First, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy for dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crumbled. While never officially articulated, Netanyahu’s approach since 2009 had involved sidelining the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) and allowing the strengthening of Hamas in Gaza, within certain limits.
This approach enabled Netanyahu to avoid meaningful negotiations with the PA, which might have led to the establishment of a Palestinian state, a prospect he opposes. The ascent of Hamas in Gaza aided Netanyahu in his effort to fragment the Palestinian national movement. It also allowed him to claim he could not negotiate with a significant part of the Palestinian national movement, due to its extremist Islamist rejectionist stance. The combined effect was that Netanyahu did not face significant international pressure to resume talks with the Palestinians. Moreover, the state of affairs limited international efforts (in particular by the European Union and the United States) to advance Palestinian unification. Due to Hamas’ nature, such efforts were deemed too sensitive.
The prime minister’s policy went largely unchallenged for over a decade, in part because it wasn’t fully disclosed. Ongoing clashes with Hamas every few years signaled deep hostility between the parties; although behind closed doors, Netanyahu admitted that the status quo, including Qatari funding to Hamas, serves his policies. In a 2019 Likud faction meeting, the prime minister said that if one opposes a Palestinian state, he should favor the (Israeli approved) Qatari transfer of funds to Hamas in Gaza because maintaining the wedge between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza would prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Shifting political conditions in Israel — such as the decline of the Israeli left, which had been advocating for a two-state solution — further helped the prime minister. Finally, Netanyahu’s increasingly populist leadership style led to the removal of strong figures who might have dissented in both his party and the cabinet.
The second pillar of the October 07 debacle was the intelligence failure. Israeli security agencies, especially the Directorate of Military Intelligence (AMAN) and the Israeli Security Agency (SHABAK, also widely known as Shin Bet), acknowledged their shortcomings. SHABAK’s head, Ronen Bar, took responsibility on October 16, followed a day later by Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliwa of AMAN. The intelligence failure was systemic. At a strategic level, Israel misunderstood Hamas’ goals, with some in the security establishment wrongly believing that the necessity for quasi-sovereignty in Gaza would make the organization more pragmatic and potentially alter its ideology. The 2017 policy paper released by Hamas was viewed by some in Israel and abroad as a potential sign of change. Hamas’ choice not to engage Israel during its two last major armed clashes with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza were regarded by many in Israel as further proof of Hamas’ pragmatic approach. Additionally, Israel’s security agencies failed to anticipate the attack pattern and its timing. The bitter taste of failure in Israel is especially pronounced, considering that the country’s intelligence agencies have enjoyed ample resources and demonstrated their effectiveness in near and distant arenas for decades. As in previous Israeli and international intelligence failures, it seems that Israel had some information, but its intelligence agencies did not piece it together and issue a warning.
The third aspect of the failure pertained to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) operational preparedness. It appears that the organization lacked clear plans for how to handle such a widespread attack. Israel was caught off guard by the large and brutal assaults on civilian communities, or the massive rave party that took place near the border. Another surprise was Hamas’ influence campaign accompanying the attacks, which included the extensive use of cameras by the attackers, documenting their actions, which members of the international human rights community have already begun to identify as war crimes. Others in the international community, such as US President Joe Biden, compared Hamas’ actions to the brutality displayed by ISIS. Israel was further taken aback by some of the tactical military aspects of the attack, including the dismantling of sensors, assaults on Israeli command-and-control posts, and the easy breach of the barrier constructed on the Israel-Gaza border.
The fourth failure involved the state’s weak response to the crisis, at least in the initial phase. Many Israelis were deeply disappointed by the military’s inability to come to the aid of the 1,000 civilians who were murdered, the thousands wounded, and the approximately 220 abducted to Gaza. In some cases, military forces were only able to retake control more than 24 hours after the attack began. This general sense of ineptitude was accompanied by an underwhelming leadership response, including in providing information and reassuring the public as the crisis unfolded, facilitating the absorption of internally displaced people, or offering financial support and social services. The prime minister, normally a brilliant speaker, did not effectively engage with the public and — to date — has yet to take any responsibility for what transpired on his watch.
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