In a February 27th communiqué to a leading member of the Raj
Sabha, India’s upper house of parliament, Indian Defense Minister AK Antony
outlined a proposal to establish two new missile test sites for its
increasingly-sophisticated arsenal of conventional and nuclear-capable
missiles.(http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=92660). The
first will be constructed on property near the banks of the River Krishna in
the coastal state of Andhra Pradesh. The other is planned for Rutland Island in
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India’s easternmost territory in the Bay of
Bengal. The new facilities, when completed, would complement the Defence
Research and Development Organization’s current location on Wheeler Island off
the coast of Orissa, which has been the mainstay of the organization’s missile
tests.
Plans to build two additional facilities to accommodate
India’s ambitious missile program appear, at first glance, to be a function of
necessity. After all, a single missile range may prove inadequate as further
tests are required to incorporate India’s newest ballistic and cruise missiles
into its military force posture. However, the timing of the announcement (only
nine days after the long-awaited transfer of Pakistan’s deep-sea port at Gwadar
to China) and the location of the missile test sites (particularly the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands near the Strait of Malacca) suggests the announcement
serves a broader, more strategic purpose for India.
Why Gwadar Makes India Nervous
Although Chinese control of the Gwadar port came as no
surprise to Indian policy makers and regional security analysts, the official
ceremony on February 18 transferring operational rights of the deep-sea port to
the China Overseas Port Holding Company clearly marked a new chapter for
Chinese involvement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral. Pakistani
President Asif Ali Zardari – who attended the signing ceremony along with the
Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad and Pakistani Foreign Minister Hinna Rabbani
Khar – noted that the Chinese operation of the port provides a “new impetus” to
Sino-Pakistani relations. (http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=3&sel=2&pId=1462&pressReleaseYear=2013&pressReleaseMonth=02)
The significance of the move was not lost on Defense
Minister Antony who, in January, claimed the development at Gwadar was “a
matter of concern” for Indian the military. (http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinese-presence-at-gwadar-port-is-a-matter-of-concern-antony/article4386103.ece)
The geopolitical implications of the Gwadar port deal have
been clear for some time. Establishing a secure, overland energy route from the
Persian Gulf to underdeveloped and energy-starved provinces in western China
would alleviate Beijing’s dependence on maritime trade through the vulnerable
Strait of Malacca, a narrow sea-lane which could be blocked by an adversary
during a crisis. Overcoming this “Malacca Dilemma” would mitigate China’s
reliance on the good graces of the U.S. Navy, which has been the guarantor of
open sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean since
the fall of Imperial Japan in 1945. As the Chinese economy’s demand for energy
expands in the coming decades, ensuring the unabated flow of oil from the
Persian Gulf to Chinese consumers will increasingly become a core national
interest. (http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1148093/gwadar-seaport-holds-key-chinas-energy-search)
Safeguarding China’s maritime trade routes and Gulf energy
supplies will likely compel the PLA-N in the long-term to project power into
the Indian Ocean region, long the uncontested domain of the U.S. Navy and, to a
lesser degree, the Indian Navy. Operation of the port at Gwadar, in addition to
a similar arrangement at the Chinese-built deep-water port at Hambantota on the
southern coast of Sri Lanka, may grant the PLA-N future sites for refueling,
resupplying, and repairing a future blue-water fleet – all from India’s
backyard. (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/16/business/global/16port.html?_r=0)
Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Location, Location, Location
An enhanced capability for the PLA-N in the Indian Ocean
aggravates a nightmare scenario for Indian military strategists, in which India
must fight a multi-front war against Pakistan and China on land and at sea.
Given each country’s sizable nuclear deterrent, such an event is extremely
unlikely. Since the stakes are so high, however, India had to respond to the
Gwadar deal in a way that reestablished strategic parity with China, while at
the same time falling short of overreacting. In the existing geopolitical
environment, the planned missile test sites at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
should come as no surprise.
The Andaman and Nicobar Islands occupy some of the most
valuable strategic real estate in the world. The archipelago sits astride the
eastern mouth of the Strait of Malacca, and only 500km separate Port Blair –
the territorial capital of the island chain – from the energy-rich Burmese
coast. Geography demands that any sea traffic between the Western Pacific and
the Indian Ocean must pass these islands, conferring a tremendous source of
leverage and power projection capability to whoever controls them. Their
strategic significance was underscored in 2001, when the Ministry of Defense
established the Andaman and Nicobar Command at Port Blair, India’s first
integrated theater command. (http://ids.nic.in/WebAbhiIDS/brief.html)
Whether it was a strategic signal or a coincidence that
India’s announcement to build a missile test site near the Strait of Malacca
came so soon after China took control of the Gwadar port facility, it is
nevertheless a noteworthy, if subtle, reminder that the strategic relationship
between India and China is becoming increasingly complex. It is likely
inevitable that the interests of these two countries – with massive populations
and increasingly dynamic economies – will become increasingly incongruous with
time. While nothing suggests that the trajectory of the bilateral relationship
between Beijing and New Delhi is devolving into an adversarial one any time
soon, interests in the Indian Ocean littoral between the two countries are
already divergent in key areas.
It remains to be seen whether bilateral relations between
China and India remain cooperative or turn into something more combative. While
much focus has been paid to long-standing border disputes in Askai Chin and
Aruchnal Pradesh as potential flash points it could turn out that places like
Gwadar, Hambontato, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are even greater
sources of tension and distrust in the Sino-Indian relationship. History
suggests that naval disputes tend to be more benign than conflicts on land,
which bodes well for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, if
the last few weeks are any indication, the strategic interplay between these
two rising powers is likely to continue at sea for some time.
Courtesy: Eurasia Review
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