Does change in MBS tone mean change of heart also?

Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) has expressed desire to mend ties with Iran for the first time in years, but refrained from offering any goodwill gesture to build confidence between two rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In a dramatic change in his views on Iran, MBS called for a ‘distinguished relationship’. 

“At the end of the day, Iran is a neighboring country. All we ask for is to have a good and distinguished relationship with Iran. We do not want the situation with Iran to be difficult. On the contrary, we want it to prosper and grow as we have Saudi interests in Iran, and they have Iranian interests in Saudi Arabia, which is to drive prosperity and growth in the region and the entire world,” the Saudi crown prince said in a recent televised interview.

He also expressed hope that his country would be able to overcome some challenges affecting Iranian-Saudi relations. “We really hope we would overcome them and build a good and positive relationship with Iran that would benefit all parties,” MBS pointed out. 

Public diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia came after several Western media outlets reported that the two countries held direct talks in Baghdad in early April for the first time in at least five years. These talks are widely expected to continue in the coming weeks especially after Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited a number of regional countries ‑ Iraq, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait ‑ enjoying good relations with Tehran and some of them with both Tehran and Riyadh. 

During his regional tour, Zarif once again presented the long-standing Iranian peace initiative Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), which is mainly intended to foster dialogue among regional states on security. 

Zarif’s tour raised speculations over a possible exchange of messages between Tehran and Riyadh. The Arab Weekly, a publication close to the United Arab Emirates, has put Zarif’s visits into a broader context of de-escalation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, implying that the tour is aimed at bridging the divide between long-standing rivals and launch a dialogue between them.

Regardless of the motivation behind Zarif’s visits, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to be experiencing a period of de-escalation of tension, at least for now. Whether this easing would continue for a long time or advance to a full-fledged restoration of diplomatic ties remains to be seen.

Saudis demonstrated little enthusiasm about mending ties with Iran beyond a change of tone that was more likely necessitated by the changing dynamics of the region’s politics after Joe Biden moved into the White House. The Saudi apparent flexibility came amid renewed US diplomatic efforts to put an end to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis in Yemen. 

Right from the start, Joe Biden made it clear to the Saudis that the days of full US support for their regional adventurism are over. He started his new Saudi policy by focusing more attention on the Yemen crisis, naming a special envoy for the war-torn country. He then announced that his administration would pursue diplomacy with Iran to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which the Trump administration withdrew in May 2018.

Saudis first called on the United States to include them in the ongoing Vienna nuclear talks and expand the JCPOA in a way that encompasses other thorny issues such as Iran’s missile program and its regional influence. The US rejected the call to include the Saudis in the nuclear talks, while assuring them that these talks will not harm their interests. 

Facing a changing international environment, the Saudis seem to have decided to tone down their rhetoric against Iran and increase diplomatic contacts with the US and other Western powers. The diplomatic maneuver of MBS is not likely to heal the wounds Iranian-Saudi relations suffered in the past few years because this move is not driven by a genuine desire to change, but to realign him with the Biden administration.

Can Saudi Arabia and Iran ever initiate direct military confrontation?

Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been tense ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic back in 1979. Creation of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and support for Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s regime during its 1980-1988 war with Iran became a big thorn. Ties were further strained in 1987 after the massacre of over 400 Iranian pilgrims by Saudi security forces in the holy city of Mecca.

In 2011, as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East, the breach of mistrust between Tehran and Riyadh grew wider. The civil wars in Syria and Yemen pushed the two sides into indirect military confrontations. Execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi Arabia further worsened the situation.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s decision to cut ties with Iran after its diplomatic facilities were stormed by Iranian protesters, with countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Bahrain and Djibouti soon following suit, brought about a novel state in the Iranian-Saudi relationship. In this atmosphere, analysts sat with crossed fingers, exploring can Tehran and Riyadh ever initiate direct military confrontation? Likely the answer was clear; there can’t be a war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for five main reasons.

First, the administration of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world, the reason Iranians elected him in 2013. In Iran’s complicated political system, the executive and legislative branches are elected by popular vote; though the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates makes the elections process not entirely free. Within this political system, making a decision to engage in war is not an easy task. Therefore, while some Saudi leaders may beat the drums of escalation, the possibility of outright war depends on factors such as whether there is political will for such action and how the two countries choose to handle the crisis in their relations. Engaging in war is not something that can be done by one side alone. Moreover, Iran’s government has no incentive to increase tensions, as evidenced by the condemnation of the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran by the triangle of power in Iranian foreign policy, meaning Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. In a goodwill effort, Iran also announced that it will continue to send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. Thus, if Saudi Arabia intends to initiate war, the Iranian public — seeing themselves as victims of a violation — will mobilize, and also gain the sympathy of the international community.

Second, the majority of Iran’s current leaders was involved in war with Iraq and is fully aware of its costs. Rouhani held several military positions during the conflict, while Zarif and his deputies also remember the hardships of that era in their capacity as diplomats. Khamenei, who was president at that time, also served as chairman of the Supreme Defense Council, while Rafsanjani served as the de facto commander-in-chief of the Iranian military. Even Iran’s parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, served as a commander with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Larijani’s brothers, including incumbent Judiciary Chief Sadegh Larijani, were also involved in the conflict. Many other influential Iranian figures, including a great number of parliamentarians and Friday prayer leaders, also have bitter memories of war. Although the IRGC at times seems to favor showdowns — such as in the cases of the recent detention of US sailors or its surveillance of the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman in the Persian Gulf — it is not empowered to take arbitrary actions.

Third, the very nature of the current crisis makes war unlikely. According to Charles Hermann, a renowned analyst of issues related to US foreign policy, crisis management and decision-making, what defines a crisis are the three elements of threat, time and surprise. Whether the situation threatens the vital interests of a state allows only a short time for decision-making, and whether it occurs as a surprise to policymakers must all be considered. When it comes to Iran and Saudi Arabia, the nature of their crisis does not meet these criteria. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s tone against Iran has even softened in recent times. Indeed, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman told The Economist, “Whoever is pushing toward [war with Iran] is somebody who is not in their right mind.”

Fourth, on the international level, Saudi Arabia believes that in the event of a military confrontation with Iran, the United States and the rest of the West may side with the Islamic Republic. Riyadh’s decision to cut ties with Tehran has received virtually no international support aside from some African countries that play no significant role in international power equations. Even the then US Secretary of State John Kerry urged calm following the breakdown in the Saudi-Iranian relationship.

Last but not the least; victory is uncertain in a potential Iranian-Saudi war. Saudi Arabia and Iran may take destructive blows from each other, but both know that neither has the ability to destroy the other side or impose regime change. Saudi Arabia has more warplanes and modern military equipment, while Iran has better missile capabilities and military personnel. Riyadh’s involvement in the Yemen war is another factor that reduces the motivation for war with Tehran. Moreover, the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province is mainly Shiite and has the potential to revolt — an advantage for Tehran that Riyadh cannot easily create for itself in Iran. Lastly, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, through which Saudi Arabia conducts much of its trade, is a further preventative factor, since war would necessitate redirecting all that trade to the Red Sea, which in the short run is just not possible.

Why United States is shy in imposing sanctions on Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) “approved an operation … to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi,” according to a scathing new report from Joe Biden administration. Yet the President says the US will not sanction the Saudi government, cognizant of the fact that any direct punishment could risk Saudi Arabia’s cooperation in confronting Iran.

Biden is grapple with the reality that Saudi Arabia is needed to achieve certain US objectives in the Middle East. This is a change from Biden’s criticism of Saudi Arabia on the campaign trail. The Khashoggi affair highlights a persistent oddity in the US foreign policy.

The Trump administration was reluctant to confront Saudi Arabia over the killing of Khashoggi. Beyond revoking the visas of some Saudi officials implicated in Khashoggi’s death, Trump did nothing to punish the kingdom for Khashoggi’s torture, assassination and dismemberment. Trump and other White House officials reminded critics that Saudi Arabia buys billions of dollars weapons from the US.

 Biden has taken a slightly tougher line, approving the release of the intelligence report that blames MBS for Khashoggi’s murder and sanctioning 76 lower-level Saudi officials. Saudi Arabia isn’t the only nation to get a free pass from the US for its terrible misdeeds. The US has for decades maintained close ties with some of the world’s worst human rights abusers.

Ever since the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world’s dominant military and economic power, consecutive American presidents have seen financial and geopolitical benefit in overlooking the bad deeds of brutal regimes. Before the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran was a close US ally. Shah Reza Pahlavi ruled harshly, using his secret police to torture and murder political dissidents. President Nixon hoped that Iran would be the “Western policeman in the Persian Gulf.”

After the shah’s overthrow, the Reagan administration in the 1980s became friendly with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The US supported him with intelligence during Iraq’s war with Iran and looked the other way at his use of chemical weapons. And before Syria’s intense bloody civil war – which has killed an estimated 400,000 people and featured grisly chemical weapon attacks by the government – its authoritarian regime enjoyed relatively friendly relations with the US Syria has been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1979. But US presidents i.e. Nixon, Carter, Bush and Clinton visited President Bashar al-Assad’s father, who ruled from 1971 until his death in 2000.

Why Saudi Arabia matters

Before the alleged assassination of Khashoggi by Saudi operatives, the 35-year-old crown prince was cultivating a reputation as a moderate reformer. He has made newsworthy changes in the conservative Arab kingdom, allowing women to drive, combating corruption and curtailing some powers of the religious police. Still, Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes.

Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea on political rights, civil liberties and other measures of freedom, according to the democracy watchdog Freedom House. The same report ranks both Iran and China ahead of the Saudis. But its wealth, strategic Middle East location and petroleum exports keep the Saudis as a vital US ally.

President Obama visited Saudi Arabia more than any other American US president – four times in eight years – to discuss everything from Iran to oil production.

American realpolitik

This kind of foreign policy – one based on practical, self-interested principles rather than moral or ideological concerns – is called “realpolitik.” Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under Nixon, was a master of realpolitik, which drove that administration to normalize its relationship with China. Diplomatic relations between the two countries had ended in 1949 when Chinese communist revolutionaries took power. Then, as now, China was incredibly repressive. Only 16 countries – including Saudi Arabia – are less free than China, according to Freedom House. Iran, a country the US wants Saudis to help in keeping in check, ranks ahead of China. But China is also the world’s most populous nation and a nuclear power.

Nixon, a fervent anti-communist, sought to exploit a growing rift between China and the Soviet Union. Today Washington retains the important, if occasionally rocky, relationship Kissinger forged with Beijing, despite its ongoing persecution of Muslim minority groups. American realpolitik applies to Latin America, too. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the U.S. regularly backed Central and South American military dictators who tortured and killed citizens to “defend” the Americas from communism.

US not ‘so innocent’

 US presidents tend to underplay their relationships with repressive regimes, lauding lofty “American values” instead. That’s the language former President Barack Obama used in 2018 to criticize Trump’s embrace of Russia’s authoritarian president, Vladimir Putin, citing America’s “commitment to certain values and principles like the rule of law and human rights and democracy.” But Trump defended his relationship with Russia, tacitly invoking American realpolitik. “You think our country’s so innocent?” he asked on Fox News.

The US has maintained close ties to numerous regimes, and still does, who’s values and policies conflict with America’s constitutional guarantees of democracy, freedom of speech, the right to due process and many others.