The recent escalation in tensions between Israel and Iran
has sparked concerns about a potential shift in Tehran’s strategy toward full
weaponization of its nuclear program.
On April 14, in retaliation for an Israeli strike on
the Iranian consulate in Syria on April 01 that killed seven Iranians,
including Quds Force Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Iran launched over 300
drones and ballistic missiles against Israel, in its first ever direct
attack on the country. Given Israel's reportedly sizable, undeclared nuclear
arsenal, analysts have interpreted this move as a sign that Iran intends on
becoming a declared nuclear power.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines the
threshold for creating an atomic bomb as approximately 42 kg of uranium
enriched up to a purity of 60%. The latest IAEA report indicates that
Iran possesses 121 kg of uranium enriched to this level — enough for nearly
three bombs.
Despite Iran's claim that it is not seeking to
develop nuclear weapons, it remains the only country enriching uranium at this
level without a confirmed nuclear weapons program.
Maintaining its status as a threshold nuclear power is
likely to be Iran's chosen strategy under the current circumstances. This is in
line with the country’s new proactive and preemptive grand strategy, as
compared to its previous approach of strategic patience.
While Iran previously refrained from directly retaliating
against Israel for its alleged covert operations, including assassinating
Iranian nuclear scientists and operatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), it has decided to adopt a new stance. In the words of Hossein
Salami, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, “Henceforth if Israel attacks our
interests, assets, figures, and citizens anywhere, it will be met with a
counterattack from within the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
The failure of the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Israel’s alleged covert activities in
Iran in recent years have led Tehran to abandon its policy of strategic
patience, no longer willing to fight a shadow war by relying on its regional
non-state allies.
Recent
incidents, such as Iran’s mid-January missile strike on Pakistan in
response to a Jaish al-Adl terrorist attack on the port city of Chabahar and
its mid-April drone and missile strike on Israel, reflect a change in
Iran's stance and a new willingness to take more assertive measures. According
to a post on the social media platform X by Mohammad Jamshidi, President
Ebrahim Raisi’s deputy chief of staff, "Iran's era of strategic patience
is over."
However, contrary to many analysts’ fears, Iran is aware of
the benefits of remaining a latent nuclear power, rather than becoming an openly
declared one. As the Iranian authorities see things, possessing threshold
nuclear capabilities will not only deter large-scale military attacks but also
provide greater leverage in negotiations with the United States and other
adversaries. In addition, it could reinvigorate the possibility of regional
de-escalation and improve bilateral relations with important neighbors,
processes that have been underway since March 2023, following the
China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Iranian officials clearly believe that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons is not necessary to deter a direct attack by Israel, as its
ability to launch a large-scale assault on Iran without US support is limited
by geopolitical constraints. Both the US and Iran have been highly reluctant to
engage in a direct, large-scale conflict since the October 07, 2023, Hamas
attacks on Israeli soil, which sparked a spiraling escalation in the region.
Since October 07, Tehran and Washington have managed to handle regional
tensions relatively successfully.
Following Iran's retaliatory strike on Israel, Iranian Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian assured the US that Iran had no
intention of targeting American bases in the region, and Washington reiterated its
stance of non-participation in Israel’s offensive operations against Iran.
From Iran's perspective, Israel's attack on an air base in
Isfahan on April 19 was a clear attempt at sabotage. According to Iranian
media, this incident, similar to a previous operation reportedly carried out by
the Israelis in January 2023, involved small drones believed to have
originated from within Iranian territory.
Iranian officials assert that their air defense system
successfully intercepted and destroyed the drones mid-flight.
In response to perceived threats from the US and Israel in
the region, Iran has employed a combination of internal and external balancing
strategies that has effectively safeguarded its security thus far. In terms of
internal balancing, Iran relies on enrichment and reprocessing facilities like
other latent nuclear states, such as Japan.
Nuclear latency refers to states with the potential ability
to assemble a nuclear arsenal in a relatively short period of time in the event
of an existential threat.
By maintaining the ability to rapidly build nuclear weapons
without actually doing so, a policy known as the “Japan Option,” Iran
remains in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In addition, Iran also relies on its conventional military
strength and the exploitation of strategic geopolitical assets. In terms of
external balancing, Tehran has built a network of partners and allies across
the Middle East who share the common goal of countering US and Israeli
hegemony. Iranian policymakers view these internal and external components as
interconnected, creating a stable equilibrium to safeguard Iran’s security and
interests.
Iran's defense doctrine is based on the concept of active
deterrence, whereby a predetermined countermeasure is carried out if deterrence
alone fails, thus reinforcing deterrence of further actions by belligerent
actors. In this regard, the recent tit-for-tat exchange of missile strikes
between Iran and Israel does not signify a major shift away from this doctrine
and toward nuclear armament, but rather signals a new stage in an ongoing
active deterrence approach.
Israel's emphasis on keeping the scope of conflict limited
and the American commitment to non-involvement in military engagements with
Iran indicate that the doctrine has been effective in deterring broader
military action against Iran thus far.
As a threshold nuclear power, Iran maintains strategic
ambiguity around its nuclear capabilities and can use this as a political
bargaining chip. According to the IAEA, from June 2023 on, Iran reduced the
rate at which it was enriching uranium (up to 60%) for a few months,
before reversing course in November 2023 and increasing the rate of
production of enriched uranium (up to 60%) to 9 kg per month. The most recent
report from the IAEA indicates that while Iran has been enriching uranium at
the same rate since the beginning of 2024, it also downblended about
31.8 kg of its 60% enriched uranium stockpile, reducing its total reserves by
6.8 kg.
These fluctuations in the production and reserves of
enriched uranium suggest that clandestine negotiations and agreements
between Iran and the United States may have been taking place in recent months.
Despite the ongoing war in Gaza, Iran managed to export approximately 1.56
million barrels of oil per day in the first three months of 2024, the greatest
volume since late 2018.
While Iran has been able to master various methods of
circumventing sanctions during this period, it seems that the Biden
administration is reluctant to enforce strict secondary sanction measures that
would further impede Iranian oil sales.
While the war in Gaza has provided Iran with new opportunities
to affect regional power dynamics, being a threshold nuclear power does not
impose extra costs on it. Rather, it provides Tehran with significant leverage if
external pressures increase.
As such, Iran's nuclear capabilities serve as both a
deterrent and a bargaining tool. Currently, Tehran views the United States and
Israel as its primary external threats. Consequently, it shapes its regional
security strategies with these two nuclear powers in mind.
As a component of this approach, Tehran endeavors to reduce
threat perceptions among its Arab neighbors by implementing a neighborhood
policy and initiating confidence-building measures, such as expanding bilateral
diplomatic relations.
Iran seeks to continue strengthening its relations with its
neighbors, break out of its political isolation, and, to some extent, address its
lagging economic development. Its economy, hindered by sanctions, needs to be
revived, and in this context, Tehran remains acutely aware of the
material and relative costs of declaring itself a nuclear power. The suspicions of
analysts, predicting a surge in Tehran’s enriched uranium production, may be
unmerited given the many benefits that Iran could reap from remaining a
threshold power.
Nevertheless, there is a real prospect that Iran could
become a nuclear power — a move that would have dire implications — and this is
more likely to occur if or when Iran perceives a threat to its security that
cannot be adequately managed by its existing use of active deterrence.
Were the US and Israel to jointly carry out a significant
military strike targeting Iran's key nuclear and military installations, this
could render Tehran’s current deterrence strategy unviable, ineffective, and
unsustainable.
On April 18, Gen. Ahmad Haqtalab, commander of the Nuclear
Centers Protection and Security Corps, stated that if Israel attacks
Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran may seriously reassess its nuclear strategy.
There are several steps key regional players could take that
would ensure this does not happen:
First and foremost, resuming diplomatic negotiations over
Iran’s nuclear program and establishing clear rules for preventing its
weaponization, in return for a reduction in the scale and impact of economic
sanctions, would benefit all stakeholders.
Second, as an additional step, encouraging neighboring
countries, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council member states, to develop
constructive diplomatic and economic relations with Iran would discourage
Tehran from pursuing further uranium enrichment, disincentivize engagement in
more small-scale military confrontations, and build on Iran's tentative commitment
to assume the role of a responsible regional actor.
Finally, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as
distant as that might seem right now in the midst of war, would be a crucial
step toward mitigating the risk of escalating tensions between Israel and Iran
as well as alleviating the heated security crisis that currently plagues the
region.
Courtesy: Middle East Institute
