The World Beyond Ukraine

“Ukraine has united the world,” declared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a speech on the first anniversary of the start of the war with Russia. The war may have united the West, but it has left the world divided. And that rift will only widen if Western countries fail to address its root causes.

The traditional transatlantic alliance of European and North American countries has mobilized in unprecedented fashion for a protracted conflict in Ukraine. It has offered extensive humanitarian support for people inside Ukraine and for Ukrainian refugees. And it is preparing for what will be a massive rebuilding job after the war. But outside Europe and North America, the defense of Ukraine is not on top of agenda.

Few governments endorse the brazen Russian invasion, yet many remain unpersuaded by the West’s insistence that the struggle for freedom and democracy in Ukraine is also theirs.

As French President Emmanuel Macron said at the Munich Security Conference in February, “I am struck by how we have lost the trust of the global South.” He is right. Western conviction about the war and its importance is matched elsewhere by skepticism at best and outright disdain at worst.

The gap between the West and the rest goes beyond the rights and wrongs of the war. Instead, it is the product of deep frustration—anger, in truth—about the Western-led mismanagement of globalization since the end of the Cold War.

The concerted Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has thrown into sharp relief the occasions when the West violated its own rules or when it was conspicuously missing in action in tackling global problems.

Such arguments can seem beside the point in light of the daily brutality meted out by Russian forces in Ukraine. But Western leaders should address them, not dismiss them. The gulf in perspectives is dangerous for a world facing enormous global risks. And it threatens the renewal of a rules-based order that reflects a new, multipolar balance of power in the world.

The Russian invasion has produced remarkable unity and action from the liberal democratic world. Western countries have coordinated an extensive slate of economic sanctions targeting Russia. European states have increasingly aligned their climate policies on decarbonization with national security-related commitments to end their dependence on Russian oil and gas.

Western governments have rallied to support Ukraine with enormous shipments of military aid. Finland and Sweden aim to be soon admitted to NATO.

Europe has adopted a welcoming policy toward the eight million Ukrainian refugees within its borders.

All these efforts have been advocated by a US administration that has been sure-footed in partnering with European allies and others.

The squabbles over Afghanistan and the AUKUS security partnership (a 2021 deal struck by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that irked France) seem a long time ago.

Many in the West have been surprised at this turn of events. Clearly, so was the Kremlin, which imagined that its invasion would not provoke a strong and determined Western response. The West’s unity and commitment are not matched elsewhere.

At the beginning of the war, the UN General Assembly voted 141 to 5, with 47 absences or abstentions, to condemn the Russian invasion. But that result flattered to deceive.

“Most non-European countries that voted to deplore Russia’s aggression last March did not follow up with sanctions. Doing the right thing at the UN can be an alibi for not doing much about the war in the real world.”

In a series of UN votes since the war started, around 40 countries representing nearly 50% of the world’s population have regularly abstained or voted against motions condemning the Russian invasion.

Fifty-eight countries abstained from a vote, in April 2022, to expel Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, two-thirds of the world’s population lives in countries that are officially neutral or supportive of Russia. These countries do not form some kind of axis of autocracy; they include several notable democracies, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa.

Much of the fence-sitting is not driven by disagreements over the conflict in Ukraine but is instead a symptom of a wider syndrome, anger at perceived Western double standards and frustration at stalled reform efforts in the international system.

The distinguished Indian diplomat Shivshankar Menon put the point sharply in Foreign Affairs earlier this year when he wrote, “Alienated and resentful, many developing countries see the war in Ukraine and the West’s rivalry with China as distracting from urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic.”

Courtesy: Foreign Affairs

 

India faces sanctions under CAATSA

Moscow has started supplying New Delhi with S-400 air defense missile systems said Dmitry Shugayev, the head of the Russian military cooperation agency. The deal between Russia and India, worth around US$5.5 billion was signed in 2018 for five long-range surface-to-air missile systems. New Delhi believes it is crucial for countering China.

The deal attracts attention of the experts to the US legislation called Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It is the US Federal Law signed on August 02, 2017 that requires the US President to sanction Russian, North Korean and Iranian, punishing direct or indirect support of them. The three sections of CAASTA are aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program, reducing Russian growing influence in Europe and Eurasia and curbing North Korean weapons of mass destruction.

The US applied CAASTA on Turkey in January 2021 after it bought S-400 systems from Moscow. But sanctioning India under CAATSA appears to be a herculean task for Washington. New Delhi is not bothered about CAATSA, being considered a US law, and not one by the United Nations. In March 2021 Lloyd Austin, US Secretary of Defense raised concerns over India’s planned procurement of the S-400 air defense missile. He had accentuated that the US allies and partners ought to shun “any kind of acquisitions that will trigger sanctions”.

Austin soon after clarified that the question of sanctioning India was not under consideration as New Delhi had not taken delivery of the system; sanctions would be applied only when deliveries took place, Austin added.

Interestingly, India has purchased S-400 air defense missile systems from Russia. A few queries remain unanswered. Will the US impose sanctions against India under CAATSA? If sanctioned are applied what would be the Indian reaction?

India, arguably, is a robust bulwark of the US against the containment of China sanctioning would loss a strategic ally in the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, India and Russia have a long history of military relations since the era of the Soviet Union.

Currently in the military services of India nearly 86% of the weapons, equipment, and platforms are of Russian origin. The US started selling weapons and equipment to India in 2001 after easing its relations with New Delhi.

Russian air defense system is extensively used in the Indian military; the latter is unlikely to compromise on the former’s sophisticated weapons. Sanctioning India will reduce Indian military buttress vis-à-vis China and will swing New Delhi to Moscow that the US never wants to happen. The US is fully cognizant of the fact that if sanctions are imposed will alienate India resulting in losing Indian arms market damaging the US military-industrial complex.

The fact of matter is that instead of sanctioning and alienating India, the US presumably will occupy the Indian arms market by competing with Russian weapons and equipment in terms of performance and price. 

On the other hand, there is a great deal of likelihood that CAATSA will bypass India, under the Act’s “modified waiver authority” for “certain sanctionable transactions’ granted by the US president Joe Biden. India has already been lobbying in Washington for CAATSA waiver over the S-400 air defense missile systems.

Indian diplomats and security officials reassured the US that both India and the US had a comprehensive global strategic partnership and both were having a threat from China and S-400 air defense missile systems were attributed to countering China. New Delhi had also guaranteed the protection of the US materiel and the US “technical and operational secrecy”.

India predominantly reassured Washington that the former was willing to reduce its dependency on the Russian defense equipment in the foreseeable future. India, as a result, was backed by three Republican senators presented an amendment in Congress to the National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 with the aim of making obstacles for the U.S. in the imposition of CAATSA on India.

The latest US legislation, called the Circumspectly Reducing Unintended Consequences Impairing Alliances and Leadership (CRUCIAL) Act, 2021 maintains that CAATSA will only weaken the US security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Ted Cruza a Republican senator argues that “Now would be exactly the wrong time for President Biden to undo all of that progress (in partnering India) through the imposition of these sanctions”.

S-400 obviously ushers a path to a diplomatic crisis for the Biden administration. Applying CAATSA on India will dilute the strategic coherence of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue QUAD in the Indo-Pacific undermining US diplomatic ties with India in the containment of China.

Moscow also looks forward to taking advantage of the sanctions reclaiming its role as an Indian bona fide military partner. Applying of sanctions would remain a geostrategic victory of Russia damaging the US Indo-Pacific strategy overwhelmingly.

Beijing remains a prime adversary of the US and India that forces both countries to be strategic allies in the region. However, the S-400 air defense missile somewhat caused a rift in the diplomatic ties of the US and India.

It can be argued that the irresponsible US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the non-inclusion of India in the AUKUS compelled India to move towards Moscow in a bid to pressurize the United States.

The US certainly hangs in the balance as far as CAATSA is concerned. On one hand, sanctioning India will bring New Delhi and Moscow further closer, weakening the US containment policy of China and the credibility of the Quad. On the other, non-imposition of CAATSA would tarnish the US image globally, showcasing its selective approach in punishment of the countries. 

Biden wants to mend relations between US and France

Joe Biden, President of the United States, has lately acknowledged that handling of a submarine deal with Australia by his administration was clumsy.

 He sought to repair relations between the US and France during a one-on-one meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron in Italy.

The security pact made between Australia, United Kingdom and the United States, known as AUKUS, caused a rift between the US and its oldest ally, France and resulted in France temporarily recalling its ambassador to the United States

“I think what happened was, to use an English phrase, what we did was clumsy,” Biden told reporters during the meeting with Macron at the French Embassy to the Holy See. "It was not done with a lot of grace. I was under the impression certain things had happened that hadn’t happened."

“I want to be clear: France is an extremely, an extremely valued partner,” Biden continued. “We have the same values.”

Biden later said he was under the impression that France had been informed long before the AUKUS pact was announced, in fact Paris had not been.

“We clarified together what we had to clarify,” Macron then told reporters. “And now what’s important is precisely to be sure that such a situation will not be possible for our future.”

Macron insisted on the need for “stronger coordination" and "stronger cooperation” and said the two countries had taken steps in recent weeks to enhance their ties.

"What really matters now is what we will do together in the coming weeks, the coming months, the coming years," he said.

France was caught flat-footed with the announcement of the AUKUS pact, which deals with security in the Asia Pacific, and reacted angrily to the announcement last month. The pact involves the U.S. and the U.K. selling Australia nuclear-powered submarines and caused France to lose out on a multibillion-dollar deal to provide submarines to Australia.

At the time, one French official likened Biden to former President Trump, who often acted unilaterally to the dismay of US allies.

Biden and Macron have spoken twice over the phone since the incident. On Friday, there were signs of a thawing. Biden and Macron shook hands, sat closely to one another and occasionally smiled in the meeting, giving way to a genial atmosphere that seemed to ease tensions between the US and France in recent weeks.

A senior administration official told reporters following the meeting that the two leaders discussed a range of topics, including Russia, China, Iran and nuclear issues.

The official also said of the US-France relationship: “We’re moving forward.”

 “We had some hard conversations in September and October, I think the conversations heading into November will be exciting and engaging,” the official said. “There’s not any sense that there's some kind of fundamental rift in the relationship, I think, at this point.”

The meeting came at the start of Biden’s second overseas trip as president. Both leaders will attend a Group of 20 Summit in Rome and, later, a major UN climate summit in Glasgow.

US, UK and Australia forging military alliance against China

The United States, Britain and Australia have forged a historic security alliance to strengthen military capabilities in the Pacific, allowing them to share advanced defence technologies and giving Australian forces nuclear submarine technology. The move, announced on Wednesday, extends Washington’s drive for military cooperation.

To begin the “Aukus” security partnership, naval officials and technical specialists from the three countries will work together over the next 18 months to give Australia the nuclear technology that will allow it to deploy submarines “to improve deterrence across the Indo-Pacific”, said a senior official from US President Joe Biden’s administration.

“We undertake this effort as part of a larger constellation of steps, including stronger bilateral partnerships with our traditional security partners in Asia – Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines – and also stronger engagements with new partners like India, Vietnam and new formations like the Quad,” the official said, referring to the security grouping of the US, India, Japan and Australia.

“This is an historic announcement. It reflects the Biden administration’s determination to build stronger partnerships to sustain peace and stability across the entire Indo-Pacific region.”

The three countries will also cooperate on integrating artificial intelligence, quantum computing and undersea capabilities into their military operations.

At a joint press conference with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British leader Boris Johnson, Biden said the initiative was needed to ensure the US and its allies had the “most modern capabilities we need to manoeuvre and defend against rapidly evolving threats”.

“We need to be able to address both the current strategic environment in the region and how it may evolve because the future of each of our nations, and indeed the world, depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific enduring and flourishing in the decades ahead,” Biden said.

The nuclear-powered submarines will be built in Adelaide with “in close cooperation” with Britain and the US, said Morrison.

Johnson called the undertaking “one of the most complex and technically demanding projects in the world”.

“Only a handful of countries possess nuclear-powered submarines,” he said. “And it is a momentous decision for any nation to acquire this formidable capability, and perhaps equally momentous for any other state to come to its aid.”

While all three leaders cast the initiative as an effort to bring “stability” to the Indo-Pacific region, none made any explicit mention of China.

Asked whether the formation of Aukus was meant to counter China’s military build-up, the US official said the move “is not aimed or about any one country”, adding that “it’s about advancing our strategic interests, upholding the international rules-based order and promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific”.

The official said that Biden did not mention the Aukus initiative specifically when he spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping last week, but that the US leader “did underscore our determination to play a strong, strong role in the Indo-Pacific”.

Asked on Wednesday about the new security alliance, Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, said that countries “should not build exclusionary blocs targeting or harming the interests of third parties”.

“In particular, they should shake off their Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” Liu said.

While Beijing may seek to downplay the new pact by calling it an outdated ideological move, there was “no doubt” about the initiative’s significance, said Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert in Chinese military and security policy at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

“Not only for the content of the deal, but it shows innovation in how US allies and partners are thinking of working together,” she said. “It’s more than the usual exercises and air shows.”

News of the trilateral alliance comes as China’s People’s Liberation Army steps up aerial drills near Taiwan and in the South China Sea, where China’s territorial claims have been contested by Washington and other countries in the region.

Against this backdrop, Beijing will not buy the Biden administration’s assertion that Aukus is not a specific reaction to China’s military rise, said Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

“Beijing will see this as part of US efforts to forge coalitions aimed at pushing back against China, and they aren’t wrong,” she said. “The Chinese need to recognize that this assertive behavior is drawing democratic countries to cooperate in new ways to defend their interests.”

Charles Edel, an expert in Indo-Pacific security issues, viewed Wednesday’s announcement as the latest example of Biden’s rejection of the go-it-alone approach that characterized his predecessor’s China policy, and “a signal that the United States is willing to invest more responsibilities into its allies than it has in the past”.

 “The bet that’s clearly being placed here is that, in response to increasing Chinese capabilities and the turn to a more threatening Chinese foreign policy, more allies are going to become more capable, and that that will serve as a greater deterrent to the Chinese, both militarily and politically,” said Edel, a global fellow at the Wilson Centre in Washington and senior fellow at the University of Sydney’s United States Studies Centre.

At Wednesday’s press conference, Morrison stressed that the submarines would be nuclear in propulsion only, rather than carrying nuclear weapons. “We will continue to meet all our nuclear weapons,” he said.

But nuclear power alone carried with it significant tactical advantages that had obvious applications when it came to countering China’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific, said Edel.

Besides increased payload capabilities, nuclear-powered submarines had greater endurance and could remain in deep waters for longer periods of times, said Edel. “They are, at depth, less detectable, so that’s a deterrent,” he said. “When we think about the extraordinary production of Chinese ground-based missiles that basically blanket the entire South China Sea – without necessarily a counterbalancing force other than the US – this then, I think, is a partial answer to that.”

Biden’s other geopolitical initiatives since taking office, including his efforts to bolster ties with NATO and the G7 and the shaping of the QUAD, have specifically included language about countering China’s growing influence.

The administration official cited Biden’s planned in-person meeting with Morrison and the other Quad leaders next week at the White House, and suggested that the presence of British aircraft carriers in the South China Sea in recent months figured into the strengthening military alliance.

“You have just seen the substantial deployment of British forces throughout the Indo-Pacific very successful deployments of the aircraft carriers, supporting ships, lots of valuable port engagements,” he said. “Our strategic discussions … transcended several months of very deep, very high level engagements with both our military commands, our political leadership and the people closest to our leaders in order to chart a common path on the way forward.”

The establishment of Aukus follows a warning on Tuesday by Glaser, former US National Security Council, Deputy National Security adviser Zack Cooper and other military analysts that the US needs stronger military partnerships in region.

“China’s modernizing military … poses the greatest challenge in the world,” they said in a white paper on how Washington should respond to challenges posed by Beijing. “China is not a global military peer competitor of the US … but it has developed a robust capability to fight effectively in the areas within the first island chain, which runs north to south from Japan in the East China Sea, to Taiwan, to the Philippines in the South China Sea.”

“Long-term success will depend on the US making significant advances in its regional diplomacy with new partners who feel threatened by Beijing’s military modernization and grey zone assertiveness, even as many have strong trade, investment and financial ties with China,” they said.

But in the wake of Wednesday’s announcement, it remains a possibility that Beijing will respond to Washington’s growing alliances with increased assertion, said Ali Wyne, a senior analyst with Eurasia Group and an expert in US-China relations.

“A big question is whether China will recalibrate, recognizing that it is engendering greater resistance among advanced industrial democracies or instead adduce that resistance as evidence that it needs to double down on its current course of diplomacy.”