According to the report, Japan has placed 118 orders for US
military equipment worth over US$7 billion that remain undelivered more than
five years after contracts were signed. In several cases, the delays have
forced Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to rely on aging platforms—the very problem
these purchases were meant to address. This is not a bureaucratic mishap but a
structural flaw in the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
Under FMS rules, buyers must pay in advance, while prices
and delivery schedules remain estimates. Washington retains the right to
prioritize its own military needs, a reality that has become more pronounced
since the war in Ukraine. Weapons already paid for by allies can be diverted
elsewhere, while client states are expected to wait patiently. The refund of
surplus funds, often cited as evidence of fairness, does little to compensate
for years of strategic uncertainty.
This arrangement increasingly resembles economic coercion.
Countries are encouraged to replace “obsolete” systems even when existing
hardware remains functional. The logic of modernization often aligns more
closely with US defense contractors’ production cycles than with genuine threat
assessments. The buyer’s ability—or even need—to deploy advanced systems
becomes secondary.
Japan’s experience is particularly instructive. As a
technologically advanced nation and a key US ally, Tokyo should, in theory,
enjoy priority treatment. Its difficulties raise serious questions about the
position of smaller or less influential buyers, for whom arms purchases can
become sunk costs with limited security returns.
The Nikkei Asia findings should serve as a warning.
Dependence on a single supplier whose economy is deeply tied to militarization
carries inherent risks. Paying upfront for weapons that arrive late—or not at
all—undermines both security and sovereignty. Japan’s US$7 billion backlog is
not merely a logistical failure; it is a lesson in the real economics of buying
American security.
