Historically, wars unite Israelis, not anymore. Not only
that Israelis do not agree with Benjamin Netanyahu’s war; they simply do not
believe that the prime minister is the man who could win this
supposedly existential fight.
An end to the Gaza war, even if
branded as a ‘victory’ by Netanyahu, will only further the polarization and
deepen Israel’s worst internal political struggle since its founding on the
ruins of historic Palestine. A continuation of the war will add to the schisms,
as it will only serve as a reminder of an irremediable defeat.
Netanyahu’s war remains unwinnable simply because liberation
wars, often conducted through guerrilla warfare tactics, are far more
complicated than traditional combat.
Nearly
six months after the Israeli attack on Gaza, it has become clear that
Palestinian Resistance groups are durable and well-prepared for a
much longer fight.
Netanyahu, supported by far-right ministers and an equally
hardline Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, insists that more firepower is the
answer. Though the unprecedented amount of explosives, used by Israel
in Gaza, killed and wounded over 100,000 Palestinians, an Israeli victory
remains elusive.
What do Israelis want and, more precisely, what is their
prime minister’s end-game in Gaza, anyway?
Major opinion polls since October 07 continued to
produce similar results: the Israeli public prefers Benny Gantz, leader of the
National Unity Party, over the prime minister and his Likud party.
A recent poll conducted by the Israeli newspaper
Maariv also indicated that one of Netanyahu’s closest and most important
coalition partners, Finance Minister and leader of the Religious Zionist Party,
Bezalel Smotrich, is virtually irrelevant in terms of public support. If
elections were to be held today, the far-right minister’s party would not even
pass the electoral threshold.
Most Israelis are calling for new elections this
year. If they are to receive their wish today, the pro-Netanyahu coalition
would only be able to muster 46 seats, compared to its rivals with 64.
And, if the Israeli coalition government – currently
controlling 72 seats out of 120 Knesset seats – is to collapse, the
rightwing dominance over Israeli politics will shatter, likely for a long
time.
All of Netanyahu’s political shenanigans, which served him
well in the past, would fall short from allowing him to return to power,
keeping in mind he is already 74 years of age.
A greatly polarized society, Israelis learned to blame an
individual or a political party for all of their woes. This is partly why
election outcomes can sharply differ between one election cycle to another.
Between April 2019 and November 2022, Israel held five general
elections, and now they are demanding yet another one.
The November 2022 elections were meant to be decisive, as
they ended years of uncertainty, and settled on the “most right-wing
government in the history of Israel” – an oft-repeated description of Israel’s
modern government coalitions.
To ensure Israel does not delve back into indecision,
Netanyahu’s government wanted to secure its gains for good. Smotrich, along
with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, wanted to fashion a new
Israeli society that is forever tilted towards their brand of religious and
ultranationalist Zionism.
Netanyahu, on the other hand, simply wanted to hold on to
power, partly because he became too accustomed to the perks of his office, and
also because he is desperately hoping to avoid jail time due to his several
corruption trials.
To achieve this, the right and far-right parties have
diligently worked to change the rules of the game, by curtailing the
power of the judiciary and ending the oversight of the Supreme Court. They
failed at some tasks, and succeeded at others, including an amendment to the
country’s Basic Laws to curtail the power of Israel’s highest court, thus its
right to overturn the government’s policies.
Though Israelis protested en masse, it was clear
that the initial energy of these protests, starting in January 2023, was
petering out, and that a government with such a substantial majority – at
least, per Israel’s standards – will not easily relent.
The
Palestinian Al-Aqsa Flood Operation is often examined in terms of its military
and intelligence components, if not usefulness, but rarely in terms of its
strategic outcomes. It placed Israel at a historic dilemma that even
Netanyahu’s comfortable Knesset majority cannot – and most likely will not – be
able to resolve.
Complicating matters, on January 01, 2024 the Supreme
Court officially annulled the decision by Netanyahu’s coalition to
strike down the power of the judiciary.
The news though significant, was overshadowed by many other
crises plaguing the country, mostly blamed on Netanyahu and his coalition
partners: the military and intelligence failure leading to October 07, the
grinding war, the shrinking economy, the risk of a regional conflict, the rift
between Israel and Washington, the growing global anti-Israel sentiment, and
more.
The
problems continue to pile up, and Netanyahu, the master politician of former
times, is now only hanging by the thread of keeping the war going for as long
as possible to defer his mounting crises for as long as possible.
Yet, an indefinite war is not an option, either. The Israeli
economy, according to recent data by the country’s Central Bureau of
Statistics, has shrunk by over 20% in the fourth quarter of 2023. It
is likely to continue its free fall in the coming period.
Moreover,
the army is struggling, fighting an unwinnable war without realistic goals. The
only major source for new recruits can be obtained from
ultra-Orthodox Jews, who have been spared the battlefield to study in yeshivas,
instead.
70 percent of all Israelis, including many in Netanyahu’s
own party, want the Haredi to join the army. On March 28, the Supreme
Court ordered a suspension of state subsidies allocated to these
ultra-Orthodox communities.
If that is to happen, the crisis will deepen on multiple
fronts. If the Haredi lose their privileges, Netanyahu’s government is likely
to collapse; if they maintain them, the other government, the post October 07
war council, is likely to collapse as well.
Courtesy: Information Clearing House