Who is Ali Shamkhani?

Since 2013, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani has served as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Iran’s top policymaking body. Shamkhani’s position has become more important in recent years as Iran’s incumbent president is more limited than his predecessor in matters of foreign policy.

The recent execution of one of Shamkhani’s former deputies, Alireza Akbari, criticism from some power centers in Tehran, and his longevity in this post have raised speculation that he could soon vacate his seat.

Such a change would be an important signpost of how the Iranian establishment is posturing itself against the backdrop of continued revolutionary sentiment among significant segments of the population.

Shamkhani has long been a political chameleon — with stints in reformist, pragmatic, and conservative presidential administrations. He is the only member of the Iranian establishment to have served in the top brass of both Iran’s regular Army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Likewise, Shamkhani has been arguably the most senior ethnic Arab to have risen in the Iranian system since 1979.

He is the second-longest serving SNSC secretary since Iran’s previous president, Hassan Rouhani, first ascended to the job in 1989. Rouhani’s tenure spanned over 15 years, whereas Shamkhani is nearing a decade in office. Their terms bookended Ali Larijani, who was only secretary for around two years, and Saeed Jalili, who held the post for approximately six years. Unlike his predecessors, Shamkhani, who commanded both the Artesh and IRGC navies, has considerable military experience. Rouhani had some command responsibilities during the Iran-Iraq War, including as head of Iran’s National Air Defense Command.

Shamkhani, in contrast, has been a career military man. The military roles of Larijani and Jalili were not as senior — Larijani was a parliamentary deputy in the IRGC and Jalili a member of the Basij paramilitary militia — with the former a one-time culture minister and head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the latter a deputy foreign minister before becoming secretary.

Shamkhani has also managed to survive and thrive across the political spectrum. He was defense minister under the reformist President Mohammad Khatami and SNSC secretary under Rouhani, a pragmatist, continuing in this role under the incumbent, President Ebrahim Raisi, a more conservative figure. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei purged the Iranian system in recent years — extending even to the likes of Larijani, whom the Guardian Council barred from running in the June 2021 presidential election despite being a regime mainstay.

Yet more recently, figures like Shamkhani, who may have more credibility among reformist elements of the Iranian political elite, have been indispensable as Tehran deploys a series of pressure valves to preserve the Islamic Revolution amid protests.

Last year, the government enlisted Shamkhani for such an assignment, asking representatives of the founding families of the Islamic Republic (the Khomeinis and the Rafsanjanis) to speak out publicly to placate the Iranian people. If they did, Shamkhani promised reforms would follow. But both clans reportedly refused those specific conditions. He also recently met with marginalized reformist figures like Ali Shakuri Rad, a former lawmaker.

Shamkhani likewise has been an advocate for change within the system, to divide and conquer those protesting, forming an unusual coalition with Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Vice President for Economic Affairs Mohsen Rezaei, Amwaj Media has reported.

Such efforts coincide with the increased visibility of reformists and pragmatists in Tehran since the onset of the protests in September. Former President Khatami, once the subject of a media ban, has become more vocal in warning that the Islamic Revolution is in danger and advocated for not overhauling the constitution but merely returning to the spirit and even the text.

The remarks resembled similar calls for reform he made while in office, which failed then because of the Iranian deep state presided over by the supreme leader. After being lambasted in his last days in office by Khamenei, Rouhani has also resurfaced a few weeks ago, telling reporters on the 44th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, “We should not allow a power-hungry minority to push the majority aside,” and warning that this “would be the end of the revolution.”

However, there has been no evidence that Khamenei is listening to Shamkhani. In fact, it appears he is moving in the opposite direction, doubling down and deflecting. His elevation of Ahmad-Reza Radan — a notorious hardliner — as the new commander of Iran’s national police indicates as much. There is also evidence some in the Iranian system are laying the groundwork to make Shamkhani the fall guy amid the demonstrations.

It would not be unusual for Khamenei to reshuffle the government amid significant challenges to the system. For instance, he shifted Hossein Taeb, then commander of the Basij, to head a newly empowered IRGC Intelligence Organization in 2009, when mass demonstrations took hold after the disputed reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency.

Likewise, on foreign policy, Shamkhani is the rare official in the Raisi presidency who is a leftover from the Rouhani administration. The dynamics of the SNSC have changed since the Rouhani era, when the then-chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Hassan Firouzabadi,  defended Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy with the P5+1 (the five permanent United Nations Security Council members, the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom, along with Germany).

Fast forward to 2023, his successor, Mohammad Bagheri, has emerged as a leading critic of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the SNSC. Shamkhani has evolved as well. In 2014, he argued to international media that Tehran and Washington can behave in a way that they do not use their energy against each other [in the region]. A nuclear agreement can be very crucial in this regard. Everything will depend on the honesty of the Americans in the talks; by 2019, he expressed regret about the JCPOA.

However, Shamkhani has also hedged, counseling against a complete pivot away from the West to align with China and Russia. Indeed, this outlook is increasingly a minority view on the SNSC. This ideological nimbleness may explain why Khamenei has, so far, been resistant to replacing him.