Greek vessel hit by missile in Red Sea

A Malta-flagged, Greek-owned vessel has been hit with a missile in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen, maritime security firm Ambrey reports It is thought to be the third incident involving the bulk carrier, believed to be named Zografia, in 24 hours.

Tuesday's incident comes as the US military announced it had seized Iranian-supplied weapons bound for the Houthis during an operation last week. Meanwhile, the US has hit more targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.

An official told CBS, the BBC's American partner, that the US conducted further strikes on Houthi positions overnight.

The US and UK launched a wave of airstrikes against dozens of Houthi targets on Januart 11 following attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have vowed to retaliate and on Sunday the US said it had shot down a missile fired towards one of its warships from a Houthi area of Yemen.

Several vessels have been targeted by the movement's fighters since November in protest at Israel's war with Hamas.

The Houthis say they are targeting vessels which are Israeli-owned, flagged or operated, or are heading to Israeli ports.

The Red Sea connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal but several shipping lines have announced they are now diverting round the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe instead.

The US said on Tuesday that analysis from the weapons it seized from a ship near the Yemen coast suggested the Houthis had been using the same kind of weapons in their Red Sea attacks.

"This is the first seizure of lethal, Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons (ACW) to the Houthis since the beginning of Houthi attacks against merchant ships in November 2023," US Central Command said in a statement.

Iran: Deylaman Destroyer a great addition to Caspian Sea fleet

Pointing to Iran’s warm relations with all Caspian Sea littoral states, General Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of joint staff of Iran’s Armed Forces has said that the Deylaman destroyer sends a message of peace and friendship to all neighbors of the Islamic Republic. 

On the sidelines of the inauguration ceremony of the Deylaman destroyer, the senior Iranian commander called the unveiling great for all the armed forces staff and Iranian people since the destroyer has joined Iran’s Caspian Sea fleet.

The destroyer is part of an Iranian class of similar ships called the Mowj class which weigh around 1,500 tons and are based on the Jamaran destroyer which was launched in 2010.

The new destroyer joins ships such as the Dena, Sahand, and Damavand, along with the Jamaran. 

Speaking at the inauguration ceremony of the Deylaman destroyer in Bandar Anzali, Bagheri described the vessel as a great addition to Iran's Caspian Sea fleet. 

Chief Commander of the Army Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, and a number of top military officials were also present at the ceremony. 

He said the Iranian Navy plays a leading role in increasing the country's sustainable deterrent power in the face of the enemies. 

The top commander praised Iranian young scientists for their role in manufacturing the homegrown destroyer, which was built under imposed sanctions using world-class technology and the participation of Iranian industries, knowledge-based companies, and academic centers. 

He further hailed the young scientists, who turned the we can mindset into action.

General Bagheri also stressed that Iran enjoys warm relations with all Caspian Sea littoral states and that the destroyer sends a message of peace and friendship to all neighbors of the Islamic Republic. 

He also added to the importance of security of sea transportation and readiness for any unexpected incident.

“It is necessary for the armed forces to be fully prepared,” said General Bagheri, highlighting the necessity of manufacturing the Deylaman destroyer, which was deployed in the Caspian Sea to carry out its missions well.

Speaking on the occasion of November 28, the National Day of Navy in the Iranian calendar, Iran's Navy Chief, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, said on Friday that Deylaman is a powerful vessel that can act very well in the fields of detection, interception, and rescue. 

He also announced that two military drills will take place in the Indian Ocean; one includes a rescue exercise with Oman, to which other countries are invited, and the other would involve a sustainable security exercise with more countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

‘Progressive and deterrent powers’

Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps Navy, likened the Iranian Navy and the IRGC to intertwined fists that have turned into an advancing and deterrent power in various aspects.

On the commemoration of Iran’s Navy Day, Rear Admiral Tangsiri wrote a message to Iran’s Navy Chief, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, saying November 28 is reminiscent of the braveries of Iranian Navy soldiers, who protect and guard the borders of Islamic Iran. 

“They have become a source of honor for the Islamic Revolution,” the IRGC Navy chief said.

He said, "Undoubtedly, Iran’s maritime policy will pave the way for providing tranquility and security for the Iranian people.”

The commander also said that we would not stop a second in treading the path of progress.  

He also paid tribute to the martyrs of Operation Morvarid, offering congratulations on Iran's Navy Day to the Navy chief, staff and their families.

Pakistan-China Joint Naval Exercises

The opening ceremony of the Pakistan Navy and PLA (Navy) bilateral exercise Sea Guardian-2023 was held at the Pakistan Navy Dockyard, Karachi.

Commander Qingdao Naval Base, Rear Admiral Liang Yang graced the occasion as Guest of Honour. Commander Pakistan Fleet, Vice Admiral Muhammad Faisal Abbasi was also present at the occasion.

In his opening remarks, Vice Admiral Muhammad Faisal Abbasi welcomed the officers and personnel of PLA (N) Flotilla, underscoring the close and strategic ties between the two countries in general and Navies in particular.

The admiral emphasized the importance of immaculate and sound planning during the exercise and hoped that this exercise would further enhance strategic cooperation and interoperability between the two navies.

In his speech, Commander Qingdao Naval Base Rear Admiral Liang Yang thanked the Pakistan Navy for hosting Exercise Sea Guardian and hoped to have a mutually beneficial and professionally rewarding experience from the joint exercise.

Earlier, the Chinese Flotilla comprising of naval ships, Submarine and Submarine Rescue Ship along with PLA (Navy) Marines Corps Detachment, arrived in Karachi to participate in the exercise.

During the exercise, frontline destroyers/ frigates along with Air and other assets and Marines/ Special Forces from Pakistan Navy and PLA (Navy) will carry out advanced-level joint drills and naval maneuvers in the North Arabian Sea besides professional and social activities during the harbor phase.

The objective of Exercise Sea Guardian-2023 is to share professional experiences on contemporary traditional and non-traditional threats in the Indian Ocean Region as well as to enhance bilateral cooperation and interoperability between the two Navies.

The exercise is a reflection of strong bilateral military cooperation between the Pakistan Navy and the Chinese Navy and will foster greater bilateral cooperation between the two navies.

 

 

Persian Gulf needs homegrown security

Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed troops, has criticized the deployment of foreign military troops in the region and emphasized the necessity for the Persian Gulf governments to work together to secure the region.

In a meeting with Commander of Royal Army of Oman Major General Matar bin Salim bin Rashid al Balushi, General Baqeri said, “We believe that the security of the Persian Gulf region must be provided through interaction and cooperation among the regional countries.”

The Iranian commander emphasized the nations of the Persian Gulf are capable of ensuring regional security without the presence or involvement of foreigners.

He also underscored the armed forces of Iran and Oman’s operational, intelligence and training competence, saying that the two nations’ mutual experience-sharing will help improve regional security.

Inviting the Omani navy forces to participate in the Marine Security Belt naval exercises, General Baqeri also praised Oman’s regional initiatives.

Omani commander called for strengthening military ties between Tehran and Muscat.

General Salim bin Rashid al Balushi cited Oman’s initiative to strengthen connections with neighbors and noted that communications have become even more important due to Oman and Iran’s connectivity in the Strait of Hormuz.

High-level military officials from Iran and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2019 to expand military cooperation.

In recent years, the two friendly neighbors have conducted a number of joint naval exercises.

In May, the Iranian Armed Forces chief of staff paid a visit to Oman to have discussions about fostering regional security, cooperation, and peace.

Major General Baqeri slammed the presence of foreign troops in the region and asserted that collaboration between Tehran and Muscat would enhance regional security.

The general also said, “The joint actions by Iran and Oman can improve security and demonstrate that outsiders are not required in the region.”

Baqeri noted that the multipolar world order and the transfer of power from the West to Asia have an impact on West Asia and emphasized the need for closer military cooperation to maintain security in the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, and the northwestern regions of the Indian Ocean.

The commander then praised Oman for its sensible foreign policy toward the Yemen issue, emphasizing that more work must be done to establish a fair peace and safeguard Yemen’s territorial integrity.

Iran requires US$9 billion for developing Makran Coast Line

The Secretary of Makran Coast Development Council said developing the cost line requires three years of work and US$9 billion of investment, Fars News Agency reported.

Speaking to Fars, Hossein Dehghan said the need for developing the cost line came under the spotlight nearly 15 years ago when stressed by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Seyyed Ali Khamenei.

“Over the past 15 years, important measures have been taken in this regard, however, it has not been enough,” Dehghan noted.

According to the official, distance from the center and lack of infrastructure have been the two main obstacles in the way of attracting investment in the mentioned region.

Makran is a historical region in Iran that runs from mountains west of Jask all the way to parts of Pakistan's Baluchistan province in the southwest along the Sea of Oman.

Iran has recently constructed significant nautical and commercial infrastructure in a number of Makran districts, particularly at Chabahar port, which serves as a vital trade route between the Indian Ocean and landlocked nations in Central Asia.

Earlier in June, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO) announced a plan for attracting over US$390 million of domestic investment in the Makran Coast.

Ali-Akbar Safaei said that so far, the private sector has invested more than US$215 million in the region and the country’s small ports.

He also noted that good measures have been taken in the foreign investment sector, which will hopefully bear results soon.

Back in November 2022, President Ebrahim Raisi called for a quick development of the south and southeastern shores of Iran, namely the Makran coastline.

Raisi stated that plans for the development of the Makran coasts by the government and the private sector might assist the comparatively underdeveloped region.

Making Indian Ocean safer

Heidar Ali Balouji, Iranian representative at the UN warned about the dangers posed by the military presence of extra-regional countries in the Indian Ocean and proposed the regional security can be advantageous to the world. He made these comments at the recently held meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean held in New York.

He highlighted that the region faces a number of serious security challenges, ranging from the military presence of extra-regional powers to newly emerging issues like piracy, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation.

Follows is the text of the statement read by Balouji:

I would like to begin by commending you for convening this meeting. I extend our thanks to the secretariat for its continuous support.

The Indian Ocean has served as a critical trade route for centuries, currently accounting for one-third of the world's bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world's oil shipments.

It is home to approximately 35% of the global population.

Given the significance of trade and the vastness of its many sub-regions, the Indian Ocean holds immense importance in terms of military and strategic engagement.

It acts as a vital trading hub, connecting the Middle East to Southeast and East Asia, as well as Europe and the Americas.

However, the region faces a range of serious security challenges, from traditional threats such as the military presence of extra-regional powers to emerging concerns like piracy, drug trafficking, and environmental degradation. These issues pose a significant threat to the region's growth.

Consequently, fostering indigenously driven regional security becomes a public good that benefits not only the region but also the entire world, while simultaneously preventing major powers from vying for control over the region's resources and sea lanes.

We must bear in mind the significance of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted on December 16, 1971.

This declaration calls upon all states to consider and respect the Indian Ocean region as a zone of peace, free from great power rivalry.

It also envisions the region to be free of nuclear weapons, an essential component for sustainable security in the area.

In light of the worrisome exponential increase in military tensions and expenditure, it remains crucial to allocate available resources to non-military alliances, reducing tensions that contradict the goals outlined in the Declaration.

In this context, military powers bear a substantial responsibility to refrain from any activity that undermines this noble goal. Extra-regional powers must eliminate their military presence in the Indian Ocean region.

It is high time for the world to recognize the capabilities of regional countries in addressing issues independently, without relying on external powers.

Lastly, the strengthening of Iran's friendly relationships with regional countries and its recent full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization serve as ample proof and examples that regional countries can determine their destiny and shape their history.

 

Iran adds 15 ships to its merchant fleet

Iran has added 15 ships to its trade maritime fleet in the Caspian Sea amid growing trade ties with Russia and other countries located to the north of Iran.

According to Mehr News Agency, the head of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO) has said that expanding Iran’s northern fleet of commercial vessels has become a priority for the country’s Transport and Urban Development Ministry, of which the PMO is a subsidiary.

“Given that the volume of trade with neighboring countries to the north is growing, the first priority for the ministry is to expand the fleet and to increase the capacity in the Caspian Sea,” Ali-Akbar Safaei said on Saturday.

Safaei said Iran’s Caspian Sea merchant fleet will further expand in the near future with the arrival of new ships from the Volga River.

The announcement comes amid growing shipping activity in the Caspian Sea as Russia and other countries have ramped up their exports and imports via Iran and its southern ports.

Media reports and statements by Iranian authorities show there has been a major surge in trade via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a route that connects the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to countries to the north of Iran via the Iranian road and rail transportation network.

Iran has created new infrastructure, including modern port operation systems, in its northern ports to both facilitate cargo transit via the INSTC and to increase its own exports to Russia and other countries.

Last month, Iran and Russia signed a contract to build a key railway along the Caspian Sea that would significantly boost trade via INSTC’s western branch.

 

 

Iran, Saudi Arabia to form naval coalition in northern Indian Ocean

Iranian Navy Commander Shahram Irani announced on Saturday that a naval coalition will be formed in the northern Indian Ocean with the involvement of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and other countries in the region.

“In line with this purpose new coalitions are being formed in the region and beyond,” the admiral added.

“Today regional countries have reached the conclusion that if there is going to be security in the region, definitely it can be done through convergence and cooperation with each other,” Shahram Irani said in a televised interview.

Earlier, the website of the Emirati foreign ministry said Abu Dhabi had withdrawn from the Joint Maritime Forces that operate in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Analysts say Abu Dhabi has made the decision in line with its ambition to diversify its security relationships.

A Qatari news website reported on Friday that Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman are to form a joint naval force under China's support in line with increasing maritime security in the Persian Gulf.

Al-Jadid said China had already begun mediating negotiations among Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi aimed at reinforcing navigation's safety in the strategic body of water.

Back in March, China successfully helped broker a deal between Tehran and Riyadh according to which Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to reestablish diplomatic ties after seven years of estrangement.

According to analysts, the consent of the Persian Gulf states to Beijing's mediation in such sensitive matters shows China's growing influence in the region as opposed to Washington's declining influence.

 

 

India selling US dollar for UAE dirham

Reportedly Indian companies are switching from the US dollar to Asian currencies to pay for Russian coal imports. Steelmakers and cement manufacturers in India have been using the UAE dirham, Hong Kong dollar, Chinese yuan, and euro to pay for Russian coal in recent weeks.

Last month, Russia became India’s third-largest coal supplier after the South Asian giant dumped the greenback to secure deals, with imports surging to a record 2.06 million tons.

In June, Indian buyers paid for at least 742,000 tons of Russian coal using currencies other than the US dollar, equaling 44 percent of the 1.7 million tons of Russian imports that month.

Meanwhile, the Reserve Bank of India also recently approved payments for commodities in the Indian rupee, a move that could further boost bilateral trade with Russia.

Recent reports revealed that Moscow was calculating the value of oil exports to India in US dollars while requesting payment in dirhams, asking that payments be made to Russia’s Gazprombank via Mashreq Bank, its correspondent bank in Dubai.

India has increased purchases of Russian oil and coal since the start of the war in Ukraine, helping Moscow cushion the effect of western sanctions and allowing New Delhi to secure raw materials at a discount.

In early July, the Russian logistics company, RZD Logistics, announced the completion of the first transportation of goods via container trains from Russia to India through the eastern branch of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

The INSTC, which links the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, is a 7,200 kilometer-long, major international shipping route for Indo-Russian trade.

In the face of aggressive western sanctions, Russia has bolstered economic cooperation with several friendly nations. Iran and Turkey are currently working on implementing Russia’s Mir payment system into their economies.

Turkey also recently agreed to make partial payments for Russian gas in rubles, while European companies have reportedly been inquiring with Ankara about acting as a middle man to supply Russia with metals, as a way to overcome sanctions.

 

Maritime security and rules based order

Maritime scholars and practitioners often grapple with a question, what should be the desirable architecture for maritime security, and how should this be implemented properly? 

It is a complex issue, because security may be best delivered in collective and cooperative settings, there is often a lack of clarity about how cooperation between multinational security agencies should be practically operationalized.

Two aspects seem particularly thorny. First, how does one account for the material and strategic costs of military cooperation? It is no secret that naval collaboration entails political costs.

India, which has long faced pressure from Russia to reduce strategic engagement with the United States is familiar with the costs of strategic cooperation. ASEAN, too, with a history of balancing between the United States and China, is conscious of the downsides of maritime collaboration.

There is also a second and more complicated dimension. If integrative frameworks are rooted in national security and national interest, can region-wide maritime cooperation ever be functionally effective?

Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the need for collaboration in the maritime domain, the political leadership in many countries is unclear about the extent of acceptable cooperation. Navies broadly know they must work together, but to what degree, to what specific ends, and at what cost, remains unexplained.

The preference for balanced interactions is markedly high in the Indian Ocean region, where many states regard non-traditional security as the holy grail of maritime operations.

In the absence of clear guidance about how maritime cooperation is to be operationalised, navies engage in short-term arm’s length collaboration, which does not translate into much over the longer term.

Each side develops its own model of cooperative security, based entirely on the appreciation of national interests.

At times, the military interactions are robust – such as during constabulary and humanitarian missions – but for the most part, maritime forces avoid working together in formats that risk provoking powerful players and disturbing the strategic balance of power.

The preference for balanced interactions is markedly high in the Indian Ocean region, where many states regard non-traditional security as the holy grail of maritime operations. Particularly in South Asia, human security and livelihood challenges are accorded priority over traditional security threats.

Despite its record of aggression in the Indo-Pacific, China is widely regarded as an economic and security partner, and not as a threat to the rules-based order.

Members of the Royal Australian Air Force, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, Indian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force at the conclusion of exercise Sea Dragon, an annual multilateral anti-submarine warfare exercise that improves interoperability in the Indo-Pacific, 28 January 2021.

India, of course, is an exception to the consensus in South Asia. New Delhi recognizes the China challenge in ways its neighbors do not.

From an Indian standpoint, a Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean has implications that go beyond naval confrontation.

The realists in New Delhi know that Chinese dual-use ports under the Belt and Road Initiative are meant to establish Chinese power and hegemony in India’s natural sphere of influence, and shift the regional balance of power away from Delhi.

Yet the Chinese threat in India’s backyard is qualitatively different from the challenge in the South China Sea. Unlike in Southeast Asia, where Beijing aspires to full-spectrum dominance, China’s strategy in the Indian Ocean is one of incremental stakeholdership. If India used force against China, New Delhi not Beijing would be seen as the aggressor.

In the Western Pacific, too, the picture is mixed. Southeast Asian states have resisted Chinese efforts to dominate the littorals, and even upped their collaboration to help fight irregular security challenges. But non-traditional security isn’t the low hanging fruit it was once assumed to be.

Despite successes in counter-piracy and humanitarian relief, law enforcement agencies remain reluctant to jointly tackle armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing and other crimes that occur in coastal spaces. For all their professed zeal for integrated operations, navies and coastguards remain unwilling to allow foreign partners access into coastal waters.

The imperative to forge issue-based coalitions in a post-Covid world – where resources are scarce and commitments diverse – is bound to draw likeminded states into tighter embrace.

Against this backdrop, can the AUKUS trilateral security pact, the Quad and ASEAN succeed in creating the conditions for sustained cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region?

The foregoing suggests it would be difficult. However, that should not dishearten avid proponents of vigorous strategic collaboration, for country priorities are wholly circumstantial and shaped by the vagaries of geopolitics. India, which has consistently advocated Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), is today more confrontational towards China (in the wake of the border crisis in Ladakh). Chinese aggression in Taiwan and Hong Kong has forced ASEAN also into hardening its Indo-Pacific posture.

But scholars and practitioners should beware of reducing maritime security to a simple contest of narratives. Those who insist the rules-based security order must focus on enforcement and red lines of acceptable conduct should recognize that order rather than strict rules animates the policy preferences of many Asian states.

Countries ought to be more creative in generating consensus around long-term cooperation. The aim should be to identify avenues for association and partnerships in areas where states may not necessarily agree on a way forward.

The imperative to forge issue-based coalitions in a post-Covid world – where resources are scarce and commitments diverse – is bound to draw likeminded states into tighter embrace.

The need of the hour is for maritime forces to improve interoperability, expand collaboration in hard and soft security, and share the burden of littoral security. The habits of cooperation they now foster will hold navies in good stead when the threats begin to crystallize in ways that few today imagine or anticipate.

Courtesy: The Bangladesh Chronicle

United States interested in working closely with Bangladesh

The newly-appointed Ambassador of United States to Bangladesh, Peter D. Haas has said he looks forward to working with Dhaka to further advance the relationship between the two countries. 

He was speaking at an interaction session with the officers of the Bangladesh Embassy in Washington DC. Haas is expected to arrive in Dhaka in early March to assume charges.

The new envoy was received by the Bangladesh Ambassador to the United States, M. Shahidul Islam and other officials of the Mission.

During the discussion, the ambassadors of the two countries expressed their resolve to work closely to further strengthen the friendly relations between Bangladesh and the United States.

They also laid emphasis on greater engagements of the two sides and undertaking mutually beneficial program and actions to celebrate the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Bangladesh and the United States.

Bangladesh’s location holds significant strategic value for Beijing. China relies on the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway between Malaysia, Singapore, and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, to import energy and goods from the Middle East and Africa via the Indian Ocean.

The Strait of Malacca could become a high-risk passageway in the event of a potential conflict either in the South China Sea or the India-China border. Consequently, China has taken a number of initiatives to build alternative routes aimed at reducing dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Seeking port facilities in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal region along with overland connections to them is one of the efforts in this direction.

It may be recalled that Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming recently expressed concerns that China-Bangladesh relations will suffer if Dhaka joins the Quad, an informal grouping that aims to counterbalance Beijing.

Though China shares no border with Bangladesh, the distance between the two countries is only about 100 kilometers. Beijing hopes to bridge this distance through infrastructure that would link the two countries closer.

The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor is one of the six proposed economic corridors of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Bangladesh enjoys a strategic location in Beijing’s strategic advances in the Indian Ocean.

Is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean?

Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since

Today it is legally indisputable that the high seas belong to all. This means China`s navy has as much right to ply the Indian Ocean as any other nation, even though it might make countries like India feel a creeping sense of dread. Likewise, it is a well-established fact the People`s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been sailing in the Indian Ocean far more frequently in recent years, compounded by fears that Beijing is seeking to establish new naval bases on the periphery of this ocean. 

Yet, is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean? Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since.

Chinese warships remain despite pirate attacks disappearing almost entirely in the area. However, such assets have also been used for non-combatant evacuation operations in Yemen and Libya, plus ships are available for humanitarian assistance operations. China is understandably concerned about protecting its sea lanes, the conduits that bring in raw materials (9.3 million barrels of oil per day, with 44% of Chinese oil imports coming from the Middle East in 2018) and which simultaneously deliver finished products to Africa and Europe (20% of China`s GDP comes from exports). 

Strategists call these sea lines of communication (SLOC), and Beijing wants to protect them from threats in peacetime and against hostile powers in times of tension or war. China`s economic investments continue to grow, as does the diasporas of its citizens. The Middle East and Africa comprise an essential part of Chairman Xi Jinping`s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, and its importance is seen in the fact that Xi has visited the region 18 times since he gained power in 2012.

Furthermore, there are particular chokepoints along these SLOCs, locations where shipping is funneled and becomes particularly vulnerable. The most obvious of these is the Strait of Malacca between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Other chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandab (the Horn of Africa) and Suez Canal. China`s interest in the Indian Ocean region is a product of growing commercial interests, with the PLAN being handed the task of safeguarding them. 

This is not a new concern, for Beijing`s 2015 Defense White Paper stated that "with the growth of China`s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil...and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue".

In fact, three critical factors affect how China can project power, protect its SLOCs and keep chokepoints open. The PLA is acutely aware of all three, and much effort is devoted to negating current disadvantages.

First is the PLAN`s rather modest presence in the Indian Ocean, especially compared to powers like India or the USA. 

Second is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. Third is China`s rather limited logistics/sustainment infrastructure along the Indian Ocean`s periphery. If China is to dominate the Indian Ocean, if that is its aim, it must address each of the above weaknesses. Interestingly, the US Naval War College recently published a report addressing the PLAN`s utilization of the Indian Ocean. 

Authored by Jeffrey Becker, the report entitled Securing China`s Lifelines across the Indian Ocean provides insights into Chinese ambitions. It summarized China`s predicament as follows: "To address these challenges, Beijing has already undertaken a series of initiatives, including expanding the capabilities of China`s base in Djibouti and leveraging the nation`s extensive commercial shipping fleet to provide logistics support. Evidence suggests that China may also be pursuing other policy options as well, such as increasing the number of advanced PLAN assets deployed to the region and establishing additional overseas military facilities."Becker admitted, "However, while the PLAN`s ability to operate in the Indian Ocean has improved considerably, its ability to project power into the region, and defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints in times of crisis, remains limited."

Addressing each of the three factors in turn, the first was China`s modest naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with just two warships and a support vessel on permanent rotation to the Gulf of Aden. Other warships may occasionally make passage or conduct exercises, plus it is estimated that Chinese submarines perform just two forays into the Indian Ocean annually on average.

Nonetheless, Chinese naval exercises west of the Malacca Strait (but still in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean) are becoming more common. These have two advantages, familiarizing crews with the area, and normalizing the appearance of PLAN ships.

It is certainly possible for the PLAN to deploy more ships there, for it is the largest navy in the world in terms of hull numbers. Becker quoted one source suggesting "that China is already capable of maintaining about 18 ships on station fulltime in the Indian Ocean, given the PLAN`s current force posture".

Senior Captain Liang Fang at China`s National Defense University has written papers advocating that the PLAN deploy aircraft carriers there to protect SLOCs. A Chinese carrier group operating around the Horn of Africa would certainly make a bold statement about Chinese power projection capabilities, and could provide leverage over nearby countries.

However, it is rare for Chinese experts to directly discuss any concept of a dedicated PLAN Indian Ocean squadron. The second aforementioned factor is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. 

Close to home, Chinese warships enjoy support from land-based missiles and aircraft, plus a heavy concentration of submarines, but these are luxuries not afforded in distant seas. Such support would be absent in the Indian Ocean, plus Chinese assets would be within land-based strike range of potential adversaries like India. 

The latter, especially in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, is boosting its ability to detect and track foreign submarines and surface ships. The defensive capacity of Chinese warships is improving, though, The Type 052D destroyer, for example, has 64 vertical-launch missile cells that can fire missiles against multiple enemy aircraft. 

However, within their first five years of service since 2014, none had deployed to the Gulf of Aden. Significantly, their first foray with a Gulf of Aden task force occurred in May 2019. Moving on, the third factor is China`s limited logistics support infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region. China formally opened a shore-based base in Djibouti on 1^st August 2017. 

China is not the only country with a military presence in Djibouti, for France, Italy, Japan and the USA all have military facilities there, with the Saudis to build one too. China has been expanding the pier at its Djibouti military base in recent weeks, sufficient to host at least a four-ship flotilla, including the large Type 901 auxiliary ship. 

The future deployment of more advanced weaponry to Djibouti - such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-submarine aircraft - would indicate more urgent Chinese intent. Already, one of six berths at Djibouti`s commercial Doraleh Multipurpose Port is reserved for use by the PLA.

Becker commented on auxiliary ships: "While these ships could be used to support other vessels in the fleet, given their limited numbers, and the fact that they were designed to support the PLAN`s future carrier strike groups, expanding facilities in Djibouti to support Type 901s may indicate that the base could also host a PLAN carrier strike group in the future. Indeed, the size and nature of the facilities being built at Djibouti suggest that the PLAN is establishing the capability to support a carrier strike group from its first overseas base should it so chose.

"China is well aware of the advantages that new regional logistics bases would bring, and Pakistan is usually touted as the most likely location. Becker noted, though, "...At least in the near term, the likelihood of the PLAN obtaining access to a military facility which it could use during a conflict remains remote, as many Indian Ocean region countries seek to maintain a balance in their relations between regional powers, and appear unlikely to abandon this hedging approach."

One Chinese scholar, Gao Wensheng of Tianjin Normal University, encourages setting up such Chinese "strategic fulcrum ports" to enhance logistics support in the region. This topic, often referred to as the "string of pearls theory", has generated a lot of heat and noise. Such bases along the coast of the Indian Ocean - whether dual use or purely military - would undeniably greatly aid the PLAN`s ability to operate so far from home.

Becker assessed, "Over the past decade, the PLAN has proven capable of sustaining small groups of vessels in the Indian Ocean for long periods of time. However, though a three-ship taskforce is sufficient for the PLAN`s counter-piracy needs in peacetime, defending access to Indian Ocean SLOCs in a conflict would require a much larger and more sustained force, and the PLAN has only a limited number of replenishment ships capable of supporting far-seas operations."

A shortage of replenishment ships (currently eight Type 903/903A and two Type 901 vessels) could force China to utilize its massive commercial fleet, one of the largest in the world.

Becker indeed noted: "Beijing has already taken steps so that the fleet can better support PLAN activities. For example, it has promulgated regulations requiring certain civilian vessels - including roll-on/roll-off vessels, tankers and container ships - be built to military specifications, theoretically facilitating their future use by the navy with few if any modifications. 

In September 2016, China enacted the Law of the People`s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation, which improves the process for military requisition of civilian transportation assets during wartime, natural disasters, emergencies or `special circumstances`, both domestically and abroad."Chinese commercial vessels have taken part in maritime exercises, meaning that an entity such as COSCO could easily be called upon to support the PLAN in the Indian Ocean to augment naval capabilities. 

Furthermore, Chinese state-owned companies own or operate port facilities around the region (including Djibouti, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and the UAE), and they could provide some degree of sustainment.

In line with other analysis, Becker concluded: "...Other than its base in Djibouti, the PLAN does not, at present, appear to have arrangements with any other country in the region that would allow it to preposition specialized military equipment or technicians required to use that equipment, even in port facilities owned or operated by Chinese state-owned firms. Host governments whose ports do service PLAN vessels during a conflict, or allow the PLA to preposition military equipment on their territory, could possibly be dragged into the conflict as a co-belligerent."

Yet China has slightly improved its posture by developing more comprehensive naval facilities farther south within China - including an aircraft carrier base at Yulin on Hainan Island, thus speeding up the PLAN`s ability to deploy assets to the Indian Ocean. China could also surge platforms from reclaimed reef bases in the South China Sea, as they can harbor ships and accommodate aircraft such as fighters, maritime patrol and aerial refueling types. 

This would give the PLA a quicker response to any contingency in the Malacca Strait, for instance. It would make sense for China to establish a second overseas military base at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, to help defend access to the region. 

For many years, locations such as Myanmar have been discussed. Or even farther east, China`s military relationship with Phnom Penh has become quite exclusive in recent years. In 2019 there were media reports that China may have forged an agreement for the PLAN to use a Cambodian naval base, plus a large and mysterious airport is being constructed in Cambodia. 

Speculation is rife that the PLA could one day use the latter, even though Cambodia is some 1,000km from the Malacca Strait. Becker suggested another possibility, that Beijing may simply be content to emulate the Soviet Union`s past presence in the Indian Ocean. The Cold War power sought only limited SLOC protection and localized sea denial, as opposed to outright sea control. This could represent an achievable solution for China too.

Iran, India and Uzbekistan meeting on Chabahar Port

Iran, India, and Uzbekistan are scheduled to hold their first online meeting on cooperation in Iran's Chabahar Port on Monday, 14th December 2020, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced.

The trilateral working group meeting will be jointly chaired by Deputy Ministers of Iran and Uzbekistan and a secretary from India, Hindustan Times reported.

The announcement came a day after Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed during a summit with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that a trilateral meeting should be held with Iran to promote Chabahar port.

According to the website of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Indian Government welcomes Uzbekistan's interest in using Chabahar port, in Southeastern Iran, as a transit port, which provides economic opportunities for traders in the region.

In addition to Uzbekistan, other Central Asian countries have shown interest in using the port.

“This would open up economic opportunities for the traders and business community of the region. Besides Uzbekistan, other Central Asian countries have also shown interest in using the port. India seeks to cooperate closely with regional countries on this issue,” the statement by the Indian ministry said.

India currently operates one of the terminals of Chabahar port and offers loading and unloading services in the mentioned terminal.

“The strategic project has been given a waiver from sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran in view of its importance in shipping cargo and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan," the report highlighted.

Following an India-Uzbekistan Summit on Friday, Adarsh Swaika, Joint Secretary (Eurasia), Indian External Affairs Ministry, said the two sides had discussed the ways to overcome the lack of overland connectivity.

Mirziyoyev gave his in-principle concurrence to joining the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) when Modi reiterated a proposal on Uzbekistan’s participation in the project.

“We would welcome any initiative that increases connectivity between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan or with other Central Asian countries,” Swaika said.

Chabahar Port, the only Iranian ocean port, is a strategic port with unique opportunities that can attract investments from Iranian and foreign private sectors.

The development of the Chabahar Port is important for the economic development of regional countries and in this regard endorsing regional agreements with neighboring countries are of significant importance for Iran so that it can increase its transit share to connect the shores of the Indian Ocean to Russia, northern Central Asia, and the Caucasus.

CPEC Myths and Realities

In Pakistan a lot is being said and talked about China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). While some analysts term it a mega initiative by Pakistan’s ‘time tested friend’, cynics label it ‘another East India Company in Making”. Another group says, “British Raj undertook many mega developmental project in Indian subcontinent but most of these were aimed at taking the raw materials from one of its bountiful colony to the home town and sell its finished products to one of the huge markets enjoying substantial purchasing power, as against this CPEC is aimed at ushering prosperity in the rural areas of Pakistan”.

China has one of the largest population and industrial base. The country is deficient in indigenous production of energy products. To keep the factories running it has to import huge quantities of crude oil and finished products. Bulk of these products comes from Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Carrying these through ships takes long time and the cost is also high. Presence of navies of various super powers, particularly the US Navy, poses serious security risks for the ship carrying oil to China. Therefore, another route has to be constructed that is short, efficient and cost effective. Taking goods from Gwadar to Kashgar though Pakistan does not pose serious problems because most of the road and rail network is already in place, which can be further improvised at a faster pace and with lesser expenditures.

China, the fast growing economic power has embarked upon ‘One Road, One Belt’ program, which consists of economic belt and maritime road. A closer look at the illustration hardly shows any road or railway track passing through Pakistan. This implies that Pakistan is not the sole beneficiary of this grand plan but will reap the benefits to the extent it is able to use the corridor. At the best it will collect transit fee and the roads may make any contribution in boosting Pakistan’s GDP. The experts having futuristic vision say that adding to power generation and developing robust infrastructure can help in containing electricity outages and post-harvest losses, which means additional contribution to country’s GDP. However, reaping benefits will totally depend on conceiving right policies and their implementation in letter and spirit. The overwhelming perception is that the Government of Pakistan has not come up with any ‘home grown plan’ to fully exploit the true potential of CPEC.  

It is being said that CPEC envisages investment ranging from US$46 billion to US$72 billion. However, only scanty details are available about the projects and component of equity and debt. The overwhelming perception is that bulk of the money will come as debt and Pakistan may face serious debt serving constraints. Drawing substantial and sustainable income from infrastructure projects is a long drawn process. Sri Lanka already faces such a problem. Therefore, local policy planners have to take swift remedial steps to avoid a similar situation. It may be true that CPEC may yield enormous benefits for Pakistan, but it is more important to take into account any potential fallout and come up with ‘Disaster Recovery Plan’.

One of the basic lessons taught in management sciences is having a recovery plan in case the original plan fails. This is unavoidable because Pakistan faces internal and external treats. Even after seventy years of independence Pakistan is surviving on aid, grants, and loans and on the crutches of multilateral donors, particularly International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The primary obstacle to the CPEC’s full implementation is security. To address Chinese concerns and ensure the safety of these projects, Pakistan has created a dedicated CPEC force, but even a force of that size may not prove substantial. Many of the constituent projects are being constructed in the areas having sanctuaries of terrorist and anti-state groups. Attacks on the work force or Chinese engineers could delay or derail the CPEC.

A decades-long insurgency simmers in Baluchistan, where a number of important CPEC projects are underway. The CPEC also faces domestic political opposition in Pakistan, with infighting between provinces and the central government over the allocation of investments. The lack of transparency surrounding the negotiated deals has heightened concerns and skepticism that only a select few, if any in Pakistan, will benefit from the investments. In case Pakistan is unable to provide sufficient security or address the concerns of domestic opponents, projects will have trouble getting off the ground and will fail to prompt follow-on investments or deliver commercial success.

On the external front, CPEC face threats from the United States, India and Afghanistan. Indian Prime Minister has already lodged protest with China. Washington is likely to join hands with India, having concerns about the CPEC, as it represents the leading edge of China’s expanding access to, and likely influence within Eurasia. Any direct intervention by the US or India could be costly, unwinnable and almost certainly counterproductive to other US goals in Pakistan and the region.

This article was originally published in Pakistan & Gulf Economist