This is not the first time that Iran and Israel have
faced each other. One of the reasons for not expanding the level
of tension between these two actors is the agreed level of action and
reaction by both the countries.
After October 07, it seems that the Zionist regime is no
longer a rational actor due to the shocking blow it received, along with the
preference of Netanyahu's personal and party interests over other issues.
The
number of killings and civilian casualties, the targeting of hospitals,
and the shutting off of water, electricity, and food have made even the
regime's traditional allies criticize its irrational behavior.
This irrational behavior emanated from the lack of accurate
calculation of Iran's behavior in response to changing the red line drawn in
the parties' actions. However, it is also possible that due to the
understanding of Tehran's intention not to expand the war and engage in a
conflict with economic problems and sanctions, there was hope for continued
strategic patience from Iran.
Iran, whose security is based on deterrence,
considered the attack on the embassy a serious violation of its
existential interest.
In a situation where targeting Iran's nuclear infrastructure
has been among the goals of Israel and America for years, the main factor that
caused such a decision was Iran's significant deterrence.
However, after this attack on the embassy, what could be the
perception about Iran's deterrence? Iran's determination to respond
was inevitable; the question of its ability and design was raised.
Iran wanted to give a clear response to Israel in
a situation where the Zionist regime was under pressure in the field of public
opinion due to numerous violations of human rights, its widening gap with the
West and the United States regarding the handling of operations, and future of
Gaza.
All these elements indicate that Iran did not seek to expand
the conflict with Israel and other actors to open a new front and disrupt this
situation.
Therefore, the puzzle of the response to the attack on the
consulate had two apparently contradictory and paradoxical variables.
First,
the answer must be given in such a way that the damaged deterrence is revived
and causes a change in the enemy's perception of this type of strike.
Second,
the conflict should not spread, neither in the geographical field
nor in the increasing of actors involved.
According to Iran's previous experiences reviving its
deterrence, solving this problem and paradox have been two conceivable tools
and leverages: 1) Designing a type of military operation that demonstrates its
capability (at the tactical and design level) but not at the level of forcing
the target to respond and 2) Through political tools. The uncertainty in the
minds of the regional and global states regarding their goals should be
reduced.
Now, if we examine the True Promise operation with this
statement, these things are evident. According to previous experiences,
Iran and the Axis of Resistance have a specific knowledge and understanding of
the weak points of the Zionist regime.
One of the most obvious of these weaknesses is the
lack of strategic depth and a clear vulnerability regarding the
number of strikes and the number of fronts. Also, using the
principle of surprise usually increases the success rate.
However, Iran, knowing these cases, presented a designed
response in which it did not involve all the actors of the resistance axis who
were active during the past months; at the same time, it responded with minimal
quantity and quality (according to the Israeli regime's statistics, Hamas in
Al-Aqsa Storm operation had used about 3,500 projectiles) and of course, the
start of the attack was already known hours ago.
At the same time, during the days before the operation,
Tehran had expressed to the regional and extra-regional countries its intention
to carry out this "calibrated response."
This operation has shown Iran's maturity in design and
implementation. In general, it should be kept in mind that the main audience of
deterrence is not public opinion but decision-makers.
Security officials must know the type of target selection,
weapons, and tactics used better than anyone else. Until now, it seems that
Western officials and experts have received this calibrated response.