When Rules Apply Only to Adversaries

The United States frequently speaks of a rules-based international order. Yet recent events involving Iran raise a fundamental question: are these truly universal rules, or merely rules that apply to America's adversaries?

The contradiction is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. When Washington launches military strikes, the action is described as self-defense, deterrence, or a contribution to regional security. When Iran retaliates, the same commentators who justified the initial strike suddenly discover the dangers of escalation. Cause and effect disappear from the discussion. The response becomes the story, while the action that provoked it is conveniently forgotten.

The ceasefire narrative offers an even clearer example. If a ceasefire is violated, responsibility should logically rest with whoever broke it first. Instead, the international audience is often presented with a distorted version of events in which retaliation becomes the principal crime and the preceding action fades into the background. Such a narrative does not uphold peace; it merely protects one side from scrutiny.

An equally revealing contradiction surrounds American military bases in Arab countries. These installations are not humanitarian centers or cultural exchanges. They exist for one purpose: military power projection. They provide logistical support, intelligence capabilities, and operational platforms for military action throughout the region.

Yet a curious transformation occurs whenever these facilities come under threat. The military base suddenly ceases to be viewed as a military asset and is instead portrayed solely as the territory of a friendly Arab state. When attacks are launched from the base, it is considered a legitimate instrument of American strategy. When retaliation targets the same facility, it is presented as an attack on an innocent host nation.

Such arguments are not merely inconsistent; these expose the selective logic that increasingly defines international discourse.

The uncomfortable reality is that Washington's greatest challenge today is not Iran, Russia, or China. It is the widening gap between the principles it advocates and the policies it pursues. Power can compel compliance, but it cannot manufacture credibility. Every time one standard is applied to allies and another to adversaries, the claim of defending a rules-based order becomes less convincing.

The world is not questioning America's power. It is questioning whether the rules Washington promotes are genuinely universal or simply another instrument of that power.

US and Oil Producers: Always in Confrontation

A striking pattern runs through modern geopolitics. Over the past three decades, many of the nations that have found themselves in Washington’s crosshairs share one defining characteristic: they are major producers of oil and gas.

The historical record is difficult to ignore. Iraq was invaded and dismantled under a pretext of weapons of mass destruction that never existed. Libya, once Africa’s most prosperous energy producer, was reduced to a fragmented state following Western military intervention. Syria became a prolonged proxy theater where strategic energy routes carried immense weight. Meanwhile, Venezuela—holding some of the world’s largest proven crude reserves—has endured years of crippling economic sanctions.

The containment list does not end there. Russia and Iran, two global energy titans, remain subject to unprecedented, extensive sanctions regimes. While each conflict features its own local political and security dimensions, the recurring intersection between energy wealth and geopolitical confrontation points to a deliberate strategic template rather than mere coincidence.

Iran has become the latest focal point of this enduring struggle. Recent military escalations against Iranian targets and the heightened friction surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have once again exposed the raw mechanics of global power politics. Officially, Washington and its allies frame these interventions as efforts to secure maritime routes, combat terrorism, or prevent nuclear proliferation. Critics, however, see a much broader, calculated agenda: squeezing regional producers to assert strategic dominance over the world's most critical energy corridor.

This raises uncomfortable economic questions. If market stability and uninterrupted energy flows are the ultimate objectives, why does the Arabian Peninsula repeatedly find itself pushed to the brink of conflict? The unsettling answer is that instability itself creates strategic leverage. A region under perpetual tension remains dependent on external security architecture, keeping energy markets highly vulnerable to artificial supply shocks.

For a superpower seeking to control global pricing power and enforce political alignment, a peaceful, independent, and smoothly operating Strait of Hormuz may simply not align with the broader geopolitical playbook.

PSX benchmark index up 6.7%MoM

According to a report by Taurus Securities, at the end of May 2026, the benchmark index of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) closed at 173,963, up 10,969 points or 6.7%MoM. Net FIPI outflow was recorded at US$17.08 million. Average daily traded volume was slightly more than 705 million shares, down 23%MoM. The average traded value also declined by 11%MoM to PKR36.8 billion. Nevertheless, overall activity remained dull in terms of volume and value.

Overall, mixed sentiments were witnessed at the bourse during the month. The earlier half was dominated by bearish sentiment, cautious activity and profit-taking. However, some recovery was seen in the latter half. Sentiments also got a boost from multiple IPOs in May’26 like Wahdat Poultry and Sitara Petroleum.

Key triggers for the market during the month under review included: 1) Pakistan stepped up mediator role as US-Iran draw closer to a deal; while global energy prices remain volatile as supplies remain affected, 2) IMF Executive Board approved third EFF review and disbursement of US$1.3 billion. The IMF adds 11 new structural conditions for future, 3) Pakistan issued Panda Bonds at a competitive 2.5% coupon, 4) Pakistan committed to 2% Primary Surplus for the next fiscal year, 5) LNG supplies remained disrupted due to the Middle-East conflict, 6) April 2026 balance of payments came under pressure on a sequential basis, as oil import bill spiked due to the US-Israel war on Iran and remittances also declined, 7) Headline inflation in April 2026 was reported at 10.9% and May 2026 NCPI is expected to rise to 12.4%, 8) the GoP increased petroleum levy to bridge revenue short-fall, 9) Pakistan auctioned offshore exploration blocks after 20 year gap, and 10) Internal security situation became fragile with fresh terrorist attacks in KP and Baluchistan.

Ceasefire Diplomacy or Managed Conflict?

Every morning brings fresh reports suggesting that the United States and Iran are inching closer to a ceasefire understanding. Yet, by evening, contradictory statements emerge, once again clouding the picture with uncertainty and strategic ambiguity. The pattern has now become too repetitive to ignore. It increasingly appears that both Washington and Tehran are buying time rather than genuinely pursuing peace, while carefully concealing their actual strategic objectives.

The initial justification for the US-Israel military campaign against Iran centered on Tehran’s refusal to accept Washington’s conditions regarding its nuclear and missile programs. However, the conflict narrative now appears to be evolving. The focus increasingly seems linked to reshaping the political architecture of the Middle East through expansion of the Abraham Accords, effectively compelling key Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, toward formal recognition of Israel.

Simultaneously, the continued tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz raises another critical question. Despite repeated calls for de-escalation, there appears to be little urgency in Washington to fully restore normal maritime stability in the region.

Such instability serves multiple strategic purposes for the United States. It constrains oil exports from Gulf producers, complicates China’s energy security calculations, and strengthens Washington’s leverage in global energy markets by enhancing demand for American oil and gas supplies.

The domestic political environment inside the United States also adds another dimension. Repeated but unsuccessful attempts to politically weaken or impeach Donald Trump suggest that influential power centers may still consider him indispensable in managing an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. His aggressive foreign policy posture, particularly towards Iran and the broader Middle East, continues to align with powerful strategic interests within Washington.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the current crisis may not be moving toward immediate resolution. Instead, the world may be witnessing the management of a prolonged controlled confrontation designed to gradually exhaust Iran economically, diplomatically, and militarily until Tehran is pushed toward accepting terms that resemble unconditional surrender. Until then, ambiguity itself may remain the most effective weapon in this conflict.

Oman: Next Phase of Washington’s Strategy

After failing to secure a decisive strategic victory against Iran despite months of escalation and military pressure, Washington appears determined to restore its geopolitical credibility elsewhere in the Gulf. In this evolving power contest, Oman may increasingly find itself exposed to external pressure disguised as regional “security management.”

For decades, Oman has maintained a delicate diplomatic balance. Unlike many regional actors, Muscat preferred mediation over confrontation and dialogue over military adventurism. Yet geography has transformed the Sultanate into one of the most strategically valuable locations in the region.

The Port of Duqm and surrounding naval infrastructure are dangerously close to the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s most critical oil transit corridor. At the same time, the location places Oman within immediate strategic proximity of Iran’s Chabahar Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, two emerging nodes in regional trade and connectivity. This triangle alone explains why global powers increasingly view Oman not merely as a Gulf state, but as a geopolitical gateway.

Washington’s expanding military footprint across the Gulf is often presented as a mechanism for maintaining stability and protecting maritime trade. However, history suggests that foreign military presence rarely remains temporary. Strategic access gradually evolves into political leverage, while security dependency slowly weakens national sovereignty.

Donald Trump’s confrontational posture toward Iran reflects more than ideological hostility. It also represents an attempt to demonstrate American dominance after Tehran resisted enormous economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military intimidation. Direct confrontation with Iran carries enormous risks, but smaller Gulf states may appear easier arenas where Washington can project strength without triggering full-scale regional war.

This should concern every Arab emirate. The Gulf monarchies must recognize that fragmented security policies only increase dependence on outside powers. No state, regardless of wealth, can indefinitely preserve sovereignty while outsourcing its strategic defense architecture to foreign military forces.

Today the pressure may revolve around Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. Tomorrow the same logic could be applied elsewhere in the Gulf under another security pretext.

The lesson is becoming impossible to ignore - Arab states must either develop a collective regional security framework based on mutual defense and strategic independence, or continue watching external powers shape the future of the Gulf according to their own geopolitical interests.

Pushing Iran to Edge a Dangerous Gamble

The recent US strikes on Iran during Eid ul Adha have intensified a growing perception across the Muslim world that Washington is no longer merely seeking deterrence, but is steadily pushing Tehran toward a position where unconditional surrender becomes the only acceptable outcome. Rightly or wrongly, this perception is gaining traction because of the open and silent backing extended by several regional allies, particularly some Arab states that view Iran primarily through the lens of strategic rivalry.

However, history shows that when powerful nations attempt to corner adversaries without offering a credible political exit, the consequences often become unpredictable and dangerous. States under extreme pressure rarely capitulate quietly. More often, they resort to asymmetric retaliation before losing the capability to respond altogether.

Iran’s leadership is fully aware that its strategic infrastructure, military facilities, energy assets, and regional influence networks remain under increasing pressure. If Tehran reaches the conclusion that its long-term survival is at stake, it may decide that escalation carries fewer risks than submission. That is the point where the entire region could enter a far more dangerous phase.

The uncomfortable reality is that the United States, because of geography, may remain relatively insulated from direct retaliation. The immediate exposure instead lies with neighboring Gulf countries hosting American military bases, intelligence facilities, naval deployments, and logistical infrastructure. In any expanded confrontation, these locations could rapidly transform into frontline targets.

Such a development would not only threaten regional security but could also severely disrupt global energy markets, maritime trade routes, and already fragile economies across the Middle East. Investors, energy importers, and governments around the world would all pay the price for a conflict that may initially appear limited but could spiral beyond control.

This is reason the present trajectory demands urgent diplomatic intervention rather than continued escalation. Strategic pressure may weaken an adversary temporarily, but humiliation-driven conflict rarely produces lasting stability. The Middle East has already witnessed enough wars born from miscalculation, proxy rivalries, and excessive military confidence.

The world must recognize the danger before events move beyond diplomacy. Pushing Iran to the edge may not produce surrender; it may instead trigger a retaliatory spiral whose consequences no regional actor can fully contain.

Crucial week ahead for tanker market

Tanker owners were mulling their options as more contradictions came from the United States and Iranian peace negotiations updates over the weekend. 

On the one hand, President Trump declared on Saturday night that a deal with Iran had been ‘largely negotiated’ and the Strait of Hormuz would be included in a potential deal. On the other, Iran’s semi-official news agency, Tasnim, said on Sunday that under draft terms of the US-Iran negotiations, the Strait ‘will not return’ to pre-war status, but added more uncertainty by stating that ship traffic would return to previous levels.

Whatever happens in the next few days, the tanker market will take months to return to some semblance of normality. If there is a deal, London-based shipbroker, Gibson, expects some residual hesitancy in transiting the Strait, with only higher-risk owner ready to commit. The voyages are likely to follow tried and tested post-war routes close to the Iranian or Omani coastlines, the broker said, especially as uncertainty remains over the location of possible mines. 

Gibson said that of the 157 mainstream tankers of more than 25,000 dwt lying in the Gulf at the time of its report, 123 were laden and ‘will attempt to exit swiftly’. 

Meanwhile there are 150 ballasters above that deadweight promptly positioned in the Gulf of Oman and ready to be fixed for export cargoes in short order. Freight rates will be high and volatile, the broker predicted, until the risks and hazards are deemed to be low. 

Port congestion is likely, loading schedules will have to re-established, export infrastructure and port operations remain uncertain. But all parties in the supply chain will be keen to get cargoes moving again as quickly as possible. 

However, Gibson also points out that there are further challenges in the longer term. It could take months for tanker positioning to return to normal. 

Significantly more tankers are now positioned in the West largely because of record volumes of both crude and product exports out of the US Gulf. 

Ballasters are unlikely to react immediately and Western-located tankers are weeks away from the Gulf. Their owners will be unlikely to commit to a pricy ballast haul without a paying cargo to cover the eastbound leg, Gibson said. 

Overall, the shipbroker’s analysis is cautiously optimistic. But some on the ground in the Gulf are less so.

ADNOC CEO, Sultan Al Jaber, attending an Atlantic Council event last Wednesday, said: “Even if this conflict ends tomorrow, it will take at least four months to get back to 80 per cent of pre-conflict flows, and full flows will not return before the first or even second quarter of 2027”.

Analysts said that this was among the most pessimistic of views from top industry executives. However, it underscored the severity of what the International Energy Agency has called the largest-ever energy crisis because of the almost total closure of the Strait.

Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime New