The Pan Asian trade pact between 15 countries including Japan,
China, and South Korea, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or
RCEP is a wakeup call for the West, writes Lionel Barber, former Editor of The
Financial Times.
With the US conspicuous by its absence, RCEP is the latest
sign of a shift in economic power eastward. China's stunning third-quarter
rebound from COVID-19 contrasts starkly with the relatively feeble recovery in
Europe, where governments are still struggling with a second wave of the
pandemic.
China has become the European Union's most important trading
partner, a remarkable achievement given Beijing only joined the World Trade
Organization 19 years ago. "China is catching up even faster," says
Herman Van Rompuy, former Belgium Prime Minister, President of the EU council,
and leading member of the European Policy Centre in Brussels.
Van Rompuy, a devotee and publisher of haiku poetry knows
Asia well. He observes that China's rise and Donald Trump's "America
First" protectionism has created a new term in the EU's political lexicon:
strategic autonomy. Europe is eager to escape being sandwiched between the two
superpowers, but "strategic autonomy" is more easily said than
achieved.
First, the EU must judge where best to carve out freedom of
maneuver. Should it focus on nurturing specific industrial sectors to create
"European champions?" Or is it better to set standards like the
General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR, which are later adopted by the US
and the rest of the world?
The EU has a far more developed internal trading bloc, the
single market, than the RCEP model. But the single market, in turn,
requires a "level playing field" that limits individual countries'
discretion to subsidize sectors. Strategies aimed at protecting sectors against
U.S. or Asian competition can therefore fall foul of EU rules on competition
and the application of state aid.
Between 2014 and 2019, the European Commission antitrust
authorities, led by the formidable Margrethe Vestager, blocked six mergers in
six different sectors: telecoms, financial services, cement, copper,
steel and, most notably, railways. In the last case, the Danish
commissioner scuppered a combination between Siemens and Alstom to create a
European champion to combat the rapid emergence of China's state-backed train
maker CRRC.
The Chinese colossus, itself a fusion of two big rail
equipment groups, had revenues of US$30 billion in 2017 and 12% of the
worldwide market in trains, services, and signaling. Siemens and Alstom
together would have sales of US$15 billion and about 9% of the market. Verstager's
decision provoked outrage in Berlin and Paris, where mercantilist instincts go
back to the late 17th century.
Diesel multiple units for Sri Lanka manufactured by a CRRC
subsidiary at the dockyard in Qingdao: the Chinese colossus had 12% of the
worldwide market in trains, services and signaling in 2017.
The political tides have, however, shifted since the
outbreak of the COVID pandemic. Governments have been forced to provide
billions of euros of financial aid to keep companies afloat. The state is
suddenly in the front and center in the economy.
Second, the coronavirus pandemic has turbocharged the
internet, highlighting Europe's digital gap with Asian countries. Most European
governments have a long way to go to catch up with Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea in terms of data management for reliable tracking and tracing. The lag on
the development and application of artificial intelligence compared to mainland
China is even more serious.
Third, the brutal lobbying campaign by both China and the
U.S. over the adoption of Huawei Technologies' fifth-generation, or 5G,
superfast broadband technology was a sober reminder that Europeans had no
technological alternatives. Huawei wiped out competition from the likes of
Alcatel more than a decade ago.
Finally, there is the "British question." Having
exited the EU (Brexit), the UK government has proclaimed the need for a new
industrial policy. Prime Minister, Boris Johnson is insisting on maximum
flexibility, without being bound by EU rules. Last week, he unveiled a 10-point
plan to wean the economy off carbon, with state support for the wind industry
and new nuclear plants. "We will make the UK the Saudi Arabia of
wind," Johnson promised.
Continental Europe fears that an unfettered UK could use
state aid to become a formidable competitor -- which is why the EU is playing
hardball in the final phase of the Brexit negotiations on a future trade deal.
Member states also want to draw on the 1.8 trillion euro summer rescue package
for their pandemic-ravaged economies, including provisions for common borrowing
on the bond market. This will include tens of billions of support for
"strategic" industries, notably in digital technology.
Europe is also signaling the willingness for a closer relationship
with the incoming Biden administration. In a speech this month, Ursula von der
Leyen, EU commission president, said the US and Europe enjoyed power and
influence "indispensable" to global cooperation. A common agenda
would cover climate change, trade and digital issues -- including the taxation
of big data giants like Amazon, Facebook, and Google.
Twenty years ago, European politicians employed similar
heady rhetoric with the launch of "Agenda 2000" to make Europe
"the most competitive, dynamic and knowledge-based economy in the
world." Most of the goals were not achieved. The difference today is that
China has become an economic force scarcely imaginable at the turn of the
century. Europe cannot afford another lost decade.