as many Indian Ocean region countries seek to maintain a balance in their relations between regional powers, and appear unlikely to abandon this hedging approach."

One Chinese scholar, Gao Wensheng of Tianjin Normal University, encourages setting up such Chinese "strategic fulcrum ports" to enhance logistics support in the region. This topic, often referred to as the "string of pearls theory", has generated a lot of heat and noise. Such bases along the coast of the Indian Ocean - whether dual use or purely military - would undeniably greatly aid the PLAN`s ability to operate so far from home.

Becker assessed, "Over the past decade, the PLAN has proven capable of sustaining small groups of vessels in the Indian Ocean for long periods of time. However, though a three-ship taskforce is sufficient for the PLAN`s counter-piracy needs in peacetime, defending access to Indian Ocean SLOCs in a conflict would require a much larger and more sustained force, and the PLAN has only a limited number of replenishment ships capable of supporting far-seas operations."

A shortage of replenishment ships (currently eight Type 903/903A and two Type 901 vessels) could force China to utilize its massive commercial fleet, one of the largest in the world.

Becker indeed noted: "Beijing has already taken steps so that the fleet can better support PLAN activities. For example, it has promulgated regulations requiring certain civilian vessels - including roll-on/roll-off vessels, tankers and container ships - be built to military specifications, theoretically facilitating their future use by the navy with few if any modifications. 

In September 2016, China enacted the Law of the People`s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation, which improves the process for military requisition of civilian transportation assets during wartime, natural disasters, emergencies or `special circumstances`, both domestically and abroad."Chinese commercial vessels have taken part in maritime exercises, meaning that an entity such as COSCO could easily be called upon to support the PLAN in the Indian Ocean to augment naval capabilities. 

Furthermore, Chinese state-owned companies own or operate port facilities around the region (including Djibouti, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and the UAE), and they could provide some degree of sustainment.

In line with other analysis, Becker concluded: "...Other than its base in Djibouti, the PLAN does not, at present, appear to have arrangements with any other country in the region that would allow it to preposition specialized military equipment or technicians required to use that equipment, even in port facilities owned or operated by Chinese state-owned firms. Host governments whose ports do service PLAN vessels during a conflict, or allow the PLA to preposition military equipment on their territory, could possibly be dragged into the conflict as a co-belligerent."

Yet China has slightly improved its posture by developing more comprehensive naval facilities farther south within China - including an aircraft carrier base at Yulin on Hainan Island, thus speeding up the PLAN`s ability to deploy assets to the Indian Ocean. China could also surge platforms from reclaimed reef bases in the South China Sea, as they can harbor ships and accommodate aircraft such as fighters, maritime patrol and aerial refueling types. 

This would give the PLA a quicker response to any contingency in the Malacca Strait, for instance. It would make sense for China to establish a second overseas military base at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, to help defend access to the region. 

For many years, locations such as Myanmar have been discussed. Or even farther east, China`s military relationship with Phnom Penh has become quite exclusive in recent years. In 2019 there were media reports that China may have forged an agreement for the PLAN to use a Cambodian naval base, plus a large and mysterious airport is being constructed in Cambodia. 

Speculation is rife that the PLA could one day use the latter, even though Cambodia is some 1,000km from the Malacca Strait. Becker suggested another possibility, that Beijing may simply be content to emulate the Soviet Union`s past presence in the Indian Ocean. The Cold War power sought only limited SLOC protection and localized sea denial, as opposed to outright sea control. This could represent an achievable solution for China too.

Israel saves Pakistan face

According a Reuters news, Israeli Regional Cooperation Minister, Ofir Akunis said there were two main candidate countries to become the next to move towards normal ties with Israel. He did not name either but said one is in the Gulf and could be Oman but would not be Saudi Arabia. The other, further to the east, is a “Muslim country that is not small” but is not Pakistan, he said.

Asked if a fifth country could sign up before Trump steps down on 20th January 2021, Ofir Akunis told Israel’s Ynet TV, “We are working in that direction.”

 “I believe ... there will be an American announcement about another country that is going public with the normalization of relations with Israel and, in essence, with the infrastructure for an accord — a peace accord,” he said.

Israel is working towards formalizing relations with a fifth Muslim country, possibly in Asia, during US President Donald Trump’s term, an Israeli cabinet minister said on Wednesday. The White House has brokered rapprochements bet­ween Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco this year.

Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, said last week it would not recognize Israel as long as Palestinian statehood demands remain unmet. Malaysia has signalled a similar policy.

“Malaysia’s firm stance on the Palestinian issue will not change,” Deputy Foreign Minister Kamarudin Jaffar told the country’s senate on Wednesday, adding that Kuala Lumpur would not interfere in other nations’ decisions on Israel.

In Dhaka, a foreign ministry official said Bangladesh was not interested in establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. “Our position remains the same,” he reiterated.

Oman has praised the US-brokered diplomatic drive but has not commented on its own prospects of forging Israel ties.

Israel heading to fresh polls

The Knesset dissolved automatically at midnight Tuesday, setting a 23^rd March 2021 date for elections amid mutual recriminations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz.

Netanyahu and Gantz blamed each other for not finding a way to keep their government going. Likud and Blue and White had reached an agreement to extend the deadline for passing the state budget and preventing early elections. But Gantz issued new demands, and then rebels in both parties prevented the bill from passing in dramatic fashion.

 “It is no secret that the Likud and I did not want to go to elections,” Netanyahu said in a Knesset press conference. “Israel is going to elections due to internal fights in Blue and White.”

Netanyahu said he had agreed to the rotation in the Prime Minister’s Office before Blue and White reneged on their deal.

Blue and White responded by shifting the blame to Netanyahu, saying: “A man under three indictments is dragging Israel to elections for a fourth time. If there was no trial, there would be a budget and no elections.”

Polls broadcast on Tuesday night found that the election will be devastating for Blue and White. A Kantar Institute poll broadcast on KAN News predicted six mandates for the party. A Midgam poll on Channel 12 predicted five seats, and if Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai forms a party, only four.

Both polls gave the Likud a significant majority over the New Hope Party of former Likud minister Gideon Sa’ar, Yamina and Yesh Atid. Sa’ar has risen in polls that ask who is most fit to be prime minister. In the KAN poll, 39% said Netanyahu was most fit for the job, and 36% said Sa’ar.

The Likud took action on Tuesday to deprive Sa’ar’s party of key state funding. Sa’ar called the Likud’s steps brutal and expressed confidence that the move would boomerang against Netanyahu’s party.

Sa’ar played an active role in preventing the deadline for passing the budget from being extended and the time until another election from being prolonged. His confidante Likud MK Michal Shir joined Blue and White MKs Ram Shefa, Miki Haimovich and Asaf Zamir in voting against the early election prevention bill.

Shir and Shefa waited in the Knesset parking lot before surprising their colleagues by voting against the bill and ensuring its defeat in a 49-47 vote.

Shir submitted her resignation letter to Knesset Speaker Yariv Levin on Tuesday. She said she was proud to vote to end a dysfunctional government and that she would be joining New Hope.

When her resignation takes effect on Thursday, Shir will be replaced by the next candidate on the Likud list, Shevah Stern, who was chosen for a slot on the list reserved for a candidate from Judea and Samaria.

Likud MK Sharren Haskel, who refused to come to the vote, has not said when and if she will quit, but she is also expected to join the new party. If Haskel quits, she will be replaced in the Knesset by former minister Ayoub Kara.

Meanwhile, the state budgets, which were the technical reasons for the election, were advanced in the cabinet and Knesset but not passed into law.

“Out of a sense of responsibility to the Israeli people, I have decided that we will approve legislation that will enable a rolling budget for 2021 so that the country can minimally function during election season,” Gantz said. “The prime minister and finance minister have been wildly irresponsible, denying the country a budget for six months in flagrant violation of their commitment and all out of narrow, self-serving personal considerations.”

China expels US Navy destroyer from South China Sea

Beijing on Tuesday announced its military has “expelled” a US Navy destroyer sailing near Nansha Islands – also known as Spratly Islands – in the South China Sea in a fresh escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington.

China said the southern command of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) deployed ships and aircraft to warn US destroyer USS John S. McCain as it sailed through the disputed waters of the South China Sea (SCS).

The incident took place as Shandong, China’s second aircraft carrier, was said to be conducting drills in the SCS region after sailing through the Taiwan Strait on Sunday.

China claims nearly the entire SCS but that claim is disputed by several maritime neighbors including the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, besides Vietnam and Taiwan, which China says is a breakaway region.

“The Chinese PLA on Tuesday expelled US destroyer USS John S. McCain after it trespassed into China’s territorial waters off Nansha Islands in the South China Sea,” said Senior Colonel Tian Junli, a spokesperson for the PLA southern theatre command.

China firmly opposes the US warship’s trespassing, said Tian, warning that the US moves undermine the peace and stability of the region.

“Such actions by the US have seriously violated China’s sovereignty and security and severely undermined peace and stability in the SCS,” Tian added.

The US guided-missile destroyer had last week practised anti-submarine warfare with a French submarine and Japanese carrier in the Philippine Sea.

A statement from the US 7th Fleet Public Affairs said the warship was conducting freedom of navigation operations in the SCS.

“On December 22, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) asserted navigational rights and freedoms in the Spratly Islands, consistent with international law. This freedom of navigation operation (“FONOP”) upheld the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognised in international law by challenging restrictions on innocent passage imposed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan,” the statement said.

“All interactions with foreign military forces were consistent with international norms and did not impact the operation,” it added.

The US statement added that unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the SCS pose a serious threat to the “…freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded commerce, and freedom of economic opportunity for SCS littoral nations”.

In April, China had scrambled aircraft and deployed ships to track and expel a frontline US warship from near another Beijing-controlled region called Paracel Islands - also known as Xisha Islands in China and Hoang Sa Archipelago in Vietnam - in the SCS.

Accusing the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry of carrying out a “provocative act” and violating Chinese sovereignty, the PLA’s southern command had then said the intrusion of the American warship prompted it to “track, monitor, verify, identify and expel” it.