Showing posts with label Air attacks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Air attacks. Show all posts

Thursday, 19 June 2025

Western media paving way for Israel to act against Iran

In the wake of Iran’s missile response on Israeli military centers, a wave of media and diplomatic reactions has started in the West and Israel seeking to pave the way for intensifying strikes and engineering a global consensus against Tehran through resorting to playing blame game and highlighting civilian casualties. 

The propaganda, supported by the Zionist security and media as well as Western mainstream, aims to provide the audience with a biased narration of the recent developments, introducing the Islamic Republic as the country that creates crisis and threat, not a nation giving a natural defensive response to the aggression.

In this regard, Western media such as CNN, BBC, and FOX News try to depict an emotional and dramatic image of attack on Soroka Medical Center, while, Iran targeted military and security positions and has not confirmed any reports on damage against medical centers.

Similarly, Israeli media has initiated a propaganda campaign regarding the medical center to take advantage of the incident, turning it into the symbol of Iran’s crimes in a bid to prepare ground for the international arena to pile more pressure on Iran.

What is important about this campaign is that it excludes Israel’s aggression on the Gaza Strip, aggression on Syria, assassination of the Iranian scientists, and continued violation of regional countries’ sovereignties. 

It presents a biased narration to the global audience, drawing attention to the emotional and biased consequences of Iran’s response, not explaining the reasons for the natural reaction.

What is taking place is a multi-layered project to play the blame game, manage public opinion in the world, and pave the way for exerting further political, security, and military pressure on Iran. 

To react effectively against this media hype, it is necessary for pro-Resistance media and independent elites to correct this narration, clarifying the defensive and deterrence nature of this response since it is regarded as legitimate and essential for nations to effectively respond to continued acts of aggression.

Who has killed more civilians? Israel or Iran

The killing of civilians in conflicts involving Israel and Iran is a deeply complex and politically charged issue. A cursory look show the following:

Israel:

The recent killing in Gaza and earlier conflicts show a high number of civilian casualties caused by Israeli military actions. In the ongoing Gaza conflict – post October 07, 2023, thousands of Palestinian civilians, including women and children, have been killed due to Israeli airstrikes and ground operations.

UN, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other observers have accused Israel of disproportionate use of force and potential war crimes.

However, Israel claims it targets militants and Hamas infrastructure, and blames Hamas for operating among civilians.

Iran:

Iran has been involved indirectly in several regional conflicts through proxy groups like: Hezbollah (Lebanon), Houthis (Yemen) and Shiite militias (Iraq, Syria). These groups have been accused of launching rockets or attacks that have killed civilians in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

Iran’s direct role in killing civilians is less visible, but its support of armed groups has fueled violence that resulted in civilian deaths.

Media reports suggest Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and civilian targets; Hezbollah rockets into Israeli towns; Syrian regime backed by Iran targeting civilian areas.

It may be concluded that Israel is directly responsible for a large number of Palestinian civilian deaths, particularly in Gaza.

Iran is indirectly responsible through its proxies, contributing to civilian casualties across the region.

Both Israel and Iran (often through proxies) have been responsible for civilian deaths, but Israel's military actions tend to cause more immediate, large-scale casualties, especially in Gaza. Iran’s impact is more indirect, spread across multiple countries and conflicts.

As regards the most recent conflict between Israel and Iran, which has escalated sharply in mid‑June 2025, following are the observations:

Recent Israeli airstrikes on Iran

As part of a large-scale bombing campaign targeting nuclear and military sites—including Arak, Natanz, Isfahan, and Tehran—Israel launched over hundreds of airstrikes on Iran beginning around June 13, 2025.

According to Iranian human rights monitors, less than 650 people have been killed, of whom around 260 are civilians.

Official Iranian health authorities report 224 civilian deaths, with over 90% of casualties in hospitals being women and children.

Independent sources estimate fatalities ranging from 400 to 650, with up to 260 civilian deaths.

Iranian retaliatory strikes on Israel

Iran has fired approximately 450–650 ballistic missiles and drones at Israeli territory. These strikes have resulted in at least 220 to 240 deaths in Israel, including around 24 civilian casualties.

Israeli strikes on Iran are currently responsible for significantly more civilian deaths—estimates far exceed 200—while Iran’s retaliatory attacks have caused dozens of civilian fatalities in Israel.

It is a fact that civilians in both the countries have been killed.

The largest civilian toll is currently in Iran, due to Israel’s ongoing air campaign.

In Israel, Iranian missiles and drones have also killed civilians, though on a much smaller scale.

 

 

 

Wednesday, 26 June 2019

Can US afford an assault on Iran?


The US-Iran standoff continues to evolve quickly, yet commentaries covering tanker attacks, a downed drone, and reversed orders for airstrikes from the White House fail to explain the logic behind an intervention, if the Trump administration decides to intervene. Therefore, it is worth exploring what a war between the two would actually look like.
Ideally, the US should have learnt some lessons from Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Distant foreign conflicts are difficult to win, which most of the Americans are usually unwilling to think unless faced with a massive and immediate threat. Small-scale engagements accomplish little and are instead more likely to evolve into larger conflicts. Installing foreign governments are more difficult, costly, time-consuming and even deadly than leaders are likely to claim.
Backing a local proxy is often unpalatable for the country’s sense of ethics, but US adversaries often have no such misgivings. Those proxies are often an ineffective substitute for a US military presence when it comes to pursuing the US agenda. Without a substantial, long-term commitment of US forces, such wars are more likely to leave a power vacuum when the US withdraws. The outcomes are collapsed government, invasion by a neighbor, revolution that creates new and uncertain structures – or some combination of all these. In fact, the US has had a few true victories in the wars it has fought since World War II.
Airstrikes
Exploring US government’s options in a war with Iran, the most probable option is limited strikes, similar in scale to or perhaps somewhat greater than the strikes on Syria that the Trump administration ordered on Syria in 2017 and 2018. But Iran is not Syria, as it has a sophisticated air defense infrastructure and plenty of air denial capability, increasing the chance of US casualties. Further, a limited air strike probably wouldn’t accomplish anything meaningful. It might take out a handful of radar and air defense installations, sending a political signal but affecting in no real way the strategic reality on the ground. The only time US air power alone has significantly shifted the reality on the ground was in Kosovo, but Iran today is far more powerful than Serbia in 1999.
On the contrary, limited strikes may have opposite outcome. Iran’s economy is hurting and its society appears more divided as citizens continue to grow frustrated with the government. The US has imposed sanctions as a strategy to hobble the economy enough to create social pressure on Tehran, forcing the government to spend less on its defenses and funding of militias in Syria and Iraq, so far, they’ve been effective. If the US continues this tactic, over time Iran’s domestic situation would worsen, and its citizens would be more likely to blame its leadership for their problems. And that would likely intensify the divisions within the government that are already emerging, resulting in either a more Western-friendly government or one dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Even limited US airstrikes would increase the probability of the IRGC consolidating power. If the sanctions can help create division, an attack would unite Iran’s hard-liners and reformers against the US. That unity would likely occur under the aegis of the hard-liners who have been warning all along that this day would come if Iran were foolish enough to trust the US. As the most powerful entity in the county, the IRGC would probably take over, and do so with popular support.
Use of Ground Force
Ground force is a less likely choice for the US, even with limited objectives (like eliminating specific military equipment or securing passage through the Strait of Hormuz). But it would be more likely to achieve what the US really wants, Iran to recall its foreign militias to defend the home. But when a military force is rapidly removed without a replacement ready to take its place, it creates a power vacuum and, therefore, an opportunity for others to fill the void. The pace at which Iran withdraws its militias from Syria and Iraq can alter the regional balance of power.
If any militant group occupies the space vacated by Iran, US would have to again deal with this problem, which would require reoccupying parts of Iraq while fighting Iran. This would likely entail support from Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces, which would again put pressure on US-Turkey relations. But the Syrian Kurds may not see a long-term alliance with the US as in its best interest after the US threatened to leave them high and dry in December 2018. They could instead seek out a political resolution with Damascus, backed by Russia that would protect them from Turkey. It is also likely that Russia may step in to back Kurdish groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces to fight back. But that would mean the US would be depending on Russian assistance to cover its western flank, and in exchange for such cooperation Russia would likely demand US concessions in places like Ukraine. In short, going all-in with Iran would require either a large-scale US occupation or dependence on Russia in Syria and Iraq. Neither of those are appealing options for Washington.
Regime Change
If it is regime change that the US may attempt in Iran, the risks are even greater. The fallout would look much like that of the second Iraq war, but on a far greater scale. Installing a pro-American regime isn’t easy, but it can easily fail. The US would have to commit to an indefinite occupation of Iran or again risk the emergence of a power vacuum. The US would have to deal with the rest of the Middle East. In the best-case scenario, the US would install a new head of government while facing a lengthy insurgency, which would likely include the vestiges of the IRGC and its heavy weaponry. After a long, costly occupation, the US would have to withdraw, leaving Iran’s leaders to face opposition on their own. The half-life of US-installed leaders in the Middle East would not be long. Limited airstrikes or a full-scale invasion (military confrontation with Iran) would create more problems for the US rather than offering any sustainable solution.