Saturday, 23 October 2021

Turkey to expel 10 western ambassadors

Reportedly, Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced to expel the ambassadors of 10 Western countries who appealed for the release of Osman Kavala. Seven of these ambassadors represent Turkey’s NATO allies. 

The expulsions, if carried out, would cause the worst rift with the West in Erdogan’s 19 years in power.

 “I have ordered our Foreign Minister to declare these 10 ambassadors as persona non grata as soon as possible,” Erdogan said on Saturday, referring to a term used in diplomacy that signifies the first step before expulsion. He did not set a firm date.

 “They must know and understand Turkey,” Erdogan added, accusing the envoys of “indecency”.

“They must leave here the day they no longer know Turkey,” Erdogan said.

Lately, the envoys had issued a highly unusual joint statement saying the continued detention of Parisian-born activist Osman Kavala “cast a shadow” over Turkey. Kavala has become a symbol of the sweeping crackdown Erdogan unleashed after surviving the coup attempt.

The United States, Germany, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden called for a just and speedy resolution to Kavala’s case.

Speaking to the AFP news agency from his jail cell last week, Kavala said he felt like a tool in Erdogan’s attempts to blame a foreign plot for domestic opposition to his nearly two-decade rule.

Kavala said on Friday he would no longer attend his trial as a fair hearing was impossible after recent comments by Erdogan.

The Council of Europe, the continent’s top human rights watchdog, issued a final warning to Turkey to comply with a 2019 European Court of Human Rights order to release Kavala pending trial.

If Turkey fails to do so by its next meeting scheduled to commence on November 30 and continue till December 02, the Strasbourg-based council could vote to launch its first disciplinary proceedings against Ankara.

European Parliament President David Sassoli tweeted: “The expulsion of 10 ambassadors is a sign of the authoritarian drift of the Turkish government. We will not be intimidated.

A source at the German Foreign Ministry also said the 10 countries were consulting with one another. German lawmakers called for a tough response.

“Erdogan’s unscrupulous actions against his critics are becoming increasingly uninhibited,” Bundestag vice president Claudia Roth told the dpa news agency.

She said Erdogan’s “authoritarian course must be confronted internationally” and demanded sanctions and a halt to weapons exports to Turkey.

“The possible expulsion of 10 ambassadors, including the representatives of Germany and many of Turkey’s NATO allies, would be unwise, undiplomatic and would weaken the cohesion of the alliance,” lawmaker and foreign policy expert Alexander Graf Lambsdorff tweeted. “Erdogan can have no interest in that.”

Norway said its embassy had not received any notification from Turkish authorities.

“Our ambassador has not done anything that warrants an expulsion,” said the ministry’s chief spokesperson, Trude Maaseide, adding that Turkey was well aware of Norway’s views.

“We will continue to call on Turkey to comply with democratic standards and the rule of law to which the country committed itself under the European Human Rights Convention,” Maaseide said.

Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod said his ministry had not received any official notification, but was in contact with its friends and allies.

“We will continue to guard our common values and principles, as also expressed in the joint declaration,” he said in a statement.

Friday, 22 October 2021

The New Great Game

Lately, Nikkei Asia after focusing on Mongolia has featured Central Asia. These are five states of the region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. All were members of the former Soviet Union and became independent 30 years ago.

Nikkei wants it readers to look at both the latest Big Stories, on Mongolia and on Central Asia, because historically the Mongol Empire in the 13th century, under the rule of such distinguished leaders as Chinggis Khan and Kublai Khan, were pioneers during their reigns of what today has become the "Belt and Road" initiative to link infrastructure and economy.

They could make it possible, because they governed the region from China to modern day Russia and Iran. Some historians argue that Mongolia created a global trade network for the first time in human history.

In this big story, the author mentions Samarkand in Uzbekistan as the capital of the empire of Timur, the conqueror who made the city a key economic and cultural hub linking East and West in the 14th century. Timur was a descendant of the Mongolian Empire.
 
China's current expansionism is a potential threat to these "stans", as is shown from their huge loans from the communist country, which account for 43% of the government's foreign debt in Kyrgyzstan and about 40% in Tajikistan. Still, considering their geopolitical positions, without making use of the opportunities that the Belt and Road Initiative offers them, a bright future for these countries is unimaginable.

The Great Game is a historical term referring to the political and diplomatic confrontation between the British and Russian Empires over Afghanistan and neighboring territories in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

In the main illustration to this big story, we see a chessboard with a toppled Eagle having failed in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, a Dragon has approached, while the Bear is watching from a distance.

 

Thursday, 21 October 2021

Surging Energy Prices May Not Ease Until Next Year, says IMF

Soaring natural gas prices are rippling through global energy markets and other economic sectors from factories to utilities. 

According to a report by International Monetary Fund (IMF), an unprecedented combination of factors is roiling world energy markets, rekindling the memories of the 1970s energy crisis and complicating an already uncertain outlook for inflation and the global economy. Energy futures indicate that prices are likely to moderate in the coming months.

Spot prices for natural gas have more than quadrupled to record levels in Europe and Asia and the persistence and global dimension of these price spikes are unprecedented. Typically, such moves are seasonal and localized. Asian prices, for example, saw a similar jump last year but those didn’t spill over with an associated similar rise in Europe.

Analysts expect prices will revert back to normal levels early next year, when heating demand ebb and supplies adjust. However, if prices stay high as they have been, this could begin to be a drag on global growth.

Meanwhile, ripple effects are being felt in coal and oil markets. Brent crude oil prices, the global benchmark, recently reached a seven-year high above US$85 per barrel, as more buyers sought alternatives for heating and power generation amid already tight supplies. Coal, the nearest substitute, is in high demand as power plants turn to it more. This has pushed prices to the highest level since 2001, driving a rise in European carbon emission permit costs.

Bust, boom, and inadequate supply

Given this backdrop, it helps to look back to the start of the pandemic, when restrictions halted many activities across the global economy. This caused a collapse of energy consumption, leading energy companies to slash investment. However, consumption of natural gas rebounded fast—driven by industrial production, which accounts for about 20 percent of final natural gas consumption—boosting demand at a time when supplies were relatively low.

Energy supply, in fact, has reacted slowly to price signals due to labor shortages, maintenance backlogs, longer lead times for new projects, and lackluster interest from investors in fossil fuel energy companies. Natural gas production in the United States, for example, remains below pre-crisis levels. Production in the Netherlands and Norway is also down. And Europe’s biggest supplier, Russia, has recently slowed its shipments to the continent.

Weather has also exacerbated gas market imbalances. The Northern Hemisphere’s severe winter cold and summer heat boosted heating and cooling demand. Meanwhile, renewable power generation has been reduced in the United States and Brazil by droughts, which curbed hydropower output as reservoirs ran low, and in Northern Europe by below-average wind generation this summer and fall.

Coal supplies and inventories

While coal can help offset natural gas shortages, some of those supplies are also disrupted. Logistical and weather-related factors have crippled production from Australia to South Africa, while coal output in China, the world’s largest producer and consumer, has fallen amid emissions goals that dis-incentivize coal use and production in favor of renewables or gas.

In fact, Chinese coal stockpiles are at record lows, which increases the threat of winter fuel supply shortfalls for power plants. And in Europe, natural gas storage is below average ahead of winter, adding risk of more price increases as utilities compete for scarce resources before the arrival of cold weather.

Energy prices and inflation

Coal and natural gas prices tend to have less of an effect on consumer prices than oil because household electricity and natural gas bills are often regulated and prices are more rigid. Even so, in the industrial sector, higher natural gas prices are confronting producers that rely on the fuel to make chemicals or fertilizers. These dynamics are particularly concerning as they are affecting already uncertain inflation prospects amid supply chain disruptions, rising food prices, and firming demand.

Should energy prices remain at current levels, the value of global fossil fuel production as a share of gross domestic product this year would rise from 4.1 percent (estimated in our July projection to 4.7 percent. Next year, the share could be as high as 4.8 percent, up from a projected 3.75 percent in July. Assuming half of this increase in costs for oil, gas, and coal is due to reduced supply, this would represent a 0.3 percentage point reduction in global economic growth this year and about 0.5 percentage points next year.

Energy prices to normalize next year

While supply disruptions and price pressures pose unprecedented challenges for a world already grappling with an uneven pandemic recovery, the silver lining for policymakers is that the situation doesn’t compare to the early 1970s energy shock.

Back then, oil prices quadrupled, directly hitting household and business purchasing power and, eventually, causing a global recession. Nearly a half century later, given the less dominant role that coal and natural gas plays in the world’s economy, energy prices would need to rise much more significantly to cause such a dramatic shock.

Moreover, we expect natural gas prices to normalize by the second quarter as the end of winter in Europe and Asia eases seasonal pressures, as futures markets also indicate. Coal and crude oil prices are also likely to decline. However, uncertainty remains high and small demand shocks could trigger fresh price spikes.

Tough policy choices

That means central banks should look through price pressures from transitory energy supply shocks, but also be ready to act sooner—especially those with weaker monetary frameworks—if concrete risks of inflation expectations de-anchoring do materialize.

Governments should act to prevent power outages in the face of utilities curtailing generation if it becomes unprofitable. Blackouts, particularly in China, could dent chemical, steel, and manufacturing activity, adding to global supply-chain disruptions during a peak season for sales of consumer goods. Finally, as higher utility bills are regressive, support to low-income households can help mitigate the impact of the energy shock to the most vulnerable populations.

How do Israelis view Lapid’s foreign policy?

On June 14, 2021 a day after the new government was sworn in, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid delivered his first speech in his new role at a ceremony in the Foreign Ministry where he took over from Gabi Ashkenazi. His speech was essentially a broad outline of where he would like to take Israel’s foreign policy and the Foreign Ministry during his tenure.

On Tuesday, the Mitvim Institute, a left-leaning think tank, published its Ninth Annual Public Opinion Survey on Israeli Foreign Policy. The poll, in collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, was taken in September and carried out by the Rafi Smith Institute among a representative sample of the Israeli population (700 men and women, Jews and Arabs), with a sampling error of 3.5%. It provides an instructive look at how the public views the country’s foreign policy.

What follows is a look at some of Lapid’s assumptions and policy goals, and what the public believes to be the case. In many instances what emerges are significant gaps between the two.

Israel’s global standing

“In recent years, Israel has disgracefully neglected its foreign service and the international arena,” Lapid said in that speech in the Foreign Ministry. “Then it woke up in the morning and was surprised to find that there was considerable erosion in its international standing.”

Lapid’s premise was simple, Israel’s stature in the world arena was low. But the public, according to the Mitvim survey, does not necessarily agree with that basic assumption.

Asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, Israel’s standing in the world today, almost three-fourths of the country gave it a score of 5 or higher, with the average rating being 5.58. That does not indicate a country that believes its international standing is in the doldrums.

What is even more interesting, and what flies in the face of Lapid’s premise, is that this figure – the poll was taken with him firmly in the foreign minister’s chair – is at its lowest since 2017, with the poll showing that Israel’s stature was better from 2018 to 2020, when Benjamin Netanyahu was premier.

The poll also showed that the public was more satisfied with the government’s handling of foreign policy in 2019 and 2020, under Netanyahu, than it is today under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Lapid.

As for Lapid’s claim that Israel has neglected its foreign service, while the poll finds that a vast majority of the public wants to see the Foreign Ministry strengthened, when asked how satisfied the public is with the Foreign Ministry’s status today, more were satisfied in 2019 and 2020 than they were in 2021. That result shows that at least in the eyes of the public, Lapid has not yet succeeded in bolstering the image of the ministry.

Israel and United States

Lapid blasted the former government in this speech for “abandoning” major international arenas.

For instance, he said, the policy toward the US Democratic Party “was both disgraceful and dangerous,” and in his estimation, the former government took a “bad, dangerous and hasty bet” on the Republicans, and abandoned its traditional position of bipartisanship.

Four months into his tenure and his efforts at making inroads with the Democrats, how does the public view the current ties with the US? On a scale of 1 to 10, the public gave the current state of Israel-US relations a grade of 6.46, the lowest rating since 2016, when Barack Obama was president. Under the four years of President Donald Trump, this rating varied from a low of 6.88 in 2017 to a high of 8.05 in 2020.

Lapid has said repeatedly it was a mistake for Netanyahu to focus on the Republicans, but the public – according to this poll – believes that in the years when this was the policy, Israel’s ties with the US were better.

Even though the Biden administration has been careful up until now not to pick public fights with Jerusalem, or apply heavy public pressure – as was the case during the Obama years – some 53% of the public, and 58% of the Jewish respondents, believe the Biden administration is “less beneficial for Israel” than the previous administration. And this is even before disagreements over Iran and the opening of a Palestinian consulate in Jerusalem fully break out into the open.

Relations with the EU

“The situation with the countries of the EU is also not good,” Lapid said in June. “Relations with too many governments have been neglected and turned hostile. To shout that ‘everyone is antisemitic’ is neither a policy nor a plan of action, even if it sometimes feels right.”

Lapid said at the time that he had already spoken to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell and French President Emmanuel Macron, who believe there is a need to deepen the dialogue between Israel and Europe. His first four months in office have been marked by an effort to improve ties with Brussels and certain Western European countries, and to distance Israel from the “illiberal” EU countries such as Hungary and Poland.

The public, however, largely does view the EU as a foe.

Asked if the EU is now more a “friend or an opponent of Israel,” 46% of the general public, and 51% of Jews, said “more of an opponent.”

If a condition for joining various EU programs was that the settlements would not be included in them, 47% said Israel should not join, while 35% said they should – a figure that belies the premise that Israelis are unconcerned by policies, such as the Ben & Jerry’s boycott, that “only” target those Israelis living beyond the Green Line.

The polls also showed that as Lapid steers Israel away from countries like Hungary, he is going against a position articulated by 43% of the public, which believes that Israel “should not consider regime type as a factor when building its foreign relations.” However, an equal percentage of people (42%) said it should “give priority to developing ties with democratic countries.”

Israel and the region

Lapid’s assertion that Israel needs to strive for more agreements with Muslim nations is very much in the national consensus. Interestingly, however, 31% of the respondents did not feel that Israel’s position in the Middle East has changed significantly as a result of the Abraham Accords, though 34% did detect a change.

While this government has not made any public moves to improve ties with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, a country that has proven implacably hostile to Israel, some 61% of the population think Israel should try to do so. Even with the Abraham Accords, and following an initial enthusiasm in visiting the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, some 48% of the country said they had no interest in visiting an Arab country in the region, up from 41% who said the same thing three years ago.

Tellingly, only 2.7% of the public has an interest in visiting Jordan, down from 8% in 2018 and a sign that Israelis have no great desire to visit countries – even those close by – where they do not feel welcome.

Israel and Palestinians

Lapid, in his speech, said that while a diplomatic breakthrough with the Palestinians is not in the immediate offing, there is much Israel can do to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians and to improve the dialogue.

The public, does not feel that this should include strengthening the Palestinian Authority. Asked whether, in light of the political and economic crisis in the PA, Israel should work to strengthen it, only 28% said this would be the wise policy, while 38% said Israel should not intervene.

And as far as a dialogue with the PA is concerned, even as Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Meretz ministers traveled to Ramallah to meet PA President Mahmoud Abbas in recent weeks, only 32% said this was a positive development that will contribute to improving relations, while 46% said it was either a symbolic move that will not impact Israel-Palestinian relations (29%) or a negative development (17%) that actually harms Israeli interests.

Israel and Iran

One area where there was much compatibility between what Lapid said and what the public believes is in regard to Iran, where he said that in preparing for the possibility that the US will return to the nuclear deal, Israel’s guiding principle needs to be that it will prevent in any way the possibility that Iran will get a nuclear weapon.

There is a wide consensus on this, though the country is split regarding whether it should do so independently through military action, be it covert or overt (31%) or through forming coalitions with other Mideast countries against Iran (34%). Only 17.5% thought that Israel should support the international efforts to renew and improve the 2015 nuclear deal.

Wednesday, 20 October 2021

Egypt consolidates grip on northern Sinai

According to a The Jerusalem Post report, the Egyptian military has secured large areas of the strategic stretch of land bordering Palestinian-run Gaza and Israel on one side and the Suez Canal on the other. 

It is no longer on the back foot, witnesses, security sources and analysts say. Civilian life is still severely curtailed but the long-neglected region is changing as the state forges ahead with development schemes.

Many of the militants have been killed, fled or surrendered. Around 200 are still active, down from 400 two years ago and 800 in 2017, according to three Egyptian security sources.

On the outskirts of North Sinai's main city Al Arish, near where razed olive farms once stood, the government has built new apartment blocks.

A resident said people just sought a return to normality.

"We've had enough," said the man in his 50s, declining to be named. "We want to return to our houses or even the new ones they are building. We want to live in peace again."

Unrest roiled northern Sinai following the uprising in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak in 2011, escalating after the army overthrew President Mohamed Mursi.

In November 2017, the Islamic State-affiliated militant group Sinai Province claimed the most lethal attack in Egypt's modern history, which killed more than 300 people at a North Sinai mosque, as well as an assassination attempt against the defense and interior ministers at Al Arish military airport.

The military started an operation in response in February 2018 and now appears to be in its strongest position in North Sinai - the only area in Egypt where there is regular militant activity - for at least a decade.

The security presence in southern Sinai, a popular tourist destination, has also been reinforced and some international travel warnings scaled back.

At Sinai's northeastern point at Rafah and along the border with Gaza, a buffer zone has been created on cleared land, monitored by dozens of Egyptian watchtowers.

In its most recent statement on North Sinai, the Egyptian military said 89 suspected militants had been killed in an undefined period over recent months, against eight casualties from its own ranks.

There has been a "continuous and significant decline" in the number of attacks over the past three to four years, with approximately 17 recorded shooting attacks and 39 bomb attacks so far this year compared to 166 and 187 respectively in 2017, security analyst Oded Berkowitz said.

Sinai Province's capability has also been eroded by the squeezing of supply lines and recruitment from Gaza due in part to deteriorating relations with Palestinian factions there, and the hostility from Sinai residents, Berkowitz said.

Though, estimating militant numbers is hard, recent death notices suggest those still active are mostly Egyptian and Palestinians from Gaza, while previously they included foreign fighters from the Caucuses and Saudi Arabia, he said.

Near Bir al-Abd, where militants occupied a group of villages for weeks in the summer of 2020, masked gunmen stormed a café where Salem al-Sayed was watching football in September, kidnapping him and seven others and accusing them of cooperating with the military.

"They put us in a closed place so we could not hear anything, not even the sound of the wind," the 35-year-old told Reuters. After four days with their hands bound and blindfolded, they were freed by the military in a raid, Sayed said.

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who as Army Chief ousted Mursi in 2013, says developing Sinai is a priority.

"We will not leave any land that can be developed in Sinai until we make it grow," he said this month at an event to mark the 1973 war with Israel on the peninsula.

Last month in northwestern Sinai, Sisi inaugurated a US$1.3 billion agricultural wastewater plant to help reclaim land for farming.

The government recently announced a plan for 17 agricultural and residential development clusters across Sinai, 10 of them in the north. It says it is allocating modern and traditional homes for those displaced.

Access and international cooperation development remain limited, however. Demolitions and other restrictions linked to military operations have triggered complaints from some residents and rights groups.

State infrastructure projects and housing developments seem beyond local needs and means, said Ahmed Salem of the London-based Sinai Foundation for Human Rights.

The effective siege in north-eastern Sinai has restricted much economic activity, he said.

"They (both sides) destroyed Al Arish, which used to be one of the most beautiful tourist places in Egypt. Nowhere else you could see such sandy beaches," said one middle-aged resident.

"We don't support Islamic State, but many Sinai residents, from Rafah to Al Arish, were dealt with unjustly and paid a heavy price after doing nothing wrong," he said.

Tuesday, 19 October 2021

Is European energy crisis self inflicted?

Europe is facing the brunt of an unprecedented energy crunch. Some call it a crisis and term it comparable to the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s, while others classify it self-inflicted. Brent crude is being traded at a 5 year high of US$84 per barrel, while spot natural gas prices are up more than 500% YoY. 

This is forcing gas to coal switching and putting the brakes on the EU’s green energy transition. Resurgent energy demand post-Covid, extreme weather conditions, supply chain disruptions and poor regional and global stockpiling have all contributed to Europe’s current crisis. Russia’s supremo Vladimir Putin may have a reason to pop a champagne bottle in view of the EU’s sanctions on the Kremlin. He says that Europe had created a self-inflicted wound.

Samer Moses, Manager of Global LNG Analytics at S&P Global says, “Europe finds itself between a rock and a hard place. With global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets tight for nearly a year, and Russia facing its own upstream and infrastructure issues, Europe's two key sources of flexible gas supply have not shown up. Given just how depleted the region's storage situation is, any tremble of bullish news, be it weather or supply outage, has the power to send markets in search of ever higher price anchors, with fundamentals dictating the market will need to balance on demand destruction, a dynamic already being seen in industry across both Asia and Europe.”

This illustrates the concerns of many energy experts about Europe’s hasty transition away from traditional base-load power sources (gas, coal, and nuclear) to intermittent renewable generation. Europe’s master plan for carbon neutrality has pushed the member states away from long-term purchase agreements and towards short-term pricing, making the crisis even more costly to energy utilities and other consumers who are now seeking alternative fuel sources. Gas exporters like Russia and Qatar are ready to cash in.

The Qatari Energy Minister, Saad Al-Kaabi stated, “we have huge demand from all our customers and unfortunately, we can’t cater for everyone.” Qatar prefers East Asian customers who pay a premium. The EU is no longer the top market. This trend is consistent with exporters around the globe. Coupled with a decrease in domestic production, such as the depletion of the giant Groningen gas field in the Netherlands, the EU is left to bid higher and higher for imports. This coincides with overall uptick in demand for LNG across the globe in an effort to use it as a bridging fuel away from hydrocarbons.

At the same time, China, too, is in the throes of an energy crisis aggravated by unprecedented flooding across the country, post-Covid supply chain disruptions, and resurgent demand. To compensate for the lack of domestic coal production China has doubled their LNG imports over the last year (another reason Europe finds itself with lower than normal supplies).  More than 20 provinces have enacted rationing to deal with the worsening situation. “Get energy supplies at any price”, ordered the ruling Politburo, highlighting the giant economy’s dependence on imported coal and gas.

Russia – though appears not to be an outright market manipulator – is well positioned to benefit from the unfolding market conditions as Europe seeks out any and all gas supplies at outrageous prices. Indeed, the gas shortage is being used by the Kremlin to tout the necessity of Nord Stream 2, an ambitious (and highly controversial) geostrategic gambit by the Kremlin to pump 55 bcm of gas directly into Germany via undersea pipe. The project may be framed by certain German manufacturers and Russian policymakers as a boon for Europe’s energy security, but the reality is the pipeline will only make the EU more dependent on – and vulnerable too – the whims of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

European leaders were quick to claim that Russia is now weaponizing the gas markets to gain approval of the Nord Stream 2. Currently, Gazprom sends piped natural gas through Ukraine. A new pipeline would circumvent the embattled country. By law, Russian energy producers must satisfy domestic demand prior to exporting, meaning that a missing volume of exports could be attributed to domestic stockpile shortages.

IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol has claimed that “Russia could do more to increase gas availability to Europe and ensure storage is filled to adequate levels in preparation for the coming winter heating season.” Birol went on to say a further 15% could be supplied by Russia immediately.

A staunch pro-Russia actor, former chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder published an article claiming that the Russian government is incapable of manipulating the markets: "Anyone who conducts a serious study states: the reasons for the rise in prices should be sought in the international market - increased demand, global trends in the world market, and weather."

As the EU sought to decarbonize their energy infrastructure, Brussels failed to establish a reliable baseline capacity for electricity generation. Today, without the ample nuclear, coal, and gas power stations, Europe would be a dark and cold place indeed. Moreover, they lack sources of energy for low renewable periods like the “windless summer” of this past year in the UK. Low wind speeds and cloud cover are becoming more unpredictable as climate change progresses, and the lack of base-load generation has resulted in the current crisis.

Some of the reactions were to purchase alternative fuels such as coal, a fuel source that produces double the carbon emissions of natural gas. This defeats the purpose of energy transformation.

The United Kingdom, France and Spain have all issued new price ceilings. France has gone a step further and announced a one billion euro investment in nuclear power by the end of the decade.

Germany, despite all rationality, will decommissioned nearly all its reactors next year, while betting on wind and solar, and may soon be forced to bend knee to Russia, and therefore Lord Putin, by embracing Nord Stream 2, for their energy needs. Jack Sharples, a research fellow at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies had this to say:

“The only way that we will know that for sure is if we see that Russia suddenly pull some spare gas out of their back pocket that we didn't know they had as soon as the Nord Stream 2 commercial operation is approved… Conversely, if/when Nord Stream 2 is approved and launched, we suddenly see gas transit via Ukraine drop to very low levels, that could be an indicator that Gazprom really don't have anything spare and that actually the purpose of Nord Stream 2 is to simply displace Ukraine.”

Depending on Russia to fill the energy supply gap is a risky proposition. But perhaps even more short-sighted is Europe’s unwillingness to partner with the United States beyond short-term contracts. Refusal to engage in long-term purchase agreements has led Europe to fall behind Asia as America’s top destination for LNG.

The energy crisis unfolding in Europe has many drivers, but EU green policy hubris and Russian hard-nosed energy poker are the key. The main lesson is: one cannot will energy transformation into reality without building ample, reliable and economically viable baseline generation capacity.

 

Monday, 18 October 2021

Afghanistan the largest source of opium


According to certain reports, Afghanistan is classified the source of more than 80% of the world’s opium supply, and in recent years, much of that has been in Taliban-controlled areas

When Taliban seized control of Afghanistan earlier this year, its leadership promised to end poppy cultivation across the country. To back up its pledge, Taliban leadership pointed to the prohibition on opium it imposed two decades ago when it was last in power.

Taliban will have a long way to go to make good on its commitment. In 2020, Afghan farmers devoted their third-highest-ever acreage to opium production, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime reports that the opium trade has grown to constitute more than 10% of the country’s economy.

Much of that growth came from lands under Taliban control. In fact, in recent years, Taliban leaders have used the opium trade as a major revenue source, imposing an informal tax on farmers, laboratories that converted the crop into heroin, and smugglers who transported the drugs.

Some analysts, like the International Crisis Group’s Ibraheem Bahiss, believe that Taliban’s pledge on ending the opium trade in Afghanistan is merely a “bargaining chip in return for international aid.” According to the World Bank, prior to Taliban takeover such aid accounted for 43% of Afghanistan’s GDP.

The last time Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the poppy fields flourished. In 1999, three years after the group established its Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the country’s total production of raw opium was estimated to have hit nearly 4,600 tons — more than double the amount for the year before.

Almost a quarter century later, Afghanistan continues to be the world’s top opium producer. But since Taliban assumed power in Kabul earlier this month, spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid has repeatedly told international media Taliban would not allow the production of opium or other narcotics within its state.

“Afghanistan will not be a country of cultivation of opium anymore,” Mujahid said during a news conference on Aug. 17, two days after the group seized the Afghan capital.

That may not be an easy task. According to another report Afghanistan accounted for 85% of the opium produced worldwide last year, far outdoing rival producers such as Myanmar and Mexico. The country has also been accused of playing a major role in the global supply of cannabis and methamphetamines.

Despite its austere version of Islamic theology and strict enforcement of religious rules, the Taliban has long had a symbiotic relationship with the trade in opium, which can be processed chemically to produce narcotics such as heroin. In the 1990s, the group allowed the opium trade even as it banned hashish and cigarettes as haram (forbidden) for Muslims.

The group’s religious justification? Heroin largely affected non-Muslims outside of Afghanistan.

It was a “gymnastic” interpretation of Islamic law, said Haroun Rahimi, a legal scholar at the American University of Afghanistan. But the group needed the support of smugglers and farmers, as well as funding, which it could get by taxing opium production.

Taliban banned opium production in 2000 under Western pressure. However, after the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, production flourished again in Taliban-held areas. Despite US-backed eradication efforts estimated to cost US$9 billion, production peaked at an estimated 9,000 tons in 2017.

Today, Taliban face a new landscape. It is no longer the isolated, inward-looking government that ruled between 1996 and 2001, nor the mostly rural insurgency that fought against the US-backed Afghan government until its victory this month. It is now the de facto leader of a desperately poor nation recovering from decades of war, with significant levels of opioid addiction among its own citizens.

Robert Crews, an expert on Afghanistan at Stanford University, said Taliban proclamation on opium was probably a “diplomatic overture.” “It is aimed at demonstrating they will form a ‘responsible’ government, one that adheres to international legal norms,” Crews said.

The poppy can grow in warm and dry climates, requiring only a little irrigation. Resin from the plant can be refined into morphine, which can then be processed further into heroin; both are easily transportable, making opium an attractive crop in a country with weak infrastructure.

There is evidence of opium production in Afghanistan since at least the 18th century, scholars have said. But the industry only began to thrive after 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded, setting off a protracted period of conflict in the country that has lasted almost unbroken until the present.

Before the Taliban effectively seized power in 1996, around 59 percent of global opium production was estimated by the United Nations to be from the country. But production rose quickly under the Taliban’s auspices, drawing international criticism.

Taliban founder Mohammad Omar banned the cultivation and trade of opium in July 2000 and received a US$43 million grant in US counternarcotics funding. A UN report released the following year suggested the policy was showing signs of success.

But the US-led invasion of Afghanistan a year later upended that. As more and more rural areas of Afghanistan fell out of government control, poppy cultivation soared. By 2004, it had surpassed the peak of the first Taliban era and would soon go on to double it. Efforts to end the industry, backed by the United States, faltered.

In classified interviews published by The Washington Post as the Afghanistan Papers, officials admitted it wasn’t just Taliban enabling the trade.

“The biggest problem was corruption in Afghanistan, and drugs were part of it. You couldn’t deal with one without dealing with the other,” Douglas Wankel, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent who led a federal counternarcotics task force in Kabul, told government interviewers.

 

It’s difficult to say to what extent the opium trade has contributed to the Taliban’s victory. Some experts argue that the funds produced by the trade, as well as Taliban control over it, are overstated. As the drugs have been largely exported abroad, the greatest profits have been made by criminal cartels outside of Afghanistan.

One study released earlier this year that estimated Taliban revenue in the opium-producing province of Nimruz found the group raised far more money there by taxing legal sectors such as transit goods and fuel than drugs — with US$40.9 million in taxes levied on the former and US$5.1 million on the latter in 2020.

In a sign of the shifting international drug market, the majority of revenue from the drug industry in the province was estimated to come from the production of methamphetamines, rather than opium, according to the Overseas Development Institute, the British think tank that produced the study.

David Mansfield, a British expert on Afghanistan’s informal economy and one of the authors of the report, said his research showed the limits of “control” in Afghanistan. “Everything is negotiated in Afghanistan because political and military power is diffuse, even with the Taliban,” he said.

Ibraheem Bahiss, an expert on Afghanistan with the International Crisis Group, said Taliban’s recent statements showed it was effectively “using narcotic eradication as a bargaining chip in return for international aid.”

While the group was estimated to have made US$39.9 million in revenue from taxes on the opium trade in 2018, the US government has previously supplied the Afghan government with around US$500 million in civilian aid each year.

Already blocked by the US treasury from accessing some Afghan government funds, Taliban is likely to need all the money it can get. So far, there has been no financial backing from the United States or other world powers. But cracking down on the opium trade would probably give the Taliban leverage with its neighbors such as Iran and Russia, the next stops on the drug route, or Europe and Canada, where it often ends up in its final form as heroin. (Most heroin in the United States comes from Mexico.)

For a group that has based much of its political legitimacy on the strict enforcement of religious law, it would also be more consistent. “Fundamentally, anything that harms the human body is haram [in Islamic law]. If something is prohibited, its consumption, dealing and trade are always prohibited,” Rahimi said.

Opioid addiction has taken a toll on Afghan society. One 2015 survey concluded that there were between 2.9 million and 3.6 million drug users in Afghanistan, with opioids being the drug of choice — an exceptionally high level of per capita drug usage.

Just as the Afghan government struggled with these problems, the Taliban may now too. “In many communities, opium cultivation is crucial to survival,” Crews said, adding that there could be confrontations with Afghan growers across the country who face economic problems because of drought and the coronavirus.

“They are harsh. They can use force,” Rahimi said, of the Taliban. “But there is a limit to how much force they can use. … It’d be like using force against their major base of support.”