امریکہ کی افغانستان کے بعد ایران سے بھی شکست

ابھی افغانستان سے شکست کے زخم پوری طرح بھرے نہیں تھے کہ امریکہ کو ایران سے شکست کا صدمہ سہنا پڑھ رہاہے۔ امریکہ اس جنگ میں 25 بلین ڈالرسے زیادہ ڈبونے کے بعد بھی ناکام ہے۔ وہ اب آبناۓ ہرمز کی ناکہ بندی کرکے اپنا تیل اور گیس مہنگی قیمت پر بیچ رہا ہے۔ عربوں کے تیل کی ایکسپورٹ بند ہے اور چین جانے والے تیل کو روکا جارہا ہے۔ وقت نے ثابت کردیا کہ امریکہ کا صرف اور صرف ایک مقصد ہے تیل کی تجارت پر قبضہ۔

PSX benchmark index down 4.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained in the grip of bears during the ended on April 30, 206. The benchmark index shed 7,677 points, down 4.5%WoW to close at 162,994 points, with average daily trading volume declining to 1.2 billion shares, down 30%WoW.

The most dominant factor contributing to this decline was the collapse of the Iran-US talks, where the US President cancelled a planned trip of his envoys to Pakistan. Consequently, oil prices remained elevated through the week, with the June’26 Brent contract hitting a high of US$126/ bbl.

Adding to this was decision by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to raise the policy rate by 100bps to 11.5% on Monday, the first rate hike in over two and half years.

The prolonged Middle East conflict was termed to be the primary driver for raising the policy rate, attributing inflation to remain above the target range in the next few quarters.

However, a positive development was the confirmation of the IMF Executive Board meeting scheduled for May 08, 2026 to consider approval of the US$1.2 billion tranche under the EFF and RSF programs.

Foreign exchange reserves held by SBP as of April 24, 2026 were reported at US$15.8 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan clears US$3.45 billion loan to UAE, 2) Pakistan plans launch of Panda Bonds, 3) IMF okays 60% cut in gas levy, 4) No let-up in Pakistan’s efforts for US-Iran peace, and 5) Pakistan's weekly oil import bill rises to US$800 million amid US-Iran conflict.

Top performing sectors were: Textile Weaving, Tobacco, and Auto Assemblers, while laggards included: Vanaspati, Property, and Woolen.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual funds, and Brokers amounting to US$28.6 million and US$3.1 million respectively.

Major buyers were Individuals, and Companies with net buy of US$27.4 million and US$1.4 million respectively.

Top performing scrips were: HCAR, MEHT, INDU, PAKT, and MTL, while laggards included: YOUW, NBP, SSOM, GADT, and SSGC.

According to AKD Securities, a constructive resolution of US-Iran would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with softening of oil prices to act as a trigger. Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Power Without Leverage

The rhetoric attributed to Donald Trump—of unilateral victory, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and forcing Iran into submission—reads less like strategy and more like illusion dressed as resolve.

Start with the claim of “victory.” Wars are not won by declaration. If anything, the gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes after US-Israeli strikes on Iran underscores a harsher truth: overwhelming power no longer guarantees decisive results. The superpower looks less triumphant and more constrained.

The blockade argument is equally flawed. Closing the Strait of Hormuz for months is not a show of strength—it is an invitation to escalation. Iran retains the means to retaliate asymmetrically, while Gulf states would be unwilling passengers in a conflict that directly threatens their economic lifelines. What begins as pressure quickly mutates into regional instability.

Then comes the oil calculus. Squeezing Iranian exports may sound tactically appealing, but it is strategically self-defeating. The immediate consequence would be tighter supply, higher prices, and global economic stress. Washington’s Arab partners, far from benefiting, would absorb the shock. Punishing Iran ends up punishing the system.

Most unrealistic, however, is the expectation of Iran’s unconditional surrender. Tehran’s track record suggests the opposite: pressure entrenches resistance. Escalation does not compel compliance; it erodes space for negotiation.

The underlying problem is not intent but misreading leverage. Coercion without credible endgames risks exposing limits rather than enforcing outcomes. Each additional threat weakens, rather than strengthens, the credibility of US strategy.

A sustainable path demands restraint, not bravado—consolidating ceasefire arrangements, reopening diplomatic channels, and allowing all sides a face-saving exit. Power, when detached from realism, ceases to be power at all; it becomes noise with consequences.

Is UAE Risking Its Oil Exports by Leaving OPEC?

The reported move by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to step away from OPEC signals a structural shift in global oil dynamics rather than a simple policy adjustment. The key question is whether this decision strengthens export potential or exposes the UAE to new risks.

At the core of the issue is production capacity. The UAE has invested heavily over the past decade, raising its installed capacity to nearly 5 million barrels per day, while its output quota under OPEC+ remained significantly lower, around 3–3.5 million barrels per day. This gap created sustained frustration in Abu Dhabi, where policymakers argue that constrained quotas prevent optimal monetization of long-term investments.

By exiting the OPEC framework, the UAE gains theoretical freedom to increase production and exports toward its full capacity. In normal market conditions, this would enhance revenue potential and strengthen its position as a flexible supplier. However, oil markets rarely operate in isolation from geopolitics.

Recent regional instability linked to tensions involving Iran has already demonstrated how quickly export routes through the Strait of Hormuz can be disrupted. Even without OPEC constraints, physical and security risks can limit actual export volumes. In such an environment, higher capacity does not automatically translate into higher realized exports.

The role of Saudi Arabia also remains central. Saudi Arabia has historically anchored OPEC’s production discipline to stabilize prices. A UAE exit weakens this coordinated structure and raises the possibility of more competitive output strategies among major producers. While this may benefit short-term volume expansion, it can also pressure global prices, ultimately reducing export revenue gains.

In the short term, the UAE’s export position is unlikely to change dramatically due to existing logistical and geopolitical constraints. Over the medium term, however, it gains greater autonomy to align production with market demand rather than quota allocation.

The outcome, therefore, is balanced but conditional. The UAE is not simply risking exports; it is trading coordinated stability for operational flexibility. Whether this proves advantageous will depend on how effectively it manages production discipline in an increasingly fragmented oil market.

The Shrinking Leverage of the United States

The visible frustration of Donald Trump over Iran’s negotiating posture is not merely diplomatic theatre—it is a signal of eroding leverage. What Washington presents as firmness increasingly looks like an inability to recalibrate.

The demand for unconditional concessions from Iran rests on a premise that no longer aligns with ground realities. Power, in this case, is not defined by military capability alone, but by the ability to translate pressure into outcomes. By that measure, the United States is struggling.

This conflict has exposed three uncomfortable truths. First, the United States chose to act without consolidating traditional alliances, thereby limiting both legitimacy and strategic depth. Second, its objectives remain ambiguous and unmet—maximum pressure has not yielded maximum compliance. Third, anticipated economic triggers, particularly in global energy markets, have failed to materialize in Washington’s favor.

More consequentially, Iran has demonstrated a capacity to absorb, adapt, and retaliate in calibrated ways. The costs, meanwhile, have spilled across the region - disrupted Gulf exports, strain on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure, and a dent in the UAE’s economic momentum. These are not peripheral effects—they redefine the strategic environment.

Having exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated under Barack Obama, Washington now operates without the diplomatic continuity it once discarded. Escalation remains an option, but increasingly an expensive one with diminishing returns.

Here the real disagreement begins. The prevailing narrative still assumes that time favors the United States. Evidence suggests otherwise. Prolonged pressure, instead of breaking Iran, may be normalizing its resistance.

This is not a call for capitulation—it is a recognition of limits. The United States may still possess overwhelming power, but it no longer commands automatic outcomes. Accepting that reality is not weakness; refusing to do so may prove strategically costlier.

Who holds the cards?

Having departed Pakistan on Saturday just as the US was preparing to send emissaries to discuss the war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi eventually popped up for talks with Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, where he said Tehran is committed to strengthening its partnership with Moscow, reports Bloomberg.

Araghchi’s geopolitical chess move came after a dissonant weekend of potential feints and false starts in the effort to end the US-Israel war with Iran. As news broke that the Iranian official was leaving Islamabad, Trump announced he was canceling the trip by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, in part because the US “has all the cards.”

Iran has told Pakistan, which is operating as an intermediary, that it would cease obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz if the US ended its naval blockade of Iranian shipping. Under its plan, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear research would be dealt with later, Axios reported.

While the White House said it hasn’t changed its position on “red lines” associated with Iran’s atomic program, the administration said it was nevertheless discussing the Iranian proposal.

None of this back and forth sat well with energy markets Monday, the eve of the war’s two-month anniversary. Brent crude prices rose for a sixth straight session to settle above US$108 a barrel. And at least one European leader angered by the high energy prices the continent is paying thanks to the conflict was less than diplomatic in his assessment.

The US “is being humiliated by the Iranian leadership,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Monday, adding he didn’t see “what strategic exit the Americans are now choosing.” Tehran’s negotiators, the German leader said, are proceeding “very skillfully—or indeed very skillfully not negotiating.”

Blockade as a Weapon

The United States’ long-running pressure campaign against Iran raises a harder question: when does coercion begin to disrupt the global order? After decades of sanctions, the central objective remains unmet—Iran has not abandoned its nuclear program. Yet Washington appears to be escalating, moving beyond economic pressure toward actions that constrain passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The demand that Iran halt uranium enrichment remains contested. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran retains the right to peaceful nuclear activity. Critics cite compliance and inspection concerns, but dismissing treaty entitlements outright risks eroding the credibility of the very frameworks meant to regulate nuclear conduct.

Washington justifies its posture through deterrence and regional security. Yet restrictions on Hormuz carry systemic consequences—disrupting energy flows, constraining oil exporters, and imposing costs on major importers such as China, turning a bilateral dispute into a broader geo-economic contest.

Equally significant is the human dimension. Merchant vessels and seafarers become entangled in strategic signaling, raising concerns about proportionality under maritime norms.

Framed as strategy, such measures still function as instruments of pressure on civilian economies and global trade—effectively turning blockade into a weapon that demands closer legal and academic scrutiny.