The first obstacle is Washington itself. Any agreement of
this magnitude must pass the US Senate, where Middle East policy has
historically been heavily influenced by pro-Israel interests. It is difficult
to envisage congressional approval for any arrangement that Israel believes
could narrow its long-standing strategic and technological superiority in the
region. Political resistance in Washington, therefore, remains the biggest
hurdle.
Even if the agreement survives Congress, its strategic value
for Riyadh is questionable. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that any
civilian nuclear program must eventually include the right to enrich uranium.
If enrichment is prohibited, the Kingdom would remain dependent on foreign
suppliers for nuclear fuel. Such an arrangement falls well short of the
strategic autonomy Riyadh has long pursued.
The proposal becomes even more complicated if it is linked
to Saudi recognition of Israel through the Abraham Accords. The Kingdom faces
strong domestic, Arab and wider Islamic pressure not to normalize relations
with Israel in the absence of a credible and irreversible path toward Palestinian
statehood. Without meaningful progress on that front, normalization carries
significant political costs for Riyadh.
There is also an economic dimension. Saudi Arabia has
invested heavily in the United States over several decades, yet many in Riyadh
question whether Washington has fulfilled the security commitments expected
from a strategic ally. The muted American response to attacks on Gulf energy
infrastructure and its shifting regional priorities have inevitably weakened
Saudi confidence in US security guarantees.
Above all, Saudi leaders understand that American policy in
the Middle East is inseparable from its commitment to Israel. Whether justified
or not, a growing perception across the Arab world is that Israeli security
considerations increasingly shape Washington's regional decisions. That
perception inevitably influences Saudi strategic calculations.
For these reasons, the proposed US-Saudi nuclear deal looks
less like a transformative agreement and more like a diplomatic bargaining
chip. It expects Saudi Arabia to make strategic, political and financial
concessions while offering neither an independent nuclear capability nor
security assurances that Riyadh considers fully credible. Until these
fundamental contradictions are addressed, the deal is unlikely to move beyond
diplomatic headlines.
