Why United States has lost almost every war?

Since the World War II, the United States has lost almost every war that it has initiated in a developing country. This symbolizes the tragedy of super power’s incapability. 

The US is bowing out without having achieved its original objectives. The withdrawal also poses serious consequences for Afghanistan, the region and NATO’s reputation.

After the Vietnam fiasco and the Iraq debacle, as well as the example of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the US and its allies should have been wiser in their choice of intervention, but Afghanistan’s case clearly demonstrates the opposite. These interventions have been driven by the view that the super power has the necessary military power to easily overwhelm an enemy, which has turned out to be untrue.

Washington’s planners may have proved very effective in invading a country, but have been defeated invariably in every war. Four interrelated themes explain America’s failure in these three countries.

First, Washington’s inability to comprehend the complexity of the country it has invaded and the region. The US may have been good at overthrowing governments but has no idea when it comes to their replacement. The US invades without a clear and deep understanding of the very complicated nature of their societies and intricacies of their neighborhoods.

Second, the US hasn’t been able to secure a credible and effective partner on the ground in the invaded country. This was true in South Vietnam and has been also the case with Iraq and Afghanistan. Every leader and government that the US has backed in these countries has proved to be incompetent, manipulative, unpopular and incapable of generating national unity.

Third, US hasn’t been able to sell its invasions and fulfill its original promises to the people of these countries. The disillusionment in the invaded countries and in the US has undermined its war efforts.

Fourth, Washington has learned little or nothing from its past experiences: it is not well equipped or suited for fighting national insurgencies. The insurgents have shown the staying power to exhaust the US.

All of these issues have come together to demonstrate why America’s Afghanistan adventure has failed.

President Joe Biden’s declaration to withdraw troops is a clear admission of defeat. He is doing what his predecessor and long-standing critic of the Afghan war Donald Trump had set out to do.

The tragedy is that the withdrawal follows very high human and material costs for the US and its allies as well as for the Afghan people. The war has over US$2 trillion.

Afghan’s human and property losses have been far greater. Current estimates put the number of civilians and security service men and women killed at more than 100,000, with many more injured and displaced.

All the promises made initially by President George W. Bush to free Afghans and to transform the country into a stable, secure, prosperous democracy seem farther from the reality.

The US and its allies will leave behind a broken Afghanistan, just as the US left South Vietnam and Iraq. With no political settlement or ceasefire in place Taliban have already clinch victory.

Taliban are now well positioned to get control over Kabul, but the takeover will not be the end of the Afghan conflict. On the contrary the conflict will continue with more suffering for the poor Afghans.

Bennett getting ready to replace Netanyahu as Prime Minister

Yamina leader, Naftali Bennett revealed for the first time on Wednesday that he was prepared to form a national unity government, if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fails to build a coalition by the 4^th May 2021 deadline. 

Bennett said a right-wing government was still his preference, but if it was not possible, he would make every effort to build a unity government that conforms to his values. He said he would first do everything possible to enable Netanyahu to build a coalition, whose failure to be built until now - he said - was the fault of Religious Zionist Party head Bezalel Smotrich.

Responding for the first time to Netanyahu's call for direct elections for prime minister, Bennett called the idea "throwing billions in the trash" and accused Netanyahu of "holding Israel hostage" and being ready to take Israel to a sixth and seventh election. Without the support of Yamina, there is no majority for the direct elections bill. 

"Israel needs a functioning, stable government immediately," he said. "The people of Israel are sick of fighting and want a government that works for them."

Netanyahu responded by accusing Bennett of "doing everything possible to prevent the formation of a right-wing government and instead completing a deal on a government with Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, with the support of the Joint List, despite having only seven seats. 

"This spits in the face of democracy," said Netanyahu, who accused Bennett of being "ready to assassinate the Right."

Netanyahu said a Bennett-led government would not be able to resist international pressure on Iran and other key issues.

Responding to questions about whether he would head the opposition if he fails to form a government, Netanyahu said "I am not resigning" and "We are doing all we can so we won't be in the opposition."

Netanyahu said clearly for the first time that he is not considering trying to succeed Reuven Rivlin as president. 

"I am not interested in being president and never was," he said. 

Mocking Netanyahu for talking about breaking promises and deceiving the public, Lapid wrote on Twitter "there is no limit to swindling." Lapid said no one believes Netanyahu's empty promises anymore and that the solution is a unity government. 

Channel 13 reported on Wednesday night that one of the major fights preventing a deal between Lapid and Bennett is that Bennett wants  New Hope head Gideon Sa'ar to be defense minister and Lapid wants someone less right-wing. 

In an effort to advance his direct election for prime minister idea, Netanyahu spoke on Wednesday with the heads of Ra'am (United Arab List), Labor, Meretz and Blue and White. All except the Ra'am head Mansour Abbas, who is undecided, told Netanyahu they opposed the idea. 

Another idea raised in Netanyahu's circles, that Knesset Speaker Yariv Levin serve as prime minister for a year, was dismissed on Wednesday by Netanyahu and by top officials in Likud.

Former Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat promised on Wednesday that he will be the successor of Netanyahu.

Speaking at a conference of the Association of Municipal Corporations Conference at the Herod's Hotel in Eilat, Barkat called on Bennett and Sa'ar to join a Netanyahu-led government. But he also spoke about the future of his Likud party if Netanyahu does not form a government by the 4^th May deadline.

"If the prime minister decides to resign [from the chairmanship of Likud], I will of course enter the race for prime minister and I will win," Barkat said.

Return of Iran to oil market doesn’t pose any threat to producers

The ongoing JCPOA discussions are being watched by international oil markets closely. The possibility of Washington rejoining the international Iranian nuclear agreement is still in doubt, but the Biden Administration appears to be considering the move. Iran has indicated that it will only rejoin JCPOA if US sanctions on its main economic sectors, namely oil and gas, are lifted.

Some of the analysts are worried about the possible negative repercussions of Iranian oil on global oil supply and oil prices. The current global oil market is gaining stability, but a complete recovery is far from certain. It is only due to Saudi Arabia’s actions that markets have been able to rebound.

One of the main reasons Saudi Arabia has been able to make these unilateral production cuts is that other producers have been kept out of the market. Both Iran and Venezuela have seen their production constrained by international sanctions, while Libya and Iraq are suffering from internal conflicts.

Without these players in the market, Saudi Arabia is able to successfully control oil markets. The lifting of Iranian sanctions under JCPOA deal worries Arab producers, US shale, and Russia. These worries can be termed ‘unfounded’.

Some analysts argue that a JCPOA success could destabilize oil and gas markets, increase price volatility, and even see a return of oil gluts. There is a major flaw in this narrative because it is based on the assumption that the sanctions have successfully removed Iranian oil from markets. It is certainly true that Iranian volumes are no longer at historic highs, but looking at volumes reaching markets, Iranian oil is still very visible.

Oil and tanker trackers have been showing again and again that Iranian oil exports are not only very flexible, but also increasingly aggressively. The IEA reported that China never completely stopped its purchases of Iranian oil. The OECD energy watchdog also said that Iran’s estimated oil sales to China in the fourth quarter of 2020 were at 360,000 barrels a day (bpd), up from an average of 150,000 bpd shipped in the first nine months of last year.

Just before the JCPOA discussions restarted, Iran increased exports to China to around 600,000 bpd. OPEC also reported that Iran's crude oil output increased in March 2021 by 6.3%. OPEC report published lately showed that Iran’s crude output had surged by 137,000 bpd. OPEC data also showed that Iran’s average output in 2020 hovered at 1.985 million bpd, down from 2.356 million bpd recorded in 2019 and 3.553 million bpd in 2018. Major Asian clients in China, India, and elsewhere are much too happy to take Iranian volumes based on their very low price. To forget or diminish the role of Iranian oil at present in the market is a major error.

A JCPOA success would not only threaten oil prices, but could also lead to an increase in Tehran’s revenue base. Currently, Iranian oil export successes are based on illegally or partly “not-known” sales to customers, at lower prices but still generating cash. If sanctions on oil exports are removed, Tehran won’t only see higher export volumes but it will also stop selling its crude at a discount. Iranian oil could, and most probably will, be priced at normal market price levels.

In the short term, a potentially higher revenue stream could be generated, based on higher volumes. At the same time, Tehran should take into account the fact that customers will not be willing maybe to take Iranian volumes at higher prices. The current demand-supply situation doesn’t allow for millions of additional barrels to hit the market.

In the coming months, Iranian volumes will not increase at all, regardless of how successful the JCPOA discussions are.  With overall Iran oil export potential of around 2 million bpd, current exports are estimated around one million bpd, the markets will not be shocked. Demand is still weak, and it is being threatened again as COVID’s 3rd wave in Europe is blocking the opening of markets, and Asia’s emerging giant India is recording an increase of COVID casualties. 

Iran’s oil potential and exports are unlikely to derail the market. Looking at the OPEC plus strategies and cohesion, another one million bpd on the market coming from Iran will not be a shock to the system. The market is not able to take more volumes, while Iranian clients are unlikely to be willing to increase costs. It will be interesting to watch how investors decide to price these events into oil markets. Looking at the current fundamentals, OPEC plus leaders are still the real power players in the oil market.

Can Saudi Arabia and Iran ever initiate direct military confrontation?

Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been tense ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic back in 1979. Creation of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s regime during its 1980-1988 war with Iran became a big thorn. Ties were further strained in 1987 after the massacre of over 400 Iranian pilgrims by Saudi security forces in the holy city of Mecca.

In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, the breach of mistrust between Tehran and Riyadh grew wider. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen pushed the two sides into indirect military confrontations. Execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia further worsened the situation.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut ties with Iran after its diplomatic facilities were stormed by Iranian protesters, with countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Bahrain and Djibouti soon following suit, brought about a novel state in the Iranian-Saudi relationship. In this atmosphere, analysts sat with crossed fingers, exploring can Tehran and Riyadh ever initiate direct military confrontation? Likely the answer was clear; there can’t be a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for five main reasons.

First, the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world, the reason Iranians elected him in 2013. In Iran’s complicated political system, the executive and legislative branches are elected by popular vote; though the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates makes the elections process not entirely free. Within this political system, making a decision to engage in war is not an easy task. Therefore, while some Saudi leaders may beat the drums of escalation, the possibility of outright war depends on factors such as whether there is political will for such action and how the two countries choose to handle the crisis in their relations. Engaging in war is not something that can be done by one side alone. Moreover, Iran’s government has no incentive to increase tensions, as evidenced by the condemnation of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the triangle of power in Iranian foreign policy, meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In a goodwill effort, Iran also announced that it will continue to send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. Thus, if Saudi Arabia intends to initiate war, the Iranian public — seeing themselves as victims of a violation — will mobilize, and also gain the sympathy of the international community.

Second, the majority of Iran’s current leaders was involved in war with Iraq and is fully aware of its costs. Rouhani held several military positions during the conflict, while Zarif and his deputies also remember the hardships of that era in their capacity as diplomats. Khamenei, who was president at that time, also served as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, while Rafsanjani served as the de facto commander-in-chief of the Iranian military. Even Iran’s parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, served as a commander with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Larijani’s brothers, including incumbent Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani, were also involved in the conflict. Many other influential Iranian figures, including a great number of parliamentarians and Friday prayer leaders, also have bitter memories of war. Although the IRGC at times seems to favor showdowns — such as in the cases of the recent detention of US sailors or its surveillance of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Persian Gulf — it is not empowered to take arbitrary actions.

Third, the very nature of the current crisis makes war unlikely. According to Charles Hermann, a renowned analyst of issues related to US foreign policy, crisis management and decision-making, what defines a crisis are the three elements of threat, time and surprise. Whether the situation threatens the vital interests of a state allows only a short time for decision-making, and whether it occurs as a surprise to policymakers must all be considered. When it comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the nature of their crisis does not meet these criteria. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s tone against Iran has even softened in recent times. Indeed, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman told The Economist, “Whoever is pushing toward [war with Iran] is somebody who is not in their right mind.”

Fourth, on the international level, Saudi Arabia believes that in the event of a military confrontation with Iran, the United States and the rest of the West may side with the Islamic Republic. Riyadh’s decision to cut ties with Tehran has received virtually no international support aside from some African countries that play no significant role in international power equations. Even the then US Secretary of State John Kerry urged calm following the breakdown in the Saudi-Iranian relationship.

Last but not the least; victory is uncertain in a potential Iranian-Saudi war. Saudi Arabia and Iran may take destructive blows from each other, but both know that neither has the ability to destroy the other side or impose regime change. Saudi Arabia has more warplanes and modern military equipment, while Iran has better missile capabilities and military personnel. Riyadh’s involvement in the Yemen war is another factor that reduces the motivation for war with Tehran. Moreover, the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province is mainly Shiite and has the potential to revolt — an advantage for Tehran that Riyadh cannot easily create for itself in Iran. Lastly, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which Saudi Arabia conducts much of its trade, is a further preventative factor, since war would necessitate redirecting all that trade to the Red Sea, which in the short run is just not possible.