Following is the text of the article:
The Baathist system in Syria, after nearly 60 years of
rule, has been overthrown and Bashar
al-Assad has fled to Moscow. Syria stood
alongside Iran during its invasion by Saddam Hussein, and Iran, in
turn, stood with the Syrian and Iraqi governments during
the assault by the Islamic State (IS) group and al-Qaeda on Syria and
Iraq from 2011 to 2017.
The alliance of Russia, Iran and the Axis of
Resistance led to the defeat of militant groups and the preservation of
the sovereignty of these two Arab countries. However, at the same time, Assad's
government had no alignment with democracy, and western and Arab leaders were
fearful and angry about the extensive presence and influence of Iran
and Russia in Syria. In any case, the overthrow of the Syrian political system
has created a major shift in the region's geopolitics.
In the short term, Iran, Russia, Iraq and the Axis of
Resistance will be the main losers from Assad's downfall. The collapse of the
Assad government will be a major blow to the axis, weakening Iran's
geopolitical influence in the region.
Syria has been the only land route for the supply and
transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, and cutting off this route not only
creates a strategic challenge for Hezbollah but also weakens Iran's leverage in
the Palestinian issue. Moreover, the potential spread of insecurity
to Iraq and Iran - and the weakening of Iran's diplomatic support -
are significant consequences for Iran and the axis.
Turkey main winner
The fall of the Syrian government could also pose threats to
Iraq's security, both in terms of the Kurdish region and from the aspirations
of extremist groups for Sunni-majority areas in the country, as well as the
potential activation of IS sleeper cells.
In the short term, Israel might find an
opportunity to further weaken Hezbollah and the axis in the entire region. However,
the activities of new Islamist armed groups at its borders, the rise of
Islamist movements and the potential impact on Syria's future stance on the
Palestinian issue and the occupied Golan Heights could increase long-term
national security threats for Israel.
In the short term, the US and the West will be
winners because the fall of Assad will significantly reduce Russian and Iranian
influence in the region.
However, the Islamist group that seized Damascus and toppled
Assad, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was proscribed as a
terror organization by the Britain in 2017 and the US in 2018 because of its
links to al-Qaeda. HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (real name
Ahmed al-Sharaa), who was designated a terrorist by the US in 2013.
It is uncertain how the collapse of Syria's secular
government and the rise of Islamists will impact the long-term interests of the
US, with the differing perspectives between the US and Turkey on the
Kurdish issue, the ambiguity surrounding the future actions of the opposition
and the prospect of increasing instability in the region.
Turkey is the main winner. Ankara may hope to resolve the
Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, exert more effective control over the Kurds
and strengthen its role in the Palestinian issue, as well as cement alliances
with like-minded groups in the region.
While Arab countries are also pleased with the reduction of
Iran's influence in Syria, the military operations of HTS and other militant
groups were managed and organied by Turkey, all of which have an
affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Several Arab countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE
and Jordan, are opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology.
Therefore, Turkey's power projection in the region and the
Brotherhood's potential future dominance in Syria could be perceived as a new
threat by some Arab countries.
Regarding the political future of Syria, two scenarios can be
imagined: a peaceful transition to a new system; or a Libyan and Sudanese-style
outcome.
A peaceful transition could be achieved if the opposition
continues with its moderate rhetoric and actions. However, it is composed of
diverse and fragmented groups that have united solely to eliminate a common
enemy.
Once this shared enemy is removed and the process of shaping
the future begins, their differences will surface, and it remains uncertain how
reconcilable these differences will be.
Even if there are no internal disagreements among the
opposition, their conflicts with the Kurds and Turkey's stance on this issue
alone pose a major obstacle to establishing a consensus-based order. This could
keep Syria in a prolonged political and security crisis, similar to Libya and
Sudan.
Another important factor is the conflicting interests of the
many external actors, who will each try to increase their influence over
Syria's situation in various ways.
In any scenario, future developments in Syria will have a
significant impact on the region's geopolitics. Therefore, finding a solution
that is acceptable to both regional and global powers is crucial.
In April 2017, at the Carnegie Conference in Washington,
I proposed 10 principles for resolving the Syrian crisis: 1) Resolving
the Syrian crisis through diplomacy, not war; 2) A face-saving solution for all
the main parties involved; 3) Serious and collective cooperation to
eradicate terrorism from Syria; 4) Preserving Syria's territorial integrity and
sovereignty; 5) Preventing the collapse of the Syrian army and security
institutions; 6) Forming an inclusive government in Syria; 7) Building a new
Syria based on the will and vote of the majority of the Syrian nation; 8)
Ensuring the protection of minorities in Syria; 9) Holding free elections under
the supervision of the United Nations regarding the new government and
constitution of Syria; 10) A comprehensive package of economic aid for Syria's
reconstruction, the return of refugees, and other humanitarian issues.
Although there was no receptive ear for these ideas at that
time, today, these 10 principles could still be a comprehensive and sustainable
package to resolve the Syrian crisis.
Courtesy: Tehran Times
