Is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean?

Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since

Today it is legally indisputable that the high seas belong to all. This means China`s navy has as much right to ply the Indian Ocean as any other nation, even though it might make countries like India feel a creeping sense of dread. Likewise, it is a well-established fact the People`s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been sailing in the Indian Ocean far more frequently in recent years, compounded by fears that Beijing is seeking to establish new naval bases on the periphery of this ocean. 

Yet, is China trying to dominate the Indian Ocean? Looking back, a major step for China was its first deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden to join an international counter-piracy effort. The first trio of warships arrived in December 2008, and a task force has seen a constant presence there ever since.

Chinese warships remain despite pirate attacks disappearing almost entirely in the area. However, such assets have also been used for non-combatant evacuation operations in Yemen and Libya, plus ships are available for humanitarian assistance operations. China is understandably concerned about protecting its sea lanes, the conduits that bring in raw materials (9.3 million barrels of oil per day, with 44% of Chinese oil imports coming from the Middle East in 2018) and which simultaneously deliver finished products to Africa and Europe (20% of China`s GDP comes from exports). 

Strategists call these sea lines of communication (SLOC), and Beijing wants to protect them from threats in peacetime and against hostile powers in times of tension or war. China`s economic investments continue to grow, as does the diasporas of its citizens. The Middle East and Africa comprise an essential part of Chairman Xi Jinping`s flagship Belt and Road Initiative, and its importance is seen in the fact that Xi has visited the region 18 times since he gained power in 2012.

Furthermore, there are particular chokepoints along these SLOCs, locations where shipping is funneled and becomes particularly vulnerable. The most obvious of these is the Strait of Malacca between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Other chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandab (the Horn of Africa) and Suez Canal. China`s interest in the Indian Ocean region is a product of growing commercial interests, with the PLAN being handed the task of safeguarding them. 

This is not a new concern, for Beijing`s 2015 Defense White Paper stated that "with the growth of China`s national interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil...and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication, as well as institutions, personnel and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue".

In fact, three critical factors affect how China can project power, protect its SLOCs and keep chokepoints open. The PLA is acutely aware of all three, and much effort is devoted to negating current disadvantages.

First is the PLAN`s rather modest presence in the Indian Ocean, especially compared to powers like India or the USA. 

Second is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. Third is China`s rather limited logistics/sustainment infrastructure along the Indian Ocean`s periphery. If China is to dominate the Indian Ocean, if that is its aim, it must address each of the above weaknesses. Interestingly, the US Naval War College recently published a report addressing the PLAN`s utilization of the Indian Ocean. 

Authored by Jeffrey Becker, the report entitled Securing China`s Lifelines across the Indian Ocean provides insights into Chinese ambitions. It summarized China`s predicament as follows: "To address these challenges, Beijing has already undertaken a series of initiatives, including expanding the capabilities of China`s base in Djibouti and leveraging the nation`s extensive commercial shipping fleet to provide logistics support. Evidence suggests that China may also be pursuing other policy options as well, such as increasing the number of advanced PLAN assets deployed to the region and establishing additional overseas military facilities."Becker admitted, "However, while the PLAN`s ability to operate in the Indian Ocean has improved considerably, its ability to project power into the region, and defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints in times of crisis, remains limited."

Addressing each of the three factors in turn, the first was China`s modest naval presence in the Indian Ocean, with just two warships and a support vessel on permanent rotation to the Gulf of Aden. Other warships may occasionally make passage or conduct exercises, plus it is estimated that Chinese submarines perform just two forays into the Indian Ocean annually on average.

Nonetheless, Chinese naval exercises west of the Malacca Strait (but still in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean) are becoming more common. These have two advantages, familiarizing crews with the area, and normalizing the appearance of PLAN ships.

It is certainly possible for the PLAN to deploy more ships there, for it is the largest navy in the world in terms of hull numbers. Becker quoted one source suggesting "that China is already capable of maintaining about 18 ships on station fulltime in the Indian Ocean, given the PLAN`s current force posture".

Senior Captain Liang Fang at China`s National Defense University has written papers advocating that the PLAN deploy aircraft carriers there to protect SLOCs. A Chinese carrier group operating around the Horn of Africa would certainly make a bold statement about Chinese power projection capabilities, and could provide leverage over nearby countries.

However, it is rare for Chinese experts to directly discuss any concept of a dedicated PLAN Indian Ocean squadron. The second aforementioned factor is the PLAN`s limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capacity. 

Close to home, Chinese warships enjoy support from land-based missiles and aircraft, plus a heavy concentration of submarines, but these are luxuries not afforded in distant seas. Such support would be absent in the Indian Ocean, plus Chinese assets would be within land-based strike range of potential adversaries like India. 

The latter, especially in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, is boosting its ability to detect and track foreign submarines and surface ships. The defensive capacity of Chinese warships is improving, though, The Type 052D destroyer, for example, has 64 vertical-launch missile cells that can fire missiles against multiple enemy aircraft. 

However, within their first five years of service since 2014, none had deployed to the Gulf of Aden. Significantly, their first foray with a Gulf of Aden task force occurred in May 2019. Moving on, the third factor is China`s limited logistics support infrastructure in the Indian Ocean region. China formally opened a shore-based base in Djibouti on 1^st August 2017. 

China is not the only country with a military presence in Djibouti, for France, Italy, Japan and the USA all have military facilities there, with the Saudis to build one too. China has been expanding the pier at its Djibouti military base in recent weeks, sufficient to host at least a four-ship flotilla, including the large Type 901 auxiliary ship. 

The future deployment of more advanced weaponry to Djibouti - such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-submarine aircraft - would indicate more urgent Chinese intent. Already, one of six berths at Djibouti`s commercial Doraleh Multipurpose Port is reserved for use by the PLA.

Becker commented on auxiliary ships: "While these ships could be used to support other vessels in the fleet, given their limited numbers, and the fact that they were designed to support the PLAN`s future carrier strike groups, expanding facilities in Djibouti to support Type 901s may indicate that the base could also host a PLAN carrier strike group in the future. Indeed, the size and nature of the facilities being built at Djibouti suggest that the PLAN is establishing the capability to support a carrier strike group from its first overseas base should it so chose.

"China is well aware of the advantages that new regional logistics bases would bring, and Pakistan is usually touted as the most likely location. Becker noted, though, "...At least in the near term, the likelihood of the PLAN obtaining access to a military facility which it could use during a conflict remains remote, as many Indian Ocean region countries seek to maintain a balance in their relations between regional powers, and appear unlikely to abandon this hedging approach."

One Chinese scholar, Gao Wensheng of Tianjin Normal University, encourages setting up such Chinese "strategic fulcrum ports" to enhance logistics support in the region. This topic, often referred to as the "string of pearls theory", has generated a lot of heat and noise. Such bases along the coast of the Indian Ocean - whether dual use or purely military - would undeniably greatly aid the PLAN`s ability to operate so far from home.

Becker assessed, "Over the past decade, the PLAN has proven capable of sustaining small groups of vessels in the Indian Ocean for long periods of time. However, though a three-ship taskforce is sufficient for the PLAN`s counter-piracy needs in peacetime, defending access to Indian Ocean SLOCs in a conflict would require a much larger and more sustained force, and the PLAN has only a limited number of replenishment ships capable of supporting far-seas operations."

A shortage of replenishment ships (currently eight Type 903/903A and two Type 901 vessels) could force China to utilize its massive commercial fleet, one of the largest in the world.

Becker indeed noted: "Beijing has already taken steps so that the fleet can better support PLAN activities. For example, it has promulgated regulations requiring certain civilian vessels - including roll-on/roll-off vessels, tankers and container ships - be built to military specifications, theoretically facilitating their future use by the navy with few if any modifications. 

In September 2016, China enacted the Law of the People`s Republic of China on National Defense Transportation, which improves the process for military requisition of civilian transportation assets during wartime, natural disasters, emergencies or `special circumstances`, both domestically and abroad."Chinese commercial vessels have taken part in maritime exercises, meaning that an entity such as COSCO could easily be called upon to support the PLAN in the Indian Ocean to augment naval capabilities. 

Furthermore, Chinese state-owned companies own or operate port facilities around the region (including Djibouti, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka and the UAE), and they could provide some degree of sustainment.

In line with other analysis, Becker concluded: "...Other than its base in Djibouti, the PLAN does not, at present, appear to have arrangements with any other country in the region that would allow it to preposition specialized military equipment or technicians required to use that equipment, even in port facilities owned or operated by Chinese state-owned firms. Host governments whose ports do service PLAN vessels during a conflict, or allow the PLA to preposition military equipment on their territory, could possibly be dragged into the conflict as a co-belligerent."

Yet China has slightly improved its posture by developing more comprehensive naval facilities farther south within China - including an aircraft carrier base at Yulin on Hainan Island, thus speeding up the PLAN`s ability to deploy assets to the Indian Ocean. China could also surge platforms from reclaimed reef bases in the South China Sea, as they can harbor ships and accommodate aircraft such as fighters, maritime patrol and aerial refueling types. 

This would give the PLA a quicker response to any contingency in the Malacca Strait, for instance. It would make sense for China to establish a second overseas military base at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean, to help defend access to the region. 

For many years, locations such as Myanmar have been discussed. Or even farther east, China`s military relationship with Phnom Penh has become quite exclusive in recent years. In 2019 there were media reports that China may have forged an agreement for the PLAN to use a Cambodian naval base, plus a large and mysterious airport is being constructed in Cambodia. 

Speculation is rife that the PLA could one day use the latter, even though Cambodia is some 1,000km from the Malacca Strait. Becker suggested another possibility, that Beijing may simply be content to emulate the Soviet Union`s past presence in the Indian Ocean. The Cold War power sought only limited SLOC protection and localized sea denial, as opposed to outright sea control. This could represent an achievable solution for China too.

Israel saves Pakistan face

According a Reuters news, Israeli Regional Cooperation Minister, Ofir Akunis said there were two main candidate countries to become the next to move towards normal ties with Israel. He did not name either but said one is in the Gulf and could be Oman but would not be Saudi Arabia. The other, further to the east, is a “Muslim country that is not small” but is not Pakistan, he said.

Asked if a fifth country could sign up before Trump steps down on 20th January 2021, Ofir Akunis told Israel’s Ynet TV, “We are working in that direction.”

 “I believe ... there will be an American announcement about another country that is going public with the normalization of relations with Israel and, in essence, with the infrastructure for an accord — a peace accord,” he said.

Israel is working towards formalizing relations with a fifth Muslim country, possibly in Asia, during US President Donald Trump’s term, an Israeli cabinet minister said on Wednesday. The White House has brokered rapprochements bet­ween Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco this year.

Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, said last week it would not recognize Israel as long as Palestinian statehood demands remain unmet. Malaysia has signalled a similar policy.

“Malaysia’s firm stance on the Palestinian issue will not change,” Deputy Foreign Minister Kamarudin Jaffar told the country’s senate on Wednesday, adding that Kuala Lumpur would not interfere in other nations’ decisions on Israel.

In Dhaka, a foreign ministry official said Bangladesh was not interested in establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. “Our position remains the same,” he reiterated.

Oman has praised the US-brokered diplomatic drive but has not commented on its own prospects of forging Israel ties.

Israel heading to fresh polls

The Knesset dissolved automatically at midnight Tuesday, setting a 23^rd March 2021 date for elections amid mutual recriminations between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Alternate Prime Minister Benny Gantz.

Netanyahu and Gantz blamed each other for not finding a way to keep their government going. Likud and Blue and White had reached an agreement to extend the deadline for passing the state budget and preventing early elections. But Gantz issued new demands, and then rebels in both parties prevented the bill from passing in dramatic fashion.

 “It is no secret that the Likud and I did not want to go to elections,” Netanyahu said in a Knesset press conference. “Israel is going to elections due to internal fights in Blue and White.”

Netanyahu said he had agreed to the rotation in the Prime Minister’s Office before Blue and White reneged on their deal.

Blue and White responded by shifting the blame to Netanyahu, saying: “A man under three indictments is dragging Israel to elections for a fourth time. If there was no trial, there would be a budget and no elections.”

Polls broadcast on Tuesday night found that the election will be devastating for Blue and White. A Kantar Institute poll broadcast on KAN News predicted six mandates for the party. A Midgam poll on Channel 12 predicted five seats, and if Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai forms a party, only four.

Both polls gave the Likud a significant majority over the New Hope Party of former Likud minister Gideon Sa’ar, Yamina and Yesh Atid. Sa’ar has risen in polls that ask who is most fit to be prime minister. In the KAN poll, 39% said Netanyahu was most fit for the job, and 36% said Sa’ar.

The Likud took action on Tuesday to deprive Sa’ar’s party of key state funding. Sa’ar called the Likud’s steps brutal and expressed confidence that the move would boomerang against Netanyahu’s party.

Sa’ar played an active role in preventing the deadline for passing the budget from being extended and the time until another election from being prolonged. His confidante Likud MK Michal Shir joined Blue and White MKs Ram Shefa, Miki Haimovich and Asaf Zamir in voting against the early election prevention bill.

Shir and Shefa waited in the Knesset parking lot before surprising their colleagues by voting against the bill and ensuring its defeat in a 49-47 vote.

Shir submitted her resignation letter to Knesset Speaker Yariv Levin on Tuesday. She said she was proud to vote to end a dysfunctional government and that she would be joining New Hope.

When her resignation takes effect on Thursday, Shir will be replaced by the next candidate on the Likud list, Shevah Stern, who was chosen for a slot on the list reserved for a candidate from Judea and Samaria.

Likud MK Sharren Haskel, who refused to come to the vote, has not said when and if she will quit, but she is also expected to join the new party. If Haskel quits, she will be replaced in the Knesset by former minister Ayoub Kara.

Meanwhile, the state budgets, which were the technical reasons for the election, were advanced in the cabinet and Knesset but not passed into law.

“Out of a sense of responsibility to the Israeli people, I have decided that we will approve legislation that will enable a rolling budget for 2021 so that the country can minimally function during election season,” Gantz said. “The prime minister and finance minister have been wildly irresponsible, denying the country a budget for six months in flagrant violation of their commitment and all out of narrow, self-serving personal considerations.”

China expels US Navy destroyer from South China Sea

Beijing on Tuesday announced its military has “expelled” a US Navy destroyer sailing near Nansha Islands – also known as Spratly Islands – in the South China Sea in a fresh escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington.

China said the southern command of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) deployed ships and aircraft to warn US destroyer USS John S. McCain as it sailed through the disputed waters of the South China Sea (SCS).

The incident took place as Shandong, China’s second aircraft carrier, was said to be conducting drills in the SCS region after sailing through the Taiwan Strait on Sunday.

China claims nearly the entire SCS but that claim is disputed by several maritime neighbors including the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, besides Vietnam and Taiwan, which China says is a breakaway region.

“The Chinese PLA on Tuesday expelled US destroyer USS John S. McCain after it trespassed into China’s territorial waters off Nansha Islands in the South China Sea,” said Senior Colonel Tian Junli, a spokesperson for the PLA southern theatre command.

China firmly opposes the US warship’s trespassing, said Tian, warning that the US moves undermine the peace and stability of the region.

“Such actions by the US have seriously violated China’s sovereignty and security and severely undermined peace and stability in the SCS,” Tian added.

The US guided-missile destroyer had last week practised anti-submarine warfare with a French submarine and Japanese carrier in the Philippine Sea.

A statement from the US 7th Fleet Public Affairs said the warship was conducting freedom of navigation operations in the SCS.

“On December 22, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) asserted navigational rights and freedoms in the Spratly Islands, consistent with international law. This freedom of navigation operation (“FONOP”) upheld the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognised in international law by challenging restrictions on innocent passage imposed by China, Vietnam, and Taiwan,” the statement said.

“All interactions with foreign military forces were consistent with international norms and did not impact the operation,” it added.

The US statement added that unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the SCS pose a serious threat to the “…freedom of the seas, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, free trade and unimpeded commerce, and freedom of economic opportunity for SCS littoral nations”.

In April, China had scrambled aircraft and deployed ships to track and expel a frontline US warship from near another Beijing-controlled region called Paracel Islands - also known as Xisha Islands in China and Hoang Sa Archipelago in Vietnam - in the SCS.

Accusing the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry of carrying out a “provocative act” and violating Chinese sovereignty, the PLA’s southern command had then said the intrusion of the American warship prompted it to “track, monitor, verify, identify and expel” it.

US China Rivalry: Southeast Asia cannot afford another tyranny

A new super powers contest would be a disaster for Southeast Asian states which struggle to maintain autonomy and prefer to selectively follow their wishes. The new world order must accommodate China’s interests and the United States should compromise, rather than resisting the inevitable.

The colonial era in Southeast Asia extended from 15th to late 20th century. During this period, the Western powers – including United States competed for occupying and governing Southeast Asia. Although, the colonies finally won independence, the colonial masters continue to impose economic, political, cultural and sometimes military pressures to influence the foreign and domestic policies of their former colonies. 

Now a new neocolonial era is in the offing. This time, the struggle for domination of the region is between the West and China. It is for the control of commercial, technological and maritime as well as military access. The current contest still involves coercion that clearly challenges Southeast Asian countries’ independence and sovereignty. They were – and are – viewed as pawn in a great power contest.

The world has changed dramatically since the previous colonial and neocolonial periods in Southeast Asia. China has now risen and is challenging the victors in the Cold War and the post-World War II order that the US built and now leads.

In this new neocolonial era, the methods of “colonialism” might have changed but the fundamental intent of subjugating Southeast Asian nations to their national interest has not. Now, instead of physical conquest and occupation, China and the United States are trying to impose their socio-economic norms. This is manifested in the contest between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the US’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific and its spawn.

According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, China’s belt and road is an attempt to create “vassal states [and] a tyrannical regime all around the world for global hegemony”. China views the Indo-Pacific initiative as an attempt to impose a Western version of new order on it and the region, thereby constraining its rise and right to regional leadership.

Kiron Skinner, a former Director of Policy and Planning in the US State Department said China and the US “seek adherence to their set of values. This is a fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology.” US Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe has called China the “greatest threat to America today and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom worldwide since World War II”. While many might dispute these assertions, they do indicate the view deep within the upper reaches of the US government foreign policy apparatus.

At its heart is a clash of political systems – “efficient” authoritarian communism versus “inefficient” democratic capitalism – and their underlying values. US leaders are worried that China is proving that for itself and perhaps other developing countries, its system is superior in the eyes of its people.

Although, the US hoped that China’s values and political system would become more like its own over time, that is now recognized as unlikely and probably always was. This has shaken the US establishment to the core because it challenges the fundamental assumption that the world wanted to – and would – become like it.

This clash of fundamental values and norms is driving the US-China neocolonial competition for the political allegiance and support of Southeast Asian countries. They will continue to pressure them to side with their system.

Some Southeast Asian nations have tried to take advantage of this contest by hedging and thus benefiting from the largesse of both China’s economic strength and the US security blanket. However, this is proving to be an increasingly dangerous game as the two competitors crank up the pressure to choose sides. If there is resistance by Southeast Asian countries to the entreaties of the competing powers, neither is beyond angry threats, military intimidation and formal or informal sanctions to get their way.

A particular concern is that the intensifying competition for influence and military dominance in the region could spill over into their domestic politics, with the US and China each aiding its supporters and hampering its opponents. This happened during the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, and it could happen again.

This great power contest could be a disaster for some Southeast Asian countries. These countries are struggling to maintain their strategic autonomy and would like to follow great power wishes only when their interests align, but they cannot resist such pressures alone. They need to do so in unison.

However, their cohesion is in jeopardy. As outspoken Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte warned, “The South China Sea issue is Asean’s strategic challenge. How we deal with this matter lays bare our strengths and weaknesses as a community.”

The colliding ambitions and values of China and the US suggest the inevitability of a fundamental clash. The window for compromise is closing. China is on an upwards trajectory of increasing power, not unlike America was in its postcolonial days.

The US is still ahead and on top. It should compromise while it can still significantly influence the terms rather than resist the inevitable with needless suffering for all concerned. The international order must at least partially accommodate China’s interests.

Of course, there will be stresses and strains, but confrontation is the easy way out of this dilemma. The harder but better way for all concerned is for the US to determine and negotiate where, when and how to compromise on what.

History shows the US cannot be top dog forever. Negotiating will provide an extension of its supremacy and the possibility of a soft landing. The Joe Biden administration has an opportunity to move in this direction.

Goreh-Jask oil pipeline to open Indian Ocean gates for Iranian oil

It is no secret that Islamic Republic Iran enjoys strategic geopolitical position. It is located at the heart of the world’s oil production center and the trade corridor connecting east and west. The country for more than four decades has been enduring sanctions. To counter the US strategy of Maximum Pressures, Iran has no option but to come up with new strategies for diversifying its exports and trade routes. Goreh-Jask oil pipeline is one of these initiatives.

This pipeline is going to provide Iran with an alternative route for the country’s crude oil exports that are currently carried out through the Strait of Hormuz. The pipeline will open a new gate for Iranian oil to the Indian Ocean by transferring oil from Goreh in Bushehr Province to Jask on the shores of Gulf of Oman. The pipeline project is nearing completion, as per the schedule.

Implementation of the Goreh-Jask pipeline is also in line with the country’s programs for the integrated development of Makran shores in the southeast, which has been one of the major policies of the country considering the significance of the trade with the South Asian countries.

According to the Managing Director of Iran's Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC) Touraj Dehqani, Goreh-Jask pipeline consists of 1,000 kilometers long 42-inch diameter acid-compatible pipes, five pumping stations, two pigging stations and a metering station at the end of the line.

“Offshore facilities also include wharves, support ports, and related loading facilities and pipelines. Also, electrical systems and storage facilities are under construction to be partly commissioned in the first phase.”

Dehqani stated that the first phase of this project with a capacity to transfer over 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day will be ready for operation by the end of the current Iranian calendar year. The transfer capacity of the pipeline can be increased up to 30 million barrels per day in the second phase, he said.

Despite all the limitations created by the external factors like the US sanctions, the decline of oil prices and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, the project has reached over 80 percent of physical progress in less than two years, a very significant achievement for the country’s oil industry.

Over 95 percent of the equipment, machinery, and technical parts used in this project have been supplied by domestic companies, another achievement for the country’s industrial sectors to overcome the hardships imposed by the sanctions and turn them into opportunities for flourishing in every aspect.

As one of the country’s most strategic project at the moment, the first phase of the Goreh-Jask oil pipeline is expected to come on stream by the end of this year and hopefully, Iran would need this new export hub at the Indian Ocean to come back to the oil market with full force after the US sanctions are lifted.

Back Sea Brewing Conflict

Many experts from United States find the whole swath of territory in Eastern Europe, near Russia, very far away and hard to conceptualize. This part of the world involves a number of countries, small and large that is generally neither the most frequently discussed in the US news nor frequented by the US tourists.

To make sense of much of this remote region, it can be helpful to take a perspective that centers on the Black Sea and views that body of water as the key point of reference for much of the region. Doing so not only helps clarify what Russia is up to in its neighborhood, but also shines a spotlight on Chinese activity.

The Black Sea region is best viewed as having three big anchors—Ukraine to the north, Turkey to the south, Russia to the northeast. Then there are three countries on either side of the region—Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova on the left or west, Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaijan to the east.

Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria are NATO allies; the US and NATO’s other twenty-six members (making for a grand total of thirty) are sworn to their defense through a mutual-defense treaty. And even though Ukraine is not a NATO ally, the United States did promise (along with Russia) back in 1994 to help protect its security—which is why the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has been so concerning.

None of this is to say that the US needs to prepare for war against China, or Russia for that matter, in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea is far from the Chinese coasts; the main military concerns are with China in the western Pacific region.

Moreover, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, told a group of people at the Brookings Institution on 2nd December 2020, the US is in a period of great-power competition but it is not in a period of conflict, and the goal should be to keep things that way while competing effectively against Russian and Chinese influence.

Indeed, as with many parts of the world, China does not pose a direct military threat, rather it challenges the US interests in the realms of economics, technology, and espionage. To be specific:

- China is offering loans, through its Belt and Road Initiative, to many countries along a vast periphery and perimeter. This includes the Black Sea. But buyer must be cognizant that China’s money comes with strings. The US needs to help regional countries understand this and so that they can accept any loans with their eyes wide open.

- China’s software and hardware are optimized for intrusive monitoring of the population, Black Sea inhabitants will be monitored if and when they accept Chinese technology, even from private firms, in realms like 5G. China’s civil-commercial-military-intelligence “fusion law” formalizes this; Beijing isn’t even pretending to do otherwise.

- China is actively trying to buy into sectors that have huge security implications. A prime example is the manufacturer Motorsich in Ukraine, which builds high-quality engines for helicopters and aircraft. A struggling Ukrainian economy may make such assets relatively easy pickings for a purportedly friendly but also devious foreign investor

- In general, Chinese infrastructure comes with long-term controlling interests

- Default on Chinese loans results in Chinese ownership of assets—and the default is a distinct possibility when big projects are foisted upon unsuspecting countries with weak economies and a lack of transparency in their investment decisions.

The US can do a lot to help in ways that are already showing promise in other regions around the world. Malaysia and Pakistan, for example, have figured out that they can say no to massive Chinese projects that would bring them little in the way of jobs (since China brings along most of its own workers for Belt and Road projects) and much in the way of debt. A central database that tracks such Chinese efforts, and helps countries do the calculus of pros and cons for each proposed investment before signing any contracts, can go a long way towards defeating such practices.

The US needs to be a part of the leadership in this region. The EU and NATO are important, to complement our diplomacy with both those organizations, the incoming Biden administration should recognize the Black Sea as a region of importance, requiring a focus on diplomacy and economic engagement.

The good news is that war does not have to be the future for the Black Sea. Military support is important, but it is just one of our tools for engagement in this vital region. To avoid bad news, the US must engage effectively, be patient, and sustain its efforts, when it chooses to do. It is time to choose.