Since the
establishment of the Islamic Republic, the United States has employed every
conceivable pressure tactic—crippling economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation,
covert operations, cyber warfare and sustained political hostility through
regional allies. If the objective was to topple the “Mullah regime,” the
outcome is self-evident. The system remains intact, resilient and, in some
respects, more consolidated than before.
Ironically,
sanctions—long projected as a non-military means of forcing political
change—have produced results opposite to those promised. Instead of empowering
reformist forces, they have weakened Iran’s middle class, historically the most
potent driver of political evolution. At the same time, state-linked
institutions, particularly those associated with security and defence, have
expanded their influence over the economy. External pressure has also enabled
the ruling establishment to frame dissent as foreign-sponsored, thereby
justifying tighter internal control.
Washington’s
reluctance to admit strategic failure is understandable, though not defensible.
Acknowledging defeat would challenge the credibility of sanctions as a global
policy tool and expose the limits of American coercive power. Yet denial comes
at a heavy cost. Persisting with a failed approach deepens instability,
prolongs economic suffering and increases the risk of miscalculation—without
delivering political transformation.
Even more
alarming is the absence of any credible post-clerical roadmap. History offers
sobering lessons. Iraq, Libya and Syria demonstrate what happens when regimes
are dismantled without a viable alternative governance structure. Iran’s
opposition remains fragmented—divided ideologically, geographically and
socially, with much of its leadership disconnected from realities on the
ground. There is no unified transitional plan, no agreed security framework and
no consensus on state reconstruction.
In this
context, calls to arm “rebels” or encourage violent uprising are deeply
troubling. The militarization of dissent has repeatedly produced chaos rather
than peace. From Syria to Libya, weapons fractured societies, empowered
militias and destroyed state institutions. Iran, with its dense urban
population and complex social fabric, would be particularly vulnerable. Street
violence may dismantle authority, but it cannot build a stable political order.
If peace and
stability are genuinely desired, policy must shift from illusion to realism.
Political change cannot be imposed through threats or sanctions alone. Gradual
economic engagement, calibrated sanctions relief and regional dialogue offer
more sustainable pathways. Strengthening economic normalcy and civil society
may not yield immediate results, but they create conditions under which
internal evolution becomes possible.
The lesson
is clear. Pressure has failed, and force will fail again. Peace in Iran—and
across the region—will not emerge from regime-change fantasies, but from
strategies grounded in historical experience, restraint and political realism.
