Global events, particularly the split in Gulf countries’ reactions over Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as well as the October oil production cut determined by the Saudi-dominated OPEC Plus consortium, exacerbated differences with the United States, including on issues ranging from Iran to human rights and civil liberties concerns. Popular perceptions in the United States and in the region as well have characterized these actions as reflecting hostility, especially toward the Biden administration.
In fact, the Gulf’s differences with the US have been on the rise for many years. Frustrations over US policies — ranging from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the response to the 2011 Arab Spring popular uprisings and including the 2015 agreement with Iran on its nuclear program — have encouraged closer relations with other great powers, namely China and Russia.
Notably, China has emerged as the region’s number one trade and economic partner, while Russia, aided by President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive wooing of Gulf counterparts, has become a key partner in the global energy sector.
At the same time, a new generation of leaders in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, and the UAE’s president, Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, came to power more determined to pursue an independent foreign policy course that they considered more reflective of their nation’s leadership in regional and global affairs.
Included in that determination is a willingness to break with Washington on the response to global issues spanning the gamut, from the Ukraine war to Libya to the Horn of Africa.
As President Joe Biden’s visit to the region in July exemplified, this shift by the leading Gulf states to a multipolar policy does not mean necessarily that US relations with the region have become obsolete.
Given the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members’ reliance in the defense and security realm not only on the US defense umbrella but also on US equipment, training, and doctrine for their own militaries, it’s unlikely that the GCC states would willingly move away from a continuation of that relationship. But it does mean that US policymakers can no longer assume that Gulf governments will follow a US lead on setting policy for either regional or global issues.
Going forward, to ensure Gulf cooperation, the US side will need to make the case that its policy preferences are consistent with Gulf leaders’ perspectives on their own national interests. Initiatives like the Joint Working Group on Iran should be increasingly a centerpiece of US engagement with the region.
