Seven countries agree on oil production adjustment

Seven oil producing countries, part of OPEC Plus announced to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 barrels per day in June 2026, as part of efforts to support global oil market stability.

The countries — Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman — held a virtual meeting on Sunday to review market conditions and outlook.

The adjustment is part of the additional voluntary production measures first announced in April 2023. The group said these adjustments could be partially or fully reversed depending on evolving market conditions.

The countries reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining flexibility, noting they may increase, pause, or reverse the phase-out of voluntary cuts, including those introduced in November 2023.

They also stressed the importance of full compliance with the Declaration of Cooperation, with implementation to be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).

The group confirmed plans to compensate for any overproduction since January 2024 and said the current measure would help accelerate those efforts.

The seven countries will continue to meet monthly to assess market developments, compliance, and compensation progress, with the next meeting scheduled for June 07, 2026.

 

Ground Realities Trump Must Not Ignore

The sooner President Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

What began on February 28, 2026, as an unannounced offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran was projected as swift and decisive. Weeks later, despite a fragile truce, the strategic picture tells a different story. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained, global oil markets are unsettled, and the core objectives of the campaign appear only partially fulfilled.

The most telling gap is between rhetoric and results. Early signals from Washington hinted at regime destabilization in Tehran. Yet Iran’s leadership has adapted rather than collapsed, with continuity preserved at the top. Its nuclear capability, though impacted, is not eliminated. More significantly, Tehran retains its most potent lever—its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

The economic consequences have been immediate and far-reaching. Oil prices have surged, pushing US fuel costs sharply higher and straining global markets. Ironically, some of the worst-affected players are Washington’s own Arab allies, whose economic stability is closely tied to uninterrupted energy flows. A conflict that unsettles allies while failing to decisively weaken the adversary raises uncomfortable strategic questions.

At home, the political costs are mounting. The war has already cost American taxpayers at least US$25 billion, while public opinion has turned increasingly skeptical. A clear majority of Americans now view the conflict as a mistake. Against this backdrop, Trump’s escalating attacks on the media—labeling coverage as “seditious” or hostile—appear less like defiance and more like frustration. When expectations are set high and outcomes fall short, the narrative inevitably shifts.

There is also a historical echo worth noting. During the Vietnam War, early confidence gradually gave way to a recognition of stalemate, amplified by increasingly critical media coverage. While the current conflict is different in scale and context, the emerging pattern—bold claims, limited gains, and rising domestic unease—carries a familiar undertone.

Wars are not won through declarations but through outcomes. Assertions of victory carry little weight when strategic objectives remain elusive and costs continue to rise. The longer this gap between expectation and reality persists, the greater the political and economic toll.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the sooner Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

The 700-Million-Barrel Oil Shock

Based on the projection from the Kepler Institute, by the final week of April 2026, the cumulative deficit in oil supply resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will hit 700 million barrels.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has presented the world with one of the most critical oil supply disruptions in modern history and has driven prices sharply upward. Unlike past shocks triggered by wars or embargoes, this blockage strikes at the very jugular of global energy logistics.

According to a fresh assessment by the Kepler Institute, an ongoing halt to oil tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz until the end of April 2026 could push the global energy market into an extraordinary crisis, bringing the total oil supply deficit caused by this closure to approximately 700 million barrels. This drop in supply has triggered one of the largest oil shocks of the current era. By April 12, around 300 million barrels of oil had been removed from the supply chain due to the stoppage of traffic through this vital chokepoint — a corridor that carries roughly 20% of the world's daily oil demand.

In the wake of this disruption, Brent crude oil prices have surpassed US$100 per barrel, and the cost of refined products such as jet fuel has risen above US$200 per barrel — a scenario that has set off the phenomenon of demand destruction, leading airlines to cancel numerous flight routes, consumer countries to impose fuel rationing and mandatory remote work, and the International Energy Agency to revise downward its 2026 oil demand growth forecast.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, by leveraging the full capacity of its East-West pipeline, and the United Arab Emirates, via the Fujairah export route, are attempting to offset part of the supply shortfall.

Conversely, Iraq has been largely incapacitated, with its exports collapsing from 4 million to less than 900,000 barrels per day. Without immediate diplomatic intervention, smaller Persian Gulf states may soon follow Iraq into paralysis.

Kepler cautions that even if the crisis is resolved immediately, the process of market recovery will not be swift, and the volume of lost oil could reach one billion barrels before the supply chain is fully restored. 

Two potential paths lie ahead for the market. In the favorable scenario, limited demand contraction and a gradual easing of the crisis over the next several weeks are anticipated. However, in the unfavorable scenario, continued disruption into the third quarter of the year could push oil prices toward US$190 per barrel and cause demand destruction on the order of several million barrels per day — an outcome that would be even more severe than the oil crisis of the 1970s. 

 

امریکہ کی افغانستان کے بعد ایران سے بھی شکست

ابھی افغانستان سے شکست کے زخم پوری طرح بھرے نہیں تھے کہ امریکہ کو ایران سے شکست کا صدمہ سہنا پڑھ رہاہے۔ امریکہ اس جنگ میں 25 بلین ڈالرسے زیادہ ڈبونے کے بعد بھی ناکام ہے۔ وہ اب آبناۓ ہرمز کی ناکہ بندی کرکے اپنا تیل اور گیس مہنگی قیمت پر بیچ رہا ہے۔ عربوں کے تیل کی ایکسپورٹ بند ہے اور چین جانے والے تیل کو روکا جارہا ہے۔ وقت نے ثابت کردیا کہ امریکہ کا صرف اور صرف ایک مقصد ہے تیل کی تجارت پر قبضہ۔

PSX benchmark index down 4.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained in the grip of bears during the ended on April 30, 206. The benchmark index shed 7,677 points, down 4.5%WoW to close at 162,994 points, with average daily trading volume declining to 1.2 billion shares, down 30%WoW.

The most dominant factor contributing to this decline was the collapse of the Iran-US talks, where the US President cancelled a planned trip of his envoys to Pakistan. Consequently, oil prices remained elevated through the week, with the June’26 Brent contract hitting a high of US$126/ bbl.

Adding to this was decision by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to raise the policy rate by 100bps to 11.5% on Monday, the first rate hike in over two and half years.

The prolonged Middle East conflict was termed to be the primary driver for raising the policy rate, attributing inflation to remain above the target range in the next few quarters.

However, a positive development was the confirmation of the IMF Executive Board meeting scheduled for May 08, 2026 to consider approval of the US$1.2 billion tranche under the EFF and RSF programs.

Foreign exchange reserves held by SBP as of April 24, 2026 were reported at US$15.8 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan clears US$3.45 billion loan to UAE, 2) Pakistan plans launch of Panda Bonds, 3) IMF okays 60% cut in gas levy, 4) No let-up in Pakistan’s efforts for US-Iran peace, and 5) Pakistan's weekly oil import bill rises to US$800 million amid US-Iran conflict.

Top performing sectors were: Textile Weaving, Tobacco, and Auto Assemblers, while laggards included: Vanaspati, Property, and Woolen.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual funds, and Brokers amounting to US$28.6 million and US$3.1 million respectively.

Major buyers were Individuals, and Companies with net buy of US$27.4 million and US$1.4 million respectively.

Top performing scrips were: HCAR, MEHT, INDU, PAKT, and MTL, while laggards included: YOUW, NBP, SSOM, GADT, and SSGC.

According to AKD Securities, a constructive resolution of US-Iran would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with softening of oil prices to act as a trigger. Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Power Without Leverage

The rhetoric attributed to Donald Trump—of unilateral victory, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and forcing Iran into submission—reads less like strategy and more like illusion dressed as resolve.

Start with the claim of “victory.” Wars are not won by declaration. If anything, the gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes after US-Israeli strikes on Iran underscores a harsher truth: overwhelming power no longer guarantees decisive results. The superpower looks less triumphant and more constrained.

The blockade argument is equally flawed. Closing the Strait of Hormuz for months is not a show of strength—it is an invitation to escalation. Iran retains the means to retaliate asymmetrically, while Gulf states would be unwilling passengers in a conflict that directly threatens their economic lifelines. What begins as pressure quickly mutates into regional instability.

Then comes the oil calculus. Squeezing Iranian exports may sound tactically appealing, but it is strategically self-defeating. The immediate consequence would be tighter supply, higher prices, and global economic stress. Washington’s Arab partners, far from benefiting, would absorb the shock. Punishing Iran ends up punishing the system.

Most unrealistic, however, is the expectation of Iran’s unconditional surrender. Tehran’s track record suggests the opposite: pressure entrenches resistance. Escalation does not compel compliance; it erodes space for negotiation.

The underlying problem is not intent but misreading leverage. Coercion without credible endgames risks exposing limits rather than enforcing outcomes. Each additional threat weakens, rather than strengthens, the credibility of US strategy.

A sustainable path demands restraint, not bravado—consolidating ceasefire arrangements, reopening diplomatic channels, and allowing all sides a face-saving exit. Power, when detached from realism, ceases to be power at all; it becomes noise with consequences.

Is UAE Risking Its Oil Exports by Leaving OPEC?

The reported move by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to step away from OPEC signals a structural shift in global oil dynamics rather than a simple policy adjustment. The key question is whether this decision strengthens export potential or exposes the UAE to new risks.

At the core of the issue is production capacity. The UAE has invested heavily over the past decade, raising its installed capacity to nearly 5 million barrels per day, while its output quota under OPEC+ remained significantly lower, around 3–3.5 million barrels per day. This gap created sustained frustration in Abu Dhabi, where policymakers argue that constrained quotas prevent optimal monetization of long-term investments.

By exiting the OPEC framework, the UAE gains theoretical freedom to increase production and exports toward its full capacity. In normal market conditions, this would enhance revenue potential and strengthen its position as a flexible supplier. However, oil markets rarely operate in isolation from geopolitics.

Recent regional instability linked to tensions involving Iran has already demonstrated how quickly export routes through the Strait of Hormuz can be disrupted. Even without OPEC constraints, physical and security risks can limit actual export volumes. In such an environment, higher capacity does not automatically translate into higher realized exports.

The role of Saudi Arabia also remains central. Saudi Arabia has historically anchored OPEC’s production discipline to stabilize prices. A UAE exit weakens this coordinated structure and raises the possibility of more competitive output strategies among major producers. While this may benefit short-term volume expansion, it can also pressure global prices, ultimately reducing export revenue gains.

In the short term, the UAE’s export position is unlikely to change dramatically due to existing logistical and geopolitical constraints. Over the medium term, however, it gains greater autonomy to align production with market demand rather than quota allocation.

The outcome, therefore, is balanced but conditional. The UAE is not simply risking exports; it is trading coordinated stability for operational flexibility. Whether this proves advantageous will depend on how effectively it manages production discipline in an increasingly fragmented oil market.