Showing posts with label Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Show all posts

Friday, 6 May 2022

United States portrayal of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

As negotiations between the world powers and the Islamic Republic of Iran continues over the revival of the 2015 nuclear agreement, the last barrier to a deal is, Tehran’s demand for the United States to remove its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list.

Naturally, this demand has triggered a heated debate in Washington between proponents and opponents. Proponents of such a move — including Khamal Kharrazi, former Iranian foreign minister — claim the IRGC does not belong on the FTO list as it is a national army that is no different from Saudi Arabia’s National Guard.

By contrast, opponents argue that removing the IRGC from the FTO list would legitimize an entity that has the characteristics of a terrorist organization and engages in widespread acts of terrorism.

A research prepared by a US Think-tank reveals that the nature of IRGC is not a conventional state armed force and should not be treated as such. The IRGC is an ideological organization that shares key characteristics with other designated Islamist organizations, including its quest for an expansionist Islamic state, a global Islamic order, forceful imposition of sharia law (Shi’a interpretation), militaristic concept of jihad, and anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology.

The finding of a US research paper reveals three visible trends in the IRGC. The first relates to indoctrination becoming an increasing focal point in the Guard. Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei and his hardline circle have sought to nurture a more radical IRGC generation by dedicating more time to ideological indoctrination of its members. The promotion system within the ranks of the IRGC also favors ideological conviction over technical expertise, ensuring the most zealous members rise up within the chain of command.

The second trend relates to the increasing priority given to Mahdism within the IRGC’s ideology. From the post-2009 period onwards, the doctrine of Mahdism has become one of the main prisms through which the IRGC and affiliated hardline clerics would understand the world around them and the IRGC’s actions, as well as communicate that understanding. In turn, there has been greater emphasis on viewing the IRGC as the military vehicle to prepare the foundations for the reappearance of the 12th Imam, with policy objectives such as hostility toward the US and the eradication of Israel being understood through this prism. This is consistent with the goal of Khamenei and his hardline allies, such as Ayatollah Alamalhouda, the supreme leader’s representative to Khorasan and President Ebrahim Raisi’s father-in-law, to transform the concept of Mahdism from a set of feelings into an “ideological belief.”

The third and final trend relates to the IRGC’s younger generations becoming more radical and extreme. In this regard, efforts by Khamenei and the Guard’s Ideological-Political Organization to nurture a more radical generation among the IRGC has paid, and is paying, dividends.

Against this backdrop, the rise of devout followers of the militaristic doctrine of Mahdism among the senior ranks of the IRGC is not inconceivable and should not be ruled out. While there is hope that the IRGC’s senior leadership will act pragmatically, internal structures within the Guard — including its indoctrination and promotion system — certainly open up the possibility that devoted Mahdists could occupy senior leadership positions.

Such a scenario could have far-reaching consequences as it would bring the three pillars of the IRGC’s foreign policy — militias, ballistic missiles, and the nuclear program — under their control. Even if a small number of devout Mahdists occupy senior positions in the Guard, it is possible that they may seek to facilitate and speed up the return of Mahdi. This would have major implications for some of the policies that are being understood through the prism of Mahdism, such as Israel’s existence being the “greatest barrier” to the reappearance of the 12th Imam.

At present the doctrine of Mahdism in the IRGC remains a complete blind spot for Western policymakers, yet it could have major implications for the Islamic Republic’s militia network, ballistic missile program, and even its nuclear program. Of course, no one knows for sure if devout adherents of the ideology will attain senior command positions in the IRGC. The objective of this paper, however, is simply to point out that it would be unwise not to prepare for this scenario given the huge implications it would have for US and global security.

Thursday, 11 November 2021

Is Iran the only supporter of Palestinians?

Reportedly, in a recent interview, Abu Jamal, a spokesperson for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, stated the group and the ‘Palestinian Resistance’ benefited from Iranian support in its war against Israel.

“We and the Islamic Republic fought the Zionist enemy in Lebanon and we also fought them in Gaza and the West Bank with the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Jamal stated.

Furthermore, Jamal lauded the relationship the group had with Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) by referring to them as ‘blood brothers’ and ‘comrades’ that shared a ‘common destiny’ in defeating Israel.

It’s unclear when Iran began supporting the group. However, in 2013, Iran reportedly resumed military and financial support to the group after leaders from both sides held several meetings in Tehran, Beirut and Damascus under the auspices of Hezbollah.

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and Popular Resistance Committees have boasted about their relationship with Iran including military support they have received. After the May conflict in Gaza, the aforementioned groups praised Iran and Hezbollah for their military support during the eleven days of fighting. Additionally, smaller Palestinian factions have benefited from some Iranian aid including the now defunct Harakat al-Sabireen.

The close relationship between Iran and the PFLP was also on display when a PFLP delegation met with President Ibrahim Raisi after his swearing in ceremony in August. As expected, Raisi affirmed the Islamic Republic’s continued support for the ‘Palestinian Resistance’ and the ‘liberation of Palestine.’

It is difficult to say to what extent Iran has supported the PFLP militarily and financially. The group has purposely been ambiguous about what it exactly receives in terms of funding and arms from Iran.

However, it’s likely larger groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad receive the lion share of military guidance, weapons and funding from the assistance Iran has allocated for the ‘Palestinian Resistance.’

Despite what it may or may not receive in military and financial support, the PFLP has made no qualms about showing its support and allegiance to the Islamic Republic and other members of the ‘Resistance Axis.’

After the May 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict, the PFLP held a military parade where its fighters showed their support for Iran and the IRGC by displaying pictures of former Quds Force Lieutenant-General Qasem Soleimani.