The latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting
of Foreign Ministers in Dushanbe, the Tajik capital, may have been an
under-the-radar affair, but it did reveal the contours of the big picture of
Afghanistan.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi laid out the basic road map
to his Afghan counterpart Mohammad Haneef Atmar. While stressing the Chinese
foreign policy gold standard – no interference in internal affairs of friendly
nations – Wang established three priorities:
1. Real inter-Afghan negotiations towards national
reconciliation and a durable political solution, thus preventing all-out civil
war. Beijing is ready to “facilitate” dialogue.
2. Fighting terror – which means, in practice, al-Qaeda
remnants, ISIS-Khorasan and the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Afghanistan should not be a haven for terrorist outfits – again.
3. The Taliban, for their part, should pledge a clean break
with every terrorist outfit.
Atmar fully agreed with Wang. And so did Tajik Foreign
Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin. Atmar even promised to work with Beijing to
crack down on ETIM, a Uighur terror group founded in China’s western Xinjiang.
Overall, the official Beijing stance is that all negotiations should be
“Afghan-owned and Afghan-led.”
It was up to Russian Presidential envoy Zamir Kabulov to
offer a more detailed appraisal of the Dushanbe discussions.
The main Russian point is that Kabul and the Taliban should
try to form a provisional coalition government for the next 2-3 years, while
they negotiate a permanent agreement. Talk about a Sisyphean task – and that’s
an understatement. The Russians know very well that both sides won’t restart
negotiations before September.
Moscow is very precise about the role of the extended troika
– Russia, China, Pakistan and the US – in the excruciatingly slow Doha peace
process talks: the troika should “facilitate” (also Wang’s terminology), not
mediate the proceedings.
Another very important point is that once “substantive”
intra-Afghan negotiations resume, a mechanism should be launched to clear the
Taliban of UN Security Council sanctions.
This will mean the normalization of the Taliban as a
political movement. Considering their current diplomatic drive, the Taliban do
have their eyes on the ball. So the Russian warning that they should not become
a security threat to any of the Central Asian “stans” or there will be
“consequences” has been fully understood.
Four of the five “stans” (Turkmenistan is the exception) are
SCO members. By the way, the Taliban have sent a diplomatic mission to
Turkmenistan to ease its fears.
In Dushanbe, a special meeting of the SCO-Afghanistan
Contact Group, established in 2005, for the first time was held at the foreign
minister level.
This shows that the SCO as a whole is engaged in making its
“facilitate, not mediate” role the prime mechanism to solve the Afghan drama.
It’s always crucial to remember that no fewer than six SCO member-nations are
Afghanistan’s neighbors.
During the main event in Dushanbe – the SCO Foreign
Ministers Council – the Russians once again framed Washington’s Indo-Pacific
strategy as an attempt to deter China and isolate Russia.
Following recent analyses by President Vladimir Putin and
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Russian delegation explained to its SCO
counterparts its view counterposing Moscow and Beijing’s effort to develop a
polycentric world system based on international law, on the one hand, with the
Western concept of the so-called “rules-based world order.”
The Western approach, they said, puts pressure on countries
that pursue independent foreign policy courses, ultimately legitimizing the
West’s “neocolonial policy.”
While the SCO was discussing the drive towards a polycentric
world system, the Taliban, on the ground, kept doing what they’ve been doing
for the past few weeks: capturing strategic crossroads.
The Taliban already controlled border crossings with
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Turkmenistan. Now they have taken over
ultra-strategic Spin Boldak, bordering Balochistan in Pakistan, which in trade
terms is even more important than the Torkham border crossing near the Khyber
Pass.
According to Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen, “the Spin
Boldak district in Kandahar province has been cleared of the enemy” – Kabul’s
forces – “and the district is now under the control of the mujahideen.” The
term “mujahideen” in the Afghan context means indigenous forces fighting
foreign invaders or proxies.
To have an idea of the importance of Spin Boldak for the
Taliban economy during their years in power, see the third chapter of a series
I published in Asia Times in 2010, here and here.
Eleven years ago, I noted that “the Afghan-Pakistan border is still porous, and
the Taliban seem to believe they may even get their Talibanistan back.” They
believe that now, more than ever.
Meanwhile, in the northeast, in Badakhshan province, the
Taliban are getting closer and closer to the border with Xinjiang – which has
led to some hysteria about “terrorism” infiltrating China via the Wakhan
corridor.
What’s way more relevant is that the Ministry of Public
Works in Kabul is actually building a 50-kilometer road – for the moment
unpaved – between Badakhshan province and Xinjiang, all the way to the end
of the Wakhan corridor. They will call it the Wakhan Route.
SCO member Pakistan remains arguably the key to solve the
Afghan drama. The Pakistani ISI remains closely linked to every Taliban
faction: never forget the Taliban are a creation of legendary General Hamid Gul
in the early 1990s.
At the same time, for any Jihadi outfit it’s easier to hide
and lie low deep in the Pakistani tribal areas than anywhere else – and they
can buy protection, irrespective of what the Taliban are doing in Afghanistan.
Prime Minister Imran Khan and his circle are very much aware of it – as much as
Beijing. That will be the ultimate test for the SCO in its anti-terror front.
China needs an eminently stable Pakistan for all the
long-term Belt and Road/China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects and to
fulfill its goal of incorporating Afghanistan. Kabul would be bound to benefit
not only from increased connectivity and infrastructure development but also
from future mineral including rare earth exploration projects.
Meanwhile, Hindu nationalists would love to outflank
Pakistan and extend their influence in Kabul, encouraged by Washington. For
the Empire of Chaos, the ideal agenda is – what else? – chaos, disrupting
Belt and Road and the Russia-China road map for Eurasian integration, Afghanistan
included.
Added hysteria depicting Russia and China involved in Afghan
reconstruction as but a new chapter in the never-ending “graveyard of empires”
saga does not even qualify as nonsense. The talks in Dushanbe made clear that
the Russia-China strategic partnership approach to Afghanistan is cautiously
realistic.
It’s all about national reconciliation, economic development
and Eurasian integration. Not included military component, hubs for an Empire
of Bases, foreign interference. Moscow and Beijing also recognize,
pragmatically, that fulfilling those dreams will not be possible in an
Afghanistan hostage to ethno-sectarianism.
The Taliban for their part seem to have recognized their own
limits, hence their current inter-regional diplomatic drive. They seem to be
paying close attention to the inevitable heavyweights – Russia and China – as
well as the Central Asian “stans” plus Pakistan and Iran.