US remains an uninvited guest in Persian Gulf

I am pleased to share one of my blogs posted on May 06, 2020, nearly six years ago, arguing that the United States has no legitimate role in the Persian Gulf and is effectively an “uninvited guest.”

A key theme is historical legitimacy. Iranian officials draw parallels with past foreign powers such as Britain and Portugal, noting that they eventually left the region, implying the United States will also have to withdraw.

The Persian Gulf is framed not only as a strategic waterway but as part of Iran’s identity, with claims that it has been protected by Iranians for thousands of years.

The blog also highlights Iran’s emphasis on military readiness. Rouhani and others stress that Iran’s armed forces—including the Revolutionary Guards, army, and associated units—are fully capable of securing the region.

Iranian officials describe the US presence as a source of instability, tension, and insecurity, insisting that regional security should be handled by neighboring countries.

Overall, the blog reflects a coherent narrative aimed at delegitimizing US presence while asserting Iran’s dominance and responsibility in the Persian Gulf.

To read details please click https://shkazmipk.blogspot.com/2020/05/united-states-uninvited-guest-in.html

Trump’s China Visit Under Scrutiny

Two important questions arise regarding Donald Trump’s proposed visit to China: Is this the right time? And does the United States still retain strategic supremacy over China?

On timing, the moment appears sensitive. Beijing’s concerns have grown in light of tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy flows. Given Iran’s role as a key oil
supplier to China, any perceived threat to Iranian exports naturally raises strategic anxieties in Beijing. As a result, the relationship is no longer confined to trade disputes; it is increasingly shaped by energy security considerations.

The second question—whether the United States continues to enjoy clear supremacy—is more nuanced. Washington may still hold significant military, technological, and financial advantages, the recent developments, including pressures on munitions supplies and a relatively reduced naval presence in the South China Sea, may influence perceptions of its negotiating position. In diplomacy, perception often complements reality.

At the same time, China continues to pursue long-term structural adjustments. Its efforts to promote trade settlement mechanisms beyond the US Dollar reflect a gradual attempt to diversify financial dependencies. While such shifts are unlikely to produce immediate transformation, they do indicate a broader strategic direction.

Market signals, including movements in gold and energy prices, suggest a degree of global uncertainty. However, linking these directly to a decisive shift away from the dollar would require careful qualification, as currency realignments tend to evolve over extended periods.

In sum, the proposed visit may be better understood as a cautious diplomatic engagement rather than a demonstration of dominance. The United States remains a central global power, but its position is increasingly subject to scrutiny. Navigating this evolving landscape will require both restraint and strategic clarity.

Emerging UAE Role in the US–Iran Equation

The proposition that the United States may be quietly positioning the United Arab Emirates (UAE), particularly Dubai—as a forward proxy against Iran is gaining traction, but it demands a measured and fact-driven reading rather than a dramatic conclusion.

The strategic backdrop has undeniably shifted since the Abraham Accords. These agreements did more than normalize UAE-Israel relations; these created a wider geopolitical architecture that strengthened US influence and recalibrated regional alignments vis-à-vis Iran. Analysts increasingly view this framework as part of a broader containment strategy, linking security, trade corridors, and intelligence cooperation.

At the same time, Iran’s perception of the UAE has hardened. The ongoing conflict in 2026 has seen direct strikes, diplomatic downgrades, and rising mistrust, effectively pushing bilateral relations into open hostility. This escalation reinforces the idea that the UAE is no longer a neutral economic intermediary, but an exposed frontline state—whether by choice or circumstance.

Geography amplifies this vulnerability. The narrow Persian Gulf places the UAE within immediate operational range of Iran. While this proximity could, in theory, offer logistical advantages for surveillance or rapid deployment, it simultaneously makes Emirati infrastructure an easy target. Recent attacks on shipping and critical assets in the region underline how quickly economic zones can turn into strategic pressure points.

However, the leap from “strategic partner” to “proxy battlefield” remains analytically weak. Dubai’s role as a global financial and logistics hub imposes hard constraints. Its economic model is built on stability, openness, and investor confidence—factors fundamentally incompatible with sustained military confrontation. Turning such a hub into a Launchpad for ground operations would impose costs far exceeding any tactical gain.

Equally important is the UAE’s own signaling. Despite deepening security ties with Washington, it has publicly resisted the use of its territory for offensive operations and has consistently called for de-escalation. This suggests a calibrated approach: align strategically, but avoid becoming the battlefield.

The more credible interpretation, therefore, lies in the evolving nature of modern conflict. The UAE is emerging not as a warfront, but as a strategic node—facilitating intelligence sharing, surveillance capabilities, and logistical depth within a US-led framework. In contemporary geopolitics, influence is often projected through networks rather than invasions.

In essence, the UAE’s role in the US–Iran equation is expanding, but within limits. It is a partner, a pressure point, and at times a target—but not, at least for now, a chosen battlefield.

SeaLead operated vessel transits through Strait of Hormuz

According to Seatrade Maritimes News, the Antigua-Barbuda flagged container ship Paya Lebar has traded both into and back out of the Arabian Gulf between April 13-28.

The SeaLead Shipping operated and owned Paya Lebar transited westbound through the Strait of Hormuz westbound into the Gulf on April 13 having been at anchor in Nhava Sheva, India since late March.

While in the Gulf the vessel called at Jebel Ali and Khalifa ports in the UAE and Hamad in Qatar.

The Paya Lebar crossed the Strait of Hormuz eastbound on April 29 - passing the approximate location of the US naval blockade in the Arabian Sea as it heads back to Nhava Sheva.

The movements of the Paya Lebar would imply a change in policy by SeaLead which said on March 02 in customer advisory it had halted all transits through the Strait of Hormuz for the safety of its crews, ships, and cargoes.

In July last year the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 16 container ships the company had on charter over links with Iran. SeaLead acted to quickly terminate the charters on the 16 vessels and denied it had ties with Iran.

However, in March this year the US Department of Justice filed civil forfeiture complaints seeking to seize US$2.4 million in funds allegedly intended for SeaLead Shipping and its Indian subsidiary, as part of a broader action targeting more than US$15.3 million tied to a sanctions-evasion network linked to Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of a senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader.

 

 

 

Seven countries agree on oil production adjustment

Seven oil producing countries, part of OPEC Plus announced to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 barrels per day in June 2026, as part of efforts to support global oil market stability.

The countries — Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman — held a virtual meeting on Sunday to review market conditions and outlook.

The adjustment is part of the additional voluntary production measures first announced in April 2023. The group said these adjustments could be partially or fully reversed depending on evolving market conditions.

The countries reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining flexibility, noting they may increase, pause, or reverse the phase-out of voluntary cuts, including those introduced in November 2023.

They also stressed the importance of full compliance with the Declaration of Cooperation, with implementation to be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).

The group confirmed plans to compensate for any overproduction since January 2024 and said the current measure would help accelerate those efforts.

The seven countries will continue to meet monthly to assess market developments, compliance, and compensation progress, with the next meeting scheduled for June 07, 2026.

 

Ground Realities Trump Must Not Ignore

The sooner President Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

What began on February 28, 2026, as an unannounced offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran was projected as swift and decisive. Weeks later, despite a fragile truce, the strategic picture tells a different story. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained, global oil markets are unsettled, and the core objectives of the campaign appear only partially fulfilled.

The most telling gap is between rhetoric and results. Early signals from Washington hinted at regime destabilization in Tehran. Yet Iran’s leadership has adapted rather than collapsed, with continuity preserved at the top. Its nuclear capability, though impacted, is not eliminated. More significantly, Tehran retains its most potent lever—its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

The economic consequences have been immediate and far-reaching. Oil prices have surged, pushing US fuel costs sharply higher and straining global markets. Ironically, some of the worst-affected players are Washington’s own Arab allies, whose economic stability is closely tied to uninterrupted energy flows. A conflict that unsettles allies while failing to decisively weaken the adversary raises uncomfortable strategic questions.

At home, the political costs are mounting. The war has already cost American taxpayers at least US$25 billion, while public opinion has turned increasingly skeptical. A clear majority of Americans now view the conflict as a mistake. Against this backdrop, Trump’s escalating attacks on the media—labeling coverage as “seditious” or hostile—appear less like defiance and more like frustration. When expectations are set high and outcomes fall short, the narrative inevitably shifts.

There is also a historical echo worth noting. During the Vietnam War, early confidence gradually gave way to a recognition of stalemate, amplified by increasingly critical media coverage. While the current conflict is different in scale and context, the emerging pattern—bold claims, limited gains, and rising domestic unease—carries a familiar undertone.

Wars are not won through declarations but through outcomes. Assertions of victory carry little weight when strategic objectives remain elusive and costs continue to rise. The longer this gap between expectation and reality persists, the greater the political and economic toll.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the sooner Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

The 700-Million-Barrel Oil Shock

Based on the projection from the Kepler Institute, by the final week of April 2026, the cumulative deficit in oil supply resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will hit 700 million barrels.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has presented the world with one of the most critical oil supply disruptions in modern history and has driven prices sharply upward. Unlike past shocks triggered by wars or embargoes, this blockage strikes at the very jugular of global energy logistics.

According to a fresh assessment by the Kepler Institute, an ongoing halt to oil tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz until the end of April 2026 could push the global energy market into an extraordinary crisis, bringing the total oil supply deficit caused by this closure to approximately 700 million barrels. This drop in supply has triggered one of the largest oil shocks of the current era. By April 12, around 300 million barrels of oil had been removed from the supply chain due to the stoppage of traffic through this vital chokepoint — a corridor that carries roughly 20% of the world's daily oil demand.

In the wake of this disruption, Brent crude oil prices have surpassed US$100 per barrel, and the cost of refined products such as jet fuel has risen above US$200 per barrel — a scenario that has set off the phenomenon of demand destruction, leading airlines to cancel numerous flight routes, consumer countries to impose fuel rationing and mandatory remote work, and the International Energy Agency to revise downward its 2026 oil demand growth forecast.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, by leveraging the full capacity of its East-West pipeline, and the United Arab Emirates, via the Fujairah export route, are attempting to offset part of the supply shortfall.

Conversely, Iraq has been largely incapacitated, with its exports collapsing from 4 million to less than 900,000 barrels per day. Without immediate diplomatic intervention, smaller Persian Gulf states may soon follow Iraq into paralysis.

Kepler cautions that even if the crisis is resolved immediately, the process of market recovery will not be swift, and the volume of lost oil could reach one billion barrels before the supply chain is fully restored. 

Two potential paths lie ahead for the market. In the favorable scenario, limited demand contraction and a gradual easing of the crisis over the next several weeks are anticipated. However, in the unfavorable scenario, continued disruption into the third quarter of the year could push oil prices toward US$190 per barrel and cause demand destruction on the order of several million barrels per day — an outcome that would be even more severe than the oil crisis of the 1970s.