The rise of projects like SpaceX’s Starlink and their use in the war in Ukraine has increased the attention on satellites and space security. However, submarine cables remain a crucial yet underappreciated part of the global communications system. The widespread use of these cables by private individuals, businesses, and government agencies makes their protection a matter of national and international security.
As fighting rages on in Ukraine, the cables in the Black Sea could be in danger of disruption. Accidents have caused damage to the cables in the past, and stepped-up naval activity in the region could raise the risk of vessels accidentally cutting the lines lying on the seafloor.
Moreover, deliberate Russian attacks on these cables, either through cyber operations or physical destruction, follow the Kremlin’s modus operandi of targeting critical infrastructure to gain strategic advantage without necessarily delivering decisive blows against its enemies.
To ensure regional security in the communication and data spheres, Black Sea states must increase their emphasis on protecting submarine cables, including within the format of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or novel regional frameworks.
Unlike the attacks on land-based power grids and energy pipelines, the threat to submarine cables is still a hypothetical national security concern as no definitive case of sabotage by a state actor has been confirmed thus far.
However, some defense officials, notably the chief of the British Defense Staff, Admiral Tony Radakin, have begun to emphasize the security implications of the cables’ vulnerabilities, especially in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Russia has been investing in capabilities that would allow specialized submarines to place explosives on the seafloor, physically endangering underwater communication infrastructure. In addition to the Russian navy, the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) — known as Russia’s “Deep-Sea Spetsnaz” — can undertake covert operations along the seabed.
NATO officials suspect that GUGI has been increasingly focusing on undersea cable networks in recent years. Notably, in January 2022, Norway detected damage to one of two fiber optic cables off the Svalbard archipelago; suspicions that the cable disruption may have been intentional grew later that year, after a mysterious explosion crippled the underwater Nord Stream natural gas pipeline, an incident that is still under investigation.
Skeptics argue that such concerns are exaggerated, especially since companies that own these undersea networks have been building redundancies to provide different data flow routes in case of a disruption to one cable.
Of the four Black Sea submarine cables, the only one physically connected to the territories in conflict is the Kerch Strait Cable, which links the occupied Crimean Peninsula with the Russian mainland. Not only is the cable owned by Rostelecom — Russia’s largest telecom firm — but any disruption to communications and internet in Ukraine through sabotage would affect Russian forces on the ground as well.
The primary objective of such an attack on submarine cables would be to create confusion and anxiety among the affected populations. The Kremlin could also order sabotage operations on cable networks connected to Ukraine’s allies in North America and Europe specifically to exacerbate the growing war fatigue caused by high inflation and gas prices.
Other than the Kerch Strait Cable, Rostelecom also owns the Georgia-Russia cable system in a joint venture with Georgian and Danish companies. Stretching across the Black Sea, the Caucasus Cable System, owned by Caucasus Online, connects Georgia and Bulgaria. In the west, Türk Telekom International operates the Black Sea Fiber Optic System (KAFOS), which has landing points in Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Yet a multinational security apparatus — whether through NATO or a Black Sea regional defense cooperative — is needed to help private companies successfully defend existing systems and launch future projects. The war in Ukraine has exposed NATO’s deficiencies in preventing and responding appropriately to potential Russian sabotage operations on critical infrastructure.
Measures taken by private companies to implement redundancies to limit the impact of individual disruptions will mitigate the risks of widespread internet blackouts. And if NATO states invested more in the defense of these networks, Russia would lose a potential point of leverage against the Alliance.
NATO defense ministers highlighted the importance of identifying the threats posed to submarine infrastructure, particularly by the Russian navy. As part of this effort to enhance security, NATO tasked Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC-NF) to monitor and protect these networks in the Atlantic.
Introducing a similar mission concept to the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions could be a productive step in ensuring the security of NATO’s exposed southeastern flank. The next iteration of the Black Sea Maritime Forum, first convened on February 25 of last year, could provide the appropriate platform to advance this issue and discuss solutions among Black Sea states with NATO involvement.
Regionally, coordinating strategic interests among the Black Sea states, especially with NATO, has always been a challenge. Despite Romania’s vocal support for an increased NATO presence in the region, the lack of enthusiasm from Turkey and Bulgaria has hindered progress toward sufficient Black Sea defense.
Turkey’s hesitation may be because of its “middleman” approach to the competition between Russia and the United States. Even as Russian aggression continually destabilizes the Black Sea region, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remains unwilling to fully commit to the West’s punitive stance against Moscow.
Turkey’s expanded trade relations with Russia, despite increasing pressure from the US to abide by Western sanctions, and its foot dragging on ratifying Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, demonstrate the country’s insistence on prioritizing its own security concerns, even at the expense of hindering a united Euro-Atlantic front.
However, Turkey must not overlook the importance of securing the critical infrastructure networks in the Black Sea, including submarine communication cables, especially as one of them — KAFOS — has a landing point in Istanbul, near the Bosporus Strait. Given Ankara’s interest in minimizing the risk of escalation in the Russo-Ukrainian war, it should contribute to the broader Black Sea region’s underwater domain awareness as well as monitor key vulnerabilities that could be exploited or put at risk by a malign actor — whether Moscow or anybody else.
Short of a wider North Atlantic Alliance mission, Turkey should actively cooperate with other Black Sea states, including non-NATO member Georgia, in pursuing their own regional security framework that would include as its mission the protection of submarine cables in the Black Sea.
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