Iran: Myth of Regime Engineering

Nearly half a century after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, one uncomfortable truth remains intact- the United States has failed to toppling Iran’s clergy-dominated political system. From covert operations to overt pressure, from sanctions to sabotage, Washington’s arsenal has been vast—but its outcomes limited. This reality challenges a deeply entrenched belief in Western policymaking circles that sustained external pressure can reengineer sovereign political systems.

The US–Iran confrontation began with high drama. The failed 1980 rescue mission to free American embassy staff in Tehran was an early signal that Iran would not bend easily. Since then, the playbook has expanded—economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, cyber warfare, targeted killings, and strikes on strategic installations. Each tactic was presented as decisive; none proved so. Even with Israel’s fullest political, intelligence, and military backing, the objective of dismantling Iran’s clerical power structure remains unmet.

Washington’s current emphasis on internal unrest follows a familiar pattern. Protests in Iran—whether driven by economic hardship, social restrictions, or political frustration—are quickly framed as precursors to regime collapse. Yet history offers little evidence that externally encouraged demonstrations can dismantle a deeply entrenched ideological state. On the contrary, such pressure often consolidates power by allowing the ruling elite to externalize blame and tighten internal control.

The comparison—explicit or implied—with Venezuela is particularly flawed. The assumption that methods used against Caracas can be replicated in Tehran ignores fundamental differences. Iran is not an oil-dependent, institutionally hollow state with fractured elite consensus. It possesses ideological cohesion, parallel power structures, and decades of experience in surviving siege conditions. The belief that eliminating a leadership figure—or fueling street unrest—can unravel this system reflects strategic illusion rather than informed assessment.

That said, dismissing Iran’s internal weaknesses would be equally misleading. Economic mismanagement, corruption allegations, demographic pressure, and social discontent are real and persistent. Sanctions have undeniably deepened hardship, but domestic policy failures have magnified their impact. Iran’s ruling establishment has often responded to dissent with rigidity rather than reform, narrowing its own margin for legitimacy. These internal contradictions—not foreign intervention—pose the most credible long-term challenge to clerical dominance.

The paradox is stark - US pressure has hurt Iranian society more than it has weakened the state, while simultaneously validating the regime’s narrative of perpetual external threat. Each failed attempt at coercion reinforces Tehran’s claim that resistance, not accommodation, ensures survival.

The lesson from five decades of confrontation is neither ideological nor moral—it is strategic. Regimes are rarely dismantled from the outside, especially those forged in revolution and sustained through resistance. Iran’s future will be shaped primarily by its own political evolution, not by foreign-engineered upheaval. Any policy that ignores this reality is destined to repeat past failures—at great human and geopolitical cost.

 

Trump’s Iran Threats and America’s ICE Reality

President Donald Trump’s reported warning to Iran — that Washington may attack if Tehran’s clergy-led regime cracks down on demonstrators — would carry moral weight if it were not so deeply undermined by events unfolding inside the United States itself. The contradiction is stark, uncomfortable, and revealing.

Over the weekend, tens of thousands marched through Minneapolis to protest the fatal shooting of 37-year-old Renee Good by an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer. The protest was not an isolated outburst. It was part of more than 1,000 coordinated rallies nationwide against what the federal government calls a “deportation drive,” but what many Americans now see as state violence carried out under the cover of immigration enforcement.

Demonstrators chanted “Abolish ICE” and “No justice, no peace — get ICE off our streets,” slogans born not of ideology alone but of lived experience. Bystander video, cited by Minnesota officials, reportedly shows Good’s car turning away as the agent fired. The Department of Homeland Security insists the agent acted in self-defense, claiming the vehicle was “weaponized.” This language has become routine — and troublingly convenient.

Within days, a similar incident occurred in Portland, Oregon, where a Border Patrol agent shot and wounded two people during a vehicle stop, again citing an alleged attempt to run over agents. Two shootings, two cities, identical justifications. The pattern is hard to ignore.

What makes this moment particularly jarring is timing. These shootings followed the deployment of nearly 2,000 federal officers to the Minneapolis–St. Paul area in what DHS described as its largest operation ever. When a heavily armed state expands its enforcement footprint and civilians end up dead, the moral high ground becomes difficult to claim — especially while lecturing other nations on restraint.

Trump’s threats against Iran are framed as a defense of human rights. Yet at home, protestors braving freezing winds speak of heartbreak, anger, and devastation after witnessing a fellow citizen killed by a federal agent. The administration dismisses outrage as political noise while portraying force as necessity.

This is the duality of Trump’s America - intolerance for repression abroad, justification for it at home; outrage over demonstrators elsewhere, suspicion of demonstrators on its own streets. Until Washington reconciles this contradiction, its warnings to Tehran will sound less like principled diplomacy and more like selective morality wrapped in power.

US seizes fifth Venezuela linked oil tanker

According to The Hill, the US early on Friday seized a fifth oil tanker linked to Venezuela in its campaign to control oil experts from the South American country.

The Olina was seized in international waters east of the Caribbean Sea by the US Coast Guard in coordination with the Defense Department, State Department and Justice Department, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem confirmed in a post on the social platform X.

Noem added that the “ghost fleet” ship suspected of carrying embargoed oil had “departed Venezuela attempting to evade US forces.” 

US Southern Command (Southcom) also confirmed the seizure in a post online, saying the predawn operation involved Marines and sailors launched from the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier that apprehended the Olina without incident.

“Once again, our joint interagency forces sent a clear message this morning: ‘there is no safe haven for criminals,'” Southcom added.

Public maritime database companies have identified the Olina as falsely registered and flying the flag of Timor-Leste.

The ship was last tracked near Venezuela 52 days ago, British maritime risk management company Vanguard said.

The seizure follows the taking of two other vessels in the region Wednesday, the Sophia and the Bella-1, the latter of which was a Russian-flagged tanker the US had chased for weeks.

Washington has now taken a total of five tankers as part of its stepped-up efforts to curb Venezuela oil exports. 

The Olina has been under US-imposed sanctions since January of last year, when it was named the Minerva M, for what Washington claimed was being part of the shadow fleet — ships that sail with little regulation or known insurance and help fuel Russia’s economy, according to Reuters.

The Olina’s seizure could further inflame tensions between the US and the Kremlin, which has accused Washington of a “disproportionate” focus on the Bella-1, previously named the Marinera, after it was initially chased by the Coast Guard off the coast of Venezuela last month.

PSX benchmark index up 3.0%WoW

The Pakistan Stock Exchange moved upwards sharply during the week, with the benchmark index advancing 5,375 points, up 3.0%WoW to close at 184,410 points. Market participation also strengthened by 25%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.6 billion shares, as compared to 1.3 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was driven by positive sentiments due to favorable macroeconomic indicators alongside improved relations and news of potential military equipment deals with multiple countries including Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh and Azerbaijan.

Moreover, positive meetings with China to strengthen coordination at bilateral and multilateral forums and towards CPEC phase II further helped improve the sentiment.

Remittances for December 2025 rose to US$3.6 billion, up 17%YoY, totaling to US$19.7 billion for 1HFY26, up 11%YoY).

The Central government debt fell by PKR345 billion in 5MFY26 to PKR77.5 trillion. T-bill yields declined on all the tenors, on first auction following declining inflation.

Cement offtakes grew by 1.5%YoY during December 2025, due to higher local dispatches.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$141 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 02, 2025.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Gas circular debt swells to PKR3.2 trillion, 2) Govt mulls PKR5/ ltr levy on MS and Diesel to aid gas sector, 3) OGRA moves to scrap fixed returns in gas pricing, and 4) Pakistan cuts national average power tariff for CY26.

Sector-wise, Transport, Pharmaceuticals, Insurance, Refinery, Leather & Tanneries were amongst the top performers, while Textile Spinning, Vanaspati & Allied Industries, Jute, Miscellaneous, and Close-End Mutual Funds were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Companies with a net buy of US$71.5 million and US$35.5 million. Banks and Foreigners were major sellers with net sell of US$56.3 million and US$42.5 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, MCB, ABOT, HALEON, and SAZEW, while laggards included PSEL, SSOM, GHGL, DHPL, and ISL.

The brokerage house foresees the positive momentum in the benchmark index to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house forecasts the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

The top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

 

Trump will kill Khamenei if Iranian regime continues murdering protesters

As headlines from The Jerusalem Post scream warnings of extreme US retaliation — including provocative assertions that Donald Trump might kill Ayatollah Khamenei should Tehran continue its violent suppression of protesters — it is easy to dismiss such rhetoric as hawkish posturing. Yet these headlines reflect a deeper strategic shift in US foreign policy that vindicates concerns I outlined in recent blogs that Washington’s punitive sanctions and coercive diplomacy have crafted the miseries inside Iran, and could now be laying the groundwork for external confrontation rather than domestic reform.

Iran is convulsed by one of its largest protest movements in years, driven not by some abstract ideological rebellion, but by grinding economic hardship — a direct consequence of tightening sanctions and economic isolation that have decimated ordinary livelihoods. These sanctions are widely opposed by international human rights actors because they disproportionately punish the populace rather than the political elite, exacerbating inflation and scarcity while eroding the state’s capacity to address domestic grievances.

Into this tinderbox enters a U.S. administration increasingly willing to ‘lock and load’ at the first sign of violent repression. Statements from US officials threatening lethal force against Iranian leadership if protests continue to be crushed are not isolated soundbites — they are symptomatic of a broader policy framework that conflates authoritarian repression with existential threat. The arrest of Venezuela’s president and the subdued global response appear to have emboldened hardliners in Washington who now see regime decapitation as a plausible extension of coercive diplomacy.

This is not to romanticize theocratic rule in Tehran. But conflating internal unrest rooted in economic despair with a casus belli against the Iranian state risks legitimizing harsher US interventions that increasingly look directed not at human rights but at regime change itself. The deeper injustice lies not just in Iran’s domestic repression, but in the US foreign policy calculus that has, through sanctions and threat of force, nurtured the very suffering it now claims to oppose.

Iran: US Crafts Miseries and Blames Clergy

Washington continues to promote a convenient narrative that Iran’s clergy-led political system alone is responsible for the economic suffering of its people. Recent street protests—driven by inflation, unemployment, and a weakening currency—are being projected as evidence of regime failure. What remains largely unspoken is the decisive role the United States has played in shaping Iran’s economic distress.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has lived under successive waves of US-led sanctions. These measures were neither symbolic nor limited. These systematically targeted banking channels, energy exports, trade flows, and foreign investment, effectively isolating Iran from the global economy. The consequences are visible: a battered currency, chronic inflation, supply shortages, and restricted access to essential imports. Blaming the clergy while ignoring decades of economic strangulation is a selective reading of reality.

The sanctions regime has been justified primarily by allegations that Iran is developing an atomic bomb. Yet these claims remain unproven. Iran has repeatedly denied seeking nuclear weapons, and international inspections conducted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) found no evidence of active weaponization before the agreement was unilaterally abandoned by Washington in 2018. The parallel with Iraq is difficult to ignore. There, too, unverified claims about weapons of mass destruction were treated as established facts, with disastrous consequences.

Pressure on Iran has also extended beyond economics. Cyberattacks, sabotages operations, and strikes on strategic installations—widely attributed to the United States and Israel—suggest a shift from coercion to destabilization. Such actions have not altered Iran’s strategic behavior; instead, these have increased regional volatility and reduced space for diplomacy.

If concern for the Iranian people were genuine, sanctions relief would be the starting point. Economic normalization offers a more credible path to internal reform than perpetual punishment. Five decades of pressure have neither collapsed the state nor moderated policy, but these have deepened public suffering.

The recent attempt to externally reshape Venezuela’s political order has further fueled fears in Tehran. Many now worry that Iran’s leadership could face similar tactics—arrest, assassination, or engineered collapse.

History offers a blunt lesson: sanctions punish societies, not regimes. Until this reality is acknowledged, the misery of ordinary Iranians will continue to be manufactured abroad and misattributed at home.

Who Appointed US World’s Judge, Jury, and Executioner?

I started this blog in June 2012 believing that sustained engagement with history and facts would clarify how the world’s largest democracy conducts itself on the global stage. Over time, that clarity has led less to reassurance and more to unease.

Modern history reveals a series of conflicts in which the United States played a decisive role—sometimes directly, often indirectly. From the atomic bombings of Japan to the enduring division of the Korean Peninsula, from Cold War entanglements in Lebanon to decades-long sanctions on Iran, the pattern is difficult to dismiss. Iraq stands out most starkly: first drawn into nearly a ten-year war with Iran, then subjected to crippling sanctions, and finally invaded on claims that were later proven unfounded. The humanitarian cost was immense, while accountability remained elusive.

The Ukraine conflict must also be viewed in a broader strategic context. Russia’s military action warrants criticism, yet it did not emerge in isolation. NATO’s steady eastward expansion and Washington’s deepening involvement in Eastern Europe contributed to an environment of confrontation. Sanctions on Russia, prepared well in advance, suggest that the crisis was embedded in a wider geopolitical rivalry rather than being purely reactive.

Venezuela further complicates the narrative of a rules-based international order. Years of sanctions, open support for regime change, and sustained economic pressure were justified in the name of democracy. Yet Venezuela’s vast oil reserves inevitably raise questions about the balance between principles and interests. Sovereignty, in this case, appears negotiable.

Equally striking is the restrained response from other major powers. Russia and China voice objections cautiously. Britain, France, and Germany express concern while largely aligning with Washington. India opts for strategic restraint. This reflects less global consensus and more the realities of power asymmetry.

The central issue, therefore, is not the US influence itself, but its limits. Who defines the rules, who enforces them, and who is held accountable when they are breached? Until these questions are addressed, the international order will continue to appear selective—and increasingly fragile.