Implications of the apparent rapprochement between Saudi
Arabia and Iran extend even further, with significant consequences for vital
neighboring regions like South Asia and other populous Muslim countries,
including, notably, Pakistan.
The recent announcement of a China-brokered peace deal
between Saudi Arabia and Iran initially took the world by surprise. The debate persists
concerning whether this deal will last, its potential implications for the
United States, what it means for the Middle East region (including Israel), and
what brokering this agreement indicates about China’s rising power.
Pakistan has for decades been an arena in the proxy war
between Riyadh and Tehran that was sparked soon after the Iranian Revolution in
1979.
Saudi
Arabia provided financial and ideological backing to many Sunni militant groups
trained in Pakistan that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was
arming to wage a jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Some of these
groups, such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, and its offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, later
turned their guns on the sizeable Shi’a minority in Pakistan.
Iran responded by offering support to Pakistani Shi’a
militants to counter this Sunni militancy. Iran also began to cooperate
with India in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew in 1989 and US attention
shifted away from the region.
New Delhi and Tehran notably both supported the Northern
Alliance — comprised of a mixture of ethnic minorities, including the
Shi’a — in the latter’s resistance to the predominantly Sunni Pashtun Taliban,
which enjoyed good relations with Riyadh and Islamabad.
The post-9/11 US-led intervention in Afghanistan caused a
seismic shift in regional alliances. Motivated, in part, by its longstanding
rivalry with the United States, Iran began cultivating ties with the
Taliban as they waged war against the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
Pakistan’s
relations with Iran also improved during this time. Despite some friction along
their shared border, Iran and Pakistan broached the possibility of regional
energy cooperation, which ultimately led to the two countries signing a
bilateral natural gas pipeline deal in 2013. Nonetheless, Pakistan
continued dragging its feet on completing its portion of the pipeline, fearing
both Saudi and American displeasure over cooperation with its heavily
sanctioned western neighbor.
Pakistan’s relations with the US, meanwhile, have been
tenuous at best, soured by their divergent strategic objectives in Afghanistan
and America’s increasing reliance on India to counteract Chinese influence
across South and Southeast Asia.
Pakistan
has doubled down on its military and diplomatic ties with China, and the two
have significantly boosted their economic ties by launching the US$62
billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2015, dubbed a flagship
project of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
China
included many Middle Eastern countries in the BRI, and it inked a 25-year
strategic trade and investment accord with Iran in 2021, estimated to be
worth between US$200 billion and US$300 billion. China’s move to involve Iran
in the BRI may partly have been prompted by its desire to undermine India’s
investment in the Iranian Chabahar deep-sea port on the Indian Ocean, viewed as
a rival to the Chinese-controlled Pakistani deep-sea port in Gwadar.
For its part, Iran is trying to balance its relations with India
and China. India used the Chabahar seaport to send shipments to
Afghanistan, bypassing the need to cross Pakistani territory. Despite facing
constraints due to the international sanctions regime, India had secured US waivers to
buy Iranian oil and to invest in Chabahar.
Whether India will be able to maintain those relations with
the Islamic Republic as its ties with the US continue to grow remains
to be seen, but the increasing acrimony between China and India certainly makes
it unlikely that Chabahar and Gwadar can become ‘sister ports’ to help enhance
broader regional trade and connectivity.
Beijing’s attempt to simultaneously loop Iran and many of
its arch-rival Arab states into the BRI may have been a key factor that
informed its decision to step in to mediate one of the thorniest rivalries
between Muslim nations in the Middle East. Other Muslim countries in the Gulf
region and beyond, such as the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Pakistan,
have applauded this high-profile Chinese diplomatic maneuver.
For Pakistan, in particular, the tempering of the protracted
Saudi-Iran rivalry could not only help lessen long-running domestic sectarian
frictions but also alleviate pressure on Pakistani decision makers to involve
Islamabad in contentious proxy tussles elsewhere in the Muslim world, as
happened in Yemen.
Even if
the still fragile Saudi-Iranian rapprochement holds, Pakistan’s ability to
improve its ties with the Islamic Republic will still be kept in check by
concerns over further antagonizing the United States.
Biden administration officials have cautiously welcomed Chinese
efforts to try to de-escalate tensions in the troubled region while expressing
reservations about Iran’s likelihood to stick to the deal.
For
many Muslim-majority countries, including Pakistan, Beijing’s diplomatic
endeavors are more immediately relevant and beneficial than those undertaken by
Washington to bring the Gulf states and Israel together to deter Iran.
Courtesy: Middle East Institute