Maritime scholars and practitioners often grapple with a
question, what should be the desirable architecture for maritime security, and
how should this be implemented properly?
It is a complex issue, because
security may be best delivered in collective and cooperative settings, there is
often a lack of clarity about how cooperation between multinational security
agencies should be practically operationalized.
Two aspects seem particularly thorny. First, how does one
account for the material and strategic costs of military cooperation? It is no
secret that naval collaboration entails political costs.
India, which has long faced pressure from Russia to reduce
strategic engagement with the United States is familiar with the costs of
strategic cooperation. ASEAN, too, with a history of balancing between the
United States and China, is conscious of the downsides of maritime collaboration.
There is also a second and more complicated dimension. If
integrative frameworks are rooted in national security and national interest,
can region-wide maritime cooperation ever be functionally effective?
Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the need for
collaboration in the maritime domain, the political leadership in many
countries is unclear about the extent of acceptable cooperation. Navies broadly
know they must work together, but to what degree, to what specific ends, and at
what cost, remains unexplained.
The preference for balanced interactions is markedly high in
the Indian Ocean region, where many states regard non-traditional security as
the holy grail of maritime operations.
In the absence of clear guidance about how maritime
cooperation is to be operationalised, navies engage in short-term arm’s length
collaboration, which does not translate into much over the longer term.
Each side develops its own model of cooperative security,
based entirely on the appreciation of national interests.
At times, the military interactions are robust – such as
during constabulary and humanitarian missions – but for the most part, maritime
forces avoid working together in formats that risk provoking powerful players
and disturbing the strategic balance of power.
The preference for balanced interactions is markedly high in
the Indian Ocean region, where many states regard non-traditional security as
the holy grail of maritime operations. Particularly in South Asia, human
security and livelihood challenges are accorded priority over traditional
security threats.
Despite its record of aggression in the Indo-Pacific, China
is widely regarded as an economic and security partner, and not as a
threat to the rules-based order.
Members of the Royal Australian Air Force, Japan Maritime
Self Defense Force, Indian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force at the
conclusion of exercise Sea Dragon, an annual multilateral anti-submarine
warfare exercise that improves interoperability in the Indo-Pacific, 28 January
2021.
India, of course, is an exception to the consensus in South
Asia. New Delhi recognizes the China challenge in ways its neighbors do not.
From an
Indian standpoint, a Chinese maritime presence in the Indian Ocean has implications that
go beyond naval confrontation.
The realists in New Delhi know that Chinese dual-use ports
under the Belt and Road Initiative are meant to establish Chinese power and
hegemony in India’s natural sphere of influence, and shift the regional balance
of power away from Delhi.
Yet the Chinese threat in India’s backyard is qualitatively
different from the challenge in the South China Sea. Unlike in Southeast Asia,
where Beijing aspires to full-spectrum dominance, China’s strategy in the
Indian Ocean is one of incremental stakeholdership. If India used force
against China, New Delhi not Beijing would be seen as the aggressor.
In the Western Pacific, too, the picture is mixed. Southeast
Asian states have resisted Chinese efforts to dominate the littorals, and even
upped their collaboration to help fight irregular security challenges. But
non-traditional security isn’t the low hanging fruit it was once assumed to be.
Despite successes in counter-piracy and humanitarian relief,
law enforcement agencies remain reluctant to jointly tackle armed robbery at
sea, illegal fishing and other crimes that occur in coastal spaces. For
all their professed zeal for integrated operations, navies and coastguards
remain unwilling to allow foreign partners access into coastal waters.
The imperative to forge issue-based coalitions in a
post-Covid world – where resources are scarce and commitments diverse – is
bound to draw likeminded states into tighter embrace.
Against
this backdrop, can the AUKUS trilateral security pact, the Quad and ASEAN
succeed in creating the conditions for sustained cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific region?
The foregoing suggests it would be difficult. However, that should
not dishearten avid proponents of vigorous strategic collaboration, for country
priorities are wholly circumstantial and shaped by the vagaries of geopolitics.
India, which has consistently advocated Security and Growth for All in the
Region (SAGAR), is today more confrontational towards China (in the wake of the
border crisis in Ladakh). Chinese aggression in Taiwan and Hong Kong
has forced ASEAN also into hardening its Indo-Pacific posture.
But scholars and practitioners should beware of reducing
maritime security to a simple contest of narratives. Those who insist the
rules-based security order must focus on enforcement and red lines of
acceptable conduct should recognize that order rather than strict rules
animates the policy preferences of many Asian states.
Countries ought to be more creative in generating consensus
around long-term cooperation. The aim should be to identify avenues for
association and partnerships in areas where states may not necessarily agree on
a way forward.
The imperative to forge issue-based coalitions in a
post-Covid world – where resources are scarce and commitments diverse – is
bound to draw likeminded states into tighter embrace.
The need of the hour is for maritime forces to improve
interoperability, expand collaboration in hard and soft security, and share the
burden of littoral security. The habits of cooperation they now foster will
hold navies in good stead when the threats begin to crystallize in ways that
few today imagine or anticipate.
Courtesy: The Bangladesh Chronicle
