I am delighted to share with my readers an article written
by David Ottaway of Wilson Center. This should be an eye opener for the Arab
monarchies. Their growing tilt towards China and Russia challenges the US
hegemony.
Much to the anxiety of policymakers in Washington, the two
most important Arab partners in the Persian Gulf to the United States are
asserting studied neutrality in the emerging Cold War with Russia and China.
Both
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are fast expanding their
relations with China while declaring their non-alignment in the new feuds over
Ukraine and Taiwan.
This past December, Saudi Arabia signed a Comprehensive Strategic
Partnership Agreement with China. The UAE and China signed a similar partnership
accord in 2018.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) warmly welcomed
President Xi Jinping to Riyadh for the signing of what the Chinese called an
“epoch-making milestone in the history of China-Arab relations.”
The UAE became the first Gulf Arab nation to purchase Chinese
military aircraft, including trainer jets in likely preparation for flying
China’s most advanced warplanes, the FC-31 stealth fighter.
The two
Gulf Arab monarchies have paid scant attention to US calls for economic
sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Nor have they abided
President Biden’s pleas to make up for the loss of Russian oil in order to
lower gasoline prices for American consumers.
To the
contrary, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has cut
production by 3.6 million barrels a day over the past six months, led by Saudi
Arabia in close collaboration with Russia.
The
question arises whether these Arab monarchies can afford a policy of
non-alignment with a tilt toward China in face of pressure from Washington to
stay in its corner. Their security still depends heavily on the US and the vast
bulk of their arms remain “Made in America.” China has scant military presence
in the Gulf and has so far offered no security assurances of any kind.
On the other hand, neither has the United States ever
committed itself in writing to the “ironclad” guarantee of “a swift,
overwhelming and decisive response” that President Biden pledged to South
Korea in April in case of a nuclear attack from North Korea.
The current administration, like those before it, has
limited itself to myriad verbal reassurances of US aid to help the Gulf Arab
monarchies help themselves.
The
only commitment Biden has made to Gulf Arab states’ security is to never
allow Iran to acquire a nuclear bomb. Still, decades of efforts to convince the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to form a US-backed common air defense system
against Iran have failed.
There is a long history to end Saudi Arabia’s lopsided
dependence on the US and to cultivate its relationship with China in particular
as a counterbalance.
In
2004, the former Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, explained to
me, only half-jokingly, the Saudi vision of nonalignment in these terms, Saudi
Arabia was not tied to the US in an unbreakable Catholic marriage. It was, he
reminded me, a Muslim country with the right to have up to four wives at once,
so long as it treated them all equally.
At the time, Saudi Arabia had long since reached out to
China to court a second wife. In 1985, then Saudi ambassador to Washington,
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, outraged the Reagan administration by traveling
incognito to Beijing to open negotiations on the purchase of Chinese
medium-range ballistic missiles, the East Wind CSS-2, capable of carrying
nuclear warheads.
Saudi Arabia did not yet have diplomatic relations with the
Communist country at the time. The Saudis even managed to smuggle the missiles
into the kingdom without the knowledge of the US government. The CIA only discovered the
Saudi deceit in early 1988, touching off a full-scale crisis in US-Saudi
relations and nearly triggering Israeli military retaliation.
Ironically, Saudi Arabia finally established diplomatic
relations with China just before the outbreak of the 1990-91 Gulf War when the
US dispatched 500,000 soldiers to defend the Kingdom against Iraq and liberate
Kuwait from its occupying troops.
Although, it waited until 1992, after the collapse of the
Soviet Union—and demise of communism—to reactivate its long-frozen ties with
Moscow.
Today,
China is Saudi Arabia’s number one trading partner and customer of
its oil exports. Russia, the world’s biggest non-OPEC exporter, cooperates
closely with the Kingdom to maintain high oil prices at US expense.
Neither
China nor Russia looms as a security threat to the Gulf Arab states who are
instead concerned with Iran, particularly Saudi Arabia, which views Tehran as
its main rival for Gulf primacy. In the face of Iranian expansion and
aggression in the Gulf and beyond, the US security umbrella has proven
increasingly leaky.
There was no US response when an Iranian drone and missile
barrage on Saudi oil facilities knocked out half of the kingdom’s oil
production in September 2019.
Then US president Donald Trump, declared he was in
no rush to go to war with Iran and observed, to the consternation of the Saudis
that was an attack on Saudi Arabia. That wasn’t an attack on us.
Nor did the Biden administration react when Iranian-backed
rebels in Yemen carried out several drone and missile attacks on the UAE in
January 2022. In both cases, the US response was limited to sending Patriot
missiles to bolster their defenses against future incidents.
The six Gulf Arab monarchies, though grouped together in the
GCC, have no common defense strategy or military relationship with the US. Only
three of them—Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar—rank as a Major Non-NATO Ally.
Only four—Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the UAE—have defense
cooperation agreements with Washington mainly to facilitate US arms sales and
military training. Although, Qatar does hosts US Central Command’s regional
headquarters and Bahrain the US Fifth Fleet.
The
outlier is Saudi Arabia, the GCC’s military keystone and America’s oldest
Middle East partner dating back to 1945. It has never wanted a permanent
American military presence in the Kingdom, or to become a Major Non-NATO ally,
and has not even asked for a formal defense cooperation agreement.
It has also always looked askance at US efforts to form a
collective compact with its Gulf Arab partners, such as when former President
Trump unsuccessfully sought to launch a Middle East Strategic Alliance.
Nonetheless, the Saudi military is armed to the teeth with
tens of billions of dollars of US arms and hopes to buy the most sophisticated
US warplane, the F-35.
It has reportedly, for the first time, sought a written US
security guarantee against future Iranian attacks. This comes amid
complex negotiations over a deal with the Biden administration to
establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
The
obstacles to adopting a nonaligned posture with a tilt toward China have become
painfully apparent in the Biden administration’s two-year-long negotiations
with the UAE over its purchase of the F-35 fighter jet. The UAE is arguably
America’s closest GCC military partner; it was the only one to send soldiers
and warplanes to fight alongside American forces in Afghanistan. Still, the
F-35 talks remain inconclusive because of US security concerns over the UAE’s
expanding military ties with China. These include, according to US officials,
an indication the UAE is allowing China to build a naval base there.
At some point soon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will have to
decide whether to live with a leaky security arrangement led by the US or take
their chances with China or Russia. Buying Chinese or Russian arms is certain
to incite Washington’s wrath and make purchase of advanced American weaponry
ever more problematic. But it remains very unlikely Chinese or Russian arms
will resolve Saudi’s security dilemma.
China also has extensive economic interests and a
comprehensive strategic agreement with Iran and, so far, has stuck its own
strict nonalignment policy in the Iran-Saudi rivalry. Russia, on the other
hand, has become closer to Iran militarily, selling its advanced SU-35 fighter
jet to Tehran and buying Iranian drones for its war in Ukraine in return. The
US security umbrella may be leaky but neither China nor Russia seems likely to
offer even that.