Can Israel succeed in stopping new Iran deal?

It seems that Israel might once again try to replica ‘2010 moment’ which on the surface may seem like a path to war but a bluff aimed at seeking attention.

More than 13 years later, the events of 2010 are still something of a mystery in Israel. Then, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, regularly threatened military action against Iran but stopped short of launching a strike.

Today, the ministers who were members of the security cabinet back then and the IDF officers who briefed them regularly are still conflicted about what happened. Were Netanyahu and Barak serious about attacking Iran and simply stopped – as they later claimed - due to the opposition they met within the defense establishment, or were they bluffing all along, using threats against Iran to stir panic in Washington, London and Berlin and get the world to ratchet up sanctions against Tehran?

Based on comments by senior Israeli politicians and military officers in recent weeks, it seems that Israel might once again be in a bit of a “2010 moment”, one which, on the surface, seems like a path to war, but on the other hand might be again a bluff aimed at getting the world’s attention.

There is no denying the escalation in the rhetoric. Last month, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi said that Israel is not indifferent to what is happening in Iran and might need to take action to stop it.

This week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened a war drill and issued a public threat at a meeting of the security cabinet, saying that Israel can handle the threat from Iran on its own.

And then there was Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who said Tuesday that Israelis did not need to worry themselves with the new hypersonic missile that Iran unveiled earlier that day and that if a war were to break out with Tehran’s proxy, Hezbollah, Israel would send it back to the Stone Age.

One would be forgiven for thinking that the beating of war drums means that war is coming. What we have learned over the last couple of decades in Israel is that sometimes war drums mean the exact opposite and are used to deliver messages, oftentimes to allies and not just adversaries.

It seems Israel is using its threats to put pressure on the Biden administration as it negotiates a new interim deal with Iran as a way to stop its enrichment of military-grade uranium. Based on the intensity of the Israeli rhetoric, it seems that the US-Iran talks are proceeding at a faster pace than initially anticipated, and might even be on the verge of an agreement.

As a result, it is interesting to compare the way Netanyahu and his government spoke in 2015 against the original Iran deal with the way they are speaking now. Then, as is well known, Netanyahu accepted an invitation from the republicans and spoke before Congress in direct opposition to the deal, and somewhat to then-president Barack Obama.

While Netanyahu felt the need to do everything possible to stop the bad deal – as can be expected from an Israeli leader - his decision to speak in 2015 in Congress went against the president’s wishes and is still a raw nerve for many democrats.

Would Netanyahu do the same today? The reply is most ‘Unlikely’. The reason is twofold. On one hand, while Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy said during his visit to Israel last month that he would invite Netanyahu to Washington DC if President Joe Biden did not, Netanyahu understands that a fight with the administration will not succeed in stopping a new interim deal and will become highly politicized as the 2024 presidential election race heats up.

The second reason is because deep down, Israel wants a diplomatic resolution to the Iran nuclear challenge. It knows that a military option – while viable – will only delay Iran’s pursuit of a bomb and pave the way for the mullahs to gain the legitimacy they need to plow ahead under the claim that a bomb is needed to protect the republic.

While there are some in the Knesset and the defense establishment who are enamored by the military option and cite the success of the destruction of the Iraqi reactor in 1981 and the Syrian reactor in 2007, they would do well to remember that in both cases the reactors were built by external actors – France in Iraq and North Korea in Syria. That is not the case in Iran where the nuclear technical know-how is domestic and knowledge, as is known, is not something that can easily be destroyed.

Israel has always wanted a diplomatic resolution to the threat but one that took Israel’s concerns into consideration and dealt with the fundamental issues – not only Tehran’s nuclear program, but also its development of long-range ballistic missiles as well as the regime’s support of terrorist proxies throughout the region.

The talks that the Americans are engaged in now with Iran are unlikely to meet any of those criteria. From the little details that have leaked about the pending deal, Iran will be able keep its enriched uranium while committing to suspending all high-level enrichment.

In other words, it gets to keep all the uranium it has already enriched, all of its nuclear infrastructure and technical knowledge. What this means is that in the best-case scenario, Iran will only suspend its high-grade enrichment but will not abandon its desire to one day get the bomb. In exchange for this enrichment freeze it will see significant economic benefits.

Can Israel realistically stop this deal or at the very least sweeten it? That remains to be seen and is currently the Israeli objective. Like in 2015, Jerusalem understands that it is unlikely that it will succeed in stopping a new deal.

Netanyahu knows that he has sway in Washington, especially within Republican circles where Israel is looked to as a stamp of approval when it comes to US moves on Iran. Biden might want an interim deal, but he also does not want to do something that will simply give his republican opponents ammo to use against him on the campaign trail.

Can Israel maneuver through this complicated terrain? Can it improve the framework of the deal or receive some other benefit from the US, like security assurances, new weapons systems or maybe even some form of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia?

That remains to be seen. In the meantime, Israel would be negligent not to escalate its own talk against Iran right now. It might not be as glamorous as a speech before Congress or an invitation to the White House, but everything does need to be done to stop Iran.

 

Why Biden is visiting Saudi Arabia remains a mystery?

Despite Israeli media reports that US President Joe Biden’s planned visit to Israel and the Middle East had been rescheduled to July 14, there has been no confirmation from Washington. 

Biden didn’t mention Israel but said that he hasn’t decided yet if he’ll travel to Saudi Arabia next month. 

Speaking to reporters before Air Force One departed from Los Angeles, Biden also addressed a question about whether there are commitments he is waiting for from the Saudis or about negotiations on peace talks, before announcing his trip.

“No,” said Biden. “The commitments from the Saudis don’t relate to anything having to do with energy. It happens to be a larger meeting taking place in Saudi Arabia. That’s the reason I’m going. And it has to do with national security for them – for Israelis,” he continued. “It has to do with much larger issues than having to do with the energy prices.”

What will he try to achieve in this visit?

The United States is in a years-long process of downsizing its involvement in the Middle East, said Natan Sachs, Director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.

“It still has a large military presence and still expends resources on the region, but it is looking to partner more extensively with countries in the region on security matters. This trip would be part of that effort, with the Biden administration visibly joining in an Arab-Israeli partnership for defense, especially against Iranian and Iranian-backed unmanned platforms,” he said. “It’s a significant shift in the Biden posture and another sign of a dramatically different Middle East.”

Michael Koplow, Chief Policy Officer at the Israel Policy Forum, said Biden’s visit is about US-Saudi ties first and foremost, “and I don’t expect any big American initiatives with respect to Israel or to Israeli-Palestinian issues.”

“He is trying to avoid the mistake that President Obama made in skipping Israel on his first visit to the region, and thus the Israel component seems to me more of a box-checking exercise,” Koplow said.

“The reference to Israeli security is likely about the Saudi-Egyptian agreement on transferring the islands of Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, which requires Israeli approval, and is viewed as another step toward Israeli-Saudi normalization and toward a broader regional security architecture in which Israel is integrated. Assuming that the JCPOA is not resurrected – increasingly the likely scenario – the US wants greater agreement and cooperation on dealing with Iran going forward, and this is a piece of that puzzle.”

Mark Dubowitz, Chief Executive at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, said that Biden should be trying to achieve closer coordination with Israel on a pressure campaign against Iran, expanding efforts toward greater Saudi-Israeli normalization, “and sending a clear message to the Palestinian leadership that they can be part of the expanding process of normalization or it will pass them by.”

“The major obstacle to Saudi-Israeli normalization is in Washington not in Riyadh or Jerusalem,” Dubowitz said. 

“Biden has the opportunity to repair the damage in the US-Saudi relationship and to lay out a plan for greater regional military and intelligence integration against Iran and greater political and commercial integration between Israel and the Arab world. He has the opportunity to be remembered as the president who brought the most important Muslim country into the Abraham Accords.”

According to reports in Israeli media, Biden’s visit is expected to also include a visit to east Jerusalem. The plans follow Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf’s visit to Israel and the West Bank, and as the State Department signaled on Twitter that it upgraded its Jerusalem office to the Palestinians, and changed its name to the “US Office of Palestinian Affairs in Jerusalem.”

“The separation of the Palestinian unit from the embassy is a partial step, well short of reopening the consulate general in Jerusalem, which Biden and Blinken both promised the Palestinians,” said Sachs.

“It’s a measure meant to blunt some of the worst criticism from the Left about going forward with the regional rapprochement without any major push on the Palestinian front.”

According to Koplow, “Biden wants to signal that he is continuing to repair relations with the Palestinians despite US moves falling short of Palestinian expectations.

“The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still relatively low on his list of priorities, and that is unlikely to change in the near future, but Biden wants to demonstrate that he is not ignoring Palestinian concerns and is taking a different tack than president Trump did,” he said. “It’s more about the optics of a new US approach than it is about a big substantive shift or a shift in priorities.”

Dubowitz said that Biden should “avoid walking into the same trap on the Palestinian issue, which normally entails State Department efforts like the recent changes to its Jerusalem office to reward the Palestinian leadership without making reciprocal demands or holding them accountable.”

“Biden should be telling Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, “You can join normalization efforts and lead your people into greater prosperity and security or you can continue to obstruct, incite and deflect,” said Dubowitz. “That will guarantee only more misery and violence, the collapse of the PA and the rise of Hamas on the West Bank.”