Can joining Quad help India fight Himalayan war against China?

The ambiguity over officially announcing China as its adversary, the lack of overlap between the geographies or the issues of its members with China, and the military disadvantages before a well-prepared Chinese puts a question mark over Indian inclusion in the Quad.

India has maintained that it perceives the Quad as not aimed against anyone, “denied it is an Asian NATO”, stressed on broader issues from vaccine collaboration, to resilient supply chains, and framed its language that avoids irking China. But the belated adoption of broader goals such as climate change and vaccines in the 12th March Quad Leaders’ Summit, to make it more acceptable to other countries, suggested that the target is Beijing.

Only India and Japan have territorial disputes and are geographically close with China, while the US and Australia’s opposition stems from Great Power contest, China’s socio-political system and policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea and Taiwan.

The only tangible dispute Australia has with China was the trade war where the latter’s tariffs cost Australia US$3 billion ‑ themselves in response to Australia backing a global inquiry into the COVID-19 origins in April 2020.

While India’s territorial disputes with China are in the Himalayas, Japan contests the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu in Chinese) in the East China Sea. Thus, the lack of a contiguous land or maritime geography with China does not allow a ‘united front’ per se — like Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia, or Egypt, Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean against Turkey. Moreover, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on 22nd April refused intervening in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan itself, while clarifying 17th April joint statement with Biden in the Japanese Parliament.

India is not likely to join Quad members to collectively confront China in the South China Sea, as China can be expected to retaliate with severe backlash in Ladakh. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is already limiting the disengagement only to the Pangong Tso, with the standoff becoming a year old.

Beijing initiated the standoff because of India’s rising military dalliance with the US and tacitly joining former US President Donald Trump’s COVID-19-origin charge in early 2020. China perceived it as a threat to its sovereignty and India and US exploiting its vulnerability. Moreover, India’s reconciliatory statements at the beginning of the standoff reflected an unwillingness to go to war.

Giving up the Kailash Range plateau that had stunned the Chinese, has also left India with little military options. Add to it its obsolete military equipment and structure, India can only fight a defensive war. In the South China Sea against the US Navy that is stretched thin, the Chinese have a home advantage.

In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) knows it faces the ‘away’ disadvantage and, therefore, will not challenge the Quad or India.

Retired US Navy Admiral Dennis Blair also discredits the ‘String of Pearls’ theory, saying it is “not possible for any navy to encircle a country (like India) with a few ports.” Since international law would permit India to strike regions it faces attacks from, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Pakistan will not host Chinese military facilities aimed at India.

A China policy independent of the US geopolitical rivalries that objectively addresses Indian issues with Beijing and avoids the destabilization that Washington’s military alliances effect would inspire a positive response from China. Moreover, banking on military alliances against China would harm the current government’s muscular, nationalistic image.