Crisis in Belarus and role being played by Russia, European Union and United States

After the presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, mass demonstrations broke out spontaneously throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets protesting against widespread election fraud. 

These protests soon met with sustained, brutal suppression. The masses were eventually driven from the streets, yet the resistance against the Belarusian dictatorship persists to this day.

It is clear that Alyaksandr Lukashenka lost the popular legitimacy he had enjoyed for many, if not most, of the last 26 years. Why did this Belarusian revolution fail to succeed? The responses of Russia, the European Union, and the United States to the 2020–21 protest movement had a decisive impact on the pro-democracy uprising in Belarus and will continue to be crucial for how the situation in Belarus unfolds in the future.

The 2020–21 Belarusian protest movement to date can be divided into three main phases: violent repressions; temporary cease-fire; and regime retaliation. The next phase of the Belarusian crisis will be one of power transition. This transition will likely happen after the constitutional referendum scheduled for February 27, 2022. The current draft of the new Belarusian constitution proposes several crucial changes for the political system in Belarus.

First, the amendments aim to weaken the powers of the Belarusian parliament and to strengthen the role of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly (ABPA). This body which under the present constitution does not have governing status would be endowed with wide-ranging powers and would consist of 1,200 delegates loyal to the regime. The ABPA would have the power to approve Belarus’s foreign and security policy, propose changes to the constitution, draft laws, select judges of the top courts, and have other functions. The acting president would automatically become a member of the ABPA and potentially serve as its chair, if elected by the other delegates. By strengthening the powers of the ABPA, Lukashenka is trying to create an alternative center of power which would allow him to stay in the Belarusian political arena even if he decides to step down as a president.

Second, the constitutional amendments envisage the president’s immunity from prosecution and prohibit anyone who temporarily left the country in the last 20 years from running for presidency. This provision directly targets members of Belarusian political opposition who were forced to live into exile to avoid repressions. This amendment deprives the Belarusian opposition of the opportunity to challenge the ruling regime directly inside Belarus, and provides additional guarantees for the safety of Lukashenka and his entourage. 

Finally, the new constitutional provisions also grant the president immunity from prosecution and introduce a limit of two five-year presidential terms in office. However, since these restrictions would only apply going forward, Lukashenka could potentially stay in power until 2035.

Lukashenka has not yet declared whether he will step down after the referendum. The current political instability in the region, including the January protests in Kazakhstan and the escalating tensions between Russian and Ukraine, increase the chances that Lukashenka will stay in power after the referendum.

In either case, the West will not cease pressure on the Belarusian regime and will continue to support those fighting for democratic reforms there. For its part, Russia will continue to use the vulnerability of Lukashenka and his close entourage to increase its political, economic, and military presence in Belarus.

Russia, the EU and the US have all played an important role in the evolution of the 2020–21 Belarusian post-electoral crises. The Belarusian mass protests failed to succeed in August 2020, thanks both to Russia’s significant support of the Lukashenka regime and a lack of quick and comprehensive response from the EU and the US.

However, the Ryanair incident in May 2021 catalyzed increased Western action against the Lukashenka regime. It resulted in greater coordination between the EU and the US and led to the passage of several packages of targeted sanctions. Hard sanctions are likely to continue to serve as the baseline policy towards the Lukashenka regime in the near future for the EU and the US, while Russia will likely continue exerting its influence in pursuit of greater political, economic, and military integration with Belarus.  Lukashenka’s regime has a potential to maintain political control in the country in the short-term perspective. However, in the long run it will have to face the irreversible transformations happening in the Belarusian society and step on a path of political transition.