Who Really Seeks Control of the Red Sea Gateway?

The United States has repeatedly intervened in conflicts across the Middle East, often justifying its military presence as essential to regional stability and the protection of international trade. Yet an important question remains, do these interventions resolve security crises, or can they also create opportunities to expand American strategic influence? The confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Houthis and the United States deserves scrutiny from this perspective.

The Houthis intensified attacks on shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, declaring their campaign a means of pressuring Israel. Vessels linked to Israel became particular targets, although the attacks and their consequences extended beyond Israeli shipping. International trade was disrupted, seafarers were endangered and the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait became a global concern.

However, threatening shipping bound for Israel is not the same as deliberately targeting Saudi Arabia. Each reported attack must be examined on its own evidence, including the identity of the attacker, the intended target and the strategic purpose. Iranian support for the Houthis does not, by itself, establish Iranian direction of every operation.

Washington has presented its military campaign against the Houthis as a response to threats against navigation and regional security. But military intervention can produce consequences beyond its declared objectives. By expanding its operational presence, surveillance and influence over maritime security, the United States can strengthen its position around a gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.

This raises a question that deserves serious investigation, could the escalation of hostilities be creating the strategic conditions for greater American influence over access to one of the world's most important shipping corridors?

The possibility should not be confused with proof that Washington engineered the confrontation or that a US proxy is responsible for attacks attributed to the Houthis. Such allegations require independently verifiable evidence. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of military operations merit examination regardless of their stated intentions.

I prefer to frame the broader issue as “US-Controlled Entry and Exit” rather than simply a blockade. Control over a maritime gateway need not involve formally closing it. It can also emerge through military deployments, intelligence capabilities, security partnerships and the ability to influence the conditions under which commercial vessels pass.

The central issue, therefore, is not merely whether the Houthis threaten Saudi Arabia or whether American forces can suppress them. It is whether the resulting security arrangements protect freedom of navigation for all nations or gradually concentrate strategic leverage in the hands of an outside power.

The world must distinguish between securing an international waterway and acquiring the power to determine who can use it, on what terms and under whose protection. That distinction may ultimately prove more consequential than the military confrontation itself.