Strategic military miscalculation usually results in the collapse of authoritarian regimes. The decision of Argentina’s military junta to invade the Falkland Islands in 1982 led to its defeat in the war against Britain and the fall of General Leopoldo Galtieri’s regime.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a military disaster for the Iraqi army following Operation Desert Storm, paving the way for the 2003 US invasion of the country and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Successful countries eventually accept the need to revamp their political systems, initiate democratic reforms and champion world peace.
It took Germany, whose army fought exceptionally well operationally and tactically, two world wars to metamorphose.
It took Japan’s disastrous defeat precipitated by the Pearl Harbor attack to convince Tokyo to change. Under the US direction, the two countries transformed into full-fledged democracies.
Since the turn of the 20th century, political leaders, heads of state and political movements in the Arab world have also shown a propensity for massive miscalculation.
Hamas October 07 attack is a prime example, but it was precipitated by several other cases that have shaped the region since World War I.
Hamas’ rationale for last month’s attack stemmed from its conviction that Israel, with United States backing and Arab acquiescence, intended to eliminate any possibility of Palestinian statehood.
By taking Israeli hostages, it also intended to secure the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners being held in Israeli jails, knowing that Israel has in the past been willing to conduct prisoner swaps.
In 2011, Israel released more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners to secure the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier detained by Hamas for more than five years.
However, Hamas failed to consider the likelihood that Israel’s war Cabinet would launch an unprecedented air and ground campaign following its attack, the scale of which recalled the genocidal horrors ingrained in Israel’s collective consciousness.
Hamas expected Israel to plead for negotiations to secure the freedom of some 240 Israeli captives. Images from Gaza on October 07 showed Hamas guerrillas ecstatic about the possibility of a massive prisoner swap. But Israel instead unleashed a withering military campaign.
Moreover, Hamas did not inform Iran and its regional allies in advance about its plans. It assumed Hezbollah would join the fighting from southern Lebanon and that Iraqi militias in Syria would engage Israel from the Golan Heights.
Hezbollah’s unenthusiastic involvement in the war has cost it far more casualties than Israel and did not relieve even the slightest pressure on embattled Hamas.
Hamas was left stunned by its allies’ tepid response; having previously believed its attack would transform the Middle East and pave the path toward establishing a Palestinian state.
An extraordinary summit of Arab and Islamic countries held last month in Saudi Arabia resulted only in generic statements of support for the Palestinians and demands for the immediate cessation of hostilities.
Hamas counted on the outbreak of a third intifada, but Israel’s preemptive raids against West Bank activists ruled out this possibility as well.
Arab leaders, engrossed in a distorted worldview, tend to see the world through the prism of their domestic politics, often failing to comprehend the complexity of international relations.
Arabs in high office are autocrats who do not answer to anybody else, driving them to make fateful decisions.
Many Arab leaders live in echo chambers, making decisions premised on faulty assumptions, inattentive to how their antagonists might respond. The consequences have played out time and again, including today in Gaza.
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