Rethinking Arab Security: Time to Reclaim Strategic Autonomy

Time to ask US to vacate military bases in Arabian Peninsula

The escalation following the Gaza War has triggered a reassessment across the Arab world. As the United States continues its unwavering support for Israel, a critical question is emerging: does reliance on external powers strengthen sovereignty—or steadily erode it?

For decades, the security architecture of the Persian Gulf has revolved around American military presence. Bases across Arab Emirates were meant to deter threats, particularly from Iran. Yet recent developments suggest this framework is far less reliable than assumed.

Strategic installations in the region have repeatedly faced missile and drone threats. Despite hosting advanced defense systems, these states remain vulnerable. This raises a fundamental concern: if such an extensive foreign military presence cannot ensure security, what purpose does it serve?

Washington’s singular focus on Iran has also narrowed the strategic outlook of its regional partners. While Iran pursues an assertive policy, reducing the region’s complexities to one adversary has allowed deeper structural weaknesses to persist.

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz further highlights this paradox. Despite heavy militarization, this critical corridor remains vulnerable, exposing the limits of externally driven security arrangements.

At the same time, emerging narratives—whether verified or not—have fueled a growing trust deficit. Questions around the origin of attacks and the effectiveness of defense commitments have intensified doubts about the current security model.

Against this backdrop, a strategic shift is imperative. Arab states must move beyond dependency and reassess their reliance on external powers, while opening channels of engagement with regional actors, including Iran.

The conclusion is increasingly unavoidable: Arab Emirates must begin a phased recalibration of their security framework—one that could ultimately require asking the United States to vacate its military bases.

Such a move would reflect not hostility, but strategic maturity.

Strait of Hormuz: Mandating Force, Manufacturing Legitimacy

The draft resolution before the United Nations Security Council, fronted by Bahrain, is not a neutral instrument to secure maritime trade—it is an attempt to manufacture legal cover for the use of force against Iran. Cloaked in the language of “defensive necessity,” it effectively authorizes escalation while evading the question that matters most, who set this crisis in motion?

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz did not occur in isolation. It followed coordinated strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian territory—reportedly at a time when nuclear negotiations were still underway. That decision did not just derailed diplomacy; it rendered it irrelevant. Yet, the diplomatic narrative that followed has been predictably selective - Iran’s response is branded destabilizing, while the initiating use of force is quietly normalized.

This is not inconsistency—it is doctrine. The same Council that failed to act during the devastation of Gaza, paralyzed by repeated vetoes, now finds urgency in authorizing force under elastic terminology. “All defensive means necessary” is not a stabilizing clause; it is a blank cheque. Once endorsed, it lowers the threshold for military action under the imprimatur of international legitimacy.

Crucially, the façade of consensus is already cracking. China has warned that authorizing force would legitimize indiscriminate escalation. Russia and France have disrupted procedural unanimity, exposing the geopolitical fractures beneath the resolution. This is not collective security—it is contested power politics dressed up as multilateralism.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to escalate rhetorically and militarily without presenting a credible pathway to reopening the Strait or stabilizing energy flows. Oil markets have already reacted, underscoring a simple truth: escalation without strategy is not deterrence—it is risk exported to the global economy.

Iran, hardened by decades of sanctions and isolation, is not capitulating—it is recalibrating. Its threat to restrict maritime passage is not an act of adventurism; it is leverage in the face of sustained pressure. To deny that context is to strip the crisis of causality and reduce diplomacy to theatre.

What is being constructed here is not a ceasefire framework but a hierarchy of compliance. The demand is not de-escalation—it is submission. And submission, when enforced through selective legality, does not produce stability; it breeds prolonged confrontation.

If adopted, this resolution will not secure the Strait of Hormuz. It will secure a precedent—one where force is legalized after the fact, where power dictates principle, and where the language of international order is repurposed to justify its erosion.

Why should world bear brunt of Trump’s miscalculation?

After reviewing reports of Donald Trump’s recent address to the American public, a number of observations emerge:

1. The president of a global superpower appears detached from ground realities, almost operating in a state of strategic illusion. Either he is not adequately heeding intelligence assessments, or those assessments themselves are failing him.
2. There is a persistent refusal to acknowledge that Iran has demonstrated considerable resilience—both as a state and as a military actor with indigenous capabilities. The stated objectives of regime change and meaningful degradation of its nuclear and missile assets remain largely unfulfilled.
3. His European allies are visibly reluctant to associate themselves with a war widely perceived as initiated under the influence of Benjamin Netanyahu. This hesitation underscores growing transatlantic unease.
4. While Trump may have managed to secure political loyalty at home to fend off institutional challenges, the broader sentiment within the United States is increasingly uneasy. Public discontent is no longer easy to contain.
5. The notion of occupying Kharg Island borders on strategic fantasy. Iran is not Venezuela; any such misadventure could prove disastrously costly, with airborne troops facing overwhelming resistance within hours rather than days.
6. Reports suggesting the withdrawal or repositioning of US naval assets reflect an uncomfortable reality: modern asymmetric warfare—particularly drone and missile capabilities—has altered the battlefield in Iran’s favor.
7. Even if financial resources—reportedly in the range of $200 billion—are available, the sustainability of logistics and supply chains remains questionable. Wars are not won by funding alone, but by operational continuity.

Recent reporting also indicates that while Trump claimed progress and “mission success,” he offered no clear exit strategy, even as global markets reacted negatively and oil prices surged amid fears of prolonged conflict.

Therefore, the insistence on Iran’s “unconditional surrender” appears increasingly detached from strategic reality. A more pragmatic course would be to engage with some of Tehran’s terms and seek an end to what is fast becoming a protracted and costly conflict.

Why should the global economy—and indeed the wider international community—be compelled to absorb the consequences of what increasingly resembles a strategic miscalculation driven by one leader, especially when that leader faces growing skepticism at home?

Ceasefire or Strategic Overreach? Washington’s Iran Dilemma

The confrontation between the United States and Iran has entered a familiar but dangerous phase: both sides speak of ceasefire, yet their conditions make peace increasingly elusive.

At the center of this standoff lies the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery for global energy flows. Washington’s primary demand is its immediate reopening, coupled with far-reaching conditions: rollback of Iran’s nuclear program, curbs on its missile capabilities, and disengagement from regional allies. In effect, the United States is seeking not merely de-escalation, but a strategic reordering of Iran’s regional posture.

Tehran, unsurprisingly, views these demands as excessive. Its counter-conditions—cessation of attacks, guarantees against future aggression, and compensation for war damages—reflect a sovereignty-driven approach. Most critically, Iran insists on recognition of its authority over Hormuz, transforming a geographic chokepoint into a symbol of national leverage.

This divergence reflects a deeper divide. The United States frames the ceasefire in terms of global security and stability; Iran frames it in terms of sovereignty and deterrence. Each side demands that the other act first—Washington insisting on compliance before relief, and Tehran demanding guarantees before concessions.

It is within this context that the strategy of President Donald Trump invites scrutiny. By advancing what appears to be a maximalist framework, Washington risks conflating ceasefire with capitulation. Such an approach may project strength, but it also narrows the diplomatic space necessary for de-escalation.

There is also a structural contradiction. While the United States seeks secure and uninterrupted maritime flows, its pressure-heavy strategy may incentivize Iran to tighten, rather than loosen, its grip over the Strait. The sequencing problem—each side waiting for the other to move first—has effectively locked diplomacy in place.

Ultimately, the trajectory of this conflict suggests that both Washington and Tehran may be overestimating what force alone can achieve. While US strategy risks prolonging a conflict it seeks to shape, Iran too faces economic strain and the long-term costs of sustained confrontation.

What is increasingly evident is that neither side is positioned for a clear or lasting victory. Instead, the burden is shifting outward. Energy markets remain unsettled, trade flows uncertain, and inflationary pressures persistent—leaving much of the global economy to absorb the consequences of a conflict it neither initiated nor controls.

If this impasse endures, the outcome may not be defined by who wins the war, but by who best avoids its costs. And on that count, the rest of the world may already be losing.

 

Trump’s Energy Ultimatum: Straining the Transatlantic Compact

The latest outburst by Donald Trump marks more than a passing diplomatic flare-up—it signals a troubling shift in the nature of Western alliances. By telling Britain to “go get your own oil,” Trump has introduced a coercive undertone into what has long been a relationship anchored in shared responsibility and strategic trust. In doing so, he risks diminishing not only the standing of King Charles III but also the perceived credibility of Britain’s security apparatus, including MI6.

The immediate trigger lies in British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s decision to avoid direct military involvement in strikes against Iran, opting instead for de-escalation. Washington’s response, however, frames restraint as reluctance.

Trump’s assertion that allies unwilling to participate in conflict should not expect US support in securing critical energy routes—particularly the Strait of Hormuz—effectively recasts alliance obligations as conditional.

This approach exposes a deeper inconsistency. While claiming that the United States has already “done the hard part,” Washington is simultaneously urging partners to assume the most immediate risks—reopening a volatile maritime chokepoint amid ongoing hostilities. If stability had indeed been restored, global oil flows would not remain disrupted, nor would energy prices continue their upward surge, now crossing the US$100 per barrel threshold.

Remarks by Pete Hegseth questioning the readiness of the Royal Navy reinforce a narrative of diminished British capability. Yet this overlooks the UK’s sustained security presence in the Gulf.

As Defence Secretary John Healey emphasized, Britain continues to contribute meaningfully to regional stability—its role defined by operational commitments rather than rhetorical alignment.

The broader concern is structural. By linking energy access with military participation, Washington risks normalizing a transactional model of alliance management. Such an approach may yield short-term leverage but carries long-term costs, including erosion of trust and reduced cohesion among Western partners.

At a time when geopolitical fault lines are widening, this recalibration could prove consequential. Strategic ambiguity within the transatlantic alliance not only complicates crisis response but may also create space for rival powers to exploit divisions. In seeking to pressure allies, Washington may ultimately be weakening the very framework that underpins its global influence.

US Seeks War Funding, Arabs Count Losses

 

Strategic divergence widens as Gulf economies weigh the cost of conflict over the logic of confrontation

The suggestion by Donald Trump that Arab countries should help finance the war against Iran reflects a familiar instinct in Washington: externalize the financial burden while retaining strategic command. Yet, this proposition is increasingly at odds with shifting regional priorities.

According to White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt, the idea is not merely rhetorical but rooted in the President’s thinking. This comes at a time when Washington claims that negotiations with Tehran are progressing, even as it threatens to target Iran’s energy infrastructure. Such dual signaling—diplomacy on one hand and coercion on the other—highlights a policy struggling to reconcile intent with outcome.

For decades, the United States has framed Iran as the principal destabilizing force in the region, often in strategic alignment with Israel. That narrative is no longer universally compelling across Arab capitals. The issue is not the absence of concern about Iran, but the rising cost of confrontation.

Three realities now shape the regional calculus.

First, the ongoing conflict is widely perceived as emerging from a convergence of US-Israeli strategic interests, despite visible unease among several Gulf states. This perception complicates efforts to build financial or political backing for prolonged military engagement.

Second, the credibility of US security guarantees has come under scrutiny. Strategic installations in countries hosting American bases have faced vulnerabilities, raising questions about the reliability of external protection. If security assurances appear uncertain, underwriting conflict becomes a harder sell domestically.

Third, and most decisively, the economic fallout is being borne disproportionately by Arab economies. The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global oil shipments—has directly impacted revenues, trade flows, and fiscal stability across the Gulf. For these states, the war is not an abstract geopolitical contest but an immediate economic strain.

Even within Washington, strategic clarity remains elusive. While Trump speaks in terms of near-accomplished “regime change,” Marco Rubio has cautioned that outcomes remain uncertain. This internal divergence weakens the case for burden-sharing and raises concerns about long-term policy direction.

The emerging divide is therefore subtle but significant. Arab states are not dismissing security concerns, but they are increasingly prioritizing economic stability and regional de-escalation over alignment with an open-ended conflict.

In this evolving landscape, one reality stands out: while Washington may seek partners to fund its war, Arab states—already counting the losses—are far less inclined to underwrite it.

Who should be blamed for the closure of Strait of Hormuz? Iran or United States

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent shockwaves across global markets, but the deeper question is unavoidable: what led to this point of no return?

The answer lies not in a single act, but in a sequence of decisions that began with the use of force at a moment when diplomacy was still in motion. Reports indicate that while negotiations were ongoing, the United States and Israel carried out strikes against Iranian targets. In geopolitical terms, such actions do not merely apply pressure—they fundamentally dismantle the diplomatic track.

When dialogue is replaced by force, retaliation becomes a predictable outcome. The response from Iran must be viewed within this context. Faced with attacks on its strategic installations and the killing of key leadership figures, Iran signaled clearly that it would respond—and that certain red lines, once crossed, would trigger consequences.

The closure of the Strait is not an impulsive decision. It is a calculated assertion of leverage. Geography is Iran’s strongest strategic asset, and in moments of existential pressure, it becomes the tool through which power is projected. By announcing conditions for maritime passage, Iran has reinforced that this is not chaos, but controlled pressure in response to external actions.

To place responsibility squarely where it belongs: this crisis did not emerge from Iran acting in isolation—it was set in motion by those who chose escalation over negotiation. The moment diplomacy was interrupted by strikes, the trajectory toward confrontation became unavoidable.

Compounding the situation is the rhetoric emanating from Washington, including calls for “unconditional surrender.” Such language is not just diplomatically unhelpful—it is strategically counterproductive. It removes space for compromise and signals an approach rooted in dominance rather than resolution.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy flows, has now become the epicenter of a crisis that could have been avoided. The disruption we are witnessing is not the starting point—it is the consequence.

Who Truly Dominates the Arabian Peninsula?

The idea of a “superpower” in the Arabian Peninsula is often shaped by wealth, alliances, and perception. Remove external backing—particularly that of the United States—and the equation changes dramatically. What remains is a test of self-reliance, endurance, and the ability to fight alone.

At first glance, Saudi Arabia appears dominant. With one of the world’s largest defense budgets and a formidable arsenal of advanced aircraft and missile systems, it projects overwhelming strength. Yet this power is structurally dependent. Its military ecosystem relies heavily on imported platforms, foreign maintenance, and external logistical support. Without these, its technological edge risks rapid erosion.

Qatar, though financially powerful, lacks strategic depth. Its military is modern but limited in size and sustainability. In a prolonged conflict without external guarantees, it cannot realistically compete for regional military supremacy.

Turkey presents a more complex case. Though geographically outside the Arabian Peninsula, its influence is undeniable. It combines a large standing army with a growing indigenous defense industry, particularly in drones and naval assets. Unlike Gulf states, Turkey possesses the capacity to produce and adapt independently. However, its strategic priorities are divided across multiple theaters, diluting its focus on the Gulf.

This leaves Iran—a country long constrained by sanctions, yet shaped by them. Before the recent one-month war, Iran’s strength lay in its missile arsenal, dispersed military infrastructure, and doctrine of asymmetric warfare. It was built not to dominate, but to deter through the certainty of retaliation.

One month of sustained conflict has altered—but not erased—this reality. Iran’s military infrastructure has been significantly degraded. Missile sites, production facilities, and air defenses have suffered visible damage. By conventional metrics, it is weaker today than it was at the outset.

Yet the defining outcome lies elsewhere.

Despite these losses, Iran continues to operate, retaliate, and maintain strategic coherence. Its domestically sustained and decentralized military architecture has allowed it to absorb sustained strikes without collapsing. The objective of decisively neutralizing it remains unmet.

The conclusion is therefore unavoidable. In a no-alliance scenario, power is not measured by what survives untouched, but by what continues to function under fire. Iran emerges not as the strongest because it is unscathed, but because it has proven it cannot be decisively subdued.

Between Exit and Escalation: A War Slipping Beyond Control

The evolving US-Israeli war on Iran has pushed Donald Trump into a strategic trap—one defined not by a lack of power, but by a lack of viable options. What was conceived as a limited campaign to reassert deterrence is steadily transforming into a conflict that resists containment, reshapes global markets, and erodes political capital at home. 

A month into the war, the contradictions are stark. Washington sought a short, decisive engagement; instead, it faces a resilient Iran that has shifted the battlefield from military confrontation to economic disruption. By tightening pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and sustaining missile and drone operations, Tehran has leveraged geography and endurance to impose costs far beyond the immediate theatre of war.

The consequences are already visible. Rising global energy prices are no longer an externality—they are a direct political liability. For an administration navigating fragile domestic support, the economic ripple effects risk becoming more damaging than the conflict itself. Approval ratings slipping into dangerous territory underscore a deeper problem - this war is losing its political legitimacy at home even as it remains strategically unresolved abroad.

This leaves Trump with choices that are stark but deeply constrained. A negotiated exit appears increasingly elusive. Diplomatic overtures, including reported backchannel proposals, demand concessions that Iran has historically rejected. Even if a deal were reached, it would likely be seen as a retreat—undermining the very premise on which the war was launched.

Escalation, meanwhile, carries even greater risks. Expanding military operations or deploying ground forces could entangle the United States in a prolonged conflict—precisely the kind Trump has repeatedly vowed to avoid. The shadow of past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan looms large, not just in strategic calculations but in public memory. Any move in that direction risks accelerating domestic backlash and fracturing political support.

Analysts such as Jonathan Panikoff have pointed to a fundamental flaw: the absence of a clearly defined and achievable endgame. Without clarity on what constitutes success, each tactical move risks deepening strategic ambiguity.

Meanwhile, as Jon Alterman notes, Iran’s strategy appears rooted in a far simpler objective—endure and outlast. In such a framework, survival itself becomes victory.

This asymmetry is critical. The United States seeks a decisive outcome; Iran seeks persistence. The longer the conflict continues, the more it reinforces the perception that time is not on Washington’s side. Every passing week tightens the strategic bind, amplifying economic disruption, unsettling allies, and testing domestic patience.

Trump’s shifting signals—alternating between threats of escalation and gestures toward diplomacy—reflect an attempt to manage this narrowing space. But such contradictions, while tactically useful, risk creating uncertainty among allies and markets alike.

As Laura Blumenfeld observed, this “fog of war” messaging may keep adversaries guessing, but it also underscores the absence of a coherent pathway forward.

What began as a war of choice is edging toward a loss of control. The longer the conflict persists, the narrower Washington’s options become—diplomacy without leverage, escalation without certainty, and a domestic landscape growing increasingly unforgiving. 

This is no longer about achieving decisive victory; it is about managing the consequences of a strategy that has outpaced its own assumptions. For Trump, the dilemma is no longer theoretical. It is immediate, structural, and tightening by the day.

PSX Benchmark Index Down 0.68%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) witnessed persistent volatility during the week, mainly shaped by Middle-East conflict and resulting fluctuations in international oil prices. The benchmark index registered erosion of 1,033 points or 0.68%WoW to close at 151,708 on Friday, March 27, 2026.

Week began on a positive note, supported by emerging de-escalation efforts with Pakistan acting as a mediator; however, gains were eroded in last two trading sessions as conflicting statements from the United States and Iran heightened uncertainty.

On the domestic macro front, cut-off yields in Thursday’s PIB auction increased by 90-225bps, with 5-year paper yield rising to 12.5%.

Moreover, Barrick Mining Corp extended the review period of Reko Diq by 12 months in light of ongoing Middle East conflict and escalation of domestic security issues. The aforesaid developments weighed on Bank and E&P sectors.

IMF shared MEFP draft with Pakistan, marking progress towards SLA for third review.

Amid the ongoing energy situation, GoP reduced the PSDP allocation by PKR100 billion to accommodate fuel subsidies, to maintain domestic petroleum prices in last two reviews, with an estimated two-week cost of PKR69 billion.

Market participation rebounded post-Ramadan, with average daily traded volumes surging to 872 million shares from 418 million shares in prior week.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$22 million to US$16.4 billion as of March 18, 2026.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan secures petroleum cargoes till April 25, 2) Foreign assistance inflows were up 18.35%YoY to US$5.862 billion during 8 months of current financial years 3) NEPRA okays competitive bidding for power supply, and 4) Domestic cotton prices jump sharply amid Middle East crisis.

Top performing sector of the week were Technology, Inv. Banks, and Cements while laggards included Refinery, Power, and E&P.

Major selling was recorded by Insurance and Banks with a net sell of US$12.5 million and US$6.8 million, respectively. Individuals absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$20.0 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: SYS, PGLC, INIL, BNWM, and PIBTL, while laggards included: KTML, SSGC, KEL, SAZEW, and GAL.

Going forward, market sentiment will hinge on developments of the Middle East conflict. At the same time, investor focus will remain on the government’s energy conservation measures, diversification of fuel imports, and progress on the IMF review.

According to AKD Securities, over the medium term, any de-escalation in the conflict could spark a strong market rebound, as recent corrections have made valuations more attractive, with forward P/E now at 6.4x.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

US–Israel War on Iran: Dominance Under Question

The brief but intense confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran in June 2025—lasting barely twelve days—was projected as a calibrated show of force. Officially concluded as a ceasefire, the episode aimed to restore deterrence and reset strategic equations. Yet, nearly nine months later, the outcomes appear far less definitive than anticipated.

At the time, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program were reportedly progressing. The sudden escalation suggested a shift from diplomacy to coercion, widely interpreted as an attempt—driven in part by Israeli pressure—to achieve multiple objectives: degrade Iran’s strategic infrastructure, weaken its regional posture, and potentially trigger internal instability. None of these goals, however, seem to have been fully realized.

There is little doubt that Iran’s strategic installations suffered damage. However, the broader political and military picture is more nuanced. The Iranian regime has remained intact, and domestic cohesion appears to have strengthened rather than fractured. External pressure, instead of splintering the state, may have reinforced national resolve—an outcome not unfamiliar in modern conflict settings.

Equally significant is the perceptual shift. The image of unquestioned military supremacy long associated with the United States and Israel appears to have been dented. Iran’s ability—both real and projected—to respond through retaliatory actions against regional targets and US-linked assets has complicated the narrative of one-sided dominance.

Reports and claims emerging from the conflict add further complexity. Iranian officials have asserted successful targeting of military assets and bases, while some unverified accounts point to disruptions in logistical and maritime supply lines, including incidents in strategically sensitive waterways and installations in the broader Indian Ocean region. While these claims remain contested, they nonetheless contribute to a narrative of reach and resilience that Tehran appears keen to project.

The latest signals from Donald Trump—indicating a pause or deferral in further strikes on Iran’s strategic assets—have deepened speculation. This could reflect tactical recalibration, but it also raises the possibility of operational limits rather than purely strategic choice. In contemporary conflict, pauses often reveal as much as offensives.

What emerges, therefore, is not a clear victory for any side, but a reminder of limits. Military power, even when overwhelming, does not automatically translate into decisive political outcomes. Short wars can disrupt, degrade, and demonstrate—but they rarely resolve deeply embedded strategic rivalries.

For Iran, the ability to absorb pressure and maintain internal stability can be framed as a form of strategic endurance. For the United States and Israel, the episode underscores the complexity of converting battlefield advantage into lasting geopolitical gains. The balance of power may not have fundamentally shifted—but its boundaries have certainly been tested.

In the end, the twelve-day war—and the weeks that followed—reinforce a familiar lesson - in geopolitics, outcomes are rarely as clear-cut as intentions.

Over One Million Americans Say Impeach and Remove Trump

The legal advocacy organization Free Speech for People on Thursday published a full-page advertisement in The New York Times highlighting the more than one million people who have endorsed the group’s petition to impeach and remove President Donald Trump from office.

Free Speech for People’s (FSFP) campaign—which also includes billboard trucks and projections in Washington, DC—comes ahead of the third wave of “No Kings” demonstrations, which are set to take place Saturday in thousands of locations across the United States.

“On March 28, 2026, the people will rise up,” said FSFP digital organizing strategist Jax Foley. “The No Kings 3 protest is projected to be the largest mass comobilization in US history, with over 3,000 actions planned worldwide. People across this country are organizing, mobilizing, defending their communities, and demanding accountability.”

No Kings 3 comes amid Trump’s attacks on the rule of law and constitutional rights at home and escalating militarism abroad as the president has bombed seven countries since returning to office—and 10 or possibly even 11 over the course of his two terms—while backing Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

“Donald Trump poses a direct threat to our Constitution and to the rule of law,” FSFP president and co-founder John Bonifaz said in a statement. “The constitutional remedy of impeachment exists precisely for moments like this when a president abuses power, defies the law, and attacks democracy itself. Congress must act.”

FSFP’s petition, which was launched on the day of Trump’s second inauguration, urges Congress to “take action to defend our republic and Constitution” by impeaching the president again. As of Thursday afternoon, the petition had over 1,070,000 signatures and is more than halfway to its goal of 2 million signers.

“For more than a year, FSFP’s team of lawyers, election security experts, and grassroots organizers have been tirelessly and fiercely leading the campaign to impeach and remove Trump and key administration officials,” Foley said. “We have heard from people across the United States who are with us in the call for no kings, no tyrants, and the immediate impeachment and removal of Trump and his coconspirators. Put the power back in the hands of We The People.”

Trump is the only US president to be impeached twice—once in 2019 for abuse of power and obstruction of justice and again in 2021 for incitement of insurrection. A majority of senators voted to acquit Trump in 2019; a majority—but not the requisite two-thirds—voted to convict in 2021. Both chambers of Congress are now narrowly controlled by Trump’s GOP.

“The congressional power of impeachment is designed to address this tyrannical threat to our democracy,” FSFP said in the New York Times ad. “Members of Congress must abide by their oath to protect and defend the Constitution and impeach and remove Trump from office.”

Courtesy: Common Dreams

 

Two Wars One Outcome: Failure

At first glance, Israel’s war in Gaza and the US-Israel confrontation with Iran appear fundamentally different—one a confined urban battlefield, the other a vast geopolitical contest. Yet both reveal a shared strategic failure: the inability to convert overwhelming military superiority into decisive control.

In Gaza, Israel entered with clear advantages—proximity, intelligence dominance, and unmatched firepower. The expectation was swift dismantling of resistance and consolidation of control. Instead, the conflict has proven stubbornly complex. Urban warfare, asymmetric tactics, and deeply embedded resistance networks have turned territorial gains into a costly and reversible exercise. Control, despite boots on the ground, remains contested.

The Iran theatre presents an even sharper limitation. While the United States and Israel possess unquestioned military superiority, geography alone alters the equation. Iran’s size, terrain, and strategic depth make ground invasion prohibitively costly and politically untenable. Without physical occupation, the objective of “complete control” becomes inherently unrealistic. Airstrikes and missile campaigns may degrade capabilities, but they cannot impose authority.

This contrast exposes a deeper flaw in strategic thinking. If control cannot be secured in Gaza—despite proximity and ground operations—it is even less attainable in Iran, where occupation is off the table. Military power, in both cases, reveals its limits: it can destroy assets, but not command legitimacy.

Iran, however, adds another layer to this equation—endurance. Decades of sanctions have forced adaptation. Indigenous capabilities in missiles, drones, and air defense are products of necessity, not choice. More importantly, Iranian society has internalized resilience under pressure, blunting the impact of external coercion.

Equally telling is the political outcome. Attempts to incite internal dissent against Iran’s clerical leadership have largely failed. External pressure, rather than weakening the regime, appears to have reinforced it. History suggests this is no anomaly—external threats often consolidate internal cohesion.

The parallel, therefore, is not about identical conflicts but about identical miscalculations. In both Gaza and Iran, there is a persistent overestimation of what military force alone can achieve. Territory is not merely land—it is people, perception, and political acceptance. Without these, control remains an illusion.

Iran sinks US Ship carrying 30,000 Interceptors

Please watch and save this video, because shortly it may be removed. This narrates a story of Iran sinking a US Supply Ship USNS Robert E. Peary in Red Sea, where 30,000 interceptors were lost in 20 minutes. To hear details click https://youtu.be/WqAPNl-36NU?si=f-2ngZJCnc96BVCt

Mystery about Iran’s attempted strike on Diego Garcia base

Mystery about Iran’s attempted strike on Diego Garcia base

When an attempted strike of Iran on a British base became a headline, the world was astonished. Most of the people hardly had any knowledge about this base, and on top of all the distance of Iranian missile covering 4,000 kilometers was taken as a propaganda stunt. I request the viewers to listen to this brief video clip and decide if it is a publicity stunt or the harsh reality. To watch video clip, click https://youtube.com/shorts/T8Esh-e_cCw?si=bhWrDa-FPmCSsaG1

 

Lebanon Remains Israel’s Perpetual Battlefield

At first glance, Israel’s continued military engagement in Lebanon appears excessive, even perplexing. If Hezbollah is widely seen as a proxy of Iran, why does the conflict endure despite constraints on Iranian support? The answer lies not in territorial ambition, but in a doctrine shaped by insecurity and hard-learned lessons.

The origins of this confrontation trace back to the 1982 Lebanon War—a campaign aimed at neutralizing threats, not annexing territory. Yet it produced an unintended outcome: the rise of Hezbollah, a force far more adaptive and deeply embedded within Lebanon’s socio-political fabric than any of its predecessors. Its resilience stems not merely from external backing, but from local legitimacy, making it difficult to dismantle through conventional warfare.

Israel, mindful of the costs of past entanglements, no longer seeks occupation. Its strategy is narrower, yet relentless: degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, disrupt its operational capacity, and maintain distance between the group and its northern frontier. This is not victory in the traditional sense—it is the management of a persistent threat.

Geography reinforces this reality. Southern Lebanon offers terrain ideally suited for asymmetric warfare, enabling even a weakened Hezbollah to project force into Israeli territory. For Israeli planners, restraint carries risk; periodic military action becomes a calculated necessity rather than a choice.

At a broader level, Lebanon serves as a proxy arena in the rivalry between Israel and Iran. Each strike on Hezbollah is also a signal to Tehran—asserting limits without crossing into direct war. This calibrated tension sustains a fragile but enduring equilibrium.

The conclusion is uncomfortable but clear. Lebanon is unlikely to witness lasting peace in the near term—not because Israel seeks to occupy it, but because it remains central to a conflict that thrives on continuity. In this unresolved contest between deterrence and resistance, stability is not the objective—only its temporary illusion.

Pakistan Needs Another Resolution

Every year on March 23, Pakistan celebrates the adoption of the Lahore Resolution—the historic declaration that ultimately paved the way for the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. For the Muslims of the subcontinent, the resolution represented far more than a political demand; it embodied the aspiration for sovereignty, dignity, and the right to determine their own future. More than eight decades later, Pakistan commemorates this milestone with pride and patriotic fervor. Yet the realities of the present compel a deeper reflection: does Pakistan today require another national resolve to safeguard its independence and strengthen its future? To read details click https://shkazmipk.com/pakistan-day-resolution/

US-Israel war on Iran: Killing many birds with one stone

The third week of the US-Israel war on Iran has ended, while the spotlight remains fixed on Tehran, the real story lies elsewhere. Iran has undeniably suffered heavy damage, but the silent devastation across the Gulf—particularly in Dubai and Qatar—is far more consequential and enduring.

This is not a war with a single objective. It is a multi-layered strategic strike—killing many birds with one stone.

Publicly, Iran is the target. The stated ambition is to weaken it, isolate it, and, if possible, reduce it to the kind of humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in Gaza. But beneath this declared objective lies a far more calculated design: the weakening of emerging Gulf economic powerhouses that have, in recent years, begun to rival traditional Western dominance.

Dubai stands out as a prime casualty.

 Over the past two decades, it has transformed itself into a global financial and trading hub, attracting billions of US dollars in international capital—including from Israel itself. Its strategic ports, Jebel Ali and Fujairah, have turned it into a critical artery of global commerce. Such autonomy and influence were never going to fit in comfortably within a US-led order.

The Abraham Accords, celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough, also served another purpose—drawing Dubai deeper into a geopolitical framework that left it exposed. Once tensions escalated, the emirate found itself in the crosshairs of a conflict it neither initiated nor could control.

Qatar’s trajectory is equally revealing. 

Its earlier isolation within the Gulf Cooperation Council, combined with the establishment of one of the largest US military bases in the region, was not an act of strategic generosity. It was a calculated positioning. Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves and its geographic proximity to Iran made it indispensable—not as a partner, but as a platform.

What followed was predictable. Iran was provoked into retaliation, and the Gulf became the unintended—or perhaps intended—battleground. Whether the destruction in Dubai and Qatar came directly from Iranian strikes or through more complex channels is almost secondary. The outcome remains the same - both have been dragged into a war that serves larger strategic ends.

History reinforces this pattern. Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has viewed Iran as the principal challenge to its Middle Eastern dominance. Yet, rather than engaging directly, Washington has preferred to entangle Tehran in prolonged proxy conflicts across Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Decades of sanctions and indirect warfare have failed to break Iran. If anything, they have hardened it—economically, militarily, and politically.

The current war reflects a shift born out of frustration. Israel initiated the confrontation, convinced of its ability to decisively weaken Iran. The United States, wary yet compelled, has stepped in—not out of readiness, but out of strategic necessity.

This is not merely a war against Iran. It is a broader attempt to redraw the region’s economic and geopolitical map—where even allies are expendable, and collateral damage is quietly folded into grand strategy.

Russia emerges true winner of US war on Iran

The world's attention is fixed on the Persian Gulf, where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has become the epicenter of a brewing energy shock. With roughly 80% of crude oil moving through the waterway normally heading to Asia, the region is uniquely exposed.

At first glance, the fallout looks familiar: Rising tensions between the duo US-Israel and Iran are threatening supply chains and stoking fears of another oil spike. But the story quickly takes a less obvious turn. As Ritesh Kumar Singh argues, "Amid the focus on the most obvious losers, the energy-dependent economies of Asia and the exporters of the Persian Gulf, another country stands to gain from the turmoil, Russia."

When Hormuz becomes unstable, "global oil logistics shift rapidly," and Russia's export routes -- spanning the Baltic and Pacific gain fresh strategic weight. In this environment, Russia's export geography suddenly becomes one of the most valuable assets in global energy markets, offering buyers the increasingly scarce asset of reliability.

"For Russia ... higher global oil prices translate directly into stronger export revenues and greater fiscal resilience. In a prolonged geopolitical contest where economic stability matters as much as battlefield outcomes, that dynamic strengthens Moscow's hand," Singh writes. "The result is a paradox. A conflict intended to weaken Iran may ultimately redraw the global energy map in ways that favor Russia."

Even Washington's closest allies are hedging. Japan and South Korea have "refrained from openly endorsing US military action," favoring quiet coordination over public backing. For two treaty allies at the core of US strategy in Asia, the instinct now is careful calibration, not automatic alignment.

Across the region, positions diverge further. China has condemned the strikes while casting itself as a stabilizer, Taiwan has voiced support framed around "freedom and democracy," and much of Southeast and South Asia has leaned into neutrality, emphasizing restraint and flexibility amid energy risks and domestic pressures.

Indo-Pacific responses reflect "layered calculations about alliance management, energy security, domestic politics, ideological orientation and economic vulnerability," Grossman writes.

"That diversity may frustrate policymakers in Washington seeking unified backing if the conflict intensifies and requires additional support. Yet it also reflects a deeper strategic reality: Alignment in the Indo-Pacific varies widely, and even America's closest partners carefully weigh their own interests when distant conflicts threaten to expand."

Courtesy: Nikkei Asia

Sanctions as Theatre: Washington’s War on Iran Funds Itself

 This is hypocrisy and outright strategic farce

A report by The Hill reveals that the administration of Donald Trump has authorized the release of roughly 140 million barrels of Iranian oil stranded at sea. While Washington claims to be tightening the noose around Iran, which is it—economic warfare or economic relief?

For decades, US sanctions have been designed to suffocate Iran’s revenues. Yet at a moment of heightened confrontation, Washington has chosen to unlock one of Tehran’s largest oil stockpiles and push it into global markets. This is not tactical flexibility; it is policy contradiction at its most blatant.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claims Iran will struggle to access the proceeds. That argument is deeply misleading. Oil, once sold, creates economic space—whether through direct revenue, indirect trade channels, or geopolitical leverage. Sanctions diluted at convenience cease to be sanctions at all.

More telling is Washington’s own admission Iranian oil is being used to suppress global prices. In effect, the US is leveraging Iranian crude to cushion its own economy from a crisis it is helping sustain.

This is not pressure—it is dependence.

Criticism from Richard Blumenthal and analyst Victoria Taylor exposes the deeper flaw. You cannot claim to isolate an adversary while facilitating its core export. Such a policy erodes credibility, weakens deterrence, and signals that pressure is negotiable.

The message to Tehran is unmistakable - hold firm, and the system bends.

If sanctions can be lifted when oil prices rise, then they are not instruments of strategy—they are tools of convenience. And a policy built on convenience cannot sustain a war of pressure.

Washington may call this a temporary measure. In reality, it is a revealing one.

Because in trying to weaken Iran, the United States has once again proven how indispensable it remains.

Trump faces fate worse than Bush faced in Iraq

On March 17, 2026, I posted a blog titled “Washington’s Miscalculation: War It Can't Win”. Its opening paragraph was, I quote “Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has pursued not coexistence with Iran, but its submission. Nearly five decades of sanctions, covert operations, and proxy confrontations have produced results Washington resists admitting - Iran has not weakened — it has adapted, and in many respects, hardened”. Today, March 21, 2026 Reuters ran a story with a caption “How Trump's stated reasons, goals and timeline for Iran war have shifted”.

 According to the report, President Donald Trump and his top officials have offered shifting objectives and reasons for the US-Israeli war on Iran, which critics say shows a lack of planning for the conflict and its aftermath.

Stated objectives and expected timeline have varied, including toppling Iran's government, weakening Iran's military, security and nuclear capabilities and its regional influence, as well as supporting Israeli interests.

Here is how Trump described his ​war goals and timeline:

FEBRUARY 28: CALLS FOR IRANIANS TO TOPPLE THEIR GOVERNMENT

The Iranian people should "take over" governance of their country, Trump said in a video on ‌social media as the US and Israel launched their attacks. "It will be yours to take," he added. "This will be probably your only chance for generations."

Trump described the attacks as "major combat operations."

FEBRUARY 28: WEAKEN IRAN'S MILITARY, INFLUENCE

Trump said Washington would deny Iran the ability to have a nuclear weapon, although Tehran has insisted its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while the United States does. Israel is also widely believed to ​be the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear weapons.

Trump insisted he would end what he described as Tehran's ballistic missile threat. "We're going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile ​industry to the ground," he said. "We're going to annihilate their navy."

Trump claimed Iran's long range missiles "can now threaten our very good friends and allies ⁠in Europe, our troops stationed overseas, and could soon reach the American homeland."

His remarks echoed the case of President George W. Bush for the Iraq war, which had false claims. Neither experts nor ​US intelligence support Trump's assertions and both assess that Iran's ballistic missile program was years from threatening the US homeland.

MARCH 2: SHIFTING TIMELINE

Trump said the war was projected to last four to five ​weeks but could go on longer.

"We're already substantially ahead of our time projections. But whatever the time is, it's okay. Whatever it takes," Trump said at the White House. In a social media post, Trump said there was a "virtually unlimited supply" of US munitions and that "wars can be fought 'forever,' and very successfully, using just these supplies."

In a notification to Congress, Trump provided no timeline. Trump earlier told the Daily Mail the war could take "four weeks, ​or less," then told The New York Times four to five weeks and subsequently said it could take longer.

MARCH 2: RUBIO SAYS US ATTACKED IRAN BECAUSE ISRAEL DID

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ​reporters Israel's determination to attack Iran forced Washington to strike.

"We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action, we knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if ‌we didn't preemptively ⁠go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties," Rubio said.

MARCH 3: TRUMP CONTRADICTS RUBIO

Trump said he ordered US forces to join Israel's attack on Iran because he believed Iran was about to strike first.

"I might have forced their (Israel's) hand," Trump said. "If we didn't do it, they (Iran) were going to attack first."

MARCH 04: CALL TO 'DESTROY' SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said the goal was to "destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure."

MARCH 06: 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' CALL

"There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER," Trump wrote on social ​media.

MARCH 8-11: JUST THE START BUT ALSO 'PRETTY MUCH ​COMPLETE'

Hegseth told CBS News in an interview aired ⁠March 08 strikes on Iran were "only just the beginning."

A day later, Trump told the same network "I think the war is very complete, pretty much."

"We've already won in many ways, but we haven't won enough," Trump told reporters later on the same day. When asked if the war was beginning ​or complete, he said: "Well, I think you could say both."

On March 11, Trump again said he thought the US had won but: "We've got ​to finish the job."

MARCH 13: ⁠SOFTENS CALL FOR INTERNAL UPRISING

In a March 13 interview, Trump told Fox News the war will end "when I feel it in my bones."

Trump softened his call for Iranians to topple their government. "So I really think that's a big hurdle to climb for people that don't have weapons," Trump said.

MARCH 19: HEGSETH SAYS NO TIME FRAME

Hegseth said Washington was not setting a time frame for the war and Trump would ⁠decide when to ​stop.

"We wouldn't want to set a definitive time frame," the Pentagon chief said. "It will be at the president's choosing, ​ultimately, where we say, 'Hey, we've achieved what we need to.'"

MARCH 20: TRUMP CONSIDERS WINDING DOWN BUT NO CEASEFIRE

Trump posted on Truth Social, "we are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts" in ​the Iran war. Earlier in the day, Trump told reporters "I don't want to do a ceasefire" when asked about the war.

 

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

Motives Behind Strait of Hormuz Escalation

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran is being widely blamed for the emerging shortages and surge in global oil and gas prices. However, this represents only one side of a far more complex narrative—one that is being actively shaped by the United States and amplified by sections of the Western media.

At a time when President Donald Trump is reportedly seeking an allocation of US$200 billion, the intent appears less about de-escalation and more about intensifying and prolonging the conflict. This raises a fundamental question, what is the real motive behind what is being portrayed as a response, but increasingly resembles a calculated escalation?

In my assessment, the United States has aligned itself closely with Israel, whose strategic objective remains the neutralization—if not outright elimination—of Iran as a regional rival. The broader vision often discussed in this context is the restructuring of the Middle East’s geopolitical order to suit their long-term strategic interests.

Both Washington and Tel Aviv were fully aware that any Iranian retaliation—particularly against Arab states hosting US military bases—would reinforce a long-standing narrative: portraying Iran as the principal threat to regional stability, thereby diverting scrutiny away from Israel’s own role.

There is also a significant economic dimension. A wider conflict risks damaging oil and gas infrastructure across key producing Muslim countries. Such a disruption could potentially reposition the United States and its allies to exert greater influence over global energy markets, enabling them to dictate supply dynamics and pricing.

A particularly telling signal is the reported statement attributed to Donald Trump regarding Kharg Island—not to destroy it, but to capture it. This underscores a strategic interest that extends beyond military objectives to direct control over critical energy assets.

The demand by the United States and Israel for Iran’s unconditional surrender must also be viewed through this broader lens. Both countries seek to consolidate their dominance in the Middle East. Israel benefits from geographical proximity, while leveraging the United States as a force multiplier in advancing shared strategic goals.

At the same time, influence over key global sectors—including defense industries, energy corporations, financial markets, and media platforms—plays a crucial role in shaping both policy and perception. The ongoing deliberations in Washington over massive military funding further reinforce the scale and seriousness of these ambitions.

It is also important to note how the justification for targeting Iran has evolved over time. What began as concerns over its nuclear program gradually expanded to include its missile capabilities, and eventually shifted toward calls for regime change under the banner of restoring democracy. Yet, beneath these shifting narratives, a more enduring objective appears to persist: gaining control over Iran’s vast oil and gas reserves.

PSX benchmark index down 0.70%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile throughout the week, amid persistent Middle East military conflict driving volatility in international oil prices. The benchmark index lost 1,126 points or 0.7% during the week to close at 152,740 on Thursday, March 19, 2026, the last trading day before Eid Holidays.

Market participation remained lackluster during the week, with average daily traded volume declining to 418 million shares, from 548 million shares in the prior week. Developments on the economic front remained encouraging, as the country posted Current Account surplus of US$427 million in February 2026, against a deficit of US$85 million during the same period last year, primarily driven by higher workers’ remittances.

Industrial activity (LSMI) expanded by 10.5%YoY in January 2026, led by growth in the automobile and textile sectors.

Power generation increased by 11%YoY in February 2026, supported by lower tariffs and a shift of industrial consumers towards national grid.

Urea offtakes declined by 28%YoY during February 2026 due to elevated channel inventory following advance procurement in December 2025. offtakes rose 2.5x YoY over the same period.

T-Bill yields rose by 51 to 100bps in the first auction following SBP decision to leave policy rate unchanged.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan secures alternative fuel supply from Gulf amid regional tensions, 2) ADB unveils US$10 billion financing strategy for Pakistan, 3) IT exports rise 20%YoY to US$365 million, 4) REER drops to 102.5 in February 2026, and 5) GoP considering to hold fuel price till 31st March, 2026.

Woollen, Synthetic & Rayon and Close-End Mutual Fund were amongst the top performing sectors, while Leather & Tanneries, Commercial Banks and Miscellaneous were amongst the laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Foreigners and Mutual Funds with a net sell of US$9.3 million and US$4.5 million, respectively.

Banks and Individuals absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$10.3million and US$7.4 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: PKGP, ABOT, IBFL, BNWM, and KOHC, while laggards included: NBP, AICL, PABC, UNITY, and SRVI.

Going forward, AKD Believes market sentiment will hinge on the developments in the Middle East conflict. At the same time, investor focus will remain on the government’s energy conservation measures, diversification of fuel imports, and progress on the IMF review.

Over the medium term, any de -escalation in the conflict could spark a strong market rebound, as recent corrections have made valuations attractive.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.