A West Asia security and nuclear policy specialist at
Princeton University, has enumerated nine hurdles to revitalizing
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), nuclear deal that Iran signed with 5+1 nations - five permanent members of the
UN Security Council plus Germany - in July 2015.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian points that “snapback” mechanism in
JCPOA favors 5+1 nations only. “The ‘snapback’ mechanism built into the
agreement allows any country to force the UN Security Council to reimpose
multilateral sanctions against Iran if Iran fails to fulfill its commitments.
But this is one-sided: There is no such remedy for Iran if other parties fail
to do their part,” Mousavian writes.
The article was published in Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists on 19th January 2021, one day before Joe Biden officially sworn in
as President of United States.
Following is the text of the article titled “Nine hurdles to
reviving the Iran nuclear deal”:
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on 8th
January 2021 that Tehran was in no rush for the United States to rejoin the
2015 nuclear deal formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), but, he also said, sanctions on Iran must be lifted immediately.
“If the sanctions are lifted, the return of the Americans
makes sense,” he insisted. President-elect Joe Biden has announced his plan to return
to the deal soon after he is sworn into office. “If Iran returns to strict
compliance with the nuclear deal,” he wrote in an op-ed for CNN, “the United
States would rejoin.” His Iranian counterpart, President Hassan Rouhani, has
also expressed willingness to return to the deal, stating that, “Iran could
come into compliance with the agreement within an hour of the United States
doing so.”
Five years ago, after years of intensive negotiations, six
world powers managed to sign the world’s most comprehensive nuclear agreement
with Iran. While the agreement was a political one, it was also ratified by the
UN Security Council in Resolution 2231. According to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization tasked with verifying the agreement’s
technical aspects, Iran was fully complying with the deal for about three
years, until President Trump withdrew from it in May 2018. In response to the US
violations of the nuclear agreement, Iran too reduced some of its commitments.
Most recently, on 4th January2021, Iran announced that it had increased its
uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent. Although reviving the agreement is
certainly still possible, it won’t be easy. The two sides will need to overcome
nine hurdles to make it happen:
First, the sequencing of a mutual return could be an
immediate problem. Iran expects the United States to lift sanctions first,
because it was the Trump administration that withdrew first. While Tehran’s
demand is legitimate, Washington may ask that Iran come into full compliance
before lifting sanctions. Indeed, a straightforward reading of the quotation
from Joe Biden’s op-ed suggests just that. In this scenario, after Joe Biden’s
executive order rejoining the deal, Iran and the world powers can meet and
agree on a realistic plan with a specified timeline of proportionate reciprocal
actions.
Second is the issue of what compliance constitutes. During
the Obama administration there was one major barrier to the full realization of
the terms of the agreement: Many primary sanctions, targeting US citizens and
permanent residents, organizations, and individuals that engage in trade and
business with their Iranian counterparts, remained intact. These sanctions
limited the economic benefits of the deal for Iran. The 29th paragraph of the
deal clearly states that all signatories will refrain from any policy
specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of
trade and economic relations with Iran. This cannot be achieved without
abolishing the primary sanctions.
Third, the Trump administration imposed numerous sanctions
against Iran under the guise of terrorism and human rights, aimed at preventing
the Biden administration from returning to the deal. For a clean implementation
of the agreement, Biden will need to remove all of these sanctions as well.
Fourth, Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement and violation
of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 as well as other international
commitments has damaged US credibility abroad. There is now a widespread belief
among policy makers in Iran that the United States will simply not live up to
its end of the bargain, no matter what that bargain is. This naturally raises
the important question: What guarantees are there that the United States will
remain committed to the deal in the post-Biden era?
Fifth, because of Trump’s maximum pressure policy, the
Iranian economy has suffered hundreds of billions of dollars of losses, while
Iran was in full compliance with the terms and conditions of the deal. Some Iranian
leaders, including Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, have demanded
compensation for the economic damage the country suffered after the United
States withdrew. The challenge will be to find a mechanism to compensate for
the economic damages that the Trump administration inflicted on the Iranian
economy.
Sixth, the “snapback” mechanism built into the agreement
allows any country to force the UN Security Council to reimpose multilateral
sanctions against Iran if Iran fails to fulfill its commitments. But this is
one-sided: There is no such remedy for Iran if other parties fail to do their
part. This became abundantly clear when the Trump administration first withdrew
from the deal and then tried to unilaterally re-impose multilateral sanctions
on Iran through the snapback mechanism. It was as if the injurer was demanding
punishment for the injured. Although the UN Security Council rejected the US
demand, the stunt revealed the structural flaw of the snapback.
Seventh, in the first week of December 2020, the Iranian
parliament passed a bill mandating Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization to resume
enriching uranium to 20 percent purity. The legislation also requires the
Iranian government to cease voluntary implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol
within two months of the bill’s enactment if the other signatories fail to
fully deliver on their commitments under the agreement. And after three months,
the Atomic Energy Organization is obliged to begin using at least
1,000-second-generation centrifuges. In short, president-elect Biden will need
to move fast.
Eighth, there were some in the United States who were
worried that Trump may start a reckless last-ditch war with Iran before leaving
office. While this concern is overblown, there should be no doubt that US partners
in the region will do whatever they can to prevent Biden’s return to the deal.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already said as much. To be sure,
the hardliners in Iran are also fundamentally opposed to the deal.
Ninth, some pundits and politicians in Washington want Biden
to leverage the Trump administration’s sanctions to pressure Iran to accept
additional commitments beyond the original agreement as a condition for US
return to compliance. These include limiting Iran’s missile capability,
extending the “sunset” clauses within the deal, or resolving regional disputes.
But from Iran’s perspective, such demands are a non-starter. As the
spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry said recently, “No negotiation has
been, is being, or will be held about Iran’s defense power.”
Despite these hurdles, Biden should nevertheless seek
re-entry into the deal. Only a clean and full implementation by all parties can
save the world’s most comprehensive nuclear agreement, contain rising US-Iran
tensions, and open the path toward more confidence building measures. That path
should include, upon Biden’s issuing an executive order to rejoin the JCPOA,
the creation of a working committee of parties to the agreement tasked with
ensuring full compliance by all signatories, and a forum, organized by the UN
Secretary General, in which Iran and the Persian Gulf countries can discuss a
new structure for improving security and cooperation in the region.