China and US face changing power dynamics

According to the South China Morning Post, political events in China and America have given rise to new power dynamics. While the 20th Chinese Communist Party congress has solidified the policies of President Xi Jinping, the midterm election has further muddied the already chaotic political waters in the United States.

With an already shaky hold on some of the partners that he is courting, Biden faces a weaker position in terms of congressional support, and it remains to be seen whether that will further undermine his alliance building.

The austere choreography of Beijing’s twice-a-decade leadership reshuffle contrasted with the bruising political campaigns of the US midterms, which have yet to reveal how much power Republicans will have starting in January and what that will mean for President Joe Biden’s China policy or Indo-Pacific Strategy.

While the world more or less knows what to expect from Beijing, those with a stake in the success or failure of Biden’s effort to build a strategic environment that makes it tough for China will be watching closely for indications that the new US political landscape will undermine it. 

With that in mind, now might be a good time to take stock of the alliances and partnerships that Biden has built or bolstered during his first two years in office, a network of overlapping groups and policies so sprawling that they sometimes come into conflict with each other.

One of the most recent successes on this front was Canada’s decision to join Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), an initiative that was initially portrayed by some as a poor substitute for the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and came under attack for its lack of a market-access component.

After a more tenuous approach to countering Beijing compared with Washington, Ottawa has taken more pointed steps that align with the Biden administration’s efforts to chip away at China’s dominance in the production of key industrial materials needed to manufacture electric vehicles and other products that are essential to meeting the world’s carbon-reduction targets.

Just this month, Canadian government ordered three Chinese companies to divest from a handful of lithium miners based in the country, after introducing tougher rules on foreign investments in the nation’s critical minerals sectors. Days later, Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Joly accused China of adopting an increasingly disruptive stance on the world stage as she referenced her government’s eagerly awaited Indo-Pacific strategy.

Biden has also drawn closer to the European Union through the US-EU Trade and Technology Council established last year in a bid to reduce its members’ shared reliance on China’s manufacturing juggernaut, while strengthening their respective domestic supply chains involving strategic technologies.

As with NATO and the G7, Russia’s war on Ukraine managed to give that alliance an additional sense of urgency. The group announced during their second formal gathering, just weeks after the Kremlin launched its attack that trade in technologies can be pivotal to the ability of autocratic countries to implement authoritarian policies, perpetrate human rights violations and abuses, which analysts said could be used as a justification for further restrictions on certain technology exports to China.

In addition to the interest that China’s neighbours in Asia have expressed in the IPEF, Biden has also had a degree of success in shoring up military ties with the Philippines, whose relations with Washington on defence have not been as robust as they have been with Japan and South Korea. Citing concerns about China’s military modernization, US Deputy Defence Secretary Kathleen Hicks confirmed the Pentagon’s objectives on this front earlier this year.

During a meeting with his American counterpart Lloyd Austin, Philippine Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said then-president Rodrigo Duterte had decided to renew the 23-year-old Visiting Forces Agreement, which many expected Manila would opt to scrap after Duterte abrogated the accord in 2020.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, also known as the Quad, with India, Japan and Australia – revived and invigorated by Biden – also appears to strengthen Washington’s hand with respect to the country that it has identified as its most consequential geopolitical challenge.

The Quad has also taken on more significance owing to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Biden’s frustration over Beijing’s refusal to condemn the war. However, a trip by India’s foreign minister to Moscow just days ago underscored how little control the US leader may have in nurturing new alliances.

Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hailed New Delhi’s strong and steady relationship with Moscow lately and declared India’s intention to continue to buy Russian oil, disregarding US appeals to allies and partners to isolate Russia from the global markets.

Launched in Biden’s first year in office, Washington’s new military alliance with Britain and Australia, or Aukus, also presents uncertainties over his efforts to counter Beijing’s more assertive military posture.

While Aukus will deliver advanced nuclear submarine technology to Canberra, it has also enraged the prime minister of the Solomon Islands, Manasseh Sogavare, helping to push the island nation closer to China after it switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. 

In a United Nations speech that echoed Beijing’s rhetoric, Sogavare said that his country had been maligned over its closer relationship with China to the point of intimidation.

As all of this plays out, Republicans are preparing to take control of the House of Representatives, where California’s Kevin McCarthy will most likely become the chamber’s leader. In an indication of how cooperative McCarthy will be with the president of China, he has already dismissed the Biden administration’s effort to investigate the origins of Covid-19 with a vow to start a new probe.