Thursday, 29 January 2026

Which is stronger lobby in the United States? munition makers or oil producers

In Washington, power rarely announces itself openly. It works through campaign donations, revolving doors, think tanks, and carefully shaped narratives. Among the most influential forces shaping US foreign and economic policy, two lobbies stand out: 1) defence-industrial complex and 2) fossil fuel industry. Both command enormous resources. Both influence war, peace, and prosperity. Yet when measured in reach, consistency, and policy outcomes, America’s arms manufacturers increasingly overshadow even Big Oil.

The oil lobby was once unrivalled. For decades, US foreign policy in the Middle East revolved around energy security. Oil giants funded campaigns, shaped environmental regulations, and enjoyed privileged access to policymakers. While they remain powerful—especially in blocking aggressive climate legislation—their dominance has gradually eroded. The rise of renewable energy, ESG pressures, and growing public awareness of climate change have constrained their room for manoeuvre. Oil companies now often find themselves playing defence.

The munition lobby, by contrast, is in expansion mode.

America’s major arms manufacturers—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defence, and General Dynamics—operate at the intersection of geopolitics and profit. Their influence is amplified by a permanent state of conflict or perceived threat. From Ukraine to Gaza, from Taiwan to the Persian Gulf, every escalation translates into fresh contracts, replenishment orders, and higher stock prices.

Unlike oil producers, defence firms benefit directly from instability. War is not a side effect of their business; it is their business model.

Their leverage rests on three pillars: 1) Defence contractors consistently rank among the largest donors to congressional campaigns, particularly to members of key committees overseeing defence spending. 2) Retired generals become board members, former Pentagon officials turn lobbyists, and corporate executives cycle into government roles. 3) Arms factories are spread across dozens of states, allowing lawmakers to justify military budgets as job protection rather than militarism.

This creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem. Threats are magnified. Military budgets grow almost automatically. Diplomatic options are sidelined, while weapon shipments become default policy tools.

Oil companies still shape energy policy, but they no longer dictate America’s strategic posture, defence firms do. Today, it is the arms industry that frames adversaries, defines security priorities, and normalizes trillion-dollar defence budgets with minimal scrutiny.

The implications are profound. A system driven by munition profits naturally gravitates toward confrontation. Peace becomes economically inconvenient.

If the oil lobby once pulled America into wars to secure energy routes, the munition lobby now sustains conflicts to secure revenue streams. That is a far more dangerous evolution—because it embeds war into the structure of governance itself.

The uncomfortable conclusion is this: in today’s United States, bullets carry more political weight than barrels.

Election or Selection in the United States?

The United States projects itself as the world’s leading democracy, promoting its political model while judging others against it. Yet a closer look at how power operates in Washington raises an uncomfortable question: does America still practice genuine elections, or has it quietly shifted toward managed selection?

Americans vote, campaigns are televised, and results are certified. But democracy is not merely about procedure—it is about meaningful choice. And that choice is shaped long before Election Day.

Today, candidates pass through an ecosystem dominated by money, lobbying, and media influence. Corporate donors, defence contractors, energy giants, and financial institutions determine who receives funding, visibility, and institutional backing. Those who challenge entrenched interests rarely survive primaries, while outsiders are systematically marginalized. By the time voters reach polling booths, the menu has already been curated.

This is where selection replaces election.

Campaigns now cost billions. Such sums cannot be raised without compromising political independence. Elected officials emerge indebted to donors rather than constituents. The revolving door between Congress, corporate boardrooms, and federal agencies further blurs the line between public service and private profit. Policy continuity across administrations—regardless of party—reveals where real power lies.

Foreign policy offers the clearest evidence. Presidents change, but wars persist. Military budgets expand almost automatically. Arms shipments grow. Sanctions multiply. Whether Democrat or Republican, Washington remains committed to confrontation-first strategies. This consistency reflects the priorities of powerful lobbies, particularly the defence industry, which profits directly from instability.

Domestic policy tells a similar story. Despite strong public support for healthcare reform, student debt relief, and financial regulation, progress remains limited. Meanwhile, defence spending and corporate advantages pass with remarkable ease. Popular will is routinely overridden by institutional inertia and corporate pressure.

Media consolidation deepens the problem. A handful of corporations shape national discourse, narrowing debate and manufacturing consent. Candidates who question militarism or corporate dominance receive limited coverage, while establishment figures dominate airtime.

To be clear, the United States is not a dictatorship. Elections occur, courts function, and civil liberties exist. But democracy has become conditional—operating within boundaries set by moneyed interests. Citizens vote, yet rarely determine strategic direction. That privilege belongs to donors, lobbyists, and unelected power centers.

The result is a managed democracy - ballots provide legitimacy, while selection ensures continuity. Until money is removed from politics and lobbying is meaningfully restrained, “government of the people” will remain more slogan than reality.

Wednesday, 28 January 2026

Muslim World at a Crossroads: OIC Must Act Before Iran Becomes the Next Battlefield

President Donald Trump’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward Iran should ring alarm bells across the Muslim world. Since Washington tightened its grip on Venezuela—effectively neutralizing its oil exports and political sovereignty—the White House’s tone on Tehran has grown markedly harsher. Today, threats of regime change, military strikes, and even targeted assassinations of Iran’s top clergy are being voiced with unsettling openness.

This trajectory is neither accidental nor unprecedented.

Recent Israeli and US operations against Iran succeeded largely because of access to regional airspace and ground facilities provided by neighboring Muslim countries. That cooperation—whether voluntary or extracted under pressure—proved decisive. There is little reason to believe the next phase, should it materialize, would be any different. On the contrary, Washington is almost certainly weighing which regional capitals might again be persuaded, coerced, or compelled to facilitate action against Tehran.

Herein lies the collective failure of Muslim leadership.

Individually, many states lack the political or economic resilience to withstand sustained US pressure. Collectively they possess enormous diplomatic weight, energy leverage, and strategic relevance. Yet this collective strength remains largely untapped, diluted by divisions and bilateral calculations.

This is precisely why the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must immediately convene an emergency summit.

Such a meeting should not be symbolic. It must produce a clear, unified resolution rejecting any military action against Iran and warning against the use of Muslim territories, airspace, or infrastructure for attacks on a fellow Muslim nation. Silence or ambiguity will be interpreted as consent.

Muslim rulers must also confront a sobering reality: Iran is not the endgame. Washington’s broader strategy has long revolved around reshaping political landscapes in energy-rich Muslim countries, often replacing sovereign governments with compliant “puppet” regimes. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan offer painful reminders of how external intervention leaves behind fractured societies and enduring instability.

The argument here is not about endorsing Iran’s policies. It is about safeguarding regional sovereignty and preventing yet another war that would devastate Muslim populations while serving external geopolitical interests.

History will judge today’s leaders by whether they chose unity over expediency.

If the Muslim world fails to draw a firm collective line now, it risks becoming a revolving battlefield—one country at a time. An emergency OIC meeting is not merely desirable; it is an urgent strategic necessity.

Sunday, 25 January 2026

China-India rapprochement not a good omen for United States

President Xi Jinping’s description of China and India as “good neighbours, friends and partners” may sound ceremonial, but the timing and context carry far greater geopolitical weight. His Republic Day message to Indian President Droupadi Murmu signals more than diplomatic courtesy. It reflects a calculated recalibration in Asia—one that should deeply concern Washington.

After years of tension following the deadly 2020 Himalayan clash, Beijing and New Delhi are quietly rebuilding bridges. The resumption of direct flights in 2025, expanding trade ties, and a series of high-level visits suggest both sides are determined to move beyond confrontation. Xi’s evocative metaphor of the “dragon and the elephant dancing together” underscores a strategic reality: Asia’s two largest powers are rediscovering the value of coexistence.

For the United States, this rapprochement is not a welcome development.

Washington has invested heavily in positioning India as a counterweight to China through frameworks such as the Quad and broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A warming China–India relationship weakens this pillar. If New Delhi chooses pragmatism over alignment, America’s carefully constructed containment architecture in Asia begins to fray.

More importantly, the implications extend far beyond South Asia.

A coordinated or even cooperative China–India posture diminishes US leverage across the wider Global South. Both countries are major energy consumers, influential voices in BRICS, and key stakeholders in Middle Eastern stability. As their economic and diplomatic coordination deepens, Washington risks losing its ability to shape outcomes from Tehran to Riyadh.

Weakening US hegemony in South Asia will also loosen America’s grip on the Middle East.

This is not theoretical. China already brokers regional diplomacy, from Saudi–Iran reconciliation to infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. India maintains historic ties with Gulf states while steadily expanding its economic footprint. Together, they offer regional actors alternatives to Western security and financial systems—precisely at a time when US foreign policy under President Donald Trump appears increasingly transactional and unpredictable.

To be sure, structural mistrust remains between Beijing and New Delhi. Their 3,800-kilometre disputed border is still heavily militarized, and strategic competition has not vanished. Yet both sides now seem willing to manage disputes rather than weaponize them.

That pragmatism carries consequences.

A stable China–India equation accelerates the shift toward a multipolar order, reducing Washington’s ability to divide and influence Asian powers. For the United States, the message is clear: when the dragon and the elephant learn to dance, America no longer leads the orchestra.

The emerging alignment may be fragile—but even a cautious rapprochement marks another step away from US-centric global dominance.

Saturday, 24 January 2026

PSX benchmark index closed at an all-time high of 189,167

Pakistan Stock Exchange continued upward movement during the week, with benchmark index gaining 4,068 points or 2.2% WoW to close at an all-time high of 189,167 on Friday, January 24, 2026. Market participation also improved by 8.7%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.3 billion shares, as compared to 1.2 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was supported by easing geopolitical tensions and a decline in T-Bill yields to single-digit levels for the first time in four years.

Moreover, positive economic partnerships with China, US, Britain and Saudi Arabia are expected to further boost Pakistan’s economy.

On the macroeconomic front, current account deficit was recorded at US$244 million for December 2025, while FDI outflows were recorded at US$135 million.

Power generation rose 8.8%YoY at December end, while IT sector recorded highest ever monthly exports of US$437 million, up 26%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 16, 3026, as a result PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.86 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan, China sign US$4.5 billion farm deals, boosting jobs and food supply, 2) Pakistan signs Trump-led Board of Peace charter, 3) GoP working on proposals to reduce industrial power tariff, 4) Pakistan-Philippines can boost pharma trade to US$1 billion, and 5) Foreign firms repatriate US$1.6 billion during 1HFY26.

Refinery, Fertilizer, Leather & Tanneries, Insurance, Property were amongst the top performing sectors, while Transport, Jute, Woollen, Technology & Communication, and Engineering were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$22.1 million and US$11.5 million, respectively. Foreigners and Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$21.1 million and US$10.4 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, ATRL, FATIMA, SAZEW, and ENGROH, while laggards included: PIOC, KTML, TGL, SYS, and PAEL.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark index to rise to 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are:  OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Thursday, 22 January 2026

US “armada” heading towards Middle East

US President Donald Trump said on Thursday a naval “armada” was heading toward the Middle East, as he renewed warnings to Tehran against killing protesters or restarting its nuclear program.

“We’re watching Iran,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One on Thursday as he flew back from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

“We have a big force going towards Iran,” Trump said.

“I’d rather not see anything happen, but we’re watching them very closely,” he said.

Trump’s announcement on the US naval buildup comes after he appeared to back-pedal last week on his threats of military action against Iran.

US officials said the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other assets would arrive in the Middle East in the coming days.

One official said additional air-defense systems were also being eyed for the Middle East, which could be critical to guard against any Iranian strike on US bases in the region.

The warships started moving from the Asia-Pacific last week as tensions between Iran and the United States soared following a severe crackdown on protests across Iran in recent months.

Trump had repeatedly threatened to intervene against Iran over the recent killings of protesters there but protests dwindled last week. The president backed away from his toughest rhetoric last week, claiming he had stopped executions of prisoners.

He repeated that claim on Thursday, saying Iran canceled nearly 840 hangings after his warnings.

"I said: 'If you hang those people, you're going to be hit harder than you've ever been hit. It'll make what we did to your Iran nuclear (program) look like peanuts,'" Trump said.

"At an hour before this horrible thing was going to take place, they canceled it," he said, calling it "a good sign."

The US military has in the past periodically surged forces to the Middle East at times of heightened tensions, moves that were often defensive.

However, the US military staged a major buildup last year ahead of its June strikes against Iran's nuclear program.

China’s muted response to US threats to attack Iran

China’s restrained reaction to fresh US threats against Iran is not a sign of indifference, weakness, or quiet acquiescence. Rather, it reflects a deliberate strategic calculation shaped by energy security, diplomatic doctrine, and Beijing’s evolving view of its role in the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent phone call with his Iranian counterpart captured this posture succinctly. By opposing the “use or threat of force” and reaffirming dialogue over coercion, Beijing restated principles it has upheld for decades. What stood out was what China chose not to do: no sharp condemnation of Washington, no announcement of countermeasures, and no promise of tangible intervention.

This muted response is consistent with China’s long-standing policy of non-interference. Beijing has historically avoided entanglement in the internal politics of partner states, whether governed by hardliners or reformists. For China, regime type is secondary to sovereignty, stability, and continuity of cooperation. Iran is no exception.

Economic realities reinforce this caution. China buys over 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports and remains the world’s largest crude importer. Yet Beijing is acutely aware that overt political or security involvement could invite harsher Western sanctions at a time when it is already under pressure from Washington. Restraint, therefore, is not passivity but risk management.

Crucially, China has spent decades diversifying its energy sources precisely to reduce overdependence on politically volatile suppliers. As long as Iranian instability does not escalate into a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or a collapse of Iran’s oil infrastructure, Beijing can absorb the shock. Iran’s reliance on shadow fleets and grey-zone trade has so far kept energy flows intact.

Beijing also appears relaxed about Iran’s internal political trajectory. A more pragmatic or even West-leaning leadership in Tehran would not necessarily undermine Chinese interests. Iran’s economic needs and China’s market size ensure a continued relationship, even if discounted oil disappears.

At a broader level, China is recalibrating its Middle East strategy. While its economic footprint is expanding amid a relative decline in US influence, Beijing remains unwilling to assume security responsibilities or confront Washington head-on. Verbal opposition, strategic ambiguity, and economic engagement remain its preferred tools.

In short, China is playing the long game. Its silence is not absence, but a calculated choice to protect interests without escalation — a reminder that in geopolitics, restraint can be as strategic as confrontation.