Is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

With each passing day and the precision with which Israel attacked Qatar, Iran, Syria, Iraq and other countries, a question is getting louder, is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

It is a very important and sensitive question. Based on the strategic relationships between United States and Israel the probability just can’t be ruled out.

Here are the reasons that support the perception:

Military Support:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of the US foreign military aid, running into billions of dollars annually. Much of Israel’s military technology, intelligence systems, and weapons are supplied by the US.

Operational Coordination:

While not every Israeli attack is directly supervised by the US, Washington is usually informed in advance of major military operations—especially those with regional consequences like strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, or beyond.

Political Cover:

The US provides Israel with diplomatic protection, especially at the UN Security Council, often vetoing resolutions that condemn Israeli actions. This gives Israel confidence that it can continue operations without facing strong international consequences.

Shared Intelligence:

The CIA, Pentagon, and Israeli intelligence frequently share intelligence. In many cases, Israeli attacks—particularly on Iran linked targets—are planned with at least some level of US awareness, if not outright coordination.

Recent Pattern:

Analysts often describe Israeli military actions as being carried out with a “green light” from Washington, even if the US doesn’t control the tactical execution.

The US may not be giving step-by-step battlefield orders, Israel’s ongoing military actions—especially in Gaza—are effectively carried out under US strategic supervision and protection, both militarily and diplomatically.

Let us explore the incidents where US involvement was direct (like supplying bombs during Gaza wars, or joint planning against Iran), to show how this collaboration works.

Let us identify the situations where the US involvement was direct or so close that it’s hard to separate support from supervision:

1. Gaza Wars (2008–09, 2014, 2021, 2023–25)

Weapons Supply:

During heavy Israeli bombardments of Gaza, the US quickly replenished Israel’s stock of precision-guided bombs, artillery shells, and Iron Dome interceptors. For example, in 2014 and again in 2021, Washington quietly authorized emergency transfers of munitions while battles were still ongoing.

Political Cover:

At the UN, the US vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions, allowing Israel to continue operations.

Supervision Aspect:

Without US weapons and diplomatic shields, Israel could not have sustained these long campaigns.

2. Lebanon and Hezbollah (2006 and beyond)

2006 War:

Israel’s month-long war with Hezbollah relied on US-supplied bunker-buster bombs and real-time intelligence from American surveillance assets.

Joint Planning:

US and Israeli militaries regularly war-game scenarios of a “multi-front” war with Hezbollah, meaning Israel’s current strategy is partly drawn up with Pentagon input.

3. Operations against Iran

Nuclear Program Attacks:

The famous Stuxnet cyberattack (2009–10) on Iran’s Natanz facility was a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Targeted Killings:

Israel’s assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were carried out with US intelligence support, according to multiple reports.

Air Strikes in Syria:

Israeli strikes on Iranian convoys and depots in Syria often used US intelligence and were coordinated to avoid clashing with US troops stationed nearby.

Present Gaza War

Direct Weapons Pipeline:

US cargo planes flew precision bombs, tank shells, and artillery rounds directly to Israel while civilian casualties mounted in Gaza.

White House Green Light:

Leaks from Pentagon officials revealed Israel was asked to pause or minimize strikes, but not ordered to stop.

Embedded Coordination:

US military officers reportedly worked inside Israeli command centers to coordinate targeting and logistics — an unusually deep level of involvement.

Ongoing Strategic Framework

US and Israel have joint operations rooms for real-time intelligence sharing.

Israel’s most advanced fighter jets (F-35s) are co-produced with US technology, and software updates pass through Pentagon systems — meaning the US can monitor their use.

Israel does not fight wars in isolation; every major military campaign has US fingerprints, whether in weapons, intelligence, or diplomatic protection.

Bottom line:

While Israel pulls the trigger, the US is the one who supplies the gun, reloads it, and shields Israel from the world’s outrage. That is why many analysts argue Israeli attacks are effectively conducted under US supervision.

Significance of US base in Qatar

There are contrary responses to the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar. These could be broadly clubbed in two categories: 1) Israel will have to pay a huge price and 2) Arabs have no spine to teach Israel a lesson. We invite the readers to first understand the significance of the US military base in Qatar. We should also keep in mind what some cynics say “Qatar is in total control of United States and the Arabs just can’t dare to think about causing even the smallest damage to the base”.

According to the details available about the US military base in Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base, near Doha) it holds very high strategic and geopolitical significance for both Washington and its regional allies.  Here’s why it matters:

1. Largest US Military Presence in the Middle East

Al Udeid hosts around 10,000–13,000 US and coalition troops. It is home to the US Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) forward headquarters. The base has one of the longest runways in the Gulf, capable of handling heavy bombers, cargo planes, and refueling aircraft.

2. Command and Control Hub

It houses the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which directs US and allied air missions across the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. It provides real-time surveillance, intelligence, and command capabilities for regional operations.

3. Geostrategic Location

Qatar sits between Iran and Saudi Arabia, giving the US a vantage point to monitor both. Its Gulf location allows rapid deployment to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. It acts as a deterrent against Iran’s influence and provides a security guarantee to Gulf states.

4. Operations and Wars

It has played a central role in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. It remains critical for ongoing counterterrorism, anti-ISIS missions, and monitoring the Strait of Hormuz.

5. Political Significance

The base signals a deep US-Qatar partnership, despite Qatar’s sometimes independent stance in Gulf politics (relations with Iran, hosting Hamas leaders, supporting Muslim Brotherhood).

It provides Qatar with security insurance against regional rivals (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain), especially after the 2017 Gulf blockade.

On top of all it helps the US project power without being fully dependent on bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Turkey.

6. Energy Security

Qatar is the world’s leading LNG exporter. US presence protects not only Qatar’s infrastructure but also the global energy supply routes in the Gulf.

In short, the US base in Qatar is the backbone of American military power projection in the Middle East. It protects Gulf allies, counters Iran, secures energy flows, and anchors US influence in a volatile region.

The United States faces certain risks and vulnerabilities by relying so heavily on this base. Let us look at the risks and vulnerabilities:

1. Overdependence on a Single Hub

Al Udeid is the largest US forward operating base in the Middle East, so any disruption (attack, political fallout, or natural disaster) could cripple US operations in the region. To be precise, it acts as a “single point of failure” for command and control.

2. Exposure to Iran

Iran sees Al Udeid as a primary military threat on its doorstep. The base is well within range of Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. In a war scenario, it would likely be one of the first targets.

3. Qatar’s Independent Foreign Policy

Unlike Saudi Arabia or UAE, Qatar often balances relations with both the U.S. and rivals like Iran, Turkey, and Islamist movements. Hosting Hamas leaders and maintaining ties with Tehran means Qatar could, in theory, restrict US operations if its own diplomacy is at risk. The 2017 Gulf blockade showed how fragile intra-GCC politics are, leaving Washington in an awkward position between allies.

4. Local Political Sensitivities

Presence of US troops in Muslim-majority countries can be a political flashpoint, supporting the narratives of foreign occupation. While Qatar welcomes the base for protection, its presence could become domestically unpopular in times of crisis.

5. Energy Infrastructure as Collateral

Qatar’s LNG facilities and shipping routes are near the base. Any attack on US forces risks spilling into global energy markets, creating vulnerabilities for both Qatar and the rest of world.

6. Shifting US Strategy

The US is trying to pivot to Asia and reduce military exposure in the Middle East. Heavy reliance on Al Udeid ties Washington to regional conflicts it may want to step back from. Over time, this dependency could look like a strategic liability rather than an asset.

Other US bases in the Middle East

While Al Udeid is a strategic jewel, it’s also a big, exposed target that ties US interests tightly to Gulf politics and risks. Let us compare it with other US military footholds in the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti) — to show how it fits into the bigger US military puzzle?

1. Qatar – Al Udeid Air Base

Regional command-and-control hub that houses 10,000 to 13,000 troops. It houses Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Long runways for heavy bombers, refueling aircraft, and transports. Central location for quick reach to Gulf, Levant, Afghanistan. Its biggest Weaknesses are: 1) within easy range of Iranian missiles and 2) Qatar’s independent diplomacy (ties with Iran, Turkey and Hamas) can complicate US use in a crisis.

2. Bahrain – Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, Manama

It is home of the US Fifth Fleet with 7,000 troops. Its strengths include: 1) provides control to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea., it plays vital role in keeping the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping lanes open.

Its weaknesses include: Bahrain is politically unstable; Shi’a majority often protests US presence, and 2) it is vulnerable to Iran-backed militias and unrest.

3. Kuwait – Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base

It is the army logistics hub that houses more than 13,000 troops and can be termed the largest US ground presence in Gulf).

Its strengths are: 1) key supply and logistics backbone for all Gulf operations and 2) it hosts pre-positioned equipment for rapid deployment. Its weaknesses are: 1) less glamorous than Qatar/ Bahrain but essential — if disrupted, US supply lines suffer.

4. Saudi Arabia – Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB)

It is basically a backup air operations center where around 2,500 troops are kept.

Its strengths: 1) gives US redundancy in case Qatar base is hit or denied and 2) hosts missile defense systems, fighter jets, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).

Its major weaknesses include: 1) US presence has been historically controversial in Saudi Arabia (linked to Bin Laden’s anti-US narrative) and Saudis prefer limited, rotational deployments, not permanent bases.

5. Djibouti – Camp Lemonnier (Horn of Africa)

It is primarily Africa and Red Sea operations hub with 4,000 troops.

Its strengths are: 1) key to anti-terror missions in Somalia and Yemen, and 2) strategic position on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, choke point for global shipping.

It biggest weakness is proximity to China’s naval base (first overseas Chinese base).

6. Iraq & Syria – Smaller Outposts

This is primarily to counter-ISIS missions, with 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 Syria. It is considered highly vulnerable to political backlash and militia attacks; not long-term sustainable.

In short, Qatar’s Al Udeid is the nerve center, but the US builds redundancy through Bahrain (navy), Kuwait (logistics), and Saudi (backup). If Al Udeid went offline, US operations could still continue — but far less smoothly.

Riviera of Middle East to Trump economic zone

In a report on August 21, Axios revealed part of the US President Donald Trump’s ambition in South Lebanon according to which the region will be transformed into an investment zone. The plan, called “Trump economic zone”, would be part of a greater project extending from Gaza and the West Bank, through Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf.

The “Trump economic zone” was revealed after Axios, quoting two informed sources, said in its report headlined “US asks Israel to scale down Lebanon strikes after decision to disarm Hezbollah”.

According to Axios, the Lebanese cabinet's unprecedented decision to prepare to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 came at the urging of the US, but many in the region doubt the government will be able to carry it out.

Trump’s vision for South Lebanon is a practical application of his “economic realism” with which he approaches West Asian issues.

Obviously, the controversial US President believes that the conflict with the Israeli occupation entity can be simplified and resolved through investments.

However, the “Trump economic zone” is nothing but dreams and illusions.

Trump believes that the Lebanese strip adjacent to the border with the occupied Palestine will automatically put an end to the resistance. He is deluded that peace and prosperity will prevail once the project is implemented.

This delusion is similar to his dream of turning Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East,” which would drown the Gazans in a supposed prosperity, making them forget their resistance to the Israeli occupation!

Trump and those around him delude themselves that the popular base of the Resistance is unaware of the seriousness of what is being plotted against them.

Economic temptation may be an effective tool to confront the resistance project, but previous experiences and the occupation regime’s false peace projects no longer fool anyone.

Despite their small number and modest capabilities, resistance, for the people of Lebanon and Palestine, is not merely a tactical option but rather the foundation of their sacred ideological identity, which cannot be abandoned, no matter the sacrifices and costs.

It is clear that the American empire has never ceased to treat other peoples as cheap tools for its factories. Our people believe that any Western economic initiative is nothing more than an attempt to buy people’s loyalty and turn them into slaves and mercenaries.

Last December, Israel Hayom reported that dozens of members of Ori Tzafon, also known as the Movement for Settlement in South Lebanon, had invaded the skirts of Maroun al-Ras to lay the foundation stone for a settlement called Mei Marom.

“Maroun al-Ras was an ancient Hebrew land where priests lived. We will return to all the places where Jews lived in Lebanon,” they claimed.

The Lebanese government, of course, remained silent, just as it did when Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir toured occupied Lebanese territory two weeks ago, threatening that his occupying entity “will not go back and will not allow threats to grow again.”

The government also remained silent as an Israeli prisoner in Lebanon was released unconditionally.

Meanwhile, US deputy envoy Morgan Ortagus is expected to return to Beirut early next week along with a congressional delegation that comprises hardline Zionist Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.

The visit will take place as Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani made a notable statement. He affirmed Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah, which he described as “Lebanon’s strategic capital.”

 

Palestinians have no place to live, except open air prisons

US President Donald Trump, hosting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House on Monday, talked about a controversial plan to relocate Palestinians out of Gaza. Netanyahu said the United States and Israel were working with other countries who would give Palestinians a "better future," suggesting that the residents of Gaza could move to neighboring nations. This raises a basic question, will any country/ other countries accept Palestinians?

It is a harsh reality that Palestinians have faced expulsions, restrictions, and marginalization in several countries over the decades, often due to political instability, regional conflicts, or domestic pressures in host countries. Here's a summary of key incidents and contexts:

Jordan (1970–71) Black September

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, large numbers of Palestinian fighters (PLO) operated from Jordan. Tensions rose between the PLO and Jordanian government. In 1970–71, during Black September, the Jordanian army crushed the PLO, killing thousands and forcing its leadership and fighters to flee to Lebanon. While most ordinary Palestinian civilians remained, some were expelled or displaced during the crackdown.

Lebanon (1982 and 1990s)

Lebanon became a new base for the PLO after Jordan. In 1982, during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the PLO was forced out (mostly to Tunisia). After the Lebanese civil war ended in the 1990s, some Palestinian militias were disarmed and displaced. Lebanon still denies citizenship and basic rights to most Palestinian refugees, and they are barred from many professions.

Kuwait (1991 Gulf War)

Before 1990, over 400,000 Palestinians lived in Kuwait, many working in key sectors. During the Gulf War, PLO supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. After Kuwait was liberated in 1991, the government expelled over 200,000 Palestinians in retaliation. This was one of the largest mass expulsions in recent history.

Iraq (Post-2003 War)

Under Saddam Hussein, Palestinians were treated well and given housing and rights. After the US invasion in 2003, and the rise of sectarian violence, Palestinians were targeted by militias who viewed them as Ba'athist loyalists. Thousands fled Iraq, and some were stranded in desert camps on the border with Syria and Jordan.

Syria (2011 onwards)

Syria hosted over 500,000 Palestinians before its civil war. Many lived in Yarmouk camp (near Damascus). After 2011, Yarmouk became a war zone. Many residents were displaced, killed, or fled. Tens of thousands of Palestinians fled Syria, becoming refugees again in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey.

Egypt

While Egypt has not expelled Palestinians en masse, it has historically been strict about residency and movement, especially after the peace treaty with Israel. After Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Egypt severely restricted the Rafah border crossing, effectively trapping Gazans and limiting their freedom.

Why This Happens

Palestinian communities often get caught in political conflicts in host countries. The presence of armed Palestinian groups (like the PLO or Hamas) has sometimes led to tensions with host governments. Palestinians are also stateless, making them especially vulnerable to political shifts and expulsions.

Moral of the story

Palestinians have been expelled, marginalized, or displaced multiple times even beyond their original 1948 exile. Their statelessness, the unresolved nature of their refugee status, and involvement in regional politics have made them especially vulnerable over decades.

It’s a story not just of one time displacement—but of repeated uprooting, often in harsh and unstable environments.

Saudi Arabia among world top donors

The Saudi Aid Platform has revealed that the total value of financial assistance provided by Saudi Arabia to around the world is amounted to approximately SR528.4 billion (US$140.9 billion), cementing the Kingdom's position as one of the largest donors globally.

The Saudi official platform revealed that Egypt topped the list of countries that benefited most from Saudi aid, with a total of US$32.49 billion, followed by Yemen with US$27.69 billion, and then Pakistan with US$13.19 billion. The list of countries that benefited the most also included Syria (US$7.53 billion) Iraq (US$7.33 billion) and Palestine (US$5.37 billion).

These figures reflect the Kingdom's commitment to its humanitarian and development role by supporting peoples and countries in confronting humanitarian crises and natural disasters, and achieving sustainable development.

These efforts are part of the realization of Saudi Vision 2030 goals that focus on strengthening international partnerships and establishing the Kingdom as a pillar of regional and international peace and stability, under the leadership of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman and Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman.

It is noteworthy that the Saudi Aid Platform is the precise electronic reference for the Kingdom's foreign contributions. The platform is divided into three categories: humanitarian, development and philanthropic projects, contributions to international organizations and bodies, and visitors’ services (refugees living inside the Kingdom).

The Saudi Aid Platform, inaugurated by King Salman in 2018, highlights the size and type of assistance provided by Saudi Arabia. The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief) re-launched this platform.

Due to the multiplicity of Saudi donor entities, this platform has become an imperative and effective tool for collecting, coordinating and documenting statistics on international assistance provided by the Kingdom to countries and people in need around the world.

OPEC Plus likely to accelerate oil output hike

OPEC Plus is likely to announce an increase in oil output for August at its meeting on Saturday, July 05, 2025. It will be larger than the 411,000 barrels per day (bpd) hikes announced in May, June and July, reports Reuters.

Oil futures slipped slightly due to US Independence Day holiday on Friday, as the market looked ahead to this weekend's OPEC Plus meeting and the likelihood that member countries will decide to raise output. Brent crude futures settled down at US$68.30 a barrel while US West Texas Intermediate declined US$66.50 at 1700 GMT.

Eight members of the group - Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Algeria - are scheduled to meet online on Saturday to decide their oil output policy for August.

OPEC Plus made a radical change in policy this year when the eight members started to unwind their most recent output cut of 2.2 million bpd starting in April. They then accelerated the hikes in May, June and July to 411,000 bpd for each month, despite the extra supply weighing on crude prices.

Earlier on Friday, other sources told Reuters the group was expected to agree to an increase of 411,000 bpd for August, which remains a possible outcome of Saturday's meeting.

The total number of active drilling rigs in the US has been on the decline, reaching its lowest level since late 2021 in June 2025, driven by lower oil prices, a focus on shareholder returns over production increases, and strategic shifts within the energy sector. As of early July 2025, the total US rig count was reported at approximately 539, down from 547 the previous week and 581 a year ago, with oil rigs seeing the most significant decrease.

The acceleration of the output hikes came after some OPEC Plus members, such as Kazakhstan, produced way over their targets, angering other members that were sticking more closely to agreed cuts.

Kazakh output returned to growth last month and matched an all-time high, as the Chevron-led Tengiz field ramped up.

OPEC Plus, comprising of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies led by Russia, is looking to expand its market share against the backdrop of growing supplies from other producers like the United States.

The group pumps about half of the world's oil. As of their decision for July output, the OPEC Plus eight have made or announced production increases of 1.37 million bpd. This is 62% of the production cut of 2.2 million bpd that they are unwinding.

 

 

 

 

 

 

US presidents have history of attacking countries without Congress approval

According to The Hill, Democrats bashing President Trump for striking Iran without congressional consent are bumping into an inconvenient history, Democratic presidents have done the same thing for decades.

From Bill Clinton, to Barack Obama, to Joe Biden, every Democratic president of the modern era has employed US military forces to attack targets overseas, including strikes in Bosnia, Syria, Libya and Yemen. While they sought approval from Capitol Hill in some of those cases, Congress never provided it.

That history has muddled the Democrats’ current argument that Trump, in striking three Iranian nuclear facilities last weekend, violated the Constitution by acting on his own, without the formal approval of Congress.

The dynamic has not been overlooked by Republican leaders, who have hailed the strikes on Iran as a national security necessity and defended Trump’s powers to launch them unilaterally.

Those voices are pointing specifically to the actions of Clinton, Obama and Biden to bolster their arguments.

“Since World War II we have had more than 125 military operations from Korea and Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. They have occurred without a Declaration of War by Congress,” House Speaker Mike Johnson told reporters after the strikes. “Presidents of both parties have exercised that authority frequently.”

Johnson ticked off a few examples under the most recent Democratic administrations. Biden, he noted, ordered strikes against Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Obama sustained a months-long bombing campaign in Libya. And Clinton had bombed parts of the former Yugoslavia during the Bosnian war of the mid-1990s. 

“Every one of those actions were taken unilaterally and without prior authorization from Congress,” Johnson said. 

That background is forcing Democrats to reckon with that past just as many of them are now demanding that Trump cease all military operations in Iran without explicit congressional approval. Some of them are quick to acknowledge the incongruity, voicing something like regret that Congress didn’t stand more firm in the face of those unilateral Democratic missions.

“Just because it was wrong then doesn’t mean it’s not wrong now,” said Rep. Ted Lieu, a former Air Force attorney who’s now the vice chairman of the House Democratic Caucus. “The Constitution is the Constitution. And it says only Congress has the power to declare war. And it’s been a bipartisan problem, with Congress ceding way too much power to the executive branch.”

Rep. Pete Aguilar, the chairman of the Democratic Caucus, seemed to agree. He lamented that the politics of Washington have sometimes curtailed Congress’s appetite for asserting its war powers as a check on the president, especially when Congress and the White House are controlled by opposing parties. 

“That part is unfortunate. Maybe we’ve missed a few opportunities,” Aguilar said. 

“But that doesn’t mean that we turn a blind eye right now,” he quickly added. “It doesn’t mean that we just let Donald Trump walk all over us. It means that we stand up for our authority and speak up on behalf of our constituents at every opportunity.”

The Constitution makes clear that Congress and the White House both play crucial roles in conducting military operations. Article I lends Congress the power to declare war, and Article II stipulates that the president is “Commander and Chief” of the Armed Forces, responsible for executing wars that Congress sanctions. 

Yet that conceptual balance has tilted heavily toward the executive branch over most of the last century. The last time Congress formally declared war was in 1941, after Pearl Harbor. And since then, the president has assumed virtually all power, not only to steer the Armed Forces, but also to launch them into battle.

In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress sought to reassert its authority by passing the War Powers Act. (President Nixon vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode him).

The law requires presidents to “consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities,” but it does not demand the formal authorization of the legislative branch.

As tensions in the Middle East exploded earlier in the month, lawmakers in both parties sought to limit US involvement with war powers resolutions requiring Trump to get explicit congressional consent before using military force in Iran.

One was sponsored by three leading Democrats: Reps. Gregory Meeks, Jim Himes and Adam Smith. Another was bipartisan, championed by Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Ro Khanna (D-Calif.).

Supporters of the resolutions are quick to acknowledge that the president has the power to act unilaterally in extraordinary circumstances, like if the nation is attacked. But there’s no evidence, they say, to indicate that Iran posed an immediate threat to Americans ahead of Trump’s strikes. 

“Any president has self-defense authority under Article II of the Constitution. But to meet that threshold, you have to show that there was an imminent risk of attack against Americans or US facilities. That’s the standard,” said Rep.

Jason Crow (D-Colo.), a former Army Ranger who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. “As a member of the Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, I have not seen any evidence leading up to the attack that there was an imminent risk to Americans or to US facilities to meet that threshold.”

Former Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) delivered a similar assessment. “If our country is attacked, all and any powers go to the president to act,” she said. “That didn’t exist here, so the president should have come to Congress.”

Complicating their argument are the actions of Democratic presidents who also activated the Armed Services without congressional consent.

In 1998, for instance, in response to the terrorist bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton ordered the launch of cruise missiles targeting al Qaeda strongholds in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also joined NATO forces in bombing Serbian targets in the former Yugoslavia. 

Obama infuriated liberals in Congress in launching strikes against numerous countries during his eight-year reign, including an extensive campaign in Libya in 2011, which helped in the toppling of President Muammar Gaddafi, as well as subsequent incursions in Syria, Yemen and Somalia. 

Obama had asked Congress for specific authorization in some cases, but lawmakers on Capitol Hill couldn’t agree on a resolution to provide it. Instead, those operations leaned heavily on a 2001 resolution — known as an authorization of military force, or AUMF — passed by Congress to sanction the Afghanistan War after the attacks of 9/11. 

In the same vein, Biden used US forces to target Syria, Yemen and Iraq. 

Lieu, for one, emphasized that he was opposed to Obama’s use of force without Congress giving the OK. 

“I publicly stated at the time that Obama needed congressional authorization to strike Syria. I believe Trump needs congressional authorization to strike Iran,” he said.

“My view of the Constitution does not change based on what party the president happens to belong to.” 

Other Democrats sought to keep the debate focused more squarely on current events.

“We can write books and fill your column inches with regrets under this dome. We’ll save that for other days,” Aguilar said. “But what is in front of us today, are we going to stand up for our constitutional authority?”

A week after the strikes, the debate over war powers may already be academic. 

On Tuesday, Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel that, if it holds, may make the constitutional disagreement moot. Massie has said he won’t force a vote on his war powers measure if the ceasefire continues.

Johnson has refused to consider such a resolution in any event, calling the War Powers Act unconstitutional. And Trump officials are expected to meet with Iranian officials later this week, when the US will seek a commitment from Tehran to abandon any plans to produce nuclear weapons.

Still, there are plenty of questions swirling about the ultimate success of the strikes in dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities. And Trump, asked whether he would attack again if necessary, didn’t hesitate. 

“Without question,” he said. “Absolutely.”

 

 

"We cannot let history repeat itself", Sanders

Senator Bernie Sanders on Sunday drew similarities between the US air strikes on Iran this weekend and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. He said, “We cannot let history repeat itself” reports CNN.

Sanders, an independent who caucuses with Democrats, told the Texas crowd, “Brothers and sisters, we cannot let history repeat itself. The United States faces enormous problems here at home. We should be spending our money and our manpower rebuilding America, not going into a war against Iran.”

The progressive Vermont senator, speaking at a town hall in Fort Worth as part of his “Fighting Oligarchy” tour, highlighted how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump used similar language around the strikes on Iran to what Netanyahu and then-President George Bush said surrounding the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Sanders quoted a Netanyahu congressional testimony from 2002, in which the Israeli leader said, “There is no question that Saddam Hussein is seeking nuclear weapons.”

Sanders then emphasized how “George Bush said, ‘Saddam’s regime is seeking a nuclear bomb,’ and he argued for a preemptive attack,” referencing an analogy by the then-president that the United States could not afford to wait for “the smoking gun which could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”

“No weapons of mass destruction were ever found,” Sanders continued. “That war was based on a lie. A lie that cost US 4,500 young Americans, 32,000 wounded and trillions of dollars.”

Bush in 2003 announced the invasion of Iraq under the pretext of disarming it from weapons of mass destruction, a claim that was later debunked.

Netanyahu and Trump have both cited the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program, with the US president saying Saturday from the White House, “Our objective was the destruction of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity and a stop to the nuclear threat posed by the world’s No. 1 state sponsor of terror.”

Why should Saudi Arabia buy US arms?

US President Donald Trump is scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia within this month. Reportedly his biggest task will be to sell arms worth US$100 billion to the Kingdom. I suggest that Saudis should try to find reply to a basic question, does the Kingdom need arms?

The usual US manta is that Saudi Arabia should buys arm due to several strategic, security, and geopolitical reasons. The US says, it is not just about weapons—it’s about defense, deterrence, influence, and survival in a volatile region. Let us examine some of these points:

National Defense

Over the years United States have been brainwashing Saudis that the kingdom faces threats from its neighbors and across the gulf and the adversaries are Iran, Iraq and Yemen. The manta also include security of oil infrastructure, its cities and people and above all security of two holy cities.

Deterrence

Over the years, the United States has been say that a well-armed Saudi military acts as a deterrent against aggression from regional rivals, especially Iran. Over the years Saudis were told “Iran is a bigger threat as compared to Israel”. Historically, there is no evidence that Iran attacked Saudi Arabia.

Strategic Alliances

Saudis have been constantly told that buying arms—especially from the United States and its allies, Britain and France deepens strategic partnerships. Arms deals often come with training, maintenance, intelligence sharing, and political backing. These purchases help cement defense ties, especially with the US, which says Saudi Arabia is a key Gulf ally.

Proxy Conflicts and Regional Influence

It is said that Saudi Arabia is involved in regional conflicts that include Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan. A strong military gives Saudi Arabia leverage to project power and influence outcomes.

Internal Stability

Saudis are told that a strong military plays a key role in ensuring domestic security, protecting against Terrorism and Uprisings or internal unrest. The rulers are also told that well-equipped forces help ensure regime stability and protect key infrastructure.

Modernization and Prestige

The latest manta is that Saudi Vision 2030 aims at diversifying the economy and localizing arms production. Buying advanced systems helps transfer technology, train personnel, and develop domestic defense industries. And on top of all Military Might boosts national prestige and international status.

This narrative can be summed up in a few words, “Saudi Arabia should buy arms not just to fight wars, but to prevent them, influence allies and enemies, and secure its long-term stability in one of the world’s most dangerous regions”.

It is necessary to mention that over the years United States has been brainwashing Saudis saying “Iran is a bigger threat to Saudi Arabia as compared to Israel” and also fanning animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

United States: The True Godfather of Terrorism

Once again, Washington plays its old game: accusing others of terrorism while fueling it to serve its interests. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent statements in Al-Quds with Benjamin Netanyahu are part of a longstanding American policy aimed at hiding its role in destabilizing West Asia through support for terrorist groups.

This isn’t just an accusation from US rivals—it’s a reality acknowledged by American officials. In 2016, Donald Trump declared, “Obama is the founder of ISIS, and Clinton is his co-founder,” a statement backed by evidence.

During the Syrian crisis, the CIA funneled financial and logistical aid to extremist groups under the pretext of supporting “moderate opposition.” Reports from The Washington Post repeatedly exposed this strategy. John Kerry, in a leaked recording, admitted the US allowed ISIS to grow in Syria, hoping to pressure Damascus into concessions.

In 2019, Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard revealed the US was directly arming al-Qaeda in Syria. Former Senator Richard Black recently reaffirmed this, exposing continued US backing of groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS. United Nations reports over the last decade confirm US support for Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch) via Turkey and Qatar to overthrow Assad.

Rubio talks about Syrian “instability” while ignoring US backing for Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). Once on America’s terrorist list, al-Julani now controls Syria’s northwest with American support, rebranded as a "moderate opposition leader."

US media, like PBS, have even given him a platform, whitewashing his extremist history. A RAND Corporation report exposed that Washington considers him a “potential partner” — a shocking display of double standards. Al-Julani, now known as Ahmad al-Sharaa, orchestrated massacres of over 22,000 Alawites along Syria’s coast. Instead of facing justice, he receives political and media backing from the US, ensuring Syria remains unstable and under Western influence.

Rubio’s remarks can’t be separated from unwavering US support for Israel, which engages in daily state terrorism. Since the latest Gaza aggression began, Israeli forces have killed tens of thousands of civilians, including children, while destroying hospitals and schools — all with Washington’s cover.

The US shields Israel in the UN, using its veto to block resolutions condemning war crimes, making it complicit. Washington labels groups resisting Zionist occupation as “terrorists” while backing extremist factions in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, revealing its hypocrisy.

The US narrative — branding Iran a “terror sponsor” for supporting Palestinian and Lebanese resistance — is bankrupt. Is defending one’s homeland terrorism? Washington’s twisted equation labels those who fight occupation as “terrorists” and those enabling occupation as “defenders of democracy.”

This propaganda no longer fools the world. The Zionist entity’s crimes are broadcast live, and America’s ties to the terrorists it claims to fight are increasingly exposed.

If Rubio seeks the “greatest source of instability,” he needn’t look far — Washington itself fuels terrorism while pretending to oppose it. History won’t forget who created terrorism, nor will people forget who stood for justice and who conspired against them.

What gives the US authority to impose sanctions on other countries?

It is believed that the United States has the legal authority to impose sanctions based on a combination of constitutional powers, legislative acts, executive orders, and national security considerations. Sanctions can be imposed for a range of reasons, from counterterrorism efforts to enforcing international law or responding to violations of human rights or international norms. However, the time has come to reject these power, which cause difficulties for the nations the US does not like.

Sanctions are often imposed for reasons related to US national security. This could include targeting foreign governments or groups that support terrorism, are involved in weapons proliferation, or engage in activities that harm US foreign policy objectives.

While US sanctions are often unilateral, they can also be part of multilateral efforts. The US may align its sanctions with those of international organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, especially when it comes to issues like nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and human rights violations. In this context, sanctions are seen as part of broader international diplomatic efforts.

The President has the authority to issue executive orders to implement sanctions without needing Congressional approval. These orders often cite national security concerns, international obligations, or the need to enforce specific laws (like the IEEPA) to restrict economic relations with certain countries or individuals.

 

Here's a breakdown of the key legal and institutional bases for US sanctions:

1. US Constitution

• Executive Powers (Article II): The President of the United States, as the head of the executive branch, has the authority to conduct foreign policy and engage in international relations. This includes the power to implement sanctions as a tool of diplomacy and national security.
• Congressional Powers (Article I): Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and declare war. This allows it to pass laws that authorize sanctions, and the executive branch often implements those laws.

2. Specific Legislation

Several US laws grant the authority to impose sanctions, including:

• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (1977): This law grants the President broad powers to regulate international trade and economic transactions in response to national emergencies. Under this act, the President can block financial transactions, freeze assets, and prohibit trade with foreign governments or entities that pose a threat to U.S. interests.
• Trading with the Enemy Act (1917): Initially passed during World War I, this law allows the President to regulate or prohibit trade with foreign nations deemed enemies during wartime or national emergencies.
• The USA PATRIOT Act (2001): This law expanded the President's powers to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorist activities, enabling sanctions targeting individuals and entities linked to terrorism.
• Magnitsky Act (2012): This law allows the U.S. government to impose sanctions on individuals involved in human rights violations and corruption, even if they are not from countries officially designated as threats to U.S. security.
• Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (2017): This law specifically targets countries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, providing a legal framework for imposing sanctions against foreign governments and individuals involved in activities that threaten U.S. security or foreign policy.

 

 

US mulls plan to disrupt Iranian oil movement

President Donald Trump's administration is considering a plan to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers at sea under an international accord aimed at countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction, sources familiar with the matter told Reuters.

Trump has vowed to restore a "maximum pressure" campaign to isolate Iran from the global economy and drive its oil exports to zero, in order to stop the country from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Trump hit Iran with two waves of fresh sanctions in the first weeks of his second-term, targeting companies and the so-called shadow fleet of ageing oil tankers that sail without Western insurance and transport crude from sanctioned countries.

Those moves have largely been in line with the limited measures implemented during former President Joe Biden's administration, during which Iran succeeded in ramping up oil exports through complex smuggling networks.

Trump officials are now looking at ways for allied countries to stop and inspect ships sailing through critical chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait in Asia and other sea lanes.

Previous attempts to seize Iranian oil cargoes have triggered retaliation by Iran.

The US tried to interdict at least two cargoes of Iranian oil in 2023, under Biden. This prompted Iran to seize foreign ships - including one chartered by Chevron Corp, which sent crude prices higher.

The current low oil price environment gives Trump more options to block Iranian oil flows, from sanctions on tanker companies to seizing ships, according to Ben Cahill, an energy analyst at the Center for Energy and Environmental Systems at the University of Texas.

"I think if prices stay below US$75 a barrel, the White House has more latitude to look at sanctions that would affect, you know, supply from Iran and other countries. It would be much harder to do this in a US$92 per barrel environment," Cahill said.

Aggressive US action could cut Iran exports by some 750,000 barrels per day in the short term, he said, but the longer the sanctions are in place, the less effective they are as Iran and buyers figure out ways around them.

A speedy resumption of oil exports from Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region would help offset any fall in Iranian exports.

Reuters previously reported that the White House is piling pressure on Iraq to allow Kurdish oil exports to restart or face sanctions alongside Iran.

Despite US sanctions in recent years, Tehran's oil exports brought in US$53 billion in 2023 and US$54 billion a year earlier, largely in trades with China, according to US Energy Information Administration estimates.

Iran relies on oil exports to China for vital revenue. Russia, which faces restrictions on oil exports and broader Western sanctions, is similarly focused on shipping oil to buyers in China and India.

Finland and other Nordic countries have warned in recent months of the dangers of ships sailing close to their shores and the environmental risks they pose to their shores in oil spills if there is an accident.

While European countries have spoken about inspections of ships transporting Russian oil suspected of not having valid insurance, little action has been taken and none mooted for vessels hauling Iranian oil.

 

Iraq-Turkey pipeline capacity utilization

Turkey wants an Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline to operate at maximum capacity once it resumes flows through Turkey's Ceyhan, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar was quoted as saying by the state-owned Anadolu news agency on Sunday.

The pipeline was halted by Turkey in March 2023 after the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ordered Ankara to pay Baghdad US$1.5 billion in damages for unauthorized exports between 2014 and 2018.

Turkey has said since late 2023 that it is ready to resume operations at the pipeline, carrying oil exports from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Bayraktar told Reuters last month that Ankara had not received confirmation on resuming flows.

On Friday, eight international oil firms operating in Iraq's Kurdistan region said they would not resume oil exports through Turkey's Ceyhan despite an announcement from Baghdad that the restart was imminent.

"This pipeline has been ready for 1.5 years already. We want the Turkey-Iraq pipeline, especially the two pipelines of 650 km from our Silopi to Ceyhan to be used," Bayraktar said.

"We want some of the oil passing through this line to go to the refinery in Kirikkale, and also via ships through Ceyhan, to refineries in Turkey or to different refineries in the world, so that the capacity of the line can be used at the maximum level," he added.

Bayraktar also said a planned trade route project involving Turkey and Iraq, dubbed the Development Road Project, included the construction of a pipeline reaching the Persian Gulf for the Iraqi oil flows to go to global markets via Turkey.

 

Iraq: Fire at Rumaila oilfield extinguished

A fire at Iraq's Rumaila oilfield was brought under control on Friday, the country's oil ministry said in a statement, adding that there were no serious injuries.

The fire started at a storage tank inside the oilfield's fifth gas station, "for unidentified technical reasons", the ministry said.

The station will operate again after checking all safety procedures and assessing the damages, the ministry added.

Three energy sources told Reuters that operations at the field had not been affected.

Two local oil workers suffered minor burn injuries, the sources said.

Production at Rumaila stands at about 1.45 million barrel per day (bpd), said two officials at the field.

 

Iran third largest oil producer of OPEC family

According to OPEC’s first report of 2025, Iran maintained its position as the organization’s third-largest oil producer in December 2024, with an average daily production of 3.314 million barrels.

Data from OPEC’s Secretariat revealed that the organization’s 12 member states produced a combined total of 26.741 million barrels per day (bpd) in December, marking an increase of 26,000 bpd from November.

Saudi Arabia and Iraq retained their positions as the top two producers, with daily outputs of 8.938 million barrels and 4.019 million barrels, respectively.

Production from OPEC Plus members, which includes OPEC countries and allied producers, reached 13.913 million bpd in December, a decrease of 40,000 bpd compared to the previous month.

Overall, the combined output of OPEC and its allies in December totalled 40.654 million bpd, slightly lower than November’s 40.669 million bpd.

Iran’s heavy crude oil price averaged US$73 per barrel in December 2024, reflecting 0.3% increase. For the entire year of 2024, the average price of Iran’s heavy crude stood at US$79.71 per barrel.

Meanwhile, the OPEC Reference Basket price averaged US$73.07 per barrel in December 2024, a 1.0%MoM increase.

OPEC’s January report forecasts that global oil demand will grow by 1.45 million bpd in 2025, reaching a total of 105.2 million bpd.

The organization also projects that global demand will rise by an additional 1.43 million bpd in 2026, bringing the total to 105.63 million bpd.

  

Iran's economic relations with its neighbors

In recent years, the economic relationships between Iran and its neighboring countries have grown in both complexity and significance. This economic integration is crucial for the development of Iran’s non-oil sector and its broader economic strategy, especially considering the geopolitical challenges that the country faces.

In this article, an effort has been made to explore the current state and future prospects of Iran’s trade with its neighbors, examine key sectors, trade volumes, and strategic partnerships.

As of late 2024, Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors has seen a notable increase. Non-oil trade volumes reached US$55.3 billion in the first 11 months of the year, with exports constituting 67 million tons of goods valued at US$25.8 billion and imports amounting to 21.4 million tons valued at US$29.4 billion.

This represents a significant increase in trade flows, driven by an increase in exports of petrochemical products, minerals, and agricultural goods.

Iran’s primary trading partners in the region include Iraq, the UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The UAE and Iraq are Iran’s two largest trade partners, especially in terms of exports.

For example, in the first seven months of 2024, Iran’s trade with Iraq was valued at US$7.6 billion, making it one of the most crucial destinations for Iranian goods. The major exports to Iraq include petrochemicals, cement, and agricultural products, while imports primarily consist of machinery and food items.

Turkey has also maintained its position as a key trading partner, with trade between the two countries amounting to US$9.9 billion in the same period. Iranian exports to Turkey largely consist of natural gas and petroleum products, while imports from Turkey are diverse, including electrical machinery and textiles.

Iran’s geopolitical location, bordered by 15 countries, gives it a strategic advantage in the trade of goods and services. This advantageous position allows Iran to serve as a key transit hub for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia.

In particular, the development of international transport corridors, such as the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Iran with Russia, India, and Central Asia, is expected to enhance Iran’s role in regional trade.

Furthermore, the expansion of special economic zones, such as the Lamerd Free Trade Zone, has created new opportunities for businesses to engage in regional trade. This diversification of trade routes and infrastructure investment is expected to foster deeper economic ties with countries in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Despite challenges, such as global sanctions and regional instability, Iran’s government has focused on expanding its non-oil exports, particularly to its neighbors. This strategy is part of a broader effort to reduce Iran’s dependency on oil revenues and diversify its economy.

The Iranian government’s push for stronger trade relations with Central Asia, Russia, and even countries like Oman and Turkmenistan, is driven by the need for economic diversification and the potential to access new markets. Iran’s trade with Russia, for example, has grown steadily, with recent figures showing a trade volume of US$1.5 billion in 2024.

The economic outlook for Iran’s trade with neighboring countries is promising. The country’s strategic location, combined with increased infrastructure investment and a strong focus on non-oil exports, positions Iran as a key player in the regional economy.

However, the ongoing challenges of sanctions and geopolitical tensions remain factors to consider as Iran continues to navigate its path toward economic diversification.

If these trade relationships continue to strengthen, Iran could significantly enhance its role as a regional economic hub, ensuring long-term stability and growth for its economy.

 

A prospective US war with Iran is pending

United States interference, at the behest of Netanyahu’s far-right Israel, has left the Middle East in ruins, with over a million dead and open wars raging in Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine, and with Iran on the brink of a nuclear arsenal.

The story is simple, in stark violation of international law, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ministers claim the right to rule over seven million Palestinians. When Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands leads to militant resistance, Israel labels the resistance “terrorism” and calls on the US to overthrow the Middle East governments that back the “terrorists.” The US, under the sway of the Israel Lobby, goes to war on Israel’s behalf.

The fall of Syria this past week is the culmination of the US-Israel campaign against Syria that goes back to 1996 with Netanyahu’s arrival to office as Prime Minister. The US-Israel war on Syria escalated in 2011 and 2012, when Barack Obama covertly tasked the CIA with the overthrow of the Syrian Government in Operation Timber Sycamore. That effort finally came to “fruition” this week, after more than 300,000 deaths in the Syrian war since 2011.

Syria’s fall came swiftly because of more than a decade of crushing economic sanctions, the burdens of war, the US seizure of Syria’s oil, Russia’s priorities regarding the conflict in Ukraine, and most immediately, Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah, which was the key military backstop to the Syrian Government. No doubt Assad often misplayed his own hand and faced severe internal discontent, but his regime was targeted for collapse for decades by the US and Israel.

Since 2011, the US-Israel perpetual war on Syria, including bombing, jihadists, economic sanctions, US seizure of Syria’s oil fields, and more, has sunk the Syrian people into misery.

In the immediate two days following the collapse of the government, Israel conducted about 480 strikes across Syria, and completely destroyed the Syrian fleet in Latakia. Pursuing his expansionist agenda, Prime Minister Netanyahu illegally claimed control over the demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights and declared that the Golan Heights will be a part of the State of Israel “for eternity.”

Netanyahu’s ambition to transform the region through war, which dates back almost three decades, is playing out in front of our eyes. In a press conference on December 09, 2024 the Israeli prime minister boasted of an “absolute victory,” justifying the on-going genocide in Gaza and escalating violence throughout the region.

The long history of Israel’s campaign to overthrow the Syrian Government is not widely understood, yet the documentary record is clear. Israel’s war on Syria began with US and Israeli neoconservatives in 1996, who fashioned a “Clean Break” strategy for the Middle East for Netanyahu as he came to office.

The core of the “clean break” strategy called for the Israel (and the US) to reject “land for peace,” the idea that Israel would withdraw from the occupied Palestinian lands in return for peace. Instead, Israel would retain the occupied Palestinian lands, rule over the Palestinian people in an Apartheid state, step-by-step ethnically cleanse the state, and enforce so-called “peace for peace” by overthrowing neighboring governments that resisted Israel’s land claims.

The Clean Break strategy asserts, “Our claim to the land—to which we have clung for hope for 2000 years—is legitimate and noble,” and goes on to state, “Syria challenges Israel on Lebanese soil. An effective approach, and one with which the US can sympathize, would be if Israel seized the strategic initiative along its northern borders by engaging Hizballah, Syria, and Iran, as the principal agents of aggression in Lebanon…”

In his 1996 book Fighting Terrorism, Netanyahu set out the new strategy. Israel would not fight the terrorists; it would fight the states that support the terrorists. More accurately, it would get the US to do Israel’s fighting for it.

 

As he elaborated in 2001, the first and most crucial thing to understand is this: There is no international terrorism without the support of sovereign states.… Take away all this state support, and the entire scaffolding of international terrorism will collapse into dust.

Netanyahu’s strategy was integrated into US foreign policy. Taking out Syria was always a key part of the plan. This was confirmed to General Wesley Clark after 9/11.

He was told, during a visit at the Pentagon, that “we’re going to attack and destroy the governments in seven countries in five years—we’re going to start with Iraq, and then we’re going to move to Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran.”

Iraq would be first, then Syria, and the rest. (Netanyahu’s campaign for the Iraq War is spelled out in detail in Dennis Fritz’s new book, Deadly Betrayal. The role of the Israel Lobby is spelled out in Ilan Pappé’s new book, Lobbying for Zionism on Both Sides of the Atlantic). The insurgency that hit US troops in Iraq set back the five-year timeline, but did not change the basic strategy.

The US has by now led or sponsored wars against Iraq (invasion in 2003), Lebanon (US funding and arming Israel), Libya (NATO bombing in 2011), Syria (CIA operation during 2010’s), Sudan (supporting rebels to break Sudan apart in 2011), and Somalia (backing Ethiopia’s invasion in 2006).

A prospective US war with Iran, ardently sought by Israel, is still pending.

Shia-Sunni Conflict in Syria to Get Louder

The current situation in Syria presents three significant implications. First, the recruitment of fighters, motivated by financial incentives or sectarian affiliations, is expected to rise. Second, the majority of these recruits are likely to come from the South Asian region. Videos circulating on social media already show individuals with Pashto or Hazara accents celebrating the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad’s forces from key cities, leaving behind military-grade weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. Third, existing foot soldiers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran may see new opportunities to leverage their combat experience, contributing to the rekindling of the Syrian conflict.

Shia militias, including the Zainabiyoun Brigade and other groups from Iraq, are also being drawn into the conflict. As a result, Syria is poised to become the site of escalating sectarian violence, with Sunni and Shia factions, supported by various regional and international actors, facing off.

What Impact Will This Have on the Gaza War?

How will these developments affect the ongoing conflict in Gaza? Will they weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon? And what strategic advantages might Israel and its regional or international allies gain?

Currently, Hamas is on the defensive, and the Syrian situation could demoralize its forces if Bashar al-Assad and his allies lose their grip on power, potentially drawing them into direct confrontation with rebel factions.

Iran and Russia are already evacuating some of their officials, but sectarian fighters loyal to the Assad regime will likely remain in Syria, continuing their resistance. Aerial support for Assad’s forces may still come from select countries, but unless a similar conflict arises in Iraq—where Sunni militias start pushing against Shia factions—a complete collapse of the Assad regime seems unlikely.

A Possible Escalation: Assad's Last Resort?

If Bashar al-Assad feels cornered and believes he must evacuate, he could resort to an extreme measure: launching a direct attack on Israel. What might such an assault look like?

First, a safe zone could be established for Iranian, Russian, or Syrian officials in the border region of Iraq, enabling them to continue strategizing and coordinating efforts in Syria and beyond.

Second, there would be a need for a large influx of Shia fighters into Syria and Lebanon to counteract new rebel offensives or Israeli airstrikes against Assad’s regime. These fighters could also act as conduits for weapons flowing into Lebanon, strengthening Hezbollah and other allies.

Coupled with aerial support, these forces could give Assad a better chance of reclaiming lost territories.

Wider Regional Implications: Yemen and Saudi Arabia

The sectarian tensions in Syria could also spill over into other parts of the region, particularly Yemen and Saudi Arabia, exacerbating existing conflicts there.