The civil war that devastated Afghanistan after the withdrawal was caused not by the departure of Soviet troops, but by the failure to formulate a viable plan for Afghanistan’s future. As the United States intends to pull outs its troops from the country, it should keep in mind that lesson.
After withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in 1989, the Soviet Union continued to provide financial support to the communist-nationalist regime, led by President Mohammad Najibullah. But, lacking domestic legitimacy, Najibullah’s regime quickly collapsed when Soviet Union withdrew its financial support in 1992, triggering the civil war. In 1996, the Taliban gained control of Kabul and, ultimately, the country.
The Taliban remained in power until 2001, when a US-led invasion—spurred by the 9/11 terrorist attacks—ended its rule. In February 2020, US President Donald Trump’s administration reached a deal with the Taliban intended to end the nearly 20-year-long war. The US and its NATO allies agreed to withdraw all troops by May 2021 if the Taliban fulfilled certain commitments, including cutting ties with terrorist groups and reducing violence.
The Taliban also have to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government, which was not involved in the deal. The Trump administration apparently hoped that an intra-Afghan peace agreement would materialize by the designated withdrawal date, ending the fighting and minimizing the risk that Afghanistan would become a haven for terrorists.
That hasn’t happened; the number of US troops has been reduced to around 2,000 troops, fighting in Afghanistan hasn’t decreased. On the contrary, a US watchdog agency reports that the Taliban carried out more attacks in the last quarter of 2020 than during the same period in 2019. Moreover, the latest intra-Afghan talks, which began in Doha in September, have produced virtually no results.
It seems that the Taliban’s plan was to keep fighting until US troops left, at which point they might be able to secure a victory in the long war. Now they face another possibility that US troops won’t leave nearly as expected. President Joe Biden’s administration has announced that it is reviewing the deal to determine whether the Taliban is ‘living up to its commitments’.
The Biden administration also has to decide the role NATO allies, which together have substantially more troops in Afghanistan than the US does. Keeping in view the post-Soviet experience, the US has to devise a plan for influencing the situation in Afghanistan and the region after the withdrawal.
The challenge is formidable; Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries. Afghanistan’s state income amounts to little more than a third of what the US pays to sustain its various security forces, to say nothing of US aid to the civilian sector (it amounts to less than half of Europe’s contributions). In fact, Afghanistan has remained depended on outside support to sustain its statehood since Russia and Britain played their ‘Great Game’ in the 19th century.
It seems that the US is leaning towards maintaining some sort of security presence, focused on fighting the terrorists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, beyond the May deadline, an approach German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has also advocated.
But there are risks. The Taliban could reject this solution, leading to an intensification of fighting and renewed attacks on international forces. Zalmay Khalilzad, the US special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, is most likely already working to assess this risk.
The Taliban’s acceptance of a continued security presence may depend on progress in the intra-Afghan talks, though no one seems to have a clear vision for a power-sharing agreement. The gap between today’s Afghanistan and the Taliban’s desired Islamic Emirate is wide, and narrowing it will require a recalibration of the diplomatic process concerning Afghanistan.
The regional powers—including Iran, Russia and China—should be engaged in all talks about the country’s future, with one or two also taking a more active role in facilitating the intra-Afghan political dialogue. In this process, managing the dynamics between India and Pakistan, for which developments in Afghanistan hold profound national security implications will undoubtedly emerge as a key challenge. Indeed, at the moment Russia is taking the initiative in this regard.
The pressure in the US and elsewhere to end the ‘forever war’ in Afghanistan is understandable. But, as Ghani has warned, simply withdrawing international forces is unlikely to yield that result. To avoid a new spiral of violence, all stakeholders must first deliberate what may happen after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.
