Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canadian security agencies have obtained
credible evidence linking the Indian government to the unsolved murder of
Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and notable advocate for Sikh
separatism.
Nijjar was shot by two masked assailants outside a Sikh
temple in British Columbia earlier this year in an attack that Canada alleges
has since been connected to agents of India.
The Indian foreign ministry decried the allegations as
absurd and, in the aftermath of the announcement, exchanged tit-for-tat
expulsions of senior diplomats from Ottawa and New Delhi.
The dispute has shined a sudden spotlight on the
Canada-India relationship, which, prior to the Nijjar incident, had been
trending in a positive direction. Geopolitical developments, economic ties, and
demographic trends over the past ten years had set the stage for closer
cooperation between the two former British colonies. India’s prominence in
Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy and high-level negotiations between the two
states for an early progress trade agreement (EPTA) gave supporters of the
relationship plenty of reasons to be optimistic.
Now, the allegations that the Indian government orchestrated
the assassination of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil have cast a cloud of
doubt over the path ahead for the bilateral relationship.
Trade will likely be the first major casualty of the
fallout, with negotiations for the EPTA being put on hold. Both countries
declared that they would pause trade talks with each other earlier this
month and Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng has indefinitely postponed a
trade mission to New Delhi that had been planned for October. The negotiations
were a notable part of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, which listed the EPTA as
a critical step towards a larger comprehensive economic partnership agreement
(CEPA) that would bolster trade ties between the two countries.
The stalled trade talks have put a US$17 billion bilateral
trade relationship under strain. Canadian merchandise trade with India grew
from approximately US$3.87 billion in 2012 to US$10.18 billion in 2022, with
major increases in the export of Canadian energy products and import of Indian
consumer goods. In that same year, services trade between the two
countries measured US$6.96 billion.
A reduction in the flow of Indian immigrants, which
constitute almost one in five of all recent immigrants to Canada, could be
even more devastating than a deterioration of trade relations.
Canada recently reached the 40-million-population
milestone off an influx in inbound migration following the COVID-19
pandemic. In fact, Canada’s population growth, which is the fastest in the G7,
is mainly driven by migration ‑ four in five new Canadians from 2016 to
2021 were immigrants.
Indian immigration to Canada has tripled since 2013,
overtaking and pulling away from the Philippines and China as the top source
country for new Canadians in the 2021 census.
That
census also counted 1.3 million ethnic Indians living in Canada, over 1
million of whom resided in British Columbia or Ontario. 77% of that group –
771,790 people – follow Sikhism, making Canada’s Sikh population the largest in
the world outside of India.
India also tops a notable subcategory of immigration ‑
international students, 34% of international students in Canada from
2015 to 2019 came from India, providing a critical source of revenue for
Canadian academic institutions; by 2022, that share had grown to 40%. These
numbers directly translate to the labor force, with Indian graduates from
Canadian programs accounting for the largest share of post-graduate work
permit holders in 2018 over China (20%) and the United States (1%).
Beyond the bounds of Canada-India relations, the dispute
between the two countries may throw a wrench in the emerging Indo-Pacific
framework of institutions and alliances.
India, with its economic might and security capabilities,
has been hailed by the United States and democratic allies as a regional
counterweight to China. Washington included India as a founding member of the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the freshly-anointed I2U2 bloc with
Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
Both countries are also founding members of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (QSD or Quad), a strategic security dialogue that includes
Japan and Australia.
Canada,
for its part, was not invited to join the Quad or IPEF at the conception of
either group, nor was it included alongside Five Eyes allies Australia and the
United Kingdom in the AUKUS security pact. After inviting Canada to join the
Trans-Pacific Partnership during the Obama administration, the United States
opted to not join the agreement, leaving both countries without a shared major
economic or security institution in the Indo-Pacific.
A chilling of relations with India could hinder Canada’s
ability to join the network of Indo-Pacific institutions, both because regional
allies will be wary of angering the Modi government and because India itself
could block Canadian membership in certain groups.
Ottawa is clearly aware of India’s influence and power in
the region. The Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy, published in late 2022,
has an entire section dedicated to India that reads, “India’s strategic
importance and leadership – both across the region and globally – will only
increase as India – the world’s biggest democracy – becomes the most populous
country in the world and continues to grow its economy.”
Canada
is not the only party that stands to lose from this dispute. The allegations
can damage India’s public image as a democratic nation committed to a
rules-based order or, more critically, its perception as a trustworthy ally in
the competition against China. Canada’s Five Eyes partners could reevaluate
intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation with India if Canadian
officials uncover definitive proof of India’s involvement in Nijjar’s murder.
Disputes between allies are common and, in the diverse
roster of countries that constitute the emerging Indo-Pacific architecture,
should be expected. Governments disagree frequently over trade policies,
environmental practices, and other issues that don’t pose a threat to their
diplomatic relationships.
The
Canada-India dispute is unique in that the severity of the allegations, the
economic and demographic ties between the two countries, and the geopolitical
context in which the situation unfolded have raised the stakes for all parties,
including the United States.
To prevent spillover damage to the nascent Indo-Pacific
alliances, Washington will need to approach the situation carefully. Beijing
benefits the most from in-fighting between major US allies, but regardless of
how the coming weeks play out, both Canada and India will still have poor
relations with China and good relations with the United States. One reason for
this is the values that all three countries nominally share. US leaders should
remember this and remind Ottawa and New Delhi that the path forward must be
paved by justice and a commitment to due process to deviate from those values
would be to bring relations between all three countries into uncharted and
volatile territory.