Since 2013, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani has served as
secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Iran’s top
policymaking body. Shamkhani’s position has become more important in recent
years as Iran’s incumbent president is more limited than his predecessor in
matters of foreign policy.
The
recent execution of one of Shamkhani’s former deputies, Alireza Akbari,
criticism from some power centers in Tehran, and his longevity in this post
have raised speculation that he could soon vacate his seat.
Such a change would be an important signpost of how the
Iranian establishment is posturing itself against the backdrop of continued
revolutionary sentiment among significant segments of the population.
Shamkhani
has long been a political chameleon — with stints in reformist, pragmatic, and
conservative presidential administrations. He is the only member of the Iranian
establishment to have served in the top brass of both Iran’s regular Army
(Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Likewise, Shamkhani
has been arguably the most senior ethnic Arab to have risen in the
Iranian system since 1979.
He is the second-longest serving SNSC secretary since Iran’s
previous president, Hassan Rouhani, first ascended to the job in 1989.
Rouhani’s tenure spanned over 15 years, whereas Shamkhani is nearing a decade
in office. Their terms bookended Ali Larijani, who was only secretary for
around two years, and Saeed Jalili, who held the post for approximately six
years. Unlike his predecessors, Shamkhani, who commanded both the Artesh and
IRGC navies, has considerable military experience. Rouhani had some command responsibilities
during the Iran-Iraq War, including as head of Iran’s National Air Defense
Command.
Shamkhani,
in contrast, has been a career military man. The military roles of Larijani and
Jalili were not as senior — Larijani was a parliamentary deputy in the IRGC and
Jalili a member of the Basij paramilitary militia — with the former a one-time
culture minister and head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and
the latter a deputy foreign minister before becoming secretary.
Shamkhani has also managed to survive and thrive across the
political spectrum. He was defense minister under the reformist President
Mohammad Khatami and SNSC secretary under Rouhani, a pragmatist, continuing in
this role under the incumbent, President Ebrahim Raisi, a more conservative
figure. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei purged the Iranian system in
recent years — extending even to the likes of Larijani, whom the Guardian
Council barred from running in the June 2021 presidential election despite
being a regime mainstay.
Yet more recently, figures like Shamkhani, who may have more
credibility among reformist elements of the Iranian political elite, have been
indispensable as Tehran deploys a series of pressure valves to preserve the Islamic
Revolution amid protests.
Last year, the government enlisted Shamkhani for
such an assignment, asking representatives of the founding families of the
Islamic Republic (the Khomeinis and the Rafsanjanis) to speak out publicly to
placate the Iranian people. If they did, Shamkhani promised reforms would
follow. But both clans reportedly refused those specific conditions. He also
recently met with marginalized reformist figures like Ali Shakuri
Rad, a former lawmaker.
Shamkhani likewise has been an advocate for change
within the system, to divide and conquer those protesting, forming an unusual
coalition with Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Vice
President for Economic Affairs Mohsen Rezaei, Amwaj Media has reported.
Such efforts coincide with the increased visibility of
reformists and pragmatists in Tehran since the onset of the protests in
September. Former President Khatami, once the subject of a media ban, has
become more vocal in warning that the Islamic Revolution is in danger and
advocated for not overhauling the constitution but merely returning to the
spirit and even the text.
The remarks resembled similar calls for reform he made while
in office, which failed then because of the Iranian deep state presided over by
the supreme leader. After being lambasted in his last days in office by Khamenei,
Rouhani has also resurfaced a few weeks ago, telling reporters on the
44th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, “We should not allow a power-hungry
minority to push the majority aside,” and warning that this “would be the end
of the revolution.”
However,
there has been no evidence that Khamenei is listening to Shamkhani. In fact, it
appears he is moving in the opposite direction, doubling down and deflecting.
His elevation of Ahmad-Reza Radan — a notorious hardliner — as the
new commander of Iran’s national police indicates as much. There is also evidence some in
the Iranian system are laying the groundwork to make Shamkhani the fall guy
amid the demonstrations.
It would not be unusual for Khamenei to reshuffle the
government amid significant challenges to the system. For instance, he shifted
Hossein Taeb, then commander of the Basij, to head a newly empowered IRGC
Intelligence Organization in 2009, when mass demonstrations took hold after the
disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency.
Likewise, on foreign policy, Shamkhani is the rare official
in the Raisi presidency who is a leftover from the Rouhani administration. The
dynamics of the SNSC have changed since the Rouhani era, when the then-chief of
staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Hassan Firouzabadi, defended Rouhani’s
nuclear diplomacy with the P5+1 (the five permanent United Nations Security
Council members, the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United
Kingdom, along with Germany).
Fast forward to 2023, his successor, Mohammad Bagheri,
has emerged as a leading critic of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) in the SNSC. Shamkhani has evolved as well. In 2014, he argued to
international media that Tehran and Washington can behave in a way that they do
not use their energy against each other [in the region]. A nuclear agreement
can be very crucial in this regard. Everything will depend on the honesty of
the Americans in the talks; by 2019, he expressed regret about the
JCPOA.
However, Shamkhani has
also hedged, counseling against a complete pivot away from the West to
align with China and Russia. Indeed, this outlook is increasingly a minority
view on the SNSC. This ideological nimbleness may explain why Khamenei has, so
far, been resistant to replacing him.
